Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (February 3, 1911) reversing the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Burdwan. Beni Madhab Das obtained decrees against Chhatrapat Singh for money borrowed by him, and on his application a patni taluqa was ordered to be sold in execution, the sale being fixed for February 13, 1904. The appellants, Sripat Singh and Jagatpat Singh, who were the only sons of Chhatrapat Singh, thereupon each instituted a suit alleging that the property was that of a Mitakshara joint family, consisting of their father and themselves, and that the decree was in respect of debts contracted, not for lawful purposes of the joint family, but for immoral purposes. They each claimed a third share and prayed for an injunction. An interim injunction was made ex parte restraining the 61 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 1 ( 1916- 1917) Sripat Singh V. P. K. Tagore 162 execution proceedings. Upon August 13, 1904, Beni Madhab Das showed cause against the injunction and alleged that the property belonged separately to Chhatrapat Singh. The injunction was dissolved ; the judge, however, held that as the insertion of the words " right, title, and interest " in the sale order was not calculated to affect the interest of either party they should be added to the description in the sale notices. The sale notices accordingly described the property to be sold as " all right, title, and interest of the judgment debtor in the said patni, with all its rights and appurtenances." The property was bought by Beni Madhab Das, who afterwards transferred it to the respondents Sarat Chandra Mukerji and Shrish Chandra Mukerji. Neither of the suits above referred to proceeded to trial. On July 3, 1905, Chhatrapat Singh and his sons, the appellants, instituted the present suit in which, so far as is material to the appeal, the appellants claimed a declaration against Beni Madhab Das that the sale was inoperative as to two thirds of the property, of which portion they claimed possession. They again alleged that the property was joint family property and that the debt was incurred for immoral purposes. The respondent. Sir P. K. Tagore was joined as a defendant, and Chhatrapat Singh as a plaintiff, in relation to a claim to set aside the sale as a whole upon a ground not material to the appeal. They again alleged that the property was joint family property and that the debt was incurred for immoral purposes. The respondent. Sir P. K. Tagore was joined as a defendant, and Chhatrapat Singh as a plaintiff, in relation to a claim to set aside the sale as a whole upon a ground not material to the appeal. Both Courts in India held that the father and two sons formed a Mitakshara joint family of which the father was managing member. The Subordinate Judge found that the debts upon which the decrees were founded were for legal necessities and were binding upon the joint family. He held, however, that, since the order and notices only provided for the sale of the debtors " right, title, and interest " in the taluqa, only his share passed to the purchaser. The High Court upon appeal reversed the decision. The learned judges agreed with the finding that the debts were binding upon the joint family. They were of opinion that what was sold was the whole property over which Chhatrapat Singh had a disposing power, whether that power existed in virtue of sole separate ownership, or under the Mitakshara law as kartah of the joint family. They thought that that was the intention of the Court in making the order, and found that the price paid by the purchaser was the full value of the entire taluqa. 1916. Nov. 9, 10. Be Gruyther, K.C., and Sir W. Garth, for the appellants. The sale being of the " right, title, and interest " of the judgment debtor, only his individual interest in the property passed to the purchaser. The sale was not intended to, and did not, pass the shares of the appellants. [Reference was made to Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (( 1877) L. R. 4 Ind. Ap. 247.); Hurdey Narain Saha v. Rooder Perkash Mitter (( 1883) L. R. 11 Ind. Ap. 26.) ; Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh. (( 1887) L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 77.)] Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Dunne, for the respondents Mukerji. The effect of the order was that the whole interest over which the debtor had a disposing power should be sold. The facts show that it was the intention of all parties that the whole joint family interest should be sold subject to the contention that the debts were for immoral purposes. The effect of the order was that the whole interest over which the debtor had a disposing power should be sold. The facts show that it was the intention of all parties that the whole joint family interest should be sold subject to the contention that the debts were for immoral purposes. Both Courts have negatived that contention. [Reference was made to Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Prasad Singh (( 1879) L. R. 6 Ind. Ap. 88.) ; Mahabir Pershad v. Markunda Nath Sahai. (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 11.)] De Gruyther, K.C., replied. Nov. 10. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER L.C. The point to be decided in this case is extremely simple, and it is this 61 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 1 ( 1916- 1917) Sripat Singh V. P. K. Tagore 163 What was the extent of the estate that passed on the sale, under a decree of the Court of August 13, 1904, of "the right, title, and interest " of a judgment debtor in certain property ? There is no doubt whatever that all parties considered that the entire estate had been sold under the order. The price was based upon that hypothesis, and the present appellants were so much impressed with this view that they instituted proceedings for the purpose of obtaining a declaration that in the special circumstances of the case only one third was properly liable to attachment. The grounds for that action were these The property in question was joint property, governed by the Mitakshara law. By that law a judgment against the father of the family cannot be executed against the whole of the joint family property, if the debt in respect of which the judgment has been obtained was a debt incurred for illegal or immoral purposes. In every other event it is open to the execution creditor to sell the whole of the estate in satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the father alone. In the proceedings so instituted the plaintiffs accordingly alleged that the consideration for the debt was illegal and immoral, and on this allegation obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the sale of the whole of the estate which was then admittedly the subject of advertisement, and a formal application was subsequently made asking that the injunction might be continued. In the proceedings so instituted the plaintiffs accordingly alleged that the consideration for the debt was illegal and immoral, and on this allegation obtained an ex parte injunction restraining the sale of the whole of the estate which was then admittedly the subject of advertisement, and a formal application was subsequently made asking that the injunction might be continued. Upon the hearing of that application it was urged by the appellants that, their case as to the illegality and immorality of the consideration for the debt being still under consideration, the judge ought to suspend pro ceedings under the execution decree until that point had been determined, and upon this application the order was made which has given rise to the dispute. The appellants were quite willing that the order should be amended by adding the words " right, title, and interest," and to this request the learned judge acceded. The words so used are undoubtedly ambiguous—Simbhunath Panday v. Golab Singh (L. R. 14 Ind. Ap. 77.)—and lend colour to the contention that they only cover the actua third which the judgment debtor possessed in his own right, and leave unaffected the two thirds which, though capable of being bound by the order, were not in fact the property of the debtor at all. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the facts and circumstances which led to their introduction Mahabir Pershad v. Markunda Nath Sahai. (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 11.) The learned judge stated this reason in plain language. He said that the addition of those words would not be calculated to affect the case of either party, and upon that footing they were introduced. Now there is only one hypothesis upon which the introduction of those words could have left the rights of either party unaffected, and that is by construing the order that if the plaintiffs succeeded in establishing that the debt had been incurred for immoral purposes only one third would be affected by the decree, while if they failed in that contention, as was ultimately the case, the whole of the estate would remain subject to the order for sale. That, in their Lordships opinion, is what the order meant, and had it effected anything else the result would have been that, without any reason at all, the judge would have deprived the execution creditor of the undoubted right that he possessed, except upon the happening of one event, which, in the result, has never arisen, to sell the entirety of the estate. Their Lordships are in entire agreement with the view expressed in the case—Mahabir Per shad v. Markunda Nath Sahai (L. R. 17 Ind. Ap. 11.)—to which Sir Robert Finlay called their attention, that in cases of this kind it is of the utmost importance that the substance, and not the mere technicalities, of the transaction should be regarded. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed, with costs to the respondents who appeared.