Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (February 2, 1914) varying a decree of Macleod J. (November 13, 1913). The suit was instituted in the High Court by the appellant praying for partition between himself and the respondent of the joint family ancestral estate. The only question for decision in the appeal was as to the shares to which the appellant and respondent respectively were entitled. The parties were Gujerathi Hindus, governed by the Mitakshara and the Mayukha. Their grandfather had been in possession of the property. He died in 1893 leaving two sons, Bhugwandas Nagardas and Hurkissondas Nagardas. Hurkissondas died on September 14, 1900, and Bhugwandas on December 17, 1900. The respondent was the posthumous son of Hurkissondas, born on December 18, 1900, and the appellant on February 1, 1901, was adopted as the son of Bhugwandas by the latters widow under the express authority of her deceased husband. The validity of the adoption and the appellants right as a coparcener had been contested, but were finally established upon appeal to the Privy Council (see L. R. 34 Ind. Ap. 107). In the present suit the respondent contended that the appellant being the adopted and not the natural son of Bhugwandas was only entitled upon partition to a reduced share, which, according to the Bombay authorities, would be one-fourth of the share of the respondent. The suit was tried by Macleod J. He was of opinion that the Dattaka Chandrika, s. 5, pars. 24 and 25, upon which the respondent relied, did not apply to a case of partition of joint family property under the Mitakshara law, but only to cases of succession by inheritance to the estate of a deceased person. In the view of the learned judge there was on a partition a primary division per stirpes irrespective of the quality or number of the members of each stirps, and it was only when a secondary division per capita took place that an adopted son took a reduced share. A partition was accordingly decreed on the footing that the appellant and respondent took equal shares. The respondent appealed, the appeal being heard by Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Batchelor J. The learned judges said that the question at issue had been decided upon similar facts by the Calcutta High Court in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L. R. 4 Calc. The respondent appealed, the appeal being heard by Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Batchelor J. The learned judges said that the question at issue had been decided upon similar facts by the Calcutta High Court in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.), that decision being based upon s. 5, pars. 24 and 25, of the Dattaka Chandrika, and that according to the translation adopted in that case and to a translation by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar (Both translations are set out in the judgment of their Lordships.) agreed by the parties in the present case there was no doubt that the above passage in the Dattaka Chandrika assigned to an adopted grandson an inferior share. The view of Macleod J. that the rule as laid down in the Dattaka Chandrika was inconsistent with the Mitakshara had been rejected in the Calcutta case, and they considered was in conflict with the decision in Debi Parshad v. Thakur Dial. (( 1875) I. L. R. 1 Allah. 105.) The learned judges then considered the effect of the Mitakshara, referring to ch. I., ss. 1, 5, 6, 8,10, and more especially s. 11, vv. 1, 22, 23, 24, and 25, and concluded as follows "It appears to us that there is nothing in the chapter of the Mitakshara relating to inheritance not liable to obstruction which is in conflict with the rule evolved by the author of the Dattaka Chandrika, for, as we have pointed out, s. 5 of the Mitakshara in dealing with the allotment of shares among grandsons is in no way concerned with the quality of the individual sharer, while s. 11 affirms most distinctly the inferiority as a sharer of the adopted to the natural-born legitimate son of the owner of the inheritance. But it is argued that the owner of the inheritance in this case is Nagardas and that the discussion of sons in s. 11 does not warrant the application to grandsons of the disabilities of sons. It is, however, to be observed that verse 22 declares that the right to share and the right to give the funeral oblation go together. It cannot be and is not disputed that of the two competitors in the present case Bachoo is the proper descendant to offer the funeral cake to his grandfather Nagardas. It is, however, to be observed that verse 22 declares that the right to share and the right to give the funeral oblation go together. It cannot be and is not disputed that of the two competitors in the present case Bachoo is the proper descendant to offer the funeral cake to his grandfather Nagardas. Nor can it be disputed that the word son (putra) in various passages in Yajnavalkya and the Mitakshara includes grandson. We are of opinion that the discussion relating to sons in s. 11 should be taken to relate to grandsons also. The offering of the funeral cake can be made by sons, grandsons, and great-grandsons. There is therefore nothing illogical in the conclusion arrived at by the author of the Dattaka Chandrika." A decree was accordingly made varying the decree of Macleod J. and directing a partition by allotting one share to the present appellant and four shares to the present respondent. The appeal in the High Court is reported at 16 Bomb. L. R. 263. 