JUDGMENT : 1. Certain property, to wife one anna 8 pies 10 karants seven jau out of a 3 annas share in Mouza Pauran, Mahal Talab Ali, was sold in execution of a decree. The notification of sale is to be found on the record as paper 11 C. The language used is very specific. The Court gave notice to would be purchasers that it was selling not the interest in certain lands, but was selling a well defined and specific part of immovable property. There is no allusion to any charges or encumbrances on the property and the ordinary meaning of the notification of the sale, which any purchaser would have a right to put upon it, was that this clearly defined and specific property was being sold by the Court. 2. After the sale and within the period allowed by law Hatini Ali came forward and in an application, which is to be found as 18. A on the record, applied to have the sale set aside on depositing in Court the 5 per cent, of the purchase-money for payment to the purchaser and the amount specified in the proclamation of sale for payment to the decree-holder. In his application Hatim Ali does state incidentally that he was a murtahin mukuddam or prior mortgagee of the property sold. 3. The Munsif of Allahabad in whose Court this application was filed allowed it and set aside the auction sale. The learned Judge of Allahabad to whom an appeal from this order was presented by Musammat Kashmiro Bibi agreed with the view taken by the Court of first instance and dismissed the appeal. Musammat Kashmiro Bibi was the auction-purchaser and she applied to this Court in revision, on grounds that the Courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of Hatim Ali, that Hatim Ali Khan was a prior mortgagee of this property and this being the case, he was not a person who held an interest in the property sold by virtue of a title acquired before the sale and he had no locus standi and the Courts acted without jurisdiction in accepting and coming to a decision upon his application. There was a further plea that the Courts below acted with material irregularity in setting aside the sale of the property at the instance of such a person as Hatim Ali. 4. There was a further plea that the Courts below acted with material irregularity in setting aside the sale of the property at the instance of such a person as Hatim Ali. 4. The line which the learned Vakil for the applicant took in argument before me was that the property sold in this case was the equity of redemption over the one anna, etc., share and this being the case, he was not a person who had acquired an interest in the property by virtue of a title acquired before such sale. 5. In support of his contention reference was made to several rulings passed before the present Code of Civil Procedure came into force. I do not mention those rulings because the language used in S. 310-A was very different from the language dow used in O. XXI, R. 89, which has taken the place of S. 310-A. But special stress was laid amongst those rulings on the Full Bench ruling of this Court in Ram Shankar Lal v. Ganesh Prasad, (1907) 29 All. 385 : 4 A.L.J. 273 : (1907) A.W.N. 97 (F.B.)., in which it was held that the words “property comprised in the mortgage” as used in S. 85 were probably intended to denote no more than the estate or interest which is the subject of any particular mortgage, that is, if the mortgage be a mortgage of the absolute estate in the land, then the land itself, if it be a puisne mortgage, then the interest in the land of the mortgagor, that is, the equity of redemption. 6. The principle laid down in that ruling would strongly favour the contention of the learned Vakil. He continued to draw attention to a ruling of this Court in Muhammad Ahmadullah Khan v. Ahmad Said Khan, (1911) 10 I.C. 863 : 33 All. 481. That case, however, was a very peculiar case and cannot be safely relied upon as having universal application. The decree-holder in that case held two decrees against the same judgment-debtor, the one being a decree for sale on two mortgages and the other a simple money decree, and caused part of the mortgaged property to be sold by auction. After it was sold and purchased by a stranger the same decree-holder applied to get the sale set aside. The decree-holder in that case held two decrees against the same judgment-debtor, the one being a decree for sale on two mortgages and the other a simple money decree, and caused part of the mortgaged property to be sold by auction. After it was sold and purchased by a stranger the same decree-holder applied to get the sale set aside. The learned Judges refused to consider the decree-holder as a person entitled to apply under O. XXI, R. 89. The line which was adopted is not without interest so far as the present case is concerned. It was held that “ordinarily a mortgagee of the property sold is a person who has an interest in it, and in view of the provisions of R. 89, he would be competent to make an application, but we have to consider the facts of this particular case. Here the holder of the decree for-money was also the holder of two mortgages in respect of the property of which he sought to have a sale. He caused the property to be sold either free from the mortgages or subject to the mortgages. If it was sold free from the mortgages, he must be deemed to have abandoned his mortgages and in that case he has no interest, in the property sold. If he caused the property to be sold subject to the mortgages, the sale only related to the interest of the mortgagor, that is, his right of redemption. In this right of redemption the mortgagee has no interest.” 7. In the present case the property which the Court has professed to sell and which was sold was the property i.e., the one anna odd share in Mouza Pauran, Mahal Talab Ali, and in that property Hatim Ali Khan had undoubtedly an interest by a title acquired before the sale. The Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application. Under the special circumstances of the case when the Court entertained his application, all that it knew was that certain immovable property had been sold in execution of the decree and that the person applying had a right by virtue of a title acquired before the sale to have the sale set aside. The plea then that the Court had no jurisdiction does not prevail with me. 8. The plea then that the Court had no jurisdiction does not prevail with me. 8. There remains the question, whether the Court, when it was in possession of the facts of the case, acted with material irregularity in setting aside the sale of the property at the instance of a person who had under O. XXI, R. 89, acquired a title before the sale, still to be answered. 9. Looking to the very wide language used in O. XXI, R. 89, I am not prepared to hold that Hatim Ali Khan did not hold an interest in the property. The language of Section 85 of the Transfer of Property Act differs considerably from the language used in O. XXI, R. 89. Ordinarily I should have followed the ruling of this Court in Muhammad Ahamadullah Khan v. Ahmad Said Khan, but that case, as I have already said, is a very peculiar case and the Judges had before them the peculiar circumstances of the applicant. 10. Srinvasa Ayyangar v. Ayyathorai Pillai, (1898) 21 Mad. 416 : 8 M.L.J. 54, which was a case decided before the present Code came into force, was a very similar case to the one before me and it was held that a mortgagee came within the words “owner of immovable property” of S. 310-A of the former Code. Hatim Ali Khan did in my opinion hold an interest in the property sold by virtue of a title acquired before the sale and he could apply to have it set aside. 11. The pleas taken fail and the application is dismissed. As regards costs, there is this important fact that Hatim Ali was called upon by the Court which was selling the property to produce his mortgage-deed at the time. It was making an inquiry into the property sold, but he did not produce the mortgage-deed. Under such circumstances I make the order that each party bear its own costs.