Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 18, 1910) reversing a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram (November 6, 1907). The suit was instituted in October, 1906, by the appellant upon a hypothecation bond dated November 4, 1897, granted by the pandara of a math over part of its property. The defendants were the senior pandara who had executed the hypothecation bond sued on, the junior pandara in whose favour the first defendant had by deed surrendered his rights, and other persons asserting claims upon the math property. Upon the death of the first defendant in November, 1906, the seventh respondent, who claimed to succeed as senior pandara, was added as seventh defendant. The second and seventh defendants filed written statements denying that the debt was incurred for a necessary expense of the math, or that there was any necessity in the circumstances of. the math for incurring the debt. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge found upon the evidence, and from the failure to produce the books of the math, that the debt was incurred for the purposes of the litigation in 1881, and had been recognized as a debt binding upon the institution. He said that in his view a loan taken for litigation for the purpose of asserting and vindicating the rights of the math came within the exceptional circumstances which would render it binding upon the institution. The decision in Saminatha Pandaram v. Sellappa Chetti (( 1879) I. L. R. 2 Madr. 175.) was authority for so holding, and to that extent had not been dissented from in Kashim Saiba v. Suhhindra Thirihaswami. (( 1891) I. L. R. 18 Madr. 359.) The debt might be con sidered as incurred for the maintenance of the math. He made a decree in the appellants favour. Upon appeal the High Court (Sir Charles Arnold White C.J. and Munro J.) reversed the decision. The learned judges upon an examination of the evidence considered that the surplus income of the math was sufficient for the purposes of the litigation and that necessity had not been proved. The plaintiffs father and the plaintiff had been managers of a temple connected with the math, and it was conceivable that the pandaras in dealing with them had been careless of the interests of the institution. 1916. Nov. 14, 16. The plaintiffs father and the plaintiff had been managers of a temple connected with the math, and it was conceivable that the pandaras in dealing with them had been careless of the interests of the institution. 1916. Nov. 14, 16. Sir R. Finlay, K.C., De Gruyther, K.C., and OGorman, for the appellant. The evidence establishes that the loan was made for the purposes of the litigation in which the math was involved. From the whole of the circumstances it should be inferred that the debt was necessarily incurred in the interests of the institution. Having regard to the lapse of time since the original loan, less specific evidence of necessity was required than in the case of a debt recently incurred Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore Chowdhuri. (( 1916) L. R. 43 Ind. Ap. 249.) Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown, for the seventh respondent. The onus was upon the plaintiff to prove strictly that there was necessity Abhiram Goswami v, Shyama Char an Nandi (( 1909) L. R. 36 Ind. Ap. 148.); as in the case of an alienation by a manager for a minor Hunooman Persauds Case. (( 1856) 6 Moo. Ind. Ap. 393.) The evidence did not prove necessity. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge applied the wrong test, namely, whether the debt was incurred for the purposes of the institution. For the reasons given by the High Court little weight attaches to the recognition of the debt by subsequent pandaras. This respondent was claiming to succeed to the headship adversely to the first and second respondents. There was no obligation upon the respondents to produce the books of the math. 1917. Jan. 23. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated January 18, 1910, which reversed a decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram, dated November 6, 1907. The object of the suit is for the recovery of moneys advanced under mortgage, and, in the event of default, for the sale of the hypothecated properties. The properties were those of the math to be presently mentioned. The object of the suit is for the recovery of moneys advanced under mortgage, and, in the event of default, for the sale of the hypothecated properties. The properties were those of the math to be presently mentioned. The defence in substance is that the loan over these properties, although granted by the head of the institu tion, was not granted in respect of any necessity of the math itself, which necessity falls to be proved. The Dharmapuram adhinam, or math, is situated in the Madras Presidency. It is one of some importance, being a religious institu tion consisting of a group of religious houses having various temples and other property and endowments yielding a considerable revenue. The head of the institution is known as the pandara sannadhi. The transactions which form the subject of inquiry cover a period from about 1880 to the date of the suit, that is, a period of over a quarter of a century. It appears to be established that in the year 1880—81 the math had just emerged from a heavy and expensive litigation, the costs in which amounted to about a lakh of rupees. The title of Manickavasaka, the then pandara, who had in 1373 succeeded to the headship of the adhinam, had been challenged, and the litigation, which lasted from 1875 to 1879, terminated in favour of Manickavasaka. In 1881, however, a fresh suit was instituted—this time by the pandara himself—in order to establish certain rights in regard to religious houses alleged to be subordinate to the main adhinam. This litigation is said to have cost about Rs.80,000, and it was partially successful. The report of the case is contained in I. L. R. 10 Madr. 375. There seems little reason to doubt that in this crisis in the affairs of the adhinam the obtaining of an advance was important in the] interests of the institution. Accordingly on December 8, 1881, Manickavasaka granted a promissory note in favour of Sadaya Pillai, who is alleged by the respondents to have been the manager of the institution, but who appears only to have been the manager of one temple. The promissory note bears that " the sum received by us to-day in cash for the expenses of our adhinam is Rs. 14,000." Shortly thereafter Sadaya Pillai died, leaving a widow and three minor sons. The promissory note bears that " the sum received by us to-day in cash for the expenses of our adhinam is Rs. 14,000." Shortly thereafter Sadaya Pillai died, leaving a widow and three minor sons. On June 24, 1883, a hypothecation bond was executed