1915. Oct. 27, 28, 29; Nov. 1. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellant. The appellant is entitled upon partition to an equal share with the respondent. The inferiority of an adopted son in matters of inheritance is confined to the case where the adoptive father has a natural son born to him after the adoption. An adopted son receives a reduced share under these circumstances, because he would have taken the whole but for the subsequent event which alters his status. That reasoning has no application except where the natural sons father is the adoptive father. The extension of the rule to cases of collateral succession is not warranted by the text of Vasishtha XV., 9, upon which the rule primarily rests, and is inconsistent with the Mitakshara. Chapter I., s. 5, of the Mitakshara, in dealing with the shares of grandsons, makes the primary division per stirpes, irrespective of the number or quality of the members of each stirps. In s. 11, v. 24, the rule of Vasishtha is cited, but "son " cannot there be read as including grandson consistently with the context of the Mitakshara. [The Dayabhaga, ch. X., s. 13, was also referred to.] The Mayukha, which is of particular authority among Gujerathis, contains nothing in support of the respondents contention Mayukha, ch. IV., s. 5, vv. [The Dayabhaga, ch. X., s. 13, was also referred to.] The Mayukha, which is of particular authority among Gujerathis, contains nothing in support of the respondents contention Mayukha, ch. IV., s. 5, vv. 21 and 24. The Dattaka Mimansa merely cites the rule as laid down by Vasishtha. The respondents contention rests entirely upon the Dattaka Chandrika, s. 5, pars. 24 and 25, and the construction put upon those paragraphs by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss. (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.) Paragraph 24, even with the addition of the words which Markby and Prinsep JJ. point out are omitted in Sutherlands translation, and the first part of par. 25 can only be read as supporting the view now put forward. The latter part of par. 55 though obscure, is consistent with that view. It means that if an adopted son himself adopts a son, then the latter could take no more than his adoptive father would have been entitled to, which might be (if Vasishthas rule applied to the circumstances) a reduced share. The words " of the same description as himself " do not refer to the son, but mean of that description which the father has. [Maynes Hindu Law. 8th ed., pars. 169 and 170, were referred to and adopted.] The translation of the paragraphs used in the High Court is also obscure, but is consistent with this view. The decision of Markby J. was doubted or commented on in Raja v. Subbaraya (( 1883) I. L. R. 7 Madr. 253.), Baramanund Mahanti v. Chowdhry Krishna (( 1884) 14 Calc. L. J. 183.), and Birbhadra Rath v. Kalpataru Pandu. (( 1905) 1 Calc. L. J. 388.) The decision in Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moijee Debia (( 1868) 9 Suth. W. R. 42.) is directly in the appellants favour and \vas followed in Dinonath Mukerjee v. Gopal Churn Mukerjee. (( 1881) 8 Calc. L. R. 57.) If the passage in the Dattaka Chandrika can be interpreted as the respondent contends, it must not be taken as overriding the Mitakshara Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (( 1915) L. R. 42 Ind. Ap. 155, at p. 160.) and cases there cited. (( 1881) 8 Calc. L. R. 57.) If the passage in the Dattaka Chandrika can be interpreted as the respondent contends, it must not be taken as overriding the Mitakshara Puttu Lal v. Parbati Kunwar (( 1915) L. R. 42 Ind. Ap. 155, at p. 160.) and cases there cited. Further, it is a general principle, established by decisions o the Board, that an adopted son has the same rights in the adoptive family as a natural son, save where those rights are curtailed by clear and express texts Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra. ((( 1883) L. R. 10 Ind. Ap. 138.) Clyde, K.C., and E. B. Raikes, for the respondent. An adopted member of a joint family always takes upon partition only a fourth share. This is the meaning of the passage in the Dattaka Chandrika according to the translation adopted by the parties, the translation in Sarkars Law of Adoption (p. 399), and Sutherlands translation, when the omission is supplied and the glosses omitted. This proposition is not only consistent with but follows from the Mitakshara. The first seven sections of ch. I. are confined to the rights of natural-born (aurasa) sons of the same caste (savarna); the rule in ch. I., s. 5, vv. 1 and 2, is a restrictive rule, and further is confined to natural-born sons, the word " atpadana," signifying procreation, being used. In s. 7 the aurasa sons who are not savarna are dealt with and assigned a reduced share; this reduction must apply whether they come in as sons, grandsons, or great-grandsons. In s. 11 the secondary sons are enumerated according to Yajnavalkya, each class coming in only if all higher classes are absent. An adopted son is the seventh named. In s. 11, vv. 24 and 25, the texts of Vasishtha and Katyayana are introduced in mitigation