Sir Arthur Channell :- This is an appeal from a decree of the President of the Admiralty Division, sitting in Prize, condemning as lawful prize the German steamship "Ophelia" and rejecting the claim of the appellant, made on behalf of the German Government, to her release as a hospital-ship protected by the provisions of Convention X of The Hague Conventions of 1907. A very complete abstract of these provisions is set out in the judgment of the learned President, and it is only necessary to refer to the most material of them, which are the following :- "Article 1. Military hospital-ships, that is to say, ships constructed or adapted by States wholly and solely with a view to aiding the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, the names of which have been communicated to the belligerent Powers, shall be respected and cannot be captured. "Article 8. The protection to which hospital-ships are entitled ceases if they are used to commit acts harmful to the enemy. The presence of wireless telegraphy apparatus on board is not a sufficient reason for withdrawing protection." The question whether the "Ophelia" was entitled to protection from capture, as complying with these provisions, or whether, by reason of her equipment or the acts of her captain and crew, she had lost that right to protection, is almost entirely a question of fact. The only question which is at all in the nature of a point of law arises on the words of the Convention as to the presence of a wireless telegraphy apparatus, and that question can most conveniently be dealt with after the facts have been stated which raise it. It is necessary, therefore, to consider what is open upon an appeal to this Board from the Prize Court on facts. The Attorney-General has contended that the findings of the Judge below should be held conclusive, and he quotes the Julia 14 Moo. R. 210. and the Princess Alice L. R. 2. P. C. 245. These cases, however, which were collision cases heard on appeal from the Admiralty Court, and not prize cases, only point out the advantage which the Judge below had in seeing and hearing the witnesses, and also in the knowledge of navigation which he necessarily acquired in the exercise of his office, and the Judicial Committee merely emphasized the rules on which Appeal Courts always profess to act. Their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal must be treated as a re-hearing, in the same way as an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a Judge sitting without a jury in the High Court. There is jurisdiction to review the findings of the Judge, but the Appeal Court gives very great weight to the fact that the Judge below hears the witnesses, which they do not, and practically acts on the opinion of the judge as to the credibility of the witnesses before him and the weight to be attached to their evidence. Here the evidence for the Crown was all on affidavit and the evidence for the claimant was given orally, after his witnesses had had an opportunity of studying the evidence for the Crown. The affidavits for the Crown were sworn before the case for the claimant had been disclosed, except so far as it was very slightly disclosed by an affidavit sworn by the claimant on the 13th February, 1915 (p. 6 of the Record), which did little more than verify the claim. The claimant did not apply to cross-examine any of the Crown witnesses on their affidavits, and his counsel accounts for this by saying that he does not substantially dispute the facts deposed to by the witnesses, but only the inferences drawn by the witnesses from the facts; and it is contended that the claimant's evidence explains rather than contradicts the facts on which the crown relies. To a great extent that is so, but there seem some contradictions of fact, and some points on which the learned President appears not to have accepted as reliable the oral evidence which he heard. On these points their Lordships would not lightly differ from the learned President, but many matters have been raised on the argument of the appeal which cannot be satisfactorily disposed of by treating them as matters of facts concluded by the view of the President. Their Lordships therefore feel it their duty to review the facts in some detail. No question is raised as to the necessary formalities to constitute the "Ophelia" a hospitalship having been complied with. She had a proper certificate, and her name had been duly communicated to the belligerent Power. Their Lordships therefore feel it their duty to review the facts in some detail. No question is raised as to the necessary formalities to constitute the "Ophelia" a hospitalship having been complied with. She had a proper certificate, and her name had been duly communicated to the belligerent Power. She was painted properly as a hospitalship, and was furnished with the proper flags, although a question is raised as to whether she displayed them properly on the 8th October, one of the days to which the evidence relates. [The judgment then proceeded to discuss the evidence on the question whether the fitting and equipment of the "Ophelia" were such that she could be said, as required by the Hague Convention, to be constructed or adopted "wholly and solely" for affording relief to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked.] It would, in their Lordships' opinion be the duty of a hospital-ship, even if not equipped with a wireless installation, and still more so when so equipped, to keep a full and correct log. It is a custom of the sea, very long established, that sea-going vessels shall keep logs. Originally, no doubt, logs would be required, as indeed they are now, for the navigation of the vessel, and when the weather prevented astronomical observations being taken, a ship would be ignorant of her position without a record of courses steered and estimated rates of sailing. But it has been the custom to make the log a full record of the voyage and all that happens on it. In some countries the log is legal evidence of the matters contained in it. In this country it is subject to the overriding rule of evidence that a man cannot (subject to some exceptions in case of death and the like) make evidence in his own favour by entries in his own books. But even in our Law Courts a wellkept log is in all disputes arising out of or in connection with the voyage, treated as of very great weight; and between merchants and under-writers and others doing business connected with the sea, it is in practice treated as conclusive, unless by external or internal evidence it is falsified. In Prize Courts in particular the log has always been treated as a most important document. In Prize Courts in particular the log has always been treated as a most important document. Formerly, no doubt, all entries connected with the voyage were in one book, the log, but at the present time often more than one log is kept: a steamer has her engine log, because the entries in it can thus be made direct by the engineer instead of his having to give details to the mate for entering in the ship's log. So it has become fairly common in vessels which do much signalling to keep a separate signal log, the entries in which are made by the signalling officer. In the case of the "Ophelia," the principal log, or deck log, is not very satisfactorily kept. It often omits courses and other things which would be useful to throw light on employment of the ship. As incidentally remarked already, it occasionally contains an entry of a signal received, but omits to record the next signal said to have been received. This would be likely to occur if no separate signal log were kept. Having regard to the danger of improper signalling by hospital-ships, a signal