JUDGMENT Sanderson, C.J. - This matter refers to six Criminal Revision Cases Nos. 13, 14, 15,16,17 and 18 of 1917. The question which has been referred to the Full Bench is as follows :--"Was the case of Amirita Lal Bose v. The Corporation of Calcutta (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916 : reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)) being Criminal Revision No. 1215 of 191(3, rightly decided?" 2. That Revision case was heard by Teunon and Chaudhuri, J,J., who were divided in opinion and the case was therefore under sec. 429 of Criminal Procedure Code, laid before Chitty, J., who after hearing the case gave his opinion agreeing with that expressed by Chaudhuri, J. Consequently, the judgment was in accordance with Chitty, J.'s opinion and the question we have to consider is whether that decision was correct. 3. The matter arose in the following manner :-- Three persons, Amrita Lal Bose, Hari Prosad Bose and Dasu Charan Neogi, are joint proprietors of the Star Theatre, Cornwallis Street, Calcutta. A complaint was laid against them by the Corporation of Calcutta, alleging that on the 3rd September 1916, in breach of cl. 83 of the bye-laws made under sec. 559 (52) of Calcutta Municipal Act of 1899, they had continued a performance at the Star Theatre later than 1 A.M. 4. On the 24th November 1916, one of the Petitioners appeared before the Magistrate and admitted the offence charged, whereupon the Magistrate fined Amrita Lal Bose Rs. 20 and the other two Petitioners Rs. 10 each, i.e., Rs. 40 in all. 5. The three individuals concerned petitioned the High Court and a rule was granted by Teunon and Beachcroft, J.J., on the 1st December 1916, in Revision Case No. 1215 of 1916, calling upon the Magistrate to show cause why the order of the 24th November 1916 should not be set aside. 6. On 18th January 1917, the rule was argued before Teunon and Chaudhuri, JJ.., and as already stated the learned Judges differed in opinion, Teunon, J., being in favour of discharging the Rule and Chaudhuri, J., being of opinion that the Rule should be made absolute. When the matter was referred to Chtty, J., he agreed with Chaudhuri, J. Consequently, the Rule was made absolute : the conviction of the three Petitioners was upheld but the penalty imposed was limited to Rs. When the matter was referred to Chtty, J., he agreed with Chaudhuri, J. Consequently, the Rule was made absolute : the conviction of the three Petitioners was upheld but the penalty imposed was limited to Rs. 20 and it was ordered that it should be apportioned equally between the three Petitioners. In the meantime prosecutions had been instituted with reference to six other cases against the same three persons, the allegation being that they had continued the performance at the Theatre after 1 A.M. on the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 12th and 13th November 1916. They were convicted in each case and fined Rs. 20 each. 7. In each case Rules were issued by the High Court. On the hearing by Teunon and Newbould, JJ., of these Rules the same points were involved as on the hearing of the Revision Case No. 1215 of 1916, and these two learned Judges, disagreeing with the decision of Chitty, J., in that case, have referred the matter to the Full Bench. 8. The question is whether the Magistrate in the case of Amrita Lal Bose v. The Chairman of the Calcutta Corporation (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916 : reported 21 C W. N. 1003 (1917)) had power to impose a fine exceeding the sum of Rs. 20 in respect of the offence alleged; it was contended that the Magistrate in imposing upon the joint proprietors the three fines, the total of which exceeded Rs. 20, had acted in contravention of the law. 9. The determination of this question depends upon the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1899, sees. 559 (cl. 52) and 561 : and upon two bye-laws made by the General Committee under sec. 559 (52), viz., bye-laws 83 and 85. Sec. 559 (52) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1899, provides that the General Committee may make bye-laws for the regulation of theatres and other places of public resort, recreations and amusement: and sec. 501 provides that " In making a bye-law under see. 559 the General Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable (id) with fine which may extend to Rs. 20, and in the case of a continuing breach, with fine which may extend to Rs. 10, for every day during which the breach continues after conviction for the first breach." 10. Certain bye-laws were made under sec. 559 the General Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable (id) with fine which may extend to Rs. 20, and in the case of a continuing breach, with fine which may extend to Rs. 10, for every day during which the breach continues after conviction for the first breach." 10. Certain bye-laws were made under sec. 559 (52) of the Act for the regulation of theatres and one of them, viz., bye-law 83 provides that " no performance shall be continued later than 1 A.M. unless (sic) special permission of the Chairman for any particular occasion ' and 85 provides that " every person guilty of a breach of any of these bye-laws shall be punishable--(a) with fine which may extend to Rs. 20, and in case of a continuing breach with fine which may extend to Rs. 10 for every day during which the breach continues after conviction for the first breach." 11. The main contentions urged by learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners were (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916 : reported 21 C W. N. 1003 (1917)) that the offence was, in its nature, single, and that the penalty was also single, in other words, that although all the Petitioners could be convicted of the offence the Magistrate could not impose a fine of more than Rs. 20 in respect thereof. (2) That if bye-law 85 enabled the Magistrate to impose a fine upon each person convicted of the offence, so that the total of the fine exceeded Rs. 20 the bye-law was " ultra vires." (3) That it was not necessary to hold that the bye-law was " ultra vires " because of the definition of the word " person '" in the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, sec. 3 (32) which provides that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context person shall include " any company of association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not," and that consequently the word person would include the three Petitioners as joint proprietors of the Theatre and that they could properly be regarded as a " person " for the purpose of bye-law (85). 12. 