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1916 DIGILAW 15 (SC)

JAMNA BAI v. VASANTA RAO

1916-03-21

LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, SIR JOHN EDGE, SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS

body1916
Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 29, 1910) in part affirming and in part reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Negapatam (January 19, 1906). In 1896 Vasanta Rao instituted a suit in which Jamna Bai and Sethuram, her brother, were defendants, disputing the validity of a will of one Sakharam under which the said defendants benefited, and claiming the whole estate as nearest bandhu. In 1897 a compromise of the suit was effected on the terms that Vasanta Rao should receive Rs. 90,000 in full satisfaction of his claim. At the time of this compromise both Vasanta Rao and Sethuram were minors. In order to secure the above sum Jamna Bai and Sethuram, by his grandmother who was guardian of his property, entered into a bond by which they jointly agreed to pay Rs. 90,000 to Vasanta Rao within three months of their taking delivery of the movable and immovable properties of Sakharam as scheduled in the suit and then under the management and custody of a receiver. Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 99 ( 1915- 1916) Jamna Bai V. Vasanta Rao 21 An application was made to the Court on behalf of Vasanta Rao setting out the terms of the compromise and praying that the suit might be dismissed. Upon this application the minors were represented, and the Court caused inquiries to be instituted as to whether Jamna Bai, who was pardanishin, had entered into it of her free will and considered that it was in her interest. Upon being satisfied on these questions the Court ordered the suit to be struck out, but no leave was applied for or granted sanctioning the compromise on behalf of the minors as required by s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. On April 6, 1904, Vasanta Rao instituted the suit which gave rise to the consolidated appeals, against Jamna Bai and Sethuram claiming Rs. 90,000 and interest upon the bond. At the date of the suit the properties scheduled to the plaint in the compromised suit had been made over to the defendants for over three months. The Subordinate Judge made a decree against both defendants. He rejected their contention that the properties referred to in the bond included properties which had not been handed over. At the date of the suit the properties scheduled to the plaint in the compromised suit had been made over to the defendants for over three months. The Subordinate Judge made a decree against both defendants. He rejected their contention that the properties referred to in the bond included properties which had not been handed over. He found that the sanction of the Court had not been obtained to the compromise on behalf of Sethuram, but he held upon the authority of Aman Singh v. Narain Singh (( 1897) I. L. R. 20 Allah. 98.) that the compromise was binding upon the minor as he did not offer to restore the property of which he had obtained possession under the compromise and it was not possible to place the plaintiff in the position in which he was at the date of its execution. Upon appeal to the High Court the decree against Sethuram was set aside and that against Jamna Bai was affirmed. The learned judges (Sir Charles Arnold White C.J. and Ayling J.) held that the compromise agreement, not being sanctioned by the Court, was voidable as against Sethuram. In their opinion the decision relied on by the Subordinate Judge must be taken to have been overruled, though it was possibly distinguishable. They were of opinion that the fact that the bond was unenforceable against Sethuram did not render it unenforceable against Jamna Bai, his joint con tractor. They agreed with the view of the Subordinate Judge that the suit was not premature. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 34 Madr. 314. Both Jamna Bai and Vasanta Rao appealed. 1916. March 13. De Gruyther, K.C., and E. B. Raikes, for Jamna Bai. The leave of the Court was not obtained to the compromise on behalf of the minor and it is unenforceable against him under s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 Manohar Lal v. Jadu Nath Singh (( 1906) L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 128.); Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row (( 1913) L. R. 40 Ind. Ap. 132.); Partab Singh v. Bhabuti Singh. (( 1913) L. R. 40 Ind. Ap. 182.) The decision in Aman Singh v. Narain Singh (I. L. R. 20 Allah. 98.) is in effect overruled by those cases. The bond imposed no obligation upon either this appellant or the minor unless the terms of the compromise were effectual. Ap. 132.); Partab Singh v. Bhabuti Singh. (( 1913) L. R. 40 Ind. Ap. 182.) The decision in Aman Singh v. Narain Singh (I. L. R. 20 Allah. 