Judgement Appeal from a judgment of the High Court (April 3, 1907) reversing a judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Mozufferpore. The appellants instituted two suits for declarations that each of two conveyances of land made by one Kishun Benode on September 2, 1901, was voidable under s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as being made with intent to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors. One of the conveyances was in favour of one Kamta Prashad, the other in favour of the respondents. The latter conveyance stated that the consideration for its being made was the sum of Rs. 42,656, of which Rs. 30,309 were set off against a debt due to the transferees, and that the balance was left on deposit with them on account of debts due to certain other creditors. The circumstances under which the conveyances were made appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The two suits were tried together, and the Subordinate Judge set aside both conveyances. As to that in favour of Kamta Prashad he found that there was no consideration and that it was made in fraud of 50 Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 104 ( 1915- 1916) Musahar Sahu V. Hakim Lal 151 the creditors. In the case of the conveyance to the respondents he found that there was consideration, but that it was not made bona fide and was within s. 53. Upon appeal to the High Court in both suits, that Court (Mookerjee and Holmwood JJ.) affirmed the decision as to the conveyance to Kamta Prashad, as to which there was no further appeal. With regard to the conveyance to the respondents they agreed with the finding that there was good consideration, and held that the intention to prefer the transferees to other creditors did not bring it within the section. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 34 Calc. 999. Dube, for the appellants. The appellants accept the concurrent findings that there was consideration for the conveyance to the respondents. Having regard, however, to the circumstances in which the conveyance was made, and the relationship between the respondents and Kamta Prashad, it was, like the conveyance to the latter, fraudulent and made to defeat or delay creditors. The respondents did not appear at the hearing. 1915. Nov. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD WRENBURY. Having regard, however, to the circumstances in which the conveyance was made, and the relationship between the respondents and Kamta Prashad, it was, like the conveyance to the latter, fraudulent and made to defeat or delay creditors. The respondents did not appear at the hearing. 1915. Nov. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD WRENBURY. On September 2, 1901, Kishun Benode executed two kobalas or conveyances, the one to Kamta Prashad and the other to the respondents, Hakim Lal and another. They were conveyances of certain lands, the parcels in the second deed being much more numerous than those in the first deed. Kamta Prashad was the nephew of Ram Aotar Lal, a brother of Hakim Lal. He was a minor and Ram Aotar Lal was his guardian. The plaintiff, Musahar Sahu, was at this date a creditor of Kishun Benode. He had on December 14, 1900, sued for the debt, and on January 5, 1901, had presented a petition for security by way of attachment before judgment. On February 11, 1901, Kishun Benode had made an affidavit that he did not intend to transfer any of his properties, and accordingly on February 11, 1901, the petition was dismissed. In this state of facts the two kobalas were executed by the debtor on September 2, 1901. On December 5, 1901, the plaintiff obtained judgment in his action for Rs. 12,695.10 and costs. The defendant did not appear at the trial. On December 21, 1901, Kishun Benode applied for a rehearing, but on August 2, 1902, that application was dismissed by default. In the interval, namely, on June 11, 1902, the transferees had obtained an order for registration of their names in respect of the properties transferred. Under these circumstances two suits were brought to set aside the kobalas on the ground that, within s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act IV. of 1882, the transfers were made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of Kishun Benode. The Subordinate Judge set aside the first kobala on the ground that no consideration was paid, that a debt of Rs. 6335 therein alleged to be due to Kamta Prashad was fictitious, that the transfer was made gratuitously, and that the transfer was made with intent to defraud. The Subordinate Judge set aside the first kobala on the ground that no consideration was paid, that a debt of Rs. 6335 therein alleged to be due to Kamta Prashad was fictitious, that the transfer was made gratuitously, and that the transfer was made with intent to defraud. An appeal was dismissed with costs, and this decision is not questioned before this Board As regards the second kobala, there are concurrent findings that the consideration for this deed was real and not fictitious. The Subordinate Judge nevertheless decided in favour of the plaintiff. Upon 50 Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 104 ( 1915- 1916) Musahar Sahu V. Hakim Lal 152 appeal this decision was reversed and the second kobala upheld. From that decision the plaintiff has brought this appeal. The appellant has not argued that the law is wrongly laid down in the judgment of the High Court. His contention is that the two deeds of September 2, 1901, form really one transaction, and that the second kobala must fall with the first. As matter of law their Lordships take it to be clear that in a case in which no consideration of the law of bankruptcy or insolvency applies there is nothing to prevent a debtor paying one creditor in full and leaving others unpaid although the result may be that the rest of his assets will be insufficient to provide for the payment of the rest of his debts. The law is, in their Lordships opinion, rightly stated by Palles C.B. in In re Moroney (( 1888) L. R. 21 Ir. 27, 62.), where he says " The right of the creditors, taken as a whole, is that all the property of the debtor should be applied in payment of demands of them or some of them, without any portion of it being parted with without consideration or reserved or retained by the debtor to their prejudice. 27, 62.), where he says " The right of the creditors, taken as a whole, is that all the property of the debtor should be applied in payment of demands of them or some of them, without any portion of it being parted with without consideration or reserved or retained by the debtor to their prejudice. Now it follows from this, that security given by a debtor to one creditor upon a portion of or upon all his property (although the effect of it, or even the interest of the debtor in making it, may be to defeat an expected execution of another creditor) is not a fraud within the statute; because notwith-standing such an act, the entire property remains available for the creditors or some or one of them, and as the statute gives no right to rateable distribution, the right of the creditors by such act is not invaded or affected." The transfer which defeats or delays creditors is not an instrument which prefers one creditor to another, but an instrument which removes property from the creditors to the benefit of the debtor. The debtor must not retain a benefit for himself. He may pay one creditor and leave another unpaid Middleton v. Pollock. (( 1876) 2 Ch. D. 104, 108.) So soon as it is found that the transfer here impeached was made for adequate consideration in satisfaction of genuine debts, and without reservation of any benefit to the debtor, it follows that no ground for impeaching it lies in the fact that the plaintiff who also was a creditor was a loser by payment being made to this preferred creditor—there being in the case no question of bankruptcy. The argument presented to their Lordships has in substance been that the transaction of September 2, 1901, was one transaction ; that (1.) Kamta Prashad, the nephew, the minor and ward, and (2.) Hakim Lal, the uncle of Kamta and brother of Ram Aotar Lal, the minors guardian, are for this purpose not distinguishable as independent transferees ; that from February 11, 1901, until after June 11, 1902, Kishun Benode was playing for time, and that this fact and the fact that the former kobala was fictitious and fraudulent show that the latter kobala was fraudulent also. Their Lordships do not accept this contention. Their Lordships do not accept this contention. The kobala in favour of the respondents must stand or fall on its own merits. The concurrent finding that the consideration for the deed was real reduces the case to one in which the debtor has preferred one creditor to the detriment of another, but this in itself is no ground for impeaching it under the section even if the debtor was intending to defeat an anticipated execution by the plaintiff. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should stand dismissed with costs.