12. We were referred to several cases as to the construction to be placed upon statutes dealing with the imposition of penalties for the breach of an offence, but there can he no doubt as to the principle of construction which should be applied to this matter. It is as follows :-- If either the penalty be imposed by the Act upon each person convicted even where the offence would in its own nature be single, or if the quality of the offence be such that the guilt of one person may be distinct from that of the others in either of these cases the penalties are several," see R. v. Littlechild (L R. 5 Q. B. 298 (1871)), per Hannen, J., at p. 196. 13. In each case the question must be determined by the language of the particular statute. 14. In this case we have to consider not only the Act but also the bye-laws made under the Act. It was urged that the offence was single in its nature even when committed by three persons : of this I am not satisfied, but I do not think it is necessary to express any definite opinion thereon, for on a true interpretation of the bye-laws 83 and 85, I think there is no doubt that it was the intention of those framing the bye-laws to impose upon each person convicted of a breach of the bye-law 83 a fine to the extent mentioned in bye-law 85. I think the words used in bye-laws 85 make that clear. 15. In my judgment this interpretation of the bye-law is not inconsistent with the definition of the word ' person " in the Bengal General Clauses Act. 1899, sec. I think the words used in bye-laws 85 make that clear. 15. In my judgment this interpretation of the bye-law is not inconsistent with the definition of the word ' person " in the Bengal General Clauses Act. 1899, sec. 3 (32)The three I 'et it joiners are alleged to be joint proprietors of the Star Theatre : With great deference to the learned Judges who have held the contrary view, I have considerable doubt whether the Petitioners merely because they are carrying on the Theatre jointly could be said to come within any of the expressions mentioned in the section, viz., " any Company or Association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not." Even if they do, the section is not an exhaustive definition of the word " person but only provides that the word " person " shall include certain; bodies of individuals, which without such definition might not be affected by the provisions of the Act in question; and, in my judgment, it does not prevent the bye-law 85 from applying to the three Petitioners, each of whom, according to the statement made by one of the Petitioners, as recorded in the Magistrate's letter of explanation in Amrita Lal Base v. The Chairman of the Calcutta Corporation (IT. Rev. 1216 of 1916 : reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)) was in his individual capacity, taking some part in the management of the Theatre. 16. It is said, however, that if this is the correct interpretation of bye-law 85, it is '" ultra vires '' by reason of the provisions of sec. 5G1. This section, as already mentioned, provides, that in making a bye-law under sec. 559, the General Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable, (a) with fine which may extend to Rs. 20, etc. 17. The question, therefore, is whether the terms of that section are such as to prevent the General Committee from making a bye-law which imposes a fine to the extent of Rs. 20, upon each person who is guilty of a breach of the bye-law in question. The expression in the Act, " the Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable " with a fine which may extend to Rs. 20, upon each person who is guilty of a breach of the bye-law in question. The expression in the Act, " the Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable " with a fine which may extend to Rs. 20, obviously involves the punishment of an offender or offenders; but the incidence of the fine with reference to such offender or offenders was not dealt with in the Act itself, and I think the intention was to leave it to the General Committee to make bye-laws dealing with that matter. 18. In my. judgment, therefore, bye-law 88 is not " ultra vires " and by the express terms of that bye-law, each of the Petitioners was liable to be fined to the extent of Rs. 20 for the breach of bye-law 83. 19. I do not think that this case is covered by the decision in H. v. Showdar Ghenar (7 Bom. H. C. R (Cr. Gases 39 (1870)). In the first place that was not a case such as we have before us of a general provision in an Act with a power to a Municipal body to make bye-laws for the purpose of carrying out in detail the general provision, but the offence and punishment were dealt with in one Regulation which the Court had to construe. 20. Secondly, as Couch, C. J., pointed out at p. 40, " the penalty not being a fixed sum but varying according to the quantity of opium kept or concealed was more consistent with its being a single one than with there being several penalties." In this case the penalty is a fixed sum. There might have been some analogy between the two cases, if, exempli gratia, instead of a fixed sum there had been a provision that the penalty should vary according to the amount of the takings at the performance of the Theatre. Further it seems to have been suggested by Westropp, C. J., at p. 45, that if the Regulation had contained words similar to those found in the bye-law now under consideration, viz., " every person offending against this Regulation," the decision in that case might have been different. 21. In the case under consideration the penalty of Rs. 20 was directed to be apportioned equally between the Petitioners, although the Magistrate had fined one Petitioner Rs. 20 and the other two Rs. 21. In the case under consideration the penalty of Rs. 20 was directed to be apportioned equally between the Petitioners, although the Magistrate had fined one Petitioner Rs. 20 and the other two Rs. 10 each. It has not been explained under what provision such an order of apportionment could be made : but if this could be done the anomalous result would occur that if a man committed a breach of the bve-law by himself, he would be liable to a fine of Rs. 20, but that if he and two others committed the breach, he would be liable for a third of that sum only. 22. For these reasons, in my judgment, the answer to the question addressed to us, should be that the case of Amrita Lal Bose v. The Chairman of the Calcutta Corporation (Or. Rev. 1216 of 1918: reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)) was not rightly decided. 23. In my judgment, therefore, the Rule should be discharged in each of the above-mentioned cases. Woodroffe, J. 24. I agree with the judgment about to be delivered by Mr. Justice Mookerjee. Mookerjee, J. 25. The question referred to the Full Bench for determination has been framed in the following terms :-- Was the case of Amrita Lal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta (1) rightly decided? 