JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against an order of dismissal of an application for execution of a decree. The decree was made on the 5th November 1906. The first application for execution was made on the 12th October 1909. Notice under Or. 21, r. 22 was directed to issue, as more than a year had elapsed from the date of the decree. There is an entry, in the order-sheet of return of service, which states that notice was served duly. But, on the 15th December 1909, the application was dismissed for default, as neither the decree-holder nor the judgment-debtor was present. The second application for execution was made on the 15th July 1911. Notice was directed to issue on the judgment-debtors under Or. 21, r. 22. The entry in the order-sheet made on the 7th August 1911 recites that the notice had been duly served. On the 21st August 1911, the Court directed a writ of attachment to issue in respect of the immoveable properties of the judgment-debtors. There is an entry in the order-sheet that the writ had been served in due course. This was followed by an order for proclamation of sale. But the proclamation was not published and the case was again dismissed for default on the 16th January 1912. The present application for execution was made on the 24th January 1913. The judgment-debtors entered appearance and contended that the application was barred by limitation. The Courts below have given effect to this objection and have dismissed the application. They have found that the application for execution made on the 12th October 1909 was defective in substance, that time was accordingly given to the decree-holder to amend and re-file the application within five days, that the application was not re-filed within the time allowed, and, that, even when re-filed on the 20th November 1909, without leave obtained for extension of time, it was defective in material particulars. On these grounds, the Courts have held that the application of the 12th October 1909 was not in accordance with law to the proper Court to take a step in aid of execution, that the subsequent application for execution made on the 10th July 1911 was consequently of no avail to the decree-holder, and that the present application was thus clearly barred by limitation. Neither of the Courts below, however, has examined in detail the proceedings on the basis of the second application for execution, and, this omission has, in our opinion, led to an error of law which vitiates their concurrent decision. An examination of the order-sheet in the proceedings on the basis of the second application discloses that on the 21st August 1911, the Court directed a writ of attachment to issue. This was in substance a determination that the decree was on that date alive and capable of execution. So long as that determination stands, it is impossible for the judgment-debtors to contend that the present application is barred by limitation. [Mangal Prosad Dichit v. Girija K. Lahiri (I.L.R. 8 Cal. 51 (1881))]. The order for attachment was, if the entries in the order-sheet are reliable, made after service of notice on the judgment-debtors under r. 22 of Or. 21 of the Code, and was followed by service of the writ of attachment. Consequently, to entitle the judgment-debtors to escape from the operation of the order of the 21st August 1911, they must establish that the order was made without notice to them. The principle applicable to cases of this character as deducible from a long line of cases [Maazzam Hossein v. Sarat Kumari Debi (11 C.L.J. 357 (1909)), Mon Mohon v. Dwarka Nath (12 C.L.J. 312, (1910)) and Mochai Mandal v. Meseruddin Mollah (18 C.L.J. 26 (1910))] is that an order made at one stage of execution proceedings cannot be questioned at a later stage, unless the parties sought to be bound by such order had no notice of the proceedings. Cases are by no means rare where orders have been obtained in execution proceedings without service of notice on the judgment-debtor, who has subsequently succeeded, on proof of non-service of notice upon him, to escape from the effect of such ex parte order. Reference may, in this connection, be made to Sheik Badan v. Ram Chandra (I.L.R. 11 Bom. 537 (1887)), Narayana v. Gopala (I.L.R. 28 Mad. 355 (1904)) and Ramaswami Naik v. Ramaswami Chelli (I.L.R. 80 Mad. 255, (1907)). This point of view does not appear to have been fully realised in either of the Courts below; as a result, the judgment-debtors have been allowed to attack the validity of the proceeding on the first application, regardless of what had taken place on the second application. 