Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court of Lower Burma (May 6, 1914) varying the judgment and decree of Robinson J. at the trial. In 1902 Ko Tha Gywe borrowed from Revashankar Jagjivan & Co. the sum of Rs. 50003 depositing with them as security four documents of title relating to two houses in Rangoon. These documents were as follows —(1.) A building lease dated April 2, 1884. from the Government to one Maung Bwa of a plot of land for five years, the tenancy to continue thereafter until terminated by either party giving three months notice in writing; (2.) a building lease dated July 1, 1884, from the Government to Ma Thit, the wife of Ko Tha Cywe, of another plot for the same term ; (3.) a sale deed, dated January 5, 1888, whereby the said Maung Bwa assigned to the said Ma Thit a dwelling-house described as situated in 14th Street, Rangoon, for the residue of the term of five years created by the lease of April 2, 1884 ; (4.) a sale deed, dated January 3, 1901, by which Ko Tha Gywe purchased a house " known as No. 88, situate in 14th Street, Rangoon." Ko Tha Gywe died shortly afterwards and his daughter Ma Saw took over his liability under the loan, executing on January 1, 1903, a promissory note for Rs. 6000 in favour of the lenders. She subsequently from time to time borrowed further sums from them, the above documents remaining in their possession. On June 1, 1906, Ma Saw and her husband gave the lenders a promissory note for Rs. 13,000 in respect of the total amount lent. Upon the back of this note there was a memorandum, signed by Ma Saw and the lenders, as follows " As security—grant of a house in 14th Street, Rangoon." In December, 1906, the business of the lenders was transferred to the appellant and the above promissory note was indorsed to him. In 1908 Ma Saw obtained from the Government two fresh leases in respect of the plots of land referred to in the deposited documents. These leases divided the land into four plots numbered 65, 66, 66a, and 67. There was one lease in respect of plots 65, 66, and 66a and the house standing upon them, which was then known as No. 92, Strand Road. These leases divided the land into four plots numbered 65, 66, 66a, and 67. There was one lease in respect of plots 65, 66, and 66a and the house standing upon them, which was then known as No. 92, Strand Road. The second lease was in respect of plot 67 and a smaller house thereon, known as No. 87, 14th Street. The plots did not accurately correspond with the three plots referred to in the deposited documents, but it appeared (as their Lordships found) that the house upon plot 67 was that which had been sold to Ko Tha Gywe and was the subject of the fourth deposited document. In 1909 a creditor of Ma Saw obtained a money decree against her and attached the four plots with the two houses thereon. The appellant applied to the Court, claiming to have an equitable mortgage upon the whole property and praying that the sale should be made subject to his charge. The proclamation of sale accordingly-stated that the appellant claimed to have an equitable mortgage for Rs. 13,000 and interest. At the sale the appellant purchased plot 67 with the house known as No. 87, 14th Street, and the respondent purchased plots 65, 66, and 66a with the house known as No. 92, Strand Road. The appellant instituted a suit in the Chief Court, to which the respondent and others were made defendants, claiming, inter alia, a declaration that he was entitled to a valid charge upon the whole property. Robinson J. made a decree in the appellants favour. On appeal Hartnoll, acting Chief Judge, and Twomey J. reversed that decision so far as it related to the respondent, holding that only one house was given as security and that that house was No. 87, 14th Street purchased by the appellant. De Gruyther, K.C., and Parikh, for the appellant. The equitable mortgage in favour of the appellant extended to both houses. The fact that the documents of title were deposited and remained in the possession of the lenders is conclusive. The charge is evidenced by the deposit and is not limited by the subsequent memorandum Ashton v. Dalton (( 1846) 2 Coll. 565.) ; Ex parte Kensington. ((1813) 2 Ves. & B. 79.) The memorandum was not intended to be the contract between the parties Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 91 and s. 92, proviso 2. The charge is evidenced by the deposit and is not limited by the subsequent memorandum Ashton v. Dalton (( 1846) 2 Coll. 565.) ; Ex parte Kensington. ((1813) 2 Ves. & B. 79.) The memorandum was not intended to be the contract between the parties Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 91 and s. 92, proviso 2. If the charge was limited to one house a consideration of the evidence, including parcels stated in the various leases and sale deeds, shows that the house intended was that which was purchased by the respondent. