Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (May 29, 1912) affirming, with a modification, a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Burdwan. By a registered lease dated May 24, 1901, the appellants father, Cooverji Bhoja, acquired certain mining rights from the then she-baits of an idol on the terms that the lessee should pay certain commission or royalties for all coal raised by him, and that if no coal was cut he should pay a minimum royalty of Rs.4000 per annum in quarterly instalments, with interest in case of default. A sum of Rs.5000 was paid upon execution of the lease, this sum to be repaid by setting off Rs. 1000 yearly against the royalties for the first five years. The material part of the lease is set out in the judgment of their Lordships. On March 5, 1908, the lessee not having cut any coal, three of the then four shebaits instituted a suit against the lessee to recover the minimum royalties provided by the lease, with interest, after crediting the Rs.5000 above referred to. The fourth shebait, Debanand, being unwilling to sue, was joined as a defendant. The principal defendant (represented in the appeal by the appellant) by his written statement alleged that he had paid to Debanand and to one of the plaintiffs jointly the whole amount due and that they had given him a receipt on behalf of the lessors. The Indian Limitation Act was not pleaded. Debanand by his written statement admitted that he had received Rs.4000 in respect of his share of the royalties, but denied that any further payment had been made. The Subordinate Judge found that the alleged receipt was a forgery and made a decree in favour of the three plaintiffs for three fourths of the royalties and interest payable under the lease, and in favour of the defendant Debanand for one fourth of that amount, less the Rs.4000 which he had received. The lessee died before the hearing, and the present appellant, his son, who had been substituted for him on the record, appealed to the High Court. Debanand did not appeal. The High Court (Chitty and Teunion JJ.) agreed with the finding that the alleged receipt was a forgery. The learned judges stated that an issue had been raised before them as to whether the claim was not barred by the Indian Limitation Act. Debanand did not appeal. The High Court (Chitty and Teunion JJ.) agreed with the finding that the alleged receipt was a forgery. The learned judges stated that an issue had been raised before them as to whether the claim was not barred by the Indian Limitation Act. Upon that question they held that they were bound by previous decisions of the Court to hold that art. 116 of the Limitation Act, 1877, Sched. II., and not art. 110, was applicable, and that the period was therefore six and not three years. They accordingly dismissed the appeal, but directed that the form of the decree should be altered into one in favour of the plaintiffs for the whole amount found to be due. 1916. Nov. 6, 7. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dunne, for the appellant. The plaintiffs claim was for " arrears of rent" within the meaning of art. 110, and the period of limitation was consequently only three years. The High Court was bound by its previous decision in Umesh Chunder Mundul v. Adarmoni Dasi. (( 1887) I. L. R. 15 Calc. 221.) That case and the authorities there followed were wrongly decided. The Allahabad High Court rightly held in Ram Narain v. Kalta Singh (I. L. R. 26 Allah. 138.) that a claim for rent due under a registered lease came under art. 110 and not under art. 116. The cause of action being one specifically provided for by art. 110, resort should not be had to a more general article. The word " compensation " in art. 116 indicate that the article applies only to a claim for unliquidated damages. [Reference was also made to Vythilinga Pillai v. Thetchanamurthi Pillai. (( 1880) I. L. R. 3 Madr. 76.)] In any case the decree made by the trial judge in favour of Debanand was irregular. He did not appeal, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to amend the decree in his favour. Sir W. Garth, for the respondents (Debanand excepted). There was no plea of limitation. The claim being for royalties and not for rent, the question of limitation did not arise upon the face of the plaint. The High Court was therefore not entitled to entertain the contention under s. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1877. There is, however, a current of authority in support of the decision even if the claim was for rent. The claim being for royalties and not for rent, the question of limitation did not arise upon the face of the plaint. The High Court was therefore not entitled to entertain the contention under s. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1877. There is, however, a current of authority in support of the decision even if the claim was for rent. [Their Lordships intimated that they were satisfied as to the question of limitation.] The High Court was entitled to amend the form of the decree. The plaintiffs claimed the whole amount due, and the appeal was against the decree as a whole. Debanand was a respondent to the appeal. Dec. 20. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SUMNER. In this case an idol, by his paricharaks and shebaits, sued to recover mining royalties under a lease of his colliery property in Burdwan. The shebaits, who made the agree ment in suit, were four brothers, and the property was the ijmali debottar property of their family deity. Owing to some quarrel the collection of rents was not always joint, and, at the time when the principal defendant was making default in paying the. royalties, one of the brothers obtained from him payment of Rs.4000 on account of his share, on the terms that, if his co-sharers did not agree to give up their claim to interest and be content with like sums, he was to be paid by the principal defendant in the same proportion as the co-sharers might be paid. This brother was accordingly unwilling to join as a plaintiff in bringing the suit and so was joined as a second defendant. As such he appended to his defence a claim against the first defendant to recover pari passu with the plaintiffs, after giving credit for the Rs.4000 already paid, in case they should make out their claim. This was, of course, quite irregular in point of pleading; and gives rise to a technical question of minor importance. The suit was begun more than three and less than six years after the cause of action accrued, and the main question is whether or not the whole claim is statute-barred. The lease was effected by a mokurari kabuliyat and a pottah expressed in similar terms. The suit was begun more than three and less than six years after the cause of action accrued, and the main question is whether or not the whole claim is statute-barred. The lease was effected by a mokurari kabuliyat and a pottah expressed in similar terms. The first defendant agreed that if he failed to cut any coal at all he would pay a minimum royalty of Rs.4000 per annum. It is certain that he cut no coal; whether or not he even entered or took possession is not so clear. The sum to be paid per maund of coal gotten is called "commission" and not "rent," but the right acquired by the principal defendant is described as a "settlement." The kabuliyat runs " On a proposal being made to take a settlement of the rights of your family deity in this mauza for the purpose of raising coal from below the surface of the said mauza by making pits, you, for the benefit of your family god, and with the object of increasing the income of the debottar property, are making a settlement with me of the right and interest in the said mauza to the extent owned by your family deity." Their Lordships accordingly take it, as seems to have been done by the Courts below that the minimum royalty sued for would be "rent" within art. 110 of Sched. II. of Act XV. of 1877, which is the enactment applicable. The kabuliyat sued on was a registered instrument, and the question is whether the suit is one for arrears of rent, as the appellant lessee says, and so is barred by art. 110, or whether, as the respondent lessors contend, it falls within art. 116 as a suit for " compensation for breach of contract in writing registered," and thus was brought within time. The argument for the appellant is that the suit being for arrears of " rent " is in terms within art. 110 and is not, truly speaking, a suit for compensation for breach of contract . at all, since the lessee does not covenant to get coal, but is at liberty, on paying the agreed minimum royalty, to let the coal alone, and commits no breach of contract if he chooses to do so. The Limitation Act No. XIV. 110 and is not, truly speaking, a suit for compensation for breach of contract . at all, since the lessee does not covenant to get coal, but is at liberty, on paying the agreed minimum royalty, to let the coal alone, and commits no breach of contract if he chooses to do so. The Limitation Act No. XIV. of 1859 provided that the period of limitation applicable to " all suits for the rents of any buildings or lands " should be three years (s. 8); the period applicable to suits brought " for the breach of any contract " three years, unless in the case of a contract which could have been registered such registration had taken place within six months from the date of the contract (s. 10); and, thirdly, that the period applicable " to all suits for which no other limitation is herein expressly provided " should be six years. Act IX. of 1871 repeals the Act of 1859 and adopts the present framework of a schedule subdivided into articles and columns. Sched. II., Part VI., the part which comprises the cases to which the period applicable is three years, includes art. 110 " for arrears of rent " and art. 115 " for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for." Part VII., which included the cases to which the period applicable was to be six years, contained art. 117, " on a promise or contract in writing registered." This Act in turn was repealed by Act XV. of 1877, which re-enacted art. 110 in the same terms, and art. 115 almost in the same terms, namely, " for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for," and in Part VII. substituted art. 116 for art. 117, thus, " for compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered." Both these Acts draw, as the Act of 1859 had drawn, a broad distinction between unregistered and registered instruments much to the advantage of the latter. The question eventually arose whether a suit for rent on a registered contract in writing came under the longer or the shorter period. The question eventually arose whether a suit for rent on a registered contract in writing came under the longer or the shorter period. On the one hand it has been contended that the provision as to rent is plain and unambiguous and ought to be applied, and that in any case " compensation for the breach of a contract " points rather to a claim for unliquidated damages than to a claim for payment of a sum certain. On the other it has been pointed out that " compensation " is used in the Indian Contract Act in a very wide sense, and that the omission from art. 116 of the words which occur in art. 115, " and not herein specially provided for," is critical. Art, 116 is such a special pro vision, and is not limited, and therefore, especially in view of the distinction long established by these Acts in favour of registered instruments, it must prevail. There is a series of Indian decisions on the point, several of them in suits for rent, though most of them are in suits on bonds. They begin in 1880, and are to be found in all the Indian High Courts. In spite of some doubts once only was it held, in Bam Narain v. Kalta Singh (I. L. R. 26 Allah. 