Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (April 28, 1910) affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge at Manbhum (November 25, 1907). The question for determination in the appeal was whether a patni lease granted by the manager of an incumbered estate administered under the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act, 1876, had received the sanction of the Commissioner, required by r. 16 of the rules made under s. 19 of that Act. The patni lease in question was dated June 29, 1890, and was granted to Robert Watson & Co., 1 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 97 ( 1914- 1915) Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaha V. Mathewson 12 Limited, under the circumstances stated in their Lordships judgment. The grantees of the lease had conveyed their rights thereunder to the first respondent. In 1905 the estate was released from the operation of Act VI. of 1876, and the present appellants subsequently instituted the suit, claiming a declaration that the patni lease was invalid, and possession. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the patni lease had been duly sanctioned. The High Court (Woodroffe and Richardson JJ.), by its judgment delivered on April 28, 1910, affirmed this decision. Upjohn, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellants. The sanction of the Commissioner is a condition precedent to the validity of the lease under r. 16 of the rules made under s. 19 of the Act of 1876. The rules appear in the Court of Wards Manual, 1897, at p. 200. The correspondence relied on did not show that the Commissioner sanctioned the terms of the patni lease granted, but that he contemplated the grant of a patni lease in the terms of the existing ijara lease. The full details should have been sanctioned by the Commissioner. The decision in Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas (1) is distinguishable. The enactment there in question was s. 18 of the Central Provinces Wards Act (XVII. of 1885), under which the sanction required is that of the Chief Commissioner, who could not be expected to consider the whole details. In any case the sanction in the present case was insufficient since it only referred to the grant of a patni lease to R. Watson & Co., an unincorporated firm, whereas the lease was granted to Robert Watson & Co., Limited. In any case the sanction in the present case was insufficient since it only referred to the grant of a patni lease to R. Watson & Co., an unincorporated firm, whereas the lease was granted to Robert Watson & Co., Limited. The identity of the patnidars was a material particular since they would remain liable for the performance of the covenants even if the lease was assigned. De Gruyther, K.C., and Sir W. Garth, for the respondents. The correspondence establishes that the Commissioner sanctioned all the essential features of the transaction. It was not necessary that the actual lease granted should be produced to the Commissioner for his sanction. The decision in Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas (( 1913) L. R. 40 Ind. Ap. 117.) is not distinguishable in principle and applies to this case. The fact that the proposed patnidars had been incorporated as a limited company was known to the Commissioner, and it is to be inferred that the sanction given was to grant the lease to the limited company although the Commissioner refers to them by their unincorporated title. Upjohn K.C, replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Bengal, dated April 28, 1910, affirming a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Manbhum, dated November 25, 1907, dismissing the suit with costs. The main object of the suit was to obtain a declaration of the nullity of a patni lease dated June 29, 1890. The other demands in the plaint were consequential upon such a declaration of nullity being obtained. The only question argued in the appeal was whether the patni lease was ultra vires and invalid. The facts are briefly these. The first appellant, the plaintiff, is the son and successor of the late Raja Broja Kishore Singh Deb Darpashaha, the owner of the Barabhum estate. In 1883 the Raja borrowed Rs.60,000 from Messrs. Robert Watson & Co. on a mortgage of his estate, and on February 27 of that year he executed an ijara lease in their favour. This lease contained a condition that if the company should desire to take a patni lease of such portions of 84 ¼ villages as were treated in the ijara as ghatwali lands the Raja would grant such a patni on certain terms. This lease contained a condition that if the company should desire to take a patni lease of such portions of 84 ¼ villages as were treated in the ijara as ghatwali lands the Raja would grant such a patni on certain terms. On March 8, 1885, this patni was granted. Four years thereafter, namely, on March 6, 1889, the affairs of the Raja being deeply 1 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 97 ( 1914- 1915) Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaha V. Mathewson 13 embarrassed, his estate was placed under the protection of Government by virtue of the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act, 1876. There were apparently considerable difficulties in arranging for the liquidation of the debts. After negotiations it was agreed that the remaining portions excluded from Messrs. Watson & Co.s former patni lease should be demised to these creditors for a sum of Rs.30,000. Their Lordships have considered the documents and have no hesitation whatever in accepting the view that the true and, in fact, only meaning of the transaction was that expressed in the Commissioner of Chota Nagpurs letter of February 20, 1890, in which he sanctioned " the proposal to grant them a patni lease of the 84 1/4 villages excluded from the present patni." The elements of the transaction being thus settled and the amount of the premium arranged, what remained to be done was to have the actual deed drawn up and executed. This was done. It has been argued before the Board that the patni lease which was sanctioned was to be a lease containing the terms of the ijara lease. The Board cannot assent. These two contracts are essentially different m character, the latter being of a temporary character, containing provisions and reservations suitable to a lease for a short duration. Their Lordships have no hesitation in accepting the judgment of the High Court which is thus expressed on this point " The fact that the Raja had granted a previous patni lease was known to the Commissioner, and was, in fact, referred to in his sanction.....It is .... reasonable to assume that the Commissioner understood its character when he was asked to sanction a similar patni. reasonable to assume that the Commissioner understood its character when he was asked to sanction a similar patni. It would have been inconvenient that the subsequent patni should be on any different terms from the