JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Khulna, dated the 2nd May 1914, modifying the decision of the Munsif of the same place. The plaintiff brought the suit to recover possession of a plot of laid. The facts found by the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court are wholly in favour of the plaintiff-appellant, except as regards one particular matter. One Krishna Kishore Ghose died leaving four sons and a widow. He left a Will appointing his widow, the defendant No. 4 in this case, as his executrix. The defend-ants Nos. 1 and 2 held the disputed land as tenants under the estate of Krishna Kishore Ghose. The defendant No. 4 as executrix brought a suit to recover the rent in arrear against the present defendants Nos. 1 and .2 and obtained a decree Prior to the decree, one of the sons of Krishna Kishore Ghose by name Jatindra died and the defendant No. 4 succeeded to his share. After the decree, had been obtained the property was brought to sale in execution and purchased by the defendant No. 4, the executrix. In the meantime, disputes having arisen in the family, a deed of family arrangement had been executed between the members thereof and, under the terms of that deed, the mother, that is, the defendant No. 4, the executrix, released all her interest in the estate of the deceased Jatindra to one of the Other sons, namely, Upendra. The plaintiff has got the entire interest of Upendra and the other co-sharers in the property. The only point that has been decided in this case against the plaintiff is this. That under the terms -of the deed Of family arrangement, Upendra did not acquire the interest of Jatindra in the land purchased by the executrix in execution of the rent decree and that, therefore, the plaintiff has got no interest in it. The View of the learned Judge was that that was an interest that accrued to the executrix after the date of the deed of release and could hot be affected by the terms of the deed. I do not agree in the view of the learned Judge. The View of the learned Judge was that that was an interest that accrued to the executrix after the date of the deed of release and could hot be affected by the terms of the deed. I do not agree in the view of the learned Judge. His finding that the decree was obtained by the defendant No. 4 as executrix and that the beneficial owners of the estate were the real owners of the decree seems to be right. The question is, who were the beneficial owners? It may be noticed that the defendant No. 4 is a party to this suit and she does not set' Up any claim to this land, a share in which has been awarded to her by the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge. But it is manifest that the deed of release passed any interest that the defendant No. 4 had in the estate of Jatindra. The document is in the form of an English deed. The defendant No. 4 the widow of Krishna Kishore Ghose and his executrix released and surrendered "all that undivided one-fourth share which was of the said Jatindra Mohan Ghose of, in and to the estate of the said Krishna Kishore Mianwali, dated the 24th February 1914, dismissing the plaintiff's claim. 2. Dr. Shuja-ud-Din, for the Appellants. 3. Lala Ude Bhan, for the Respondents. JUDGMENT. 4. This is a second appeal from the order of the Additional Divisional Judge of Mianwali upholding the order of the Munsif, first Class, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for redemption as barred by time. Mr. Ude Bhan, Pleader for the respondents, raises a preliminary objection that the appeal has abated because Khota Ram, one of the original defendants-respondents, died and no application to bring his legal representatives on the record was made within the statutory period of six months. The original defendants were Khota Ram and Teju Ram, who are said to be mortgagees of the land in suit in equal shares. They are descendants of Girdhari, the original mortgagee. Khota Ram is said to have died on the 27th November 1914. Counsel for the respondents has put in a certified copy of the entry in the death-register which shows that this is the date of his death. Mr. They are descendants of Girdhari, the original mortgagee. Khota Ram is said to have died on the 27th November 1914. Counsel for the respondents has put in a certified copy of the entry in the death-register which shows that this is the date of his death. Mr. Shuja-ud-Din on behalf of the appellants does not dispute the correctness of this entry and admits that the appeal has abated as against Khota Ram, the application to implead his legal representatives not having been made until the 19th July 1915. He does not, however, admit that this partial abatement results in the total abatement of the appeal and he also urges that there are sufficient grounds for setting aside the abatement, because his clients live in a village five or six miles from Bhakkar where Khota Ram lived. 5. It was pointed out in Hadu v. Lala 21 IC 951 : 41 P. R. 1915 : 15 P. L. R. 1914 : 16 P. W. R. 1914. and in Inayat v. Ganga 32 I C. 829 : 3 P. R. 1916. that where the interests of defendants-respondents were joint and the decree could not be reversed without the representatives of the deceased respondent being brought on the record, the whole appeal must abate when it abates against the deceased respondent. In Hadu v. Lala 21 I.C. 951 : 41 P. R. 1915 : 15 P. L. R. 1914 : 16 P. W. R. 1914. and Khuda Bakhsh v. Mathra Das 18 I.C. 182 : 62 P. R. 1913 : 85 P. L. R. 1913 : 89 P. W. R. 1913. it was held on the facts of those particular oases that the appeal having abated against one of the respondents could not proceed against any of the respondents. In the present case Khota Ram and Teju Ram were joint mortgagees and a suit for redemption could not have proceeded against one of them without the other being impleaded. Similarly when Khota Ram died the appeal could not proceed against Teju Ram alone without impleading the representatives of Khota Ram. The mortgage was a joint and indivisible one and all the representatives of the original mortgagee were necessary parties to a suit for redemption. 6. We, therefore, hold that the appeal abated against all the respondents six months after the death of Khota Ram i. e., on the 27th May 1915. The mortgage was a joint and indivisible one and all the representatives of the original mortgagee were necessary parties to a suit for redemption. 6. We, therefore, hold that the appeal abated against all the respondents six months after the death of Khota Ram i. e., on the 27th May 1915. The application to bring Khota Ram's legal representatives on the record was made one month and 23 days after this. 7. An application to have the abatement set aside should have been made within sixty days of the abatement, but none was made until it was made orally to us at the hearing of the appeal, that is to say, nearly two years after the abatement. In our opinion there is no sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for hearing an application made so long after time. When the appellants made their application for impleading the legal representatives of Khota Ram on the 19th July 1915, they stated that he had died about six months before that date. They ought to have ascertained exactly how long ago he bad died and should have taken care to make an application to get the abatement set aside within the sixty days prescribed by law. Moreover in the application of 19th July 1915, they said they had come to know of his death about a month previously. No explanation was given as to why they did not at once make an application. We accordingly hold that no sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement has been shown, or for hearing such a belated application to that end as has been made in this case. We accordingly refuse to set aside the abatement. 8. The appellants will pay the respondents' costs in this Court.