Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 6, 1914) reversing the judgment of Blakewell J. at the trial. The appellant, who was a merchant in London, brought an action in the Kings Bench Division of the High Court of Justice in England to recover from the defendant, who resided at Madras, 4251. 17 s. 2d., being the difference between the amount of bills drawn upon the appellant by a firm in which he alleged that the respondent was a partner and the value of the goods against which the bills were drawn. Leave was obtained to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction under the Rules of the Supreme Court, Order xi., r. 1 (e). The respondent entered an appearance under protest and took proceed ings to set aside the writ and service, but his objection was disallowed by the Court of Appeal see [ 1912] 1 K. B. 215. He subsequently delivered a defence, and on February 11, 1913, was ordered to answer certain interrogatories. He failed to comply with that order, and the judge at chambers consequently made an order on May 5, 1913, that his defence should be struck out, and that the plaintiff (appellant) should be at liberty to sign judgment for the amount claimed and costs. Judgment 64 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 6 ( 1916- 1917) Keymer V. P. Visvanatham Reddi 165 was entered accordingly for 425Z. 175. 2d. and 1501. 16s. 1d., the amount at which the costs were taxed and allowed. On October 13, 1913, the appellant instituted the present suit in the High Court against the respondent. By his plaint he claimed the two above-mentioned sums (amounting to Rs.8649) under the judgment, and alleged that the present cause of action arose at Madras on July 14, 1913, when the defendant upon demand failed to satisfy his claim. The defendant (respondent) by his written statement pleaded that he was not bound by the judgment of the Kings Bench Division on the grounds (1.) that that Court had no jurisdiction, and (2.) that the judgment was ex parte and was not given after a trial upon the merits. Blakewell J. delivered judgment for the appellant. Upon appeal the Court (Wallis and Aiyer JJ.) reversed that judgment. Blakewell J. delivered judgment for the appellant. Upon appeal the Court (Wallis and Aiyer JJ.) reversed that judgment. The learned judges held that the judgment sued on was one " not given on the merits " within the meaning of s. 13 (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The case is reported at I. L. R. 39 Madr. 95. 1916. Nov. 14. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellant. Under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the judgment sued on is conclusive between the parties and amounted to an estoppel; the judgment is not within the exception in sub-s. (6). The respondent, by failing to comply with the order to answer interrogatories and by allowing his defence to be struck out, must be taken to have admitted the facts alleged. The judgment was a final and conclusive decision of the case by a Court of competent jurisdiction. [Reference was made to Ram Chand v, Bartlett ( 1909 P. R. 263, 282.), Moazzim Hossein Khan v. Robinson (( 1901) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 641.), The Delta (( 1876) 1 P. D. 393.), Harris v. Quine (( 1869) L. R. 4 Q.B. 653.), Emanuel v. Symons ([ 1908] 1 K. B. 302.), In re South American Co. ([ 1895] 1 Ch. 95.), and Nuvion v. Freeman. (( 1889) 15 App. Cas. 1.)] De Gruyther, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the respondent, were not called upon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER L.C. This case raises only a short question, but admittedly it is one of wide and general importance. It is for that reason that the Board departed from their usual course, and permitted Sir Robert Finlay to resume his argument after it had been concluded and his junior had addressed the Board. After having given full consideration to the arguments urged both by him and by his junior, the Board find themselves unable to accede to his contention. The history of the case is this The appellant was originally plaintiff in a suit brought by him in this country against the respondent. In that suit he claimed a sum of 425?. 17s. 2d., which he said was due to him from the respondent in these circumstances The plaintiff is an Indian merchant carrying on business in London. The history of the case is this The appellant was originally plaintiff in a suit brought by him in this country against the respondent. In that suit he claimed a sum of 425?. 17s. 2d., which he said was due to him from the respondent in these circumstances The plaintiff is an Indian merchant carrying on business in London. The defendant, he alleged, was a member of a certain firm of traders who traded in Madras. The plaintiff asserted that he had entered into an arrangement with the firm, of which the defendant was a member, under which the firm were to consign to him, the plaintiff, goods for sale in London ; they were to be sold on a certain commission, this commission and expenses were to be deducted, and the net proceeds were tc be remitted back to India. As against those proceeds, it was also arranged that the defendant should be at liberty to draw bills to the extent of 75 per cent. The plaintiff asserted that bills were so drawn, that he accepted them, and that ultimately it was found that these bills exceeded the amount of the proceeds for which he was properly accountable by the sum of 425l. 175. 