log should certainly be kept by them. As to what was done in the way of keeping a signal log by the "Ophelia," the evidence is most confused and conflicting. Some of it has already been referred to. As to the Morse signals, the witnesses say a book was kept, but no one knows much about it, and the signalmen who kept it are vouched but they are not called. The only signalman called was Grau, the wireless operator, and he, after giving a good deal of confusing evidence, finally said that he knew nothing about the Morse signals. As to wireless messages, he said he did make entries of them in what he called the F. T. book ("Funken Telegraphie"), and that in that book he entered various quite unimportant messages which he sent on ship's business at Kiel. At question 1260 he distinctly told the President there were two books : one the F. T. book and another for the wireless news of events supposed to be happening circulated from Norddeich for the benefit of the world in general. This evidence as to the F. T. book was, of course, in contradiction of the affidavit of Pfeiffer already referred to. This evidence as to the F. T. book was, of course, in contradiction of the affidavit of Pfeiffer already referred to. There seems, taking the evidence as a whole, the greatest uncertainty as to what books recording signals were really kept; but the one thing which is certain is, that any which were kept, except the news log, were thrown overboard when it was seen that the vessel was about to be searched. If nothing but innocent signals had been sent, the signal log was the very book of all others which should have been preserved. The result, therefore, is that the appellant has nothing to show to vouch his story that all signals sent (including the one so unnecessarily, according to his account of its purport, sent in secret code) were of an innocent character. Further, the absence of such evidence, if any ever existed, is caused by his own act. This leads to the subject of what is technically called spoliation of documents, on which the President, rightly as their Lordships think, laid much stress. The authorities on the subject are carefully reviewed in his judgment and these authorities and others were quoted on the appeal by the appellant's counsel. In considering these authorities it is necessary to recollect that the procedure in the Prize Court has been very substantially altered by the new rules abolishing the preliminary hearing. The alterations in modes of doing business in modern times may have made this preliminary hearing not quite so useful as it was formerly, and some modification of procedure may have been desirable; but the total abolition of a preliminary hearing seems to their Lordships, as has been remarked during the argument of this and other cases before this Board recently, to operate occasionally against the interests of the Crown. Certainly the procedure in the present case has given an advantage to the claimant which he would not have had under the old procedure. In the cases as to spoliation of documents, the point has frequently arisen on the preliminary hearing on documents, and the question has been debated whether or not further proof should be allowed. This point cannot arise under the present procedure, and it may be that in some respects the old doctrine was rather technical. In the cases as to spoliation of documents, the point has frequently arisen on the preliminary hearing on documents, and the question has been debated whether or not further proof should be allowed. This point cannot arise under the present procedure, and it may be that in some respects the old doctrine was rather technical. The substance of it, however, remains and is as forcible now as ever, and it is applicable not merely in prize cases, but to almost all kinds of disputes. If anyone by a deliberate act destroys a document which, according to what its contents may have been, would have told strongly either for him or against him, the strongest possible presumption arises that if it had been produced it would have told against him; and even if the document is destroyed by his own act, but under circumstances in which the intention to destroy evidence may fairly be considered rebutted, still be has to suffer. He is in the position that he is without the corroboration which might have been expected in his case. In the present case there are two separate destructions of documents : one the throwing overboard documents when the vessel was about to be searched, the other the destruction of the accounts relating to the stock and the consumption of signal lights. As to the first, the Attorney-General admits that the destruction of the code book to prevent it getting into enemy hands is at least excusable. It is, indeed, so obvious that that must at any rate be done that complaint could not be made of it. But Captain Pfeiffer naively admitted that, when throwing overboard documents to avoid their getting into enemy hands, he acted on the principle of throwing overboard too many rather than too few, and adds that the Morse signal book contained absolutely innocent messages, which could be read by anyone. That probably was so, but it may also have contained some which were not so innocent; and it is pretty obvious that when he threw it overboard he either knew it did, or was not sure that it did not. The Morse signal book could not have disclosed or given any key to the wireless signal code, so there could be no reason for destroying it except the consciousness that as something wrong had in fact taken place, it might be disclosed by the book. The Morse signal book could not have disclosed or given any key to the wireless signal code, so there could be no reason for destroying it except the consciousness that as something wrong had in fact taken place, it might be disclosed by the book. As pointed out, a wireless signal log might have been kept in such a way as not to disclose the code or give any key to it. The destruction of the stock book of signal lights cannot be excused by any fear of disclosing a secret code. It is suggested that it was innocent because the guard on the ship was told it was being done, and that British officers had already examined it. British officers would not in the first instance examine minutely documents of that kind, but would assume that if wanted they could be looked over afterwards. Pfeiffer and the paymaster doubtless knew what the signal lights really were for, and hoped that the British, who up to that time had made no point about it, would not find it out, so they destroyed the book. Nothing that can be called a reason was given for doing so. Even if the books had become waste paper, why destroy them? Their Lordships are of opinion that Captain Pfeiffer and the other witnesses have by their acts put themselves in such a position that their evidence cannot be relied on; that the evidence discloses facts of which no satisfactory explanations are or can be given; and that although on the Crown affidavit evidence some ambiguities have been pointed out which have not been cleared up by cross-examination or re-examination, yet there are incriminatory matters in those affidavits to which no answer has been given. They are of opinion that the President was fully justified in finding that "the 'Ophelia' was not constructed or adapted or used for the special and sole purpose of affording aid and relief to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, and that she was adapted and used as a signalling ship for military purposes." Their Lordships agree in that finding, which of course justifies the condemnation of the vessel as lawful prize. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Appeal Dismissed.