by the same pandara, namely, Manickavasaka, in favour of Pillais widow and children for the sum of Rs. 14,946, this sum being the Rs.14,000 contained in the promissory note, with certain accumulated interest. The bond narrates that the original promissory note had been granted, and that the sum was paid " for the expenses of the aforesaid adhinam." Various payments were made from time to time of interest and towards the discharge of the debt. Then in 1888 Manickavasaka died. So that it is fairly clear that so far as his actings and writings are concerned they confirm the constitution of the debt as one for the necessary expenses of the adhinam. Manickavasaka was succeeded by Sevagnana. He also recognized the binding nature of the mortgage. He made payments from time to time under the bond up to the year 1897. On November 4 of that year he granted a fresh mortgage for Rs.20,000. This is the mortgage sued upon. It is admitted that the Rs.20,000 is the balance due, as the mortgage itself expresses it, under the former bond of 1883 granted by Manickavasaka, Sevagnanas predecessor; and accordingly " the bond is granted, as was the former one, over the lands belonging to the adhinam." This deed is the plainest ratification of the former transaction and of the fact that the advance had been made for the necessities of the math itself. In the year 1903 Sevagnana vacated office, and it is true of him, as of his predecessor, that his conduct and deeds confirm the view that the debt bound the math. The third pandara, who is called Manickavasaka II., entered office in that year. In 1904 he made a payment of interest upon the mortgage. The validity thereof accordingly has been recognized by three generations, so to speak, of pandaras. Their Lordships have thought it right to give this narrative, because, in their opinion, the Court below has failed to attach to the transactions and actings set forth a sufficient importance. In 1904 he made a payment of interest upon the mortgage. The validity thereof accordingly has been recognized by three generations, so to speak, of pandaras. Their Lordships have thought it right to give this narrative, because, in their opinion, the Court below has failed to attach to the transactions and actings set forth a sufficient importance. The Board does not wish to cast any doubt upon the proposition that, in the case of mortgages granted over the security of an adhinam or math by the head thereof, it lies upon the mortgagee, or those in his right, to prove that the debt was a necessary expense of the institution itself.. But it is a circumstance of great weight when holder after holder of the headship recognizes and deals with the debt on that basis ; and as time goes on this may itself come to be a not unimportant element of probation upon the issue. It must also be fully borne in mind that with the lapse of time the parties to the transaction may die or disappear. In the present case Pillai, the lender, is dead; Manickavasaka, the borrower, is also dead ; and it is conceivable that, as years elapse, in such cases nearly all the material evidence may in the course of years disappear while the debt itself still remains, having from its initiation till almost the date of suit been recognized by all concerned as a debt truly constituted by the adhinam. In such cases a Court is much more easily satisfied that the debt was properly incurred than where the transaction was itself recent, and can therefore be the subject of more exact evidence, or where the transaction, although remote, has been the subject of challenge or dispute by those charged with the interests of the institution. The Board does not enter upon the oral evidence; having con sidered it, it sees no reason to disagree with the view thereof taken by the Subordinate Judge in the careful judgment which he has pronounced. There is, it may be added, one element in the case to which their Lordships attach great weight. The Board does not enter upon the oral evidence; having con sidered it, it sees no reason to disagree with the view thereof taken by the Subordinate Judge in the careful judgment which he has pronounced. There is, it may be added, one element in the case to which their Lordships attach great weight. There is a certain body of evidence that the loan was made for the purposes of the math ; there is none to the contrary; but a more important question than even the balance of the oral evidence appears to be, What do the books of the math disclose upon the subject ? It is the habit of the heads or managers of these institutions to have books kept, and the entries are usually made in much detail and with much elaboration. They form a current record, on the financial side, of the history of the institution. A practice has grown up in Indian procedure of those in possession of important documents or information lying by, trusting to the abstract doctrine of the onus of proof, and failing, accordingly, to furnish to the Courts the best material for its decision. With regard to third parties, this may be right enough—they have no responsibility for the conduct of the suit; but with regard to the parties to the suit it is, in their Lordships opinion, an inversion of sound practice for those desiring to rely upon a certain state of facts to withhold from the Court the written evidence in their possession which would throw light upon the proposition. The present is a good instance of this bad practice. It is proved in the case by the first witness that " the math has regular fair day-books ; they are not now before the Court; ledgers are also maintained in the math." These ledgers and day-books were in the possession of the defendants or those of them who were heads of the institution, and they are not put in evidence. The proposition that these defendants challenged was that the expenses incurred had been incurred for the math and were necessary for its purposes. The best assistance to a Court of justice would have been a scrutiny of these documents, and their Lordships feel free to conclude that if they had been by their entries confirmatory of the defendants view the defendants would have brought them into Court. The best assistance to a Court of justice would have been a scrutiny of these documents, and their Lordships feel free to conclude that if they had been by their entries confirmatory of the defendants view the defendants would have brought them into Court. This part of the case, which in their Lordships view is of considerable importance, is not referred to in the High Court. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, and the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge restored. The respondents will pay the costs of the cause since the date of the Subordinate Judges decree and also the costs of this appeal.