JUDGMENT Lancelot Sanderson, C.J. - I think this case raises a question of some importance with regard to the relationship of the client and attorney. 2. What happened in this case was this. On the 28th of July 1915, there was filed an affidavit which had been sworn by the attorney, Mr. Dutt, on the 26th of July, two days previously. Mr. Sirkar told us that the notice of the application and a copy of the affidavit at the same time were served upon the clients on the 27th. The application was that the attorney should be discharged from his position of attorney and that he should not be called upon any longer to act on behalf of the clients whose names were Prabhu Lal and Nunnumull, and the ground of his application was that the client Nunnu-mull had made certain charges against the attorney which were quite inconsistent with the attorney continuing to act as such attorney. 3. I think the matter is of importance for this reason: I assume in favour of the attorney that those charges were in fact made; I assume further in his favour that there was no ground for them in any shape or form, still I am bound to come to the conclusion that what took place in this case was not right. I think the attorney was bound to give his client reasonable notice of the course he intended to take. 4. It is quite clear that the action which the attorney did take amounted to a discharge by himself, because it was he who initiated the proceedings: he gave notice to the client that he would apply to be discharged from his position as attorney in the case, and he made an application to obtain the discharge; and, therefore, he must be taken to have discharged himself. But Mr. Sirkar submitted as follows. He said in effect--yes, it is quite true that technically the attorney discharged himself, but he could not go on acting as an attorney on account of the absolutely unfounded charges the client had made against him. But even in these circumstances, I think, it was the duty of the attorney to give reasonable notice of his intention to withdraw. He said in effect--yes, it is quite true that technically the attorney discharged himself, but he could not go on acting as an attorney on account of the absolutely unfounded charges the client had made against him. But even in these circumstances, I think, it was the duty of the attorney to give reasonable notice of his intention to withdraw. Notice was given to the client on the 27th of July, the application was made on the 28th of July, and the parties were before the learned Judge on the 28th, the attorney appeared himself but the client was unrepresented by any attorney and appeared in person. I think it is safe to assume that in that short time he had no opportunity for making any other arrangement or obtaining the assistance of another attorney, or perhaps raising funds which would be necessary before he could engage the services of another attorney. I find it stated in the 26th Volume of Lord Halsbury's Laws of England, at page 739, as follows: "The solicitor is entitled to recover such remuneration where he is discharged by the client, or where he discharges himself for good cause." I am assuming that the attorney in this case discharged himself for good cause, still, the passage goes on to say, "He must, however, give reasonable notice of his withdrawal from the case to his client." In my opinion, in this case no such reasonable notice was given. I do not think that giving notice that the attorney would apply to be discharged from the case, which application came on for disposal the next day, is giving reasonable notice of his withdrawal from the case to his client. It is for that reason I think this case is of importance not only to the profession but also to the clients, and it must be clearly understood that if an attorney is going to withdraw from a case, even if the ground for his withdrawal is good, it is incumbent upon him to give reasonable notice to his client of his intention, so that his client may have a reasonable opportunity of getting other advice and making other arrangements before the hearing of the application comes before the learned Judge. 5. On this ground, I think, the appeal must be allowed with costs. 6. As a matter of course the order for arrest goes. 5. On this ground, I think, the appeal must be allowed with costs. 6. As a matter of course the order for arrest goes. John Woodroffe, J. 7. I agree. Asutosh Mookerjee, J. 8. I agree that the order of Chaudhuri, J., under appeal must be set aside on the ground that the appellants had not reasonable notice of the application. It is well settled that a solicitor retained to conduct an action may withdraw from it on good grounds. Such good grounds include misconduct of an offensive character or such misbehaviour on the part of his client as makes it impossible for a self-respecting solicitor to continue to act for him Steele v. Scott 2 Hogan 141 and Bryan v. Twigg (1834) 3 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 114. [express no opinion upon the question whether what is attributed to the client in this case did or did not amount to a conduct of this character. But if it is assumed in favour of the respondent that the conduct of his client was such as made it impossible for him to continue to act, the client was entitled to reasonable notice of his application for withdrawal Hoby v. Built (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 350 : 1 L.J.K.B. 121 : 110 E.R. 131 : 37 R.R.. 444; Whitehead v. (1852) 7 Exch. 691 : 21 L.J. Ex. 239; Nicholls v. Wilson (1843) 11 M. & W. 106 : 2 Dowl. (N.S.) 1031 : 12 L.J. Ex. 266 : 152 E.R. 734 : 63 R.R. 523 and Harris v. Osbourn (1834) 2 Cr. & M. 629 : 4 Tyr. 445 : 3 L.J. Ex. 182 : 149 E.R. 912 : 39 R.R. 872. The notice which was given in this case was obviously unreasonably short; the interval between the receipt of the notice and affidavit and the order by the Court was so short that it was impossible for the client to have himself represented by another attorney. The order must consequently be discharged with costs.