2d., and for that sum he brought his suit. His statement of claim set out these facts, and to that claim a defence was delivered by the respondent, who denied that he ever was a partner in the firm with whom, and with whom alone, it was asserted that the transaction had been made. He also denied in less explicit terms that there was any money due, or that the arrangements had been made under which the plaintiff asserted that his claim arose. Upon this defence being put in, the plaintiff 64 Law. Rep. 44 Ind. App. 6 ( 1916- 1917) Keymer V. P. Visvanatham Reddi 166 applied for liberty to exhibit interrogatories. That liberty was granted, and interrogatories were exhibited calling upon the defendant to speak as to some of the material matters in dispute. Those interrogatories the defendant omitted to answer, and thereupon an application was made to the Court asking that the defence might be struck out and judgment entered for the plaintiff in the action. That liberty was granted, and interrogatories were exhibited calling upon the defendant to speak as to some of the material matters in dispute. Those interrogatories the defendant omitted to answer, and thereupon an application was made to the Court asking that the defence might be struck out and judgment entered for the plaintiff in the action. That judgment was accordingly given on May 5, 1913, and it is in these terms " It is ordered upon the application of the plaintiff that the defendants defence herein be struck out, and that the defendant be placed in the same position as if he had not defended, and that the plaintiff be at liberty to sign judgment for 425l. 17s. 2d., the amount p claimed herein, and his costs of this action to be taxed " ; and then judgment is entered for the 425l. 17s. 2d. and the taxed costs. Upon that judgment the appellant sued the respondent in Madras. The respondent set up by way of defence the statement that the judgment between him and the plaintiff in the English Courts had not been a judgment given upon the merits of the action, and that consequently, by virtue of s. 13, sub-s. (6), of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the action could not be maintained on the judgment alone in the Indian Courts, and that the merits would have to be investigated. The question as to whether that defence is well established depends upon considering what are the terms of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and what is the meaning of the phrase there contained as to a judgment given " on the merits of the case." Sect. 13 begins by a general provision that foreign judgments shall be conclusive as between parties to the litigation. 13 begins by a general provision that foreign judgments shall be conclusive as between parties to the litigation. It is in these terms "A foreign judgment shall be conclusive as to any matter thereby directly adjudicated upon between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title." But to that general provision there are certain definite exceptions, and one of them is as follows " Except where such judgment has not been given on the merits of the case." The whole question in the present appeal is whether, in the circumstances narrated, judgment was given on May 5, 1913, between the parties on the merits of the case. Now if the merits of the case are examined, there would appear to be, first, a denial that there was a partnership between the defendant and the firm with whom the plaintiff had entered into the arrangement; secondly, a denial that the arrangement had been made; and, thirdly, and a more general denial, that even if the arrangement had been made the circumstances upon which the plaintiff alleged that his right to the money arose had never transpired. No single one of those matters was ever considered or was ever the subject of adjudication at all. In point of fact what happened was that, because the defendant refused to answer the interrogatories which had been submitted to him, the merits of the case were never investigated and his defence was struck out. He was treated as though he had not defended, and judgment was given upon that footing. It appears to their Lordships that no such decision as that can be regarded as a decision given on the merits of the case within the meaning of s. 13, sub-s. (6). It is quite plain that that sub-section must refer to some general class of case, and Sir Robert Finlay was asked to explain to what class of case in his view it did refer. In answer he pointed out to their Lordships that it would refer to a case where judgment had been given upon the question of the Statutes of Limitation, and he may be well founded in that view. In answer he pointed out to their Lordships that it would refer to a case where judgment had been given upon the question of the Statutes of Limitation, and he may be well founded in that view. But there must be other matters to which the sub-section refers, and in their Lordships view it refers to those cases where, for one reason or another, the controversy raised in the action has not, in fact, been the subject of direct adjudication by the Court. In the circumstances that happened here it is in their Lordships view impossible to hold that the merits of this case were ever the subject of adjudication, and therefore they think that this appeal must fail. They will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.