355 (1904)) and Ramaswami Naik v. Ramaswami Chelli (I.L.R. 80 Mad. 255, (1907)). This point of view does not appear to have been fully realised in either of the Courts below; as a result, the judgment-debtors have been allowed to attack the validity of the proceeding on the first application, regardless of what had taken place on the second application. But before they could reach that stage, they were bound to attack the order of the 21st August 1911 and to establish that it was not operative against them because made without previous service of notice. The judgment-debtors, however, have contended here that the burden lies upon the decree-holder to establish that the order in question is conclusive, because made after service of notice on them. In our opinion, this position is absolutely untenable. There is no presumption that the proceedings in execution in this or in other cases have been vitiated by fraud and that the entries in the order-sheet contain an untrue statement of what took place in the Court below. The petition of objection of the judgment-debtors shows that they attacked the proceedings in execution as fraudulently taken. They alleged specifically that by reason of collusion between the officers of the Court and the decree-holders, the notices had been deliberately suppressed and false returns had been submitted to the Court. When fraud of this description is charged, it is incumbent upon the judgment-debtors to establish at least a prima facie case. But reference has been made to the decisions in Mir Tapurah v. Gopi Narain (7 C.L.J. 251 (1907)), Radhey Koer v. Ajodhya Das (7 C.L.J. 262 (1907)), Ananda Kishore v. Daiji Thakurani (10 C.L.J. 189 (1909)) and Mohiudddin v. Pirthi Chand Lal (19 C.W.N. 1159 (1914)) to show that entries in the order-sheet as to the factum of service of notice issued by the Court are not admissible in evidence. There is no room for dispute that such ex parte entries did not constitute conclusive evidence; at the same time, as we have said, there is no presumption that the entries are false. The party who contends that the entries do not correctly state the events that have taken place must start his case. The position is different where, as in the case of Mir Tapurah v. Gopi Narain (7 C.L.J. 251 (1907)) where service of notice of deposit under sec. The party who contends that the entries do not correctly state the events that have taken place must start his case. The position is different where, as in the case of Mir Tapurah v. Gopi Narain (7 C.L.J. 251 (1907)) where service of notice of deposit under sec. 61 (11 C.L.J. 357 (1909)) of the Bengal Tenancy Act was raised, or in Radhey Koer v. Ajodhya Das (7 C.L.J. 262 (1907)) where service of notice of annulment of incumbrance under sec. 167 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was in controversy, the entry affects a person who is not a party to the proceedings. The case of Ananda Kishore v. Daiji (10 C.L.J. 189 (1909)) merely shows that an entry in an order-sheet of a Collector in a proceeding for partition of an estate, that possession has been delivered to one of the share-holders, is no evidence that he is in possession at a subsequent date so as to bar a suit for declaratory relief. There is also a fundamental difference between the case before us and the other class of cases represented by Mohiuddin v. Pirthi Chand (19 C.W.N. 1159 (1914)) where no right accrues against a stranger till the statutory notice has been served on him. There the service of notice is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court, is essential for the creation of a right in the claimant; in such a case, the claimant must establish that all the statutory requirements have been strictly carried out. We feel no doubt whatever that in the case before us the burden lies upon the judgment-debtors to establish that the notices were not served upon them. If that allegation is not made out, the order of the Court, dated the 21st August 1911, stands unimpeached and is an effective bar against an attack on the earlier proceedings in execution. 2. The result is that this appeal is allowed and the order of the Courts below discharged. The case will be remitted to the Court of first instance in order that it may, upon evidence to be adduced by both sides, determine whether the order of the 21st August 1911 was or was not made with notice to the judgment-debtors. If it is established that it was made with notice to the judgment-debtors, the objection of limitation must be overruled. If it is established that it was made with notice to the judgment-debtors, the objection of limitation must be overruled. If, on the other hand, it is established that the order was made without service of notice upon the judgment-debtors, the question of validity of the earlier proceedings in execution, will be taken up for examination. The Appellant is entitled to her costs in this Court as also in the Courts below. We assess the hearing fee at two gold mohurs in this Court and at one gold mohur in each of the Courts below. The sum payable as costs, which will be specified in the decree, must be deposited in the Court of first instance within one month after the arrival of the record there. If the sum is not so deposited, the objection of the judgment-debtors will stand overruled and execution will proceed forthwith at the instance of the decree-holders.