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and F. J. Coltman, for the respondent, were not called upon. March 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. Their Lordships think it unneces sary in this case to call upon learned counsel for the respondent. They are of opinion that the judgment of the Chief Court of Lower Burma appealed from is correct. The rights of the parties have to be determined, in their Lordships opinion, by a written agreement, which is, in their Lordships view, the limit and standard fully measuring the obligations of Ma Saw, who obtained an advance of Rs. 13,000 from the respondent on June 1, 1906. On that date there was a memorandum put upon the back of a promissory note then granted to this effect " As security—grant of a house in 14th Street, Rangoon." Their Lordships take no stock of an alteration made after that memorandum was signed, by which there was an interpolation of the words " Strand Road and," which words would have, in appearance at least, extended the scope of the security from " a house in 14th Street, Rangoon," to " a house in Strand Road and 14th Street, Rangoon." Had an argument been raised as to whether, this alteration having been made, any rights in law could now be founded upon this document, that argument would have been considered ; but it is unnecessary to make any pronouncement upon this topic, and accordingly their Lordships deal with the document signed by Ma Saw on June 1, 1906, as definitely limiting and describing the scope of the security. It was a " grant," in the singular, " of a house," in the singular, " in 14th Street, Rangoon." The law upon this subject is beyond any doubt (1.) Where titles of property are handed over with nothing said except that they are to be security, the law supposes that the scope of the security is the scope of the title. (2.) Where, however, titles are handed over accompanied by a bargain, that bargain must rule. (3.) Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it, and it alone, must determine what is the scope and the extent of the security. In the words of Lord Cairns in the leading case of Shaw v. Foster (( 1872) L. R. 5 H. L. 321, 341.), " Although it is a well-established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title, without more, without writing, or without word of mouth will create in equity a charge upon the property referred to, I apprehend that general rule will not apply where you have a deposit accompanied by an actual written charge. In that case you must refer to the terms of the written document, and any implication that might be raised, supposing there were no document, is put out of the case and reduced to silence by the document by which alone you must be governed. Their Lordships accordingly have admitted in argument the only possible question which remains (standing the document specifying the security and signed by Ma Saw), namely, the question of identification of the term " grant of a house in 14th Street, Rangoon." To identify this grant, a reference has been made by learned counsel for the appellant to the various title-deeds of the properties called plots 65, 66, 66a, and 67. These deeds are as follows With reference to plot 65, there is a lease of land in favour of a person named Ma Thit, who was the mother of Ma Saw. With reference to plot 66, and apparently also to 66a, there is a document for sale of a house and of land in favour of Ma Thit. But then, with reference to the last document, namely, as to plot 67, there is a " grant of a house," a conveyance of a house on January 3, 1901, in favour of Ko Tha Gywe. But then, with reference to the last document, namely, as to plot 67, there is a " grant of a house," a conveyance of a house on January 3, 1901, in favour of Ko Tha Gywe. Ko Tha Gywe was the husband of the grantee, or lessee, of the other plots of ground covered by the other documents. He was the father of Ma Saw, and it does occur as a matter of interest that this person, the father of Ma Saw, who had a con veyance of a house, that on plot 67, was himself a borrower from the persons who are interested in this suit, who were bankers and moneylenders in the district. On October 10, 1902, he borrowed a sum of Rs. 5000 from them ; and a somewhat curious transaction took place, namely, that he deposited with the money-lenders not only the title of the property belonging to himself, namely, the grant of the house, but also the title-deeds of the other three properties which belonged not to himself, but to his wife. It was on this occasion that all these titles found their way into the hands of the lenders. Ma Saw succeeded to Ko Tha Gywe in the ownership of the house on plot 67. Their Lordships have, in these circumstances, no doubt whatsoever that the identification of the " grant of a house in 14th Street, Rangoon," by her is accomplished by a reference to the conveyance of the house in favour of Ko Tha Gywe, which house had been his property when the original advance of Rs. 5000, some years before, was obtained by him. Their Lordships finally remark that as against this identification of the house in 14th Street there is no evidence at all satisfactory in this case, and it was for the persons holding this security clearly to satisfy the Court of the scope thereof. They have not done so. There is nothing in the case which confirms the view that, under the term " grant of a house," which would be a singular term applicable to a singular title, there was included the subject of three other plots of land under leases. Their Lordships cannot assent to such a con struction. They think the security is distinctly and by contract limited, and they cannot extend it as desired. Their Lordships cannot assent to such a con struction. They think the security is distinctly and by contract limited, and they cannot extend it as desired. They have no doubt that the Chief Court of Lower Burma has reached a proper conclusion. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.