of this rule, and are interpreted. It is not the texts but Vijnaneswaras interpretation which is the Mitakshara law Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy. (( 1868)) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 397, at p. 160. at p. 436.) He says in v. 26 that all the secondary sons who are of the same caste, and particularly the " son of the wife/ take a fourth part; but the " son of the wife " can only share with his uncles and cousins, for he cannot have a brother. Ind. Ap. 397, at p. 160. at p. 436.) He says in v. 26 that all the secondary sons who are of the same caste, and particularly the " son of the wife/ take a fourth part; but the " son of the wife " can only share with his uncles and cousins, for he cannot have a brother. The rule of Vasishtha is therefore an enabling rule, and was interpreted by Vijnaneswara as applying to every partition in a joint family. The adopted member is not only inferior as to consanguinity but also as regards sacrificial efficacy Mitakshara, ch. I., s. 11, v. 21 ; Sarvadhikaris Hindu Law, p. 123 (citing Nirnaya Sindhu) and p. 106 (citing Dharma Sindhu); West and Buhler, 3rd ed., p. 23 (as to Nirnaya Sindhu); Maynes Hindu Law, par...271, 8th ed., p. 342. The appellants construction of the Dattaka Chandrika, s. 5, par. 25, makes the author refute a self-evident proposition. Our interpretation makes him refute the following plausible but fallacious argument " as the grandson succeeds to the share appropriate to his father, and as the share appropriate to the father of an adopted grandson (if natural-born) is a full share, therefore the adopted son of a natural son takes a full share." The fallacy is that the first proposition of the suggested argument is, as the Dattaka Chandrika says, a restrictive rule. The author points out that the argument would lead to impropriety, and is only true if the words " the share appropriate to his father " are qualified by adding " if he had been of the same description (i.e., adopted or natural,-as himself). Tar a Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyee Debia (9 Suth. W. R. 423.) was decided upon the translation by Sutherland, which omits a material passage, and although Dinonath Mukerjee v. Gopal Churn Mukerjee (8 Calc L. R. 57.) follows that case, it contains a dictum (at p. 62) directly in the respondents favour. The decisions of the Board in Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 229.) and Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra (L. R. 10 Ind. Ap. 138.)adopt the reasoning of Mitter J. in the former case in the Calcutta High Court (( 1879) I. L. R. 5 Calc. The decisions of the Board in Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards (( 1881) L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 229.) and Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra (L. R. 10 Ind. Ap. 138.)adopt the reasoning of Mitter J. in the former case in the Calcutta High Court (( 1879) I. L. R. 5 Calc. 615, at p. 623.), but the learned judge expressly mentions, as one of the exceptions to the general rule of the equality between an adopted and a natural son, the text of the Mitakshara (ch. I., s. 11, v. 21) upon which the respondent relies. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., in reply. Save for clearly expressed exceptions, the adopted son becomes for all purposes the son of his adoptive father Sumboochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Dibeh ((1835) 3 Knapp, 55, at p. 60.) and cases already cited. The rule contended for by the respondent would have the anomalous result that an adoption of a brothers son would necessarily place him in an inferior position upon a subsequent partition. [Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 88, at p. 99.) was also referred to.] Nov. 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. The suit in which this appeal has arisen is one for the partition of the joint family property of a family of Gujerathi Hindus, of which the plaintiff by adoption and the defendant by birth are male members. The question in this appeal is one as to the share in the joint family property to which the plaintiff is on partition entitled. The property in question belonged to a joint family, the male members of which were in 1900 Bhugwandas Nagardas and Hurkissondas Nagardas, the two surviving sons of Nagardas Shobhagdas, who had died in 1893. Hurkissondas Nagardas died on September 14, 1900, leaving his wife surviving; she was then pregnant, and the defendant, who was the posthumous child, was born on December 18, 1900. Bhugwandas Nagardas died childless on December 17, 1900, leaving his widow surviving him ; he had given to her an authority to adopt a son to him, and in pursuance of that authority she, on February 17, 1901, adopted the plaintiff as a son to her deceased husband. The parties are governed by the Mitakshara, as altered or interpreted by the Vyavahara Mayukha. The parties are governed by the Mitakshara, as altered or interpreted by the Vyavahara Mayukha. