Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Chief Court (March 31, 1915) reversing a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Thaton. The appellant was the eldest son of one U Tu, who died intestate on December 19, 1906, leaving considerable movable and immovable property. On June 24, 191o, he instituted a suit in the District Court of Thaton against the respondents, the widow (his mother) and the remaining children of U Tu, claiming that as auratha, or eldest surviving son, he was entitled by Burmese Buddhist law to a fourth share in his fathers estate. The respondents by their written statement (so far as is material to the appeal) denied that the appellant was so entitled, and alleged that if he was he had exercised his election not to claim and could not then do so. At the date of the death of U Tu the appellant was a married man living apart from his parents. No evidence was given at the trial of any renunciation of his share by the appellant, 88 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 42 ( 1916- 1917) Maung Tun Tha V. Ma Thit 189 the case for the defendants resting upon the fact that no demand for a partition of his share was made by him until six years after his fathers death. The District Judge held that the appellant was entitled to the share which he claimed. On appeal the Chief Court (Twomey and Ormond JJ.) reversed the decision. The learned judges pointed out that the dhammathats do not expressly provide that the eldest son must decide promptly to make his claim. They said, however. " But from the nature of the option it is necessary in the interest of the family that it should be exercised without delay. According as it is exercised or not the mode of managing the property mast vary and the prospects of the other heirs would vary.....We think that the rights given to the eldest son (Manukye, book 10, rule 5) of claiming a quarter share of the joint estate on his fathers death must be exercised as soon as possible after that event, and that if the option is not exercised without unreasonable delay it lapses altogether." 1916. Nov. 13. Be Gruyther, K.C., and Eddis, for the appellant. Nov. 13. Be Gruyther, K.C., and Eddis, for the appellant. The Manukye, book 10, rule 5, clearly states that the eldest son upon the death of his father, his mother surviving, is entitled to a fourth share of the estate. The terms of the Manukye being unambiguous, it is not necessary to examine other dhammathats Mah Nhin Bwin v. U Shwe Gone. (( 1913) L. R. 41 Ind. Ap. 121, 138) They do not, however, support the contention that the right is in the nature of an option. The Attasankhepa Vannana, which was translated in 1907 under Government authority, in s. 150 states the rule in substantially the same terms as the Manukye. If any period of limitation is suggested by the dhammathats it is displaced by Sched. I., art. 123, of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provides a period of twelve years Maung Po Min v. U Shwe Lu. (( 1903) 2 Lower Burma Rulings, 110.) [Manukye, book 10, rule 14, and U Gaungs Digest, vol. 1, ss. 30, 34, were also referred to.] Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and F. J. Coltman, for the respondents. A general consideration of the dhammathat’s shows that the right of the eldest son to a quarter share is in the nature of an option. It is referred to in Chan Toons Principles of Buddhist Law at p. 104 as follows "The joint family system has never prevailed among the Burmese; the children do not acquire an inherent right in the family property by birth. But on the death of either parent the eldest son may claim a share in the family property.” The present claim was not made within a reasonable time of the fathers death, and the appellant must be taken to have elected not to claim. A partition of the property takes place upon the death of the surviving parent, and, as appears from the Manukye, book 10, rule 14, the eldest sons position may be improved if he has not segregated his fourth share. This indicates that his right upon the death of the first parent is an option. [Reference was made to Ma Su v. Ma Tin. This indicates that his right upon the death of the first parent is an option. [Reference was made to Ma Su v. Ma Tin. (( 1912) 6 Lower Burma Rulings, 77.)] The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER L.C. The appellant in this case is the plaintiff in certain proceedings which were instituted in the District Court at Thaton, by which he claimed to have one fourth share of the estate of his father determined and allotted to him. The claim is stated quite clearly, and with commendable brevity, in the plaint, which sets out allegations which are no longer in dispute, namely, that the plaintiff was the eldest son of his father, that his father died on December 19, 1906, intestate, and left a widow and certain other sons and daughters him surviving. The ground upon which that claim was resisted depended in the main upon an allegation that the plaintiff had behaved in an unfilial and illegal way, and, consequently, had forfeited his rights. That defence was disposed of by the learned judge who heard the cause, who, although he appears to have 88 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 42 ( 1916- 1917) Maung Tun Tha V. Ma Thit 190 been greatly embarrassed by the untrustworthiness of the evidence before him, decided that the defendant had not established this allegation. The only other matter left for decision was one which, according to the defendants contention, arose upon paragraph 5 of their defence. That paragraph suggested that the plaintiff had not in fact any share in the estate, but that, on the death of his father, he had obtained a right to elect whether he would have that share or no, and that, in the absence of election within a reasonable time, the claim could not now be brought forward. That view was sup ported by the Chief Court, and from their decision this appeal has been brought. The whole of that contention depends, as Mr. Coltman very fairly stated, upon considering the two different rules of the dhammathat Manukye which are applicable to this case. They are rule 5 and rule 14 of book 10. That view was sup ported by the Chief Court, and from their decision this appeal has been brought. The whole of that contention depends, as Mr. Coltman very fairly stated, upon considering the two different rules of the dhammathat Manukye which are applicable to this case. They are rule 5 and rule 14 of book 10. The first relates to the partition of an estate upon the death of the father, and it is under that rule, and, as their Lordships understands it, under that rule alone, that the right of the plaintiff in this case arises. It is in these words " When the father has died the two laws for the partition of the inheritance between the mother and the sons are these Let the eldest son have the riding horse " and certain ornaments, and it then pro ceeds " Let the residue be divided into four parts, of which let the eldest son have one, and the mother and the younger children three." It is said that rule 14, which deals with the division of the estate on the death of the mother, shows that, if the one fourth had not been segregated and paid over to the eldest son after the fathers death and before the mother died, there would be a different method of distribution, one that might be more favourable, or that might be more unfavourable, to the eldest son, but which certainly would not be the same as that to which he was entitled under rule 5. Their Lordships do not think that it is desirable to express an opinion upon the true construction of rule 14. It is a matter that may arise for determination hereafter, and its determination is not relevant to the present question because, even assuming in favour of the respondents that the rights of the eldest son would change in the event of his not having segregated his one fourth before his mothers death, it by no means follows that the right which he got under rule 5 was merely the right to elect within a certain limited period of time whether he would take the property or no. Their Lordships can find no ground whatever for the suggestion that he got anything under rule 5 excepting a definite one fourth part of the estate, a right which he was at liberty to assert within any period that was not outside the period fixed by Sched. I., art. 123, of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, as the period within which a claim must be made for a share of property on the death of an intestate. The respondents have certainly urged before their Lordships all that could be urged in support of their view, but their Lordships find themselves quite unable to accept their arguments or to agree with the view which was formed by the Chief Court in this matter. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the Chief Court set aside with costs, and the decree of the District Court restored. The respondents will pay the costs of the appeal.