JUDGMENT : 1. The question in this case is whether an order ought to hays been made against the applicant, under Section 107 of the Cr PC, he being a person who had been engaged for some time past in disputes with his opponents about the boundaries of land, such disputes having taken various forms and having been fought out in various Courts with varying degrees of feeling. Compendiously stated, the facts with regard to the relationship of the parties show that there has been for some time past a series of disputes, litigation, and high feeling. The question of principle which is troubling me is, whether that condition of things alone justifies a Magistrate in interfering under this section, merely because he thinks either on the one hand that the person against whom the complaint is made is likely to be the first to break out into physical disorder, or on the other hand because he thinks that inasmuch as the law has provided a section and a remedy it is his business to find a victim. Let me say that I agree in the first place entirely with the authority cited to me by Mr. Malcomson, Emperor v. Ram Baran Singh, (1906) 28 All 406, where Richards, J., says that where a person forcibly interfered with another's possession of his land and threatened to take possession by force, and the Magistrate found that his conduct was such that there was a danger of his committing a breach of the peace, there was justification for interference under this section. On the other hand I entirely agree with and adopt the observations of Piggott, J., in a more recent case relied on by Mr. Satya Chandra, Brijnandanh Prasad v. Emperor, AIR 1914 All 268 : 37 All 33 : 26 IC 638. Two principles are laid down in that case, which I adopt. The first is as follows. If a Magistrate dealing with the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC, possesses knowledge of certain facts which he obtains from sources outside the record, he should not base his judgment upon those facts but should base it upon evidence relevant to the case. The first is as follows. If a Magistrate dealing with the proceedings under Section 107 of the Cr PC, possesses knowledge of certain facts which he obtains from sources outside the record, he should not base his judgment upon those facts but should base it upon evidence relevant to the case. The second principle is as follows: “What the law requires to justify this order is a finding that these applicants were likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. 2. Now, as I have pointed out, these disputes have gone on for soma time and there has been no breach of the peace. So far as the findings by the two judgments under revision are concerned, there have been no threats. The first Magistrate directs himself to the question who is in the right about the boundary dispute, and finds that the applicant is wrong altogether. The second Magistrate (of the district) in appeal says that it is obviously impossible to give a decision. It is a little odd to find two gentlemen, one in the Court of first instance and the other in the appellate Court, agreeing as to the essential question which they had got to decide, disagreeing as to the decision, and eventually agreeing as to the result. 3. I think that it is not the right question. The right question has been correctly stated by my brother Piggott. All that the judgments before me show about this case is that the lower Courts think there is a possibility of a breach of the peace unless something is done, because feeling is running very high. The answer to all this is that it has been going on for some time and there has been no breach of the peace. I quite agree with Mr. Malcomson that it would be a mistake to say that the Magistrate in such a case in administering this section ought to wait until the horse has got out of the stable before he shuts the door. 4. But it is by no means just to bar the door when there is not the slightest ground for believing that the horse is leaving the stable or the place where he is accustomed to rest and feed. 4. But it is by no means just to bar the door when there is not the slightest ground for believing that the horse is leaving the stable or the place where he is accustomed to rest and feed. I agree with what Blair, J., said in Narindra Bahadur Pal v. King Emperor, (1904) 1 ALJ 418 : 1 Cr LJ 696. In this case the Magistrate no donbt has taken great pains. Indeed he started the whole case. After somebody else had suggested to him that it was a proper case for Section 107 of the Cr PC, he directed the Sub-Inspector “to work up a case.” From the point of view of industry the result does them great credit. The Sub-Inspector and the Magistrate have worked up the case and have arrived at the conviction for which they started to work. The misfortune is that they had not the necessary facts to justify a conviction and even a Magistrate cannot make bricks without straw. Blair, J., pointed out that if the Magistrate in the case with which he was dealing “had been in the position of a dictator, his conclusion might have been a right one.” The present case is very like that. The Magistrate appears to have acted, not so much like a dictator, as like a spiritual father whose duty it was to keep his flock in control, and in the absence of anything better to suit his purpose to find a scapegoat. I think the judgment in this case shows that the applicant was a scapegoat, and that there was no legal evidence on which such an order should have been made. The application must be allowed and the order of the Magistrate set aside.