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled on partition to a moiety of the family property. On the other hand the defendant contended that the plaintiff, as an adopted son, was entitled to a reduced share only of the family property ; in support of that contention the defendant relied upon pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika as those paragraphs were construed and applied in the High Court at Calcutta by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss. (I. L .R. 4 Calc. 425.) The present suit was tried in the High Court at Bombay by Macleod J., who held that the doctrine according to which an adopted son on partition takes only a reduced share in the family property applies only in cases in which the competition is between an adopted son and a natural-born son of the same father (which is not the case here), and he gave the plaintiff a decree for an equal share. From that decree the defendant appealed. On appeal Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Batchelor J., holding, as their Lordships understand their judgment, that there is nothing in the Mitakshara which is inconsistent with pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika as these paragraphs were construed by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L .R. 4 Calc. 425.), adopted the construction of Markby and Prinsep JJ. of those paragraphs, and decided that the plaintiff as an adopted son was on partition entitled only to a reduced share in the family property. From their decree this appeal has been brought. The learned judges of the High Court on the appeal from Macleod J. in this suit had before them Sutherlands translation of pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika, the translation of those paragraphs which was relied upon by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L .R. 4 Calc. 425.), and a translation made by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, which appears to have been accepted as correct by the parties to this suit. Sutherlands translation was not a complete translation of the Sanskrit text. The translation which was relied upon by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L .R. 4 Calc. 425.), and a translation made by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar, which appears to have been accepted as correct by the parties to this suit. Sutherlands translation was not a complete translation of the Sanskrit text. The translation which was relied upon by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L .R. 4 Calc. 425.), and is apparently accepted as a correct translation by Mr. Mayne in par. 169 of his Hindu Law and Usage, is as follows — Paragraph 24 " Therefore by the same relationship of brother and so forth, in virtue of which the real legitimate son would succeed to the estate of a brother or other kinsman, the adopted son of the same description obtains his due share. And in the event of the ancestor having other sons, a grandson by adoption, whose father is dead, obtains the share of an adopted son. Where such son may not exist, the adopted son takes the whole estate even." Paragraph 25 " Since it is a restrictive rule that a grandson succeeds to the appropriate share of his own father, the son given, where his adopter is the real legitimate son of the paternal grandfather, is entitled to an equal share even with a paternal uncle, who is also such description of son ; therefore a grandson who is an adopted son may (in all cases) inherit an equal share even with an uncle. This must not be alleged (as a general rule). For there would be this discrepancy where the father of the grandson were an adopted son, he would receive a fourth share ; but the grandson if he were such son (of him) would receive an equal share (with an uncle in the heritage of the grandfather) and accordingly, whatever share may be established by law for a father of the same description as himself, to such appropriate share of his father does the individual in question (viz., the adopted son of one adopted) succeed. Thus, what had been advanced only is correct. Thus, what had been advanced only is correct. The same rule is to be applied by inference to the great-grandson also." The translation which was made by Sir Ramkrishna Bhandarkar is as follows — "It should be understood by this that an adopted son acquires the ownership wherever possible of his proper share by a relation similar to the relation, brotherhood, &c, by which a natural-born son acquires a right to the property of his brothers, &c. Similarly, an adoptive grandson whose adopting father is dead acquires the ownership of the share proper for an adopted (son) when the owner of the property has got another son or other sons and of the whole when he has got no son r sons. It should not be argued that because a grandson is necessarily the owner of the share proper for his father, the taker (in adoption) of the adoptive son being a natural-born son of the grandfather and entitled to a share equal to that of the uncle similarly born, the adoptive grandson should take a share equal to that of the uncle; for it involves impropriety, inasmuch as the adopted son gets one-fourth and the adoptive grandson an equal share. Therefore that share is proper for a sons father which he would get by law if he were of the same description (adopted or natural born) as the son. This way should be followed in the case of great-grandsons also." Their Lordships are not in a position to say which of those translations is the more literal translation; each is obscure, but in the opinion of their Lordships neither translation