98.) is in effect overruled by those cases. The bond imposed no obligation upon either this appellant or the minor unless the terms of the compromise were effectual. The original suit should be proceeded with. Further, the bond was a joint bond and was valid as against the minor until set aside. Upon being avoided by the minor it became unenforceable against his joint contractor Kendall v. Hamilton. (( 1879) 4 App. Cas. 504.) [Sir Erle Richards, K.C. The Indian decisions are referred to in Pollock on the Indian Contract Act under s. 43.] Sect. 43 of the Indian Contract Act does not affect the principle laid down in such cases as Underhill v. Horwood ((1804) 10 Ves. 209.) and Ellesmere Brewery Co. v. Cooper. ([ 1896] 1 Q. B. 75.) The Board did not call upon the respondent to the first appeal. Law. Rep. 43 Ind. App. 99 ( 1915- 1916) Jamna Bai V. Vasanta Rao 22 Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for Vasanta Rao, as appellant in the second appeal. The compromise was made with the leave of the Court within the meaning of s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. That section does not, like Order xxxii., . r. 7, of the Code of 1908, require that the leave shall be " expressly recorded in the proceedings." In Manohar Lal v. Jadu Nath Singh (L. R. 33 Ind. Ap. 128.) there was nothing to indicate to the Court that a minor party was concerned except the title of the suit. Here the minors were represented upon the application to dismiss, as appears from the order. Further, the whole facts as to the nature of the suit and the compromise received the consideration of the Court. In any case the minor, having received the advantage of the compromise, was not entitled to avoid the bond unconditionally. Vasanta Rao was entitled, at least, to a charge on the estate of Sakharam in the hands of the minor. Even on the view taken by the High Court, Vasanta Rao should have been remitted, as against the minor, to his original rights against the estate of Sakharam. Sir W. Garth, for the minor Sethuram, was not called upon. Vasanta Rao was entitled, at least, to a charge on the estate of Sakharam in the hands of the minor. Even on the view taken by the High Court, Vasanta Rao should have been remitted, as against the minor, to his original rights against the estate of Sakharam. Sir W. Garth, for the minor Sethuram, was not called upon. March 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. These appeals arise out of a suit on a money bond of June 16, 1897, expressed to be executed to the present plaintiff, Vasanta Rao, by the defendant Sethuram Saheb, " represented by his grandmother and guardian," and by the defendant Jamna Bai. Sethuram was then a minor, and this was apparent on the face of the bond. The substantial question, therefore, now in dispute is whether Sethuram is under a personal obligation to pay the plaintiff the amount he claims, and if not, whether this furnishes Jamna Bai with an answer to the suit. The plea that the suit is premature has no real value. It does not touch the merits, and both Courts agree that the objection is not well founded. This view is in accord with the meaning placed by the defendants themselves in their written statements on the phrase in the bond which is decisive of this point, and their Lordships see no reason to doubt its accuracy. This plea therefore fails. On the more important question the two Courts are not in complete agreement. The Subordinate Judge passed a decree against both defendants. The High Court on appeal upheld the decree against Jamna Bai, but dismissed the suit against Sethuram. This has led to the two present appeals. Though the circumstances connected with the passing of the bond are intricate, the real issues involved in the suit are simple. To establish Sethurams liability the plaintiff relies on s. 462 of the Code of 1882. But even if compliance with the terms of this section would have established the claim against Sethuram—a point on which no opinion is now expressed—this in no way helps the plaintiff, for the requirements of the section have not been observed in protection of Sethuram. The High Court, therefore, rightly held him not liable to the plaintiff under the bond. But this furnishes Jamna Bai with no answer to the plain-tiffs claim against her. The High Court, therefore, rightly held him not liable to the plaintiff under the bond. But this furnishes Jamna Bai with no answer to the plain-tiffs claim against her. Stripped of all that is not relevant, the plea advanced on her behalf is that one of two promisors can plead the minority and consequent immunity of the other as a bar to the promisees claim against him. This is a position that cannot be maintained, and the plea has been properly rejected by the High Court. On possible developments in the future it would be wrong for their Lordships to make any pronouncement; they will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that each of these appeals should be dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.