JUDGMENT Ayling, J. 1. Appellant, a European British subject, has been convicted by the District Magistrate of Bangalore, who is a Justice of the Peace, of an offence under Section 8 of the Municipal by-law after a summary trial under Section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Mr. Govindaraghava Ayyar argues in his behalf that the Magistrates proceedings are void under Section 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as the District Magistrate is not empowered to try a European British subject summarily. This appears to be so. 3. The Criminal Procedure Code does not apply primarily to Bangalore, which is no part of British India, and is only in force there by virtue of declarations of the Governor-General in Council in the exercise of powers conferred by the Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council, 1902. The latest declaration is No. 732-D, dated 19th March 1913, but this provides with reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure. " Nothing in the Code as applied shall be deemed to apply to proceedings against European British subjects or persons charged jointly with European British subjects." 4. The effect of this is to refer us back to an earlier declaration under the same authority, No. 680 I.B., dated 19th March 1912, which is still in force, and which regulates the powers of Justice of the Peace beyond the limits of British India in regard to European British subjects. This notification [issued subsequent to the decision of this Court in The Public Prosecutor, Bangalore v. Merchant (1911) I.L.R. 34 Mad. 346], confers on such officers certain specified powers among which the power of trying offenders summarily under Section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not included and we must take it that the powers of the District Magistrate as Justice of the Peace as regards European British subjects are confined to those conferred on him there under. 5. It follows that the trial of the appellant was void. 6. We set aside the conviction and direct the refund of the fine if paid, In view of the pettiness of the case, we do not order a retrial under the ordinary procedure.