warrants any conclusion as to the meaning of the author of the Dattaka Chandrika other than that at which their Lordships have arrived. The author of the Dattaka Chandrika was in pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of his commentary relying upon the text of Vasishtha, according to which " when a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part." That text of Vasishtha is quoted by Nanda Pandita in par. The author of the Dattaka Chandrika was in pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of his commentary relying upon the text of Vasishtha, according to which " when a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part." That text of Vasishtha is quoted by Nanda Pandita in par. 1 of s. 10 of the Dattaka Mimansa, who added, " on the death of him (the naturally-born son) he (the adopted son) is entitled to the whole." It is obvious that Vasishtha and Nanda Pandita were referring to cases in which the competition would be between an adopted sob and a naturally-born subsequent son of the same father, and were not referring to cases in which on partition the competition would be between an adopted son of one member of a joint Hindu family and a naturally-born son of another member of the family, as for instance a naturally-born son of a brother or a nephew of the adoptive father. The author of the Dattaka Chandrika expressed his views somewhat obscurely and confusedly in pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of his commentary, but their Lordships consider that it is not difficult to ascertain what his meaning was. For the purposes of his commentary he paraphrased the text of Vasishtha that " when a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards born, the given son shares a fourth part," and in pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 he illustrated the text of Vasishtha, as he understood that text, by examples of its application. His meaning is that in cases of the distribution of family property by partition an adopted son stands exactly in the same position as he would stand if he were a naturally-born son of his adoptive father, subject to the qualification that if there be a competition between an adopted son and a subsequently born legitimate natural son of the same father the adopted son takes a less share than he would take if he had been a naturally-born legitimate son. The author of the Dattaka Chandrika, applying the well-established rule of Hindu law that a son takes no greater share than his father if a qualified person would have been entitled to, illustrated the application of the principle of the text of Vasishtha by contrasting the case of a competition between an adopted son of a naturally-born son and that naturally-born sons naturally-born brother with the case of an adopted son of an adopted son competing with a naturally-born son of his adoptive fathers adoptive father, in other words his uncle, through the adoption of his adoptive father. In the first case, as the author of the Dattaka Chandrika pointed out, the adopted son would take a share equal to that of his uncle by adoption; in the latter case, as a son cannot take a greater share than his father would have been entitled to, the adopted son of an adopted son would take a less share than his uncle by adoption who was a naturally-born member of the family, and who would have taken a greater share than his brother by adoption. As their Lordships construe pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika, those paragraphs are not in conflict with any principle of the Mitakshara or of the Vyavahara Mayukha, and they are consistent with the reference to the text of Vasishtha in par. 1 of s. 10 of the Dattaka Mimansa. To construe and apply those paragraphs as they were construed and applied by Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.) would bring them into conflict with what are now well-established principles of Hindu law. The attention of -Markby and Prinsep JJ. in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.), which was decided by them in 1878, does not appear to have been drawn to the case of Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyer Debia (9 Suth. W. R. 423.), which came on appeal before the High Court at Calcutta in 1868. In that case Loch and Hobhouse JJ. held that an adopted son took the full share which his adoptive father would have taken in the property of a deceased collateral relative of his adoptive father. In Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyer Debia (9 Suth. W. R. 423.), which came on appeal before the High Court at Calcutta in 1868. In that case Loch and Hobhouse JJ. held that an adopted son took the full share which his adoptive father would have taken in the property of a deceased collateral relative of his adoptive father. In Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyer Debia (9 Suth. W. R. 423.) the plaintiff by birth and the defendant by adoption were in equal relationship to the deceased collateral; their respective grandfathers were the first cousins of the collateral and their respective fathers were his first cousins once removed. Loch and Hobhouse JJ. were pressed in argument to put a construction upon par. 