JUDGMENT Teunon and Beachcroft, JJ. - The question for our consideration in this Rule is one of jurisdiction. The complainant has brought charges under Sections 403, 406 of the Indian Penal Code in the Court of the Magistrate at Krishnagar in the district of Nadia, against the Petitioner, an official of an Insurance Company having its head office at Bimlipatam in the Madras Presidency, alleging that he has misappropriated certain sums of money paid on account of an insurance policy. The question is whether the case can be tried in the Nadia Court. 2. Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the jurisdiction of Criminal Courts. Section 177 provides the general rule that an offence mint ordinarily be tried in the Court within the local Limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. Then follow a number of enabling sections which extend the jurisdiction of Courts. One of these, Section 181(2), provide specially for the trial of the offence of criminal misappropriation. By it the offence may be tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any part of the property, the subject of the offence, was received or retained as well as by the Court which is given jurisdiction by Section 177. 3. Now, when the Code in express terms enumerates the Courts which have jurisdiction in language which is apparently exhaustive, if it is sought to establish the fact that another enabling section still further extends the jurisdiction, we must only give effect to the argument if the Court claiming jurisdiction comes strictly within the terms of the section. 4. The Crown contends that Section 179 is such an enabling section. That section provides that when a person is accused of the commission of an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such tiling has been done or any such consequence has ensued." In the present case the money was received at Bimlipatam and it is not suggested that the conversion of the property to the use of accused took place anywhere else. But it is argued that loss was caused to the complainant in Nadia and therefore, by the application of Section 179, the Nadia Court has jurisdiction. 5. But it is argued that loss was caused to the complainant in Nadia and therefore, by the application of Section 179, the Nadia Court has jurisdiction. 5. Now, for the application of Section 179 it is essential that the offence should depend on an act done and on a consequence which has ensued. But loss to one person, though a normal result of an act of misappropriation by another, is not an essential ingredient of the offence of criminal misappropriation. The offence is complete if the conversion is done with the intention of causing wrongful gain to the offender irrespective of any loss which may ensue to any other person. The offence does not depend on the consequence which has ensued but only on the act which has been done. Section 179, therefore, does not in terms apply. 6. There is no reported decision on the point in this Court. The case of Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose ILR (1899) Cal. 746, has no application, as the charge there was of cheating. In the Madras Court the case of Rambilis v. Emperor (1914) Mad. W.N. 894, is in favour of the Petitioner. In the Allahabad Court there have been contrary decisions. The case of Queen-Empress v. O'Brien ILR (1896) All. 111, which was followed in Langridge v. Atkins ILR (1912) All. 29 supports the Crown, while that of Ganeshi Lal v. Nand Kishore ILR (1912) All 487, supports the Petitioner. The case of Emperor v. Mahadeo ILR (1910) All. 397, is not exactly in point as the Court held that the acts of embezzlement must have taken place at Mirzapur or at one of the districts in which the accused travelled. It also held that Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was applicable. The cases of Ganeshi Lal v. Nand Kishore ILR (1912) All 487 and Rambilas v. Emperor (1914) Mad. W.N. 894, in our opinion, express the correct view. 7. The Rule is, therefore, made absolute and the proceedings against the Petitioner are quashed.