26. It may be observed at the outset that the reference is not strictly in accord with r. 5 of Chap. V of the Rules of Court, which provides as follows :-- If the question arises in any case coming before a Division Court as a Court of Criminal Appeal, Reference or Revision, the Court referring the case shall state the point or points on which they differ from a decision of a former Division Court, and shall refer the case to a Full Bench for such orders as to such Bench may seem fit. 27. Consequently, what has to be referred to the Full Bench is the entire case, and the point or points on which the referring Division Court differs from the decision of the former Division Court has also to be stated : in other words, the question, that is, " the point of law or usage having the force of law " mentioned in r. 1, should also be. formulated. In these circumstances, it is necessary to specify the point of law involved in this reference. formulated. In these circumstances, it is necessary to specify the point of law involved in this reference. 28. Sec. 559 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 1899 authorises the General Committee, by cl. 52, to make bye-laws for the regulation of theatres and other places of public resort, recreation or amusement. Sec. 561 next provides, in the following terms, for the imposition of penalties for breaches of bye-laws :-- In making a bye-law under sec. 559, the General Committee may provide that a breach of it shall be punishable- (a) with fine which may extend to twenty rupees, and, in the case of a continuing breach, with fine which may extend to ten rupees for every day during which the breach continues, after conviction for the first breach, or (b) with fine which may extend to ten rupees for every day during which the breach continues after receipt of written notice from the Chairman to discontinue the breach. 29. The General Committee has framed bye laws under sec. 559 (52), which have been duly sanctioned by the Local Government and published in the Calcutta Gazette, Bye-law 83 is in the following terms :-- No performance shall be continued later than L A.M. unless with the sped permission of the Chairman for any particular occasion. 30. Bye-law 85 is in the following terms : -- Every person guilty of a breach of any of these bye-laws shall be punishable- (a) with fine which may extend to twenty rupees, and in the ease of a continuing breach, with fine which may extend to ten rupees for every day during which the breach continues after conviction for the first breach, or (b) with fine which may extend to the rupees for every day during which the-breach continues alter receipt of written notice from the Chairman to dicontinue the breach. 31. In the ease of Amrita Lal Bose v Corporation of Calcutta (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916: reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)), three persons who were joint proprietors of the Star Theatre, were found to have committed breach of bye-law 83, inasmuch as the formance at the Theatre was continued beyond the prescribed hour on the night of the 3rd September 1916. The Municipal Magistrate convicted the accused persons, and imposed a fine of twenty rupees upon one. of them and of ten rupees upon each of the others. The Municipal Magistrate convicted the accused persons, and imposed a fine of twenty rupees upon one. of them and of ten rupees upon each of the others. The legality of this sentence was called in question before this Court on the ground that it was not competent to the Magistrate to impose a fine of more than twenty rupees in the aggregate upon the three accused persons. This contention was upheld by Chitty and Chaudhuri, JJ., (Teunon J., contra). According to the judgment of Chity, J., the penalty imposed was reduced from rupees forty to rupees twenty, to be apportioned equally between the three accused persons. There appears to have been other breaches of the bye-law in question at the same Theatre on the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 12th and 13th November 1916. The joint proprietors were thereupon prosecuted and convicted as before, and as the cases were decided by the Magistrate before the pronouncement of the final decision by this Court in the case previously mentioned, he imposed a fine of twenty rupees upon each accused for each breach of the bye-law. These cases have been brought up to this Court for revision of the sentences as illegal and unauthorized by law. Teunon and Newbould, JJ., who have heard these six rules, have expressed their dissent from the view of the law adopted by Chitty and Chaudhuri, JJ., and have referred the question for decision by a Full Bench. The question for determination by this Bench may, consequently, be formulated as follows :-- When several persons have been jointly convicted of a breach of bye-law 83, are they jointly liable under bye-law 85 to pay a fine not exceeding twenty rupees, or, is each person so convicted liable to pay a fine which may extend to twenty rupees'? 32. The answer to this question depends upon the true construction of bye-law 85, read with sec. 561 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. Before we interpret sec. 561 whereon bye-law 85 is founded, we may usefully recall a fundamental principle which, as some of the cases in the books show, has not always been borne in mind. 33. The distinction between a tort and a crime, between a civil suit and a criminal proceeding, may be regarded as of an elementary character, and the same wrongful act sometimes gives rise to a civil as well as to a criminal liability. 33. The distinction between a tort and a crime, between a civil suit and a criminal proceeding, may be regarded as of an elementary character, and the same wrongful act sometimes gives rise to a civil as well as to a criminal liability. The purpose of the civil suit is to compel the Defendant to compensate the Plaintiff for what he has unjustly suffered while the object of the criminal proceeding is punishment and the cure of what may be called a public wrong. A crime is thus a wrong which the Government deems injurious to the public at large and punishes through a judicial proceeding, instituted in its own name or on its behalf. The line of demarcation between a civil and a criminal proceeding may sometimes be difficult to draw, and judicial opinion has differed in individual instances as to the true effect of a statutory proceeding, whether it is in its nature Civil or Criminal, or, as is sometimes said, quasi civil or quasi criminal. Reference may be made in this connection to R. v. Chorlay (12 Q B. 515 (1848)) and R. v. Russell (3E. & B. 942(1854)) and it may be noted that the mere fact of a fine no more shows that an indictment is a criminal proceeding than the ancient fine in trespass. As pointed out in a note to R. v. Paget (3 F. and F. 29) (where it