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika adverse to the claim of the adopted son, but they held that an adopted son is entitled to all the rights and privileges of a son of the body legitimately begotten, where there is no such son subsequently born ; and that there was no reason why the plaintiff and the defendant in the suit before them should not each take the share to which their respective fathers were entitled. The parties to the suit which was in appeal before Loch and Hobhouse JJ. were governed by the law of the Dayabhaga, but that fact does not distinguish that case in principle from the case which is now before this Board. The decision in Tara Mohun Bhuttacharjee v. Kripa Moyer Debia (9 Suth. W. R. 423.) was followed in 1881 by McDonell and Field JJ. in Dinonath Mukerjee v. Gopal Churn Mukerjee. (8 Calc. L. R. 57.) In Raja v. Subbaraya (I. L. R. 7 Madr. 253.), which was, however, a case relating to Sudras, Sir Charles Turner C.J. and Muttusami Ayyar J. in 1883 doubted that par. 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika had been correctly construed in Raghubanund Doss v. Sadhu Churn Doss. (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.) Their Lordships are not aware of any case in the High Court at Bombay before the present suit came on appeal before that Court in which the construction of Markby and Prinsep JJ. of pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika has been adopted. (I. L. R. 4 Calc. 425.) Their Lordships are not aware of any case in the High Court at Bombay before the present suit came on appeal before that Court in which the construction of Markby and Prinsep JJ. of pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika has been adopted. In support of the judgment in the suit of the High Court at Bombay in appeal it was further contended before this Board on behalf of the defendant that the position of a member by adoption in a joint Hindu family and his interest in the joint family property are inferior to the position and interest of a member by birth of the family, and it was suggested that an adopted son does not on his adoption become a coparcener in the joint family property. It was endeavoured to establish that proposition by reference to the place which was assigned by Manu and other early authorities to the twelve then possible sons of a Hindu. As to this contention it is sufficient to say that, whatever may have been the position and rights between themselves of such twelve sons in very remote times, all of these twelve sons, except the legitimately born and the adopted, are long since obsolete. A discussion as to their rights and interests, even if they could now be ascertained, would be beside the point and could throw no light on the construction of pars. 24 and 25 of s. 5 of the Dattaka Chandrika or upon the position and rights of an adopted son. Hindu law and customs have not stood still, and what we are now concerned with is the position at the present time of an adopted son in a Hindu family. As early as 1833 this Board in Sumboochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Dibeh (3 Knapp, 55.) considered that according to Hindu law an adopted son becomes for all purposes the son of the father by adoption. This Board in 1881 in Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards (L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. As early as 1833 this Board in Sumboochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Dibeh (3 Knapp, 55.) considered that according to Hindu law an adopted son becomes for all purposes the son of the father by adoption. This Board in 1881 in Pudma Coomari Debi v. Court of Wards (L. R. 8 Ind. Ap. 229.) approved of the decision of this Board in Sumboochunder Chowdry v. Naraini Dibeh (3 Knapp, 55.), and held that an adopted son succeeds not only lineally, but collaterally, to the inheritance of his relations by adoption, and also that an adopted son occupies the same position in the family of the adopter as a natural-born son, except in a few instances which are accurately denned both in the Dattaka Chandrika and the Dattaka Mimansa, Those excepted instances relate to marriage and to competition between an adopted son and a subsequently born legitimate son to the same father. To the same effect is the decision of this Board in Kali Komul Mozoomdar v. Uma Shunkur Moitra. (L. R. 10 Ind. Ap. 138.) In the last-mentioned case, when it was before the Full Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, Romesh Chunder Mitter J. held that " According to Hindu law an adopted son occupies the same position, and has the same rights and privileges in the family of the adopter, as the legitimate son, except in a few specified instances, which have been clearly and carefully noted and defined by writers on the subject of adoption. The theory of adoption involves the principle of a complete severance of the child adopted from the family in which he is born, both in respect to the paternal and the maternal line, and his complete substitution into the adopters family as if he were born in it." With that statement as to the Hindu law of adoption their Lordships agree. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed and that the decree in appeal of the High Court at Bombay should be set aside and the decree of Macleod J. should be restored. The respondent must pay the costs of this appeal and of the appeal in the High Court.