138.), decided in 1903, that in such a suit art. 110, and not art. 116, applied. Then in 1908, and in this state of the decisions, Act IX. of 1908 replaced the Limitation Act of 1877 without altering the language or arrangement of the articles, and in 1913,iln Lalchand Nanchand Gujar v. Narayan (I. L. R. 37 Bomb. 656.), the High Court of Bombay held that, especially in view of this re-enactment, the current of decisions must be followed, and Ram Narains Case (1) must be disapproved. In the present case the High Court treated the matter as settled law in the same sense. Where the terms of a statute or ordinance are clear their Lordships have decided that even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, if it is contrary to the meaning of the enactment Pate v. Pate. ([ 1915] A. C. 1100.) Such is not the case here. However arguable the construction of Act XV. Where the terms of a statute or ordinance are clear their Lordships have decided that even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, if it is contrary to the meaning of the enactment Pate v. Pate. ([ 1915] A. C. 1100.) Such is not the case here. However arguable the construction of Act XV. of 1877 may have been when the matter was one of first impression, it certainly cannot be said that the construction for which the appellants argue was ever clearly right. On the contrary, their Lordships accept the interpretation so often and so long put upon the statute by the Courts in India, and think that the decisions cannot now be disturbed. The question of limitation was not discussed at the trial. The principal defendant pleaded payment, made it his main case, failed in it, and now acquiesces in his failure. The decree passed was for royalties up to a certain amount, and was in favour of the plaintiffs for three fourths and of the second defendant for one fourth, less credit for the sum admittedly received by him on account. In form this decree was erroneous, and this was admitted in the High Court. The point was doubtless not brought to the attention of the trial judge ; otherwise the proceedings could readily have been put in proper form, the more so because the second defendant, though concluding his defence with a claim for a decree against his co-defendant, had previously pleaded that he was entitled to part of the entire arrears of royalties, the subject of the plaintiffs claim, and had prayed " that this suit may be ordered to be prosecuted upon making this defendant a plaintiff." The High Court corrected the admitted error by making a decree for the entire amount in favour of the plaintiffs and declaring that, as to a named part, it was for their share and as to the residue it was for the second defendants share. The principal defendant by his appeal had brought the entire decree before the High Court, disputing it in toto. It was one decree, not two. The second defendant had not appealed. The principal defendant by his appeal had brought the entire decree before the High Court, disputing it in toto. It was one decree, not two. The second defendant had not appealed. The present appellant argues that for want of a separate appeal by the second defendant the High Court had no jurisdiction to award to the plaintiffs for his benefit the sum which had been awarded to him directly by the trial judge. It was said that as the second defendant by not appealing stood by the decree as made below, and as in that form it was wrong, he must lose his right altogether. It would be unjust if this were so. Nevertheless, if the appellant could have shown any provision of the Civil Procedure Code, or of any other enactment, which showed clearly that the High Court had no such power, the objection must have prevailed. No such provision was cited. The appellant himself had brought the entire decree of the trial judge before the High Court for review, and thus they were right in making the decree which should have been made below, even though the second defendant had given no notice of appeal. A point was also made that as to the royalty for one kist the claim was in any case statute-barred and that the amount of the decree should be reduced accordingly. Their Lordships think that this point is not open to the appellant. There is no trace of its having been raised before either Court below. It does not appear in either the notice of appeal to the High Court or in the grounds for applying for leave to appeal to their Lordships Board. If it is raised at all by the appellant, in the reasons appended to his case, it is raised only obscurely. It depends on the construction of the kabuliyat in a respect not submitted to either Court below, and their Lordships decline to entertain it. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.