was ruled that an indictment for the obstruction of a highway, intended to effect the removal of a nuisance is in substance a civil and not a criminal case) the distinction taken in the most ancient and approved authorities between a criminal and a civil proceeding is whether the real end or object of the proceeding is punishment or reparation (Mirror of Justices, Chap. XI, sec. 3 : 1 Reeves Hist. Eng. Law 32). This fundamental distinction between a tort and a crime cannot be ignored or rejected, and leads inevitably to the position that while in a civil suit for damages, however numerous the wrong-doers, the Plaintiff is to be compensated for his loss only once, in a criminal proceeding, where each wrong-doer is as guilty as though the others were not guilty also, the full penalty must be inflicted on each precisely as if he had committed the crime unaided. Indeed, from the point of view of criminal jurisprudence, the circumstances that the wrong-doer had participants in the commission of the crime, may sometimes make his position worse. In any event, where a crime has been committed jointly by two persons, the guilt of one is undoubtedly not mitigated, even though it may not be enhanced, from the fact that another may be also guilty. The essence of the matter is that the proceeding has been instituted not to indemnify a person to the extent of the loss he may have suffered from a wrongful act, but to inflict punishment on the wrong-doer for an act which the Government deems injurious to the public at large. From the point of view of principle, consequently, the rule must be deemed established beyond question that all who participate in the commission of a crime are severally responsible to the State, as though the crime has been committed by any one of them acting alone : there is prima facie no such thing as. division of responsibility among the several participants in a crime. Based on this elementary truth the conclusion must be sustained that although joint actors in the commission of a crime are jointly tried and convicted, each must be separately punished as if he had committed the offence alone and must respond in full to his own separate sentence. I do nut deny that is open to the Legislature to depart from this fundamental principle and to rule that where a particular offence has been committed by several persons jointly, one collective sentence should be inflicted upon them jointly: but, in my opinion the legislative intent to depart from what I cannot but consider as a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence must be established beyond all reasonable doubt. 34. 34. Reliance has been placed on behalf of the Petitioners upon a passage in the work of Paley on the Law of Summary Convictions (8th Ed., p. 287) where the rule is stated in the following terms : " Though several offenders may be, as it seems, included in one conviction for offence jointly committed, it depends upon the wording of the particular statutes applicable to each case, and the quality of the offence, whether each person be liable to a distinct penalty or all collectively to but one." This formulation is based upon a long line of authorities which have an interesting history. The earliest case traceable in the reports is that of Partridge v. Naylor ([1596] Noy. 52 (62): Moore 458; Goulds 145 : Cro. Eliz. 482) which was an action of debt against three persons, upon 1 and 2 Ph. and M. C. 12, sec. 1, to recover a penalty for wrongfully impounding a distree The Court of Error, reversing the divided judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, ruled that the judgment should be joint for one penalty against all. It should not be overlooked that the proceeding to recover the penalty under the statute was in form civil. In the next case, R. v. Drake ([1867] 2 Shower 489) on a conviction of two persons under 13 Car. : II C. 10, a statute enacted for the prevention of the unlawful coursing of deer in a forest, a separate penalty of the full amount was imposed upon each and was maintained, not withstanding the contention that the design -of the statute was to give only one satisfaction for the deer spoiled. In R. v. King ([1712] 1 Salk. 182), upon conviction of two persons under 3 Wm. and M. C. 10, sec. 2, a statute enacted for the prevention of deer-stealing, a separate penalty of the maximum amount was imposed upon each offender. Reliance was placed upon partridge v. Naylor ([1596] Noy. 52: Cro. Eliz. 480) but Powell, J., overruled the contention on the ground that the penalty was not in the nature of a satisfaction to the party grieved, but a punishment on the offender; and he added the important observation that " crimes are several, though debts be joint." The next case, Marriott v. Show ([1718] 1 Comyns 274) which arose upon a conviction under 5 Anne C. 14 sec. 4, for killing several hares on the same day, is of no real assistance, except to this extent that the acts were treated as one offence. No reason was assigned, however in support of this view. In Hardyman v. Whitakar ([1749] 2 East 578) which arose upon 12 Anne C. 14, sec. 4, it was ruled that only one penalty was, under the terms of the statute, jointly payable by the persons who had, in contravention thereof, kept a lurcher to kill and destroy the game. The same view was subsequently taken with reference to the same statute, in R. v. Bleasdale ([1792] 4 T. R. 809). Meanwhile, the question had arisen for consideration before Lord Mansfield in R. v. Clarke ([1777] 1 Cowper 610), where three persons had been placed on trial under 8 George, 1 C. 18, sec. 25, for assaulting and resisting Custom House Officers in the execution of their duty and rescuing out of their custody brandy and geneva which they had seized. It was argued that there was only one offence for which only one penalty could be inflicted. This contention was overruled; but Lord Mansfield proceeded to enunciate the principle applicable to cases of this character : "where the offence is in its nature single, and cannot be severed, there the penalty shall be only single, because though several persons may join in committing it, it still constitutes but one offence. But where the offence is in its nature several, and where every person concerned may be separately guilty of it, there each offender is separately liable to the penalty : because, the crime of each is distinct from the offence of the others, and each is punishable for his own crime. For instance, the offence created by the Stat. 1 and 2 Phil., and Mar. C. 12, is " the impounding a distress in a wrong place " (a) one, two, three or four, may impound it wrongfully : it still is but one act of impounding; it cannot be severed. It is but one offence : and therefore shall be satisfied by one forfeiture, (b) So, under the Stat. C. 12, is " the impounding a distress in a wrong place " (a) one, two, three or four, may impound it wrongfully : it still is but one act of impounding; it cannot be severed. It is but one offence : and therefore shall be satisfied by one forfeiture, (b) So, under the Stat. 5 Anne C. 14, for the preservation of the game : killing a hare is but one offence in its nature : whether one or twenty kill it, it cannot be killed more than once, (c) If partridges are netted by night, two, three or more may draw the net : but still it constitutes but one offence, (d) But this Statute relates to an offence in its nature several, a several offence at common law : and the Statute adds a further sanction against that which each man must commit severally. One may resist, another molest, another run away with the goods, one may break the officer's arm, another put out his eye. All these are distinct acts : and every one offence is entire and complete in its nature, (e) Therefore each person is liable to a penalty for his own separate offence." 