first, because, as pointed oat in the course of the correspondence, the proposed new patni was in respect of villages which were scattered about in the area covered by the earlier patni, and the object of the second patni was to round up the estate. I do not think, therefore, that this ground has been made out." Apart from the point just dealt with, the patni lease actually granted is now challenged. The grounds of challenge may be compendiously and conveniently stated as follows — (1.) It is said that the sanction was, upon a sound construction of the letter of February 20, 1890, merely a sanction of a proposal to grant a patni. Their Lordships think the objection to be trivial. This proposal had been made, it had been accepted, a contract was accordingly completed on the subject, and It was that contract so completed that was sanctioned. (2.) It was said that the sanction contained the clause " provided that the amount be paid before the end of March, 1890." In the course of carrying out the bargain some delay, not very great, occurred. There was an exchange of views as to the actual wording of the draft patni, but the document was finally settled by both parties, and on June 25, 1890, Messrs. Watson & Co. paid the salami of Rs.30,000 to the official manager of the estate, namely, the Deputy Commissioner. This being done, it does not appear to their Lordships that it would have been open thereafter for a challenge to be made, even by the Deputy Commissioner himself, or for the Commissioners sanction to have been withdrawn. A fortiori there appears no ground for sustaining such a challenge when put forward after a considerable lapse of years on behalf of the successor of the debtor. (3.) The last objection is of a twofold character. It is urged that the sanction of the Commissioner, being a statutory requisite in virtue of the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act, 1876, of the rules thereunder, and of the Act of the Governor General, No. Y. of 1884, such sanction was not given to the final and actual patni lease itself. It is urged that the sanction of the Commissioner, being a statutory requisite in virtue of the Chota Nagpur Incumbered Estates Act, 1876, of the rules thereunder, and of the Act of the Governor General, No. Y. of 1884, such sanction was not given to the final and actual patni lease itself. This depends upon the construction of r. 16, which is in the following terms " The power to lease under section 17 of the Act shall be subject to the following provision—no lease shall be given for any term exceeding three years without the sanction of the 1 Law Rep. 42 Ind. App. 97 ( 1914- 1915) Ramkanai Singh Deb Darpashaha V. Mathewson 14 Deputy Commissioner, or exceeding four years without the sanction of the Commissioner." Upon this point their Lordships are of opinion that when it is affirmatively established that a transaction itself in all its essential particulars has obtained the sanction of the Commissioner, and when it is requisite that the transaction be carried into effect by the preparation of the appropriate deeds, a challenge merely on the ground that the document ultimately prepared had not been submitted for sanction cannot be sustained. In administrative and departmental action it must necessarily be the case that formal details may have to be entered upon in order to carry into practical effect, and put into legal shape, the arrangement to which sanction was adhibited. The first head of this objection accordingly fails. And it was further urged that in any view the transaction which was sanctioned was a transaction of a grant of a patni lease to Robert Watson & Co., in other words, to a firm of individual men, and not to Robert Watson & Co., Limited, i.e., a different and incorporated persona. This demands careful consideration. There is this to be said for the objection, that the persona in the latter ease is different from the persona in the former, and that a change in the lessee or patnidar ought to be treated as a change in essentials. It may be added that a patni lease of land, an agreement of an important and wide-reaching character, might demand separate consideration, and point to a different conclusion when this essential was altered. It may be added that a patni lease of land, an agreement of an important and wide-reaching character, might demand separate consideration, and point to a different conclusion when this essential was altered. Questions might arise and difficulties suggest themselves with regard to a limited company against whom legal remedies at law might not be the same as in the case of individuals, and public and administrative considerations might come into play operative either in the way of restriction or refusal on account of a change in persona in the lessee. In the opinion of their Lordships, it is not necessary to pronounce any judgment upon this point in the present case. For their Lordships are of opinion that when the negotiators in the course of correspondence mentioned in their letters Robert Watson & Co., they did in fact mean and were perfectly understood to mean Robert Watson & Co., Limited, the fact of the incorporation of the limited concern being well known; and, indeed, one of the principal documents of the case is the petition dated May 14, 1889, being the petition of Robert Watson & Co., Limited, filing the account of the money due to them. It may be true that the limited concern is a different one from the previous and unincorporated firm, but in the language of the judgment of the High Court, "the misdescription does not, under the ordinary principle applicable to such matters, affect the validity of the sanction or the lease. Though there was such a misdescription, it is perfectly clear what was intended by the sanction, and that it was intended that the lease should be given and taken by the persons who are properly described as Messrs. Robert Watson & Co., Limited." A point was taken to the effect that the patni transaction could not be held to have been ratified, seeing that it had not specifically taken into account the existence of khuroposh, or maintenance rights, over the property sold. These could in no view have been affected for the simple reason that the interests of third parties, properly secured over the properties, were in no respect prejudiced. These could in no view have been affected for the simple reason that the interests of third parties, properly secured over the properties, were in no respect prejudiced. And as to the farther point that in the event of the discontinuance of these rights a certain reversion would follow to the zamindar, their Lordships are of opinion that, this reversionary right not being in fact embraced within the grant, no prejudice to any such right has occurred. The point accordingly fails. Their Lordships are of opinion that the judgments of the Courts below are correct, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.