35. With all respect for the opinion of so eminent a Judge as Lord Mansfield, one may be permitted to make a few observations on this exposition of the law. (a) The Statute 1 and 2 Ph. and M. C. 12, to which reference is made, contemplates a proceeding, civil in form, for recovery of the penalty : consequently, the case decided thereupon, Patridge v. Naylor ([1596] Noy. 52 62) -, Moore 453 : Goulds " 146 : Oro. Eliz. (480)) cannot be accepted as a precedent applicable to a criminal proceeding, (b). Will reference to the statement that an act of impounding by one, two, three, or four, is one offence, suppose the object impounded was a human being, and numbers were jointly indicted for hi- False imprisonment : would there, then, be but one act, one offence, or, would each be liable to receive, his several sentence, the full penalty of the law? (c) With reference to the observation that killing a hare is but one offence in its nature, for whether one or twenty kill it, it cannot be killed more than once, may it not be asked whether the analogy would apply to the case of killing a man? If twenty kill a man once and are found guilty of willful murder, is the statutory sentence to be passed upon one or upon all? (d) With reference to the illustration about the netting of partridges, what would happen if two, three or more persons jointly draw away the net and steal it? Would not all be liable to be convicted and would not each receive the appropriate sentence? (e) With regard to the concluding observation, the question may be put, whether each would not he guilty of what the join offender did as if his own hand had performed the act ? I see no escape from the conclusion that the illustrations given by Lord Mansfield are not based on sound principle, and that the true distinction was pointed out by Powell, J., when he observed that the. criminal proceeding is taken not with a view to indemnify the person injured but to punish the offender. The cases of R. v. Hube ([1794] 5 T. R. 542) and Barnard v. Gostling ([1802] 2 East 569) do not develop any fresh point of view, and, consequently, do not require detailed consideration. But reference may be made to the observation of Ashurst,.J., in the former case to the effect that if the Court were to hold that where one person had disturbed a congregation, he would be liable to pay a penalty of twenty pounds, but that if the offender had 19 persons to assist: him, each would be liable to pay twenty shillings only, the conclusion would be absurd, because the amount of the penalty would be diminished with the increase in the gravity of the offence. The later decisions in Morgan v. Brown ([l886]4 A. E. 515), R. v. Dean ([1843] 12 M. & W. 39), R. v. Cridland ([1857] 7 E. & B. 853 : 110 R R. 860), R. v. Hartley ([1862] 31 L J. M. C. 232), Mayhew v. Wardley ([1863] 14 C. B. N. S. 550) and R. v. Littlechild (L. R. 6 Q. B. 293 at p. 196 (1871)), all furnish instances where, upon joint trial, separate sentences were passed upon the offenders who had jointly committed the offences. In one of these cases of R. v. Dean ([1843] 12 M. & W. 39), Baron Alderson observed that he must look at the statute to see whether it was intended that every person offending should be punished or merely that every offence should be punished. This is open to the obvious criticism that when an offence is said to he punished, it is the offender who is visited with the punishment. The truth is that when an offence has been jointly committed, each offender is prim A facie liable to be punished irrespective of the guilt of the others who may have participated with him in the commission of the crime. To take a case out of the operation of this, the primary rule, the legislative intent must be made manifest beyond doubt that all the offenders must be jointly subjected to a single penalty. The Court should not lightly depart from the principle that since one who participates with others in a crime is guilty as though he had performed the criminal act unaided, on a joint conviction of all the offenders or on a conviction of some after the others have had their punishment, each should receive a several sentence, the same in extent and intensity as if he had done the whole alone and had been alone convicted. The principle is otherwise in a civil suit for damages, where the full penalty for the damage suffered can be exacted only once. 36. As regards cases decided in the Courts of this country, stress has been laid principally upon the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in R. v. Showdar Ghenar (7 Bom: H. C. R. (Cr. Cases) 39 (1870)), which overruled the earlier decision in R. v. Vakatchand (1 Bom. 36. As regards cases decided in the Courts of this country, stress has been laid principally upon the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in R. v. Showdar Ghenar (7 Bom: H. C. R. (Cr. Cases) 39 (1870)), which overruled the earlier decision in R. v. Vakatchand (1 Bom. H. C. R. 50 (1863)) and restored the authority of the decision in R. v. Rajgur (3 Morris Fouzdari Rep, 673 (1854)). The decision of the Full Bench is to the effect that where several persons knowingly harbour, keep or conceal a parcel of smuggled opium, under sec. 4 of Bombay Eegulation, XXI of 1827, only one penalty of double the value of such opium and of double the amount of duty leviable upon it, is recoverable. This view was followed by this Court in a case under sec. 17 of the Bengal Salt Act (Act VII of 1864, B. C.) [Re Gungadhar Sahoo (22 W. R. Cr. 9)]. It is not necessary for our present purpose to determine whether, upon the terms of the Regulation in question, the interpretation adopted by the Full Bench can be justified. It cannot be denied, however, that the question of construction was one of grave doubt, as is amply indicated by the fact that the Full Bench of five Judges overruled a decision, which, though pronounced by three Judges, had the concurrence of three other Judges who had been consulted by them. Sir Michael W'estropp, who had been a party to the earlier decision and recorded an elaborate opinion in support of his altered view, was guided principally by the decisions in England, and. also relied upon the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland in R. v. McNaghten ([1845] 9 I. L.R. 93). The cases in England, as we have seen, no doubt recognise a distinction between several penalty and joint penalty for offences jointly committed, and rest this differentiation upon the phraseology of particular statutes and the quality of the offence in each case. In the large majority of cases, however, the conclusion was actually reached that the offence was several in its nature, and each offender was liable to have a separate penalty inflicted on him. In the large majority of cases, however, the conclusion was actually reached that the offence was several in its nature, and each offender was liable to have a separate penalty inflicted on him. We further find that the earliest case traceable, where a joint penalty was imposed, was in form a civil proceeding, and that although the distinction between a civil and a criminal proceeding was emphasised as early as 1712, it was overlooked or ignored in subsequent cases, which treated the matter, not as one of principle, but rather as one of form dependent upon minute distinctions in the language used in the Statutes. Indeed, a review of the cases in the English Courts almost creates the impression that the distinction maintained therein between joint and several penalty owed its origin to a desire to mitigate the severity of the game laws or the revenue laws. As regards the Irish case mentioned by Westropp, C. J., it does nut directly elucidate the point in controversy and merely shows that when a person has been adjudged guilty on a charge that he did knowingly harbour and conceal and also did knowingly permit and suffer to be harboured and concealed certain contraband articles, it could not be maintained that the information charged two offences and that there was duplicity in the conviction. I do not feel pressed by the decision of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court and I am not prepared to extend its application to other cases. As Lord Mansfield said in R. v. Clark ([1777] 1 Cowper 610), there is no cause of greater ambiguity than arguing from cases without distinguishing accurately the grounds upon which they were determined; and Couch, C. J., endorsed the same view-when he rested his decision in R. v. Showdar (7 Bom. H. C. R. (Cr. Cases) 39 (1870)) on the language of the Regulation. 37. H. C. R. (Cr. Cases) 39 (1870)) on the language of the Regulation. 37. The question under consideration has been repeatedly examined in the Courts of the United States, and the view is well settled there that, as a general rule, crimes are several and that when two or more persons are convicted of the same offence in a criminal prosecution (as distinguished from a penal or quitam action which is civil) the sentence against them must be several; each is subject to the full penalty and punishment provided for the criminal act, in the same manner as if he had been the sole offender. Reference may here be made to some of the leading decisions on the point. In U. S. v. Ismenard (1 Cranch C. C. 150: 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15450), wherein the Defendants were jointly indicted and convicted for keeping a gaming house, it was held that the fine imposed must be several. In Turner v. U. S. (66 Fed. Cas. 280 : 30 U. S App. 90 : 13 C. C. A. 436), wherein the Defendants were jointly indicted and convicted of cutting timber on Government land, the Court said :--" The Defendants were indicted, tried jointly, and both were convicted, and the Jury found the damages committed by them to be $24880. Sec. 2461 of the Revised Statutes provides that " every such person (meaning every person who has violated the section) shall pay a fine of not less than triple the value of the trees and timber so cut, destroyed or removed, and shall be imprisoned not exceeding twelve months/' The fine provided is a part of the punishment as much as is the imprisonment; it is necessarily assessed against each, just the same;is the imprisonment. Any reasoning which would make the money-penalty joint would necessarily make the imprisonment joint." In McLeod v. State (35 Alar. 395) it was held that where two persons were jointly indicted, tried and convicted for living in adultery, and then common surety confessed judgment, on the conviction a separate judgment should be rendered against each with his surety, for the amount of the fine and costs. 395) it was held that where two persons were jointly indicted, tried and convicted for living in adultery, and then common surety confessed judgment, on the conviction a separate judgment should be rendered against each with his surety, for the amount of the fine and costs. In Curtis v. Hurlburt (2 Coun 309), the Court said:--" All offences at the Common Law are several, that is, though several join in the commission of the act, and that act is single, yet each is guilty severally, and is liable to a separate punishment. If two should jointly take, and with a felonious intent carry away, the goods of another, each would be guilty of the crime of theft, and might be prosecuted jointly or separately. When a statute creates an offence, it may be joint or several, according to the language made use of. The statute on which the present question arises is, that ' no person shall use any bush seine in Ousatonnick river, etc., on penalty of sixty-seven dollars for every such offence.' The question is, whether this is a several offence in each person concerned in it, or only one offence in them all, so that one penalty only can be inflicted. No words can be more appropriate than the words of this statute to designate a several offence--no person shall do the act under a certain penalty, for each offence. It is the same as the words, every person who does the act-- whoever does the act--if any person shall do the act, such person shall suffer a certain penalty. As by the Common Law, when several join in the commission of a crime, each is considered as severally doing the act, so here, though several may join in the act, yet every person is considered as severally committing the crime and incurs a several penalty." In State v.. Hunter (33 Iowa 361) it was said : ' The record does not present us with a copy of the indictment, but it is stated in argument that the Defendants were jointly indicted under the statute for the suppression of intemperance. Sec. 4789 of the Revision provides, that in all misdemeanors, Defendants jointly indicted may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the Court; but there is no statutory provision, to which our attention has been called, authorizing a joint judgment. Sec. 4789 of the Revision provides, that in all misdemeanors, Defendants jointly indicted may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the Court; but there is no statutory provision, to which our attention has been called, authorizing a joint judgment. Indeed, in the very nature of the case, the judgments would necessarily be separate against each person convicted'. The person committing an offence against the State must himself be amenable to the law; another person cannot be substituted for him or be made to suffer for his violation, and although two or more persons may together commit an offence, each is punishable for his own crime and not for that of the other. The infliction of the penalty upon one of two jointly tried and convicted will not satisfy the judgment in respect to the other, as will a satisfaction by one of two joint judgment-debtors in a civil action operate as a full satisfaction of the judgment as to both." In Caldwell v. Commonwealth (7 Dana (Ky.) 229) the Court said : " In prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, each individual is responsible for his own individual act, and must answer to the Commonwealth, personally, for his own personal offence. If both are guilty, each is guilty, and each must make his fine to the Commonwealth for the penalty fixed by law to the offence of which he has been found guilty. Though in criminal and penal cases the prosecution may be joint, the judgment should be several, as the judgment addressed itself to each individual offender, as the punishment of his delictum." In Bosley v. Commonwealth (7 J. J. Marsh (Ky.) 598) it was said : '" we think the verdict and judgment erroneous. Although the law allows a joint indictment and trial, still a joint judgment is erroneous, because thereby one of the Defendants may be compelled to pay the whole amount, and in that event he would not be entitled to contribution from his co-Defendants. Thus, the other Defendants would escape punishment entirely, and the whole burden might fall upon him who was least blame-able in the transaction. Thus, the other Defendants would escape punishment entirely, and the whole burden might fall upon him who was least blame-able in the transaction. So far it would savor of punishing one man for the guilt of another." In Jones v. Commonwealth (1 Call, (Va.) 555) wherein several persons were indicted for an assault, and it was (sic) error to impose a joint fine against them, Roane, J., said : " In this country, I consider the construction as fortified not only by the principles of natural justice, which forbid that one man should be punished for the fault of another, but also by the clause of the Bill of Bights prohibiting excessive lines, and the Act of October 1786 (c. 65, 12 St. L. 355) founded on the spirit of it, and providing that the fine should be according to the degree of the fault and the estate of the offender. But it is most unreasonable, and directly in the teeth of the Act, that one man should suffer the punishment imposed by the Jury upon all who may chance to be with him; and who were all in the contemplation of the Jury, who assessed the fine. This is so unjust and contrary to the spirit of the Bill of Rights, that even if it were established by adjudged cases to be the law, nay even if an Act of Assembly should pass authorizing it, in express. I should most probably be of opinion that one should be exploded and the other declared unconstitutional and not law." In Waltzer v. State (8 Wis 785) the Court said : " It is unnecessary to notice all the errors assigned in this case, as the form of judgment is fatal. This was a criminal prosecution, and even admitting that all of the Defendants could be and were properly tried jointly, the punishment should have been several. Each should have been sentenced to pay a fine, according to the nature and aggravation of his offence. Every individual is answerable for his conduct to the State. The guilt of one is neither mitigated nor enhanced from the fact that another may be also guilty." In Reg. Each should have been sentenced to pay a fine, according to the nature and aggravation of his offence. Every individual is answerable for his conduct to the State. The guilt of one is neither mitigated nor enhanced from the fact that another may be also guilty." In Reg. v. Grannis (5 Manitoba 153) wherein it, was contended that where two persons, in that case a partnership, were convicted of selling intoxicating liquors, the line imposed upon them should be several and not joint, the Court, though the case was reversed on another ground, said : " in 2 Hawkins P. C., c.48, sec. 18, it is laid down, that where there are several Defendants, a joint award of one fine against them all is erroneous for it ought to be several against each Defendant; for, otherwise, one who had paid his proportionable part might be confined in prison till all the others have also paid theirs, which would be in effect to punished him for the offence of another. In Burn's Justice (30th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 115 1 where this passage from Hawkins is referred to. it is said : '' If several Defendants are convicted. whether the offence is in its nature single or joint, a joint award of one penalty against them is bad." There is a statement to the same effect in Paley on Convictions, p. 278. And in Morgan v. Brown ([1838] 4 A. and E. 515 : 31 E. C. L. 119), Littledale, J., said at p.519 " The general result of the authorities cited in Hawkins, I think, is that, where a, fine is imposed upon several Defendants, it should be imposed upon them separately." There are, on the other hand, isolated cases where joint penalties have been imposed [Lemons v. State (50 Ala 130) and Barada v. State (18 Mo. 94) explained in State v. Berry (21 Mo. 504), Wiggins v. Henderson (22 Nov. 103 : 36 Pac. 459)] The rule deducible from the cases in the American Courts may consequently be best stated in the words of Caldwell, J., in Thompson v. State ([1900] 105 Tenn. 177 : 51 L. R. A. 883 80 Am. St. Rep. 94) explained in State v. Berry (21 Mo. 504), Wiggins v. Henderson (22 Nov. 103 : 36 Pac. 459)] The rule deducible from the cases in the American Courts may consequently be best stated in the words of Caldwell, J., in Thompson v. State ([1900] 105 Tenn. 177 : 51 L. R. A. 883 80 Am. St. Rep. 875) " though joint actors in the commission of the same offence are jointly tried and convicted, it is proper that punishment be inflicted upon the Defendants separately as if each had committed the offence alone, each is bound to respond in full to his own separate sentence; satisfaction in whole or in part, of that against one of them not satisfying that against the other one, in any sense or to any extent," People v. Kent ([1908] 151 Mich. 134 : 14 Ann. Cas. 208), State v. White ([1911] 125 Tenn 143 : 140 S. W. 1059), U. S. v. Babson (1 Ware 462 : 24 Fed. Cas. 14489), Calico v. State (4 Ark 430), Straughan v. Stale (16 Ark 37), State v. Hopkyns (7 Blackf. 494), Gathings v. State (44 Miss. 343), State v. Gay (10 Mo. 440), March v. People (7 Barb. N. Y. 391) and State v. Smith (1 Noth. and M. 13). 38. What, then, is the true position, if we seek to interpret bye-law 85, read with sec. 561 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. The section authorises the General Committee to prescribe by a bye-law that a breach thereof shall be punishable with fine which may extend to twenty rupees. Bye-law 85 provides that every person guilty of a breach of bye-law 83 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to twenty rupees. Prima facie, every person guilty of such breach is punishable, regardless of the circumstance that there may be other persons who may have participated in the commission of the offence and may be equally punishable. I do not lay stress on the use of the expression " every person '' in bye-law 85; the inference I would draw would be precisely the same, even if the bye-law had been so framed as to read that " breaches of any of these by-laws shall be punishable." I do not base my conclusion on the form of the expression, but on the substance of the matter. We have to construe a provision which operates as a statutory rule for the punishment of an offence. Unless intention to the contrary is established beyond the possibility of all doubt, the Court should interpret the provision in the light of the principle that all who participate in the commission of a crime are severally responsible, as though the offence had been committed by each of them acting alone. In the case before us, there is nothing to indicate that the trainers of the bye-law acted on the principle that the larger the number of persons who participate in its violation, the smaller the responsibility and liability to punishment of each offender. I see no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the majority in Amrita Lal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916 : reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)) cannot be defended on principle. I am fortified in this view by the nature of the order made in that case. The Magistrate had imposed a fine of twenty rupees upon one of the accused parsons, and a fine of ten rupees upon each of the others. This Court imposed a fine of twenty rupees to be apportioned equally amongst them. If, as was held, the quality of the offence made the liability joint, how could a distinct penalty be imposed upon each ? Mr. Norton was constrained to concede that a sentence in this form could not be supported; on the other hand, if a joint sentence was passed and the Crown proceeded to levy the fine from one of the offenders, the others would in substance escape all punishment. No explanation was offered in justification of such a result. Furthermore, it is conceivable that, in a case of this character, the several offenders might not be guilty to the same extent and some discrimination should be exercised in imposing the sentence, as the Magistrate actually did. No explanation was even suggested as to how this can be achieved, if a joint penalty has to be inflicted or if the penalty imposed has to be equally apportioned. 39. No explanation was even suggested as to how this can be achieved, if a joint penalty has to be inflicted or if the penalty imposed has to be equally apportioned. 39. My conclusions may be summarised as follows:-- (1) As a general principle of criminal law, all who participate in the commission of an offence are severally responsible, as though the offence had been committed by each of them acting alone, consequently, although as joint actors in the commission of the crime they may be jointly tried and convicted, each must be separately punished, as if he had committed the offence alone. (2) This general principle is applicable in the construction of bye-law 85 read with bye-law 83 and sec. 561 of the Calcutta Municipal Act; consequently, each person who has committed a breach of the bye-law in question is, upon conviction, liable to be punished with the maximum amount of the prescribed fine, regardless of the number of persons who may have been associated with him in the commission of the breach. (3) The case of Amrita Lal Bose v. Corporation of Calcutta (Cr. Rev. 1215 of 1916 : reported 21 C. W. N. 1009 (1917)) was not correctly decided, and (4) the convictions and sentences in the six cases before us must be upheld and the rules discharged. Fletcher, J. 40. I agree in the judgment delivered by the learned Chief Justice. Richardson, J. 41. I agree. The question whether the Petitioners are liable to a single punishment or to several punishment for each offence committed is mainly a question of construction. 42. The answer depends in the first instance on the bye-laws under which the Petitioners were convicted and sentenced. 43. The validity of bye-law 83 is not questioned, but it is argued that bye-law 85 is repugnant to the principal Act, and ultra vires. The repugnancy suggested is that while sec. 561 of the Act enables " a breach " of a bye-law to be punished, bye-law 85 says that " every person guilty of a breach " shall be punishable. It is argued that if the bye-law means that every person participating in a breach separately amenable to the punishment provided it goes further than sec. 561 warrants. This contention is in my judgment untenable. 44. It is argued that if the bye-law means that every person participating in a breach separately amenable to the punishment provided it goes further than sec. 561 warrants. This contention is in my judgment untenable. 44. In the nature of things when a punishment is provided for an offence the punishment must obviously fall on an offender. What is meant by "punishing an offence " is punishing an offender for that offence. The expression may be elliptical, but it is perfectly natural and quite in accordance with general usage and the usage of the Legislature in other Acts. In sec. 40 of the Penal Code an offence ' is spoken of as " a thing made punishable. In cl. (o) of sec. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code the definition of " offence is " any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. This definition is repeated in sec. 3 (37) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and in sec. 3 (30) of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899. Sec.195 of the Criminal Procedure Code speaks of any offence punishable under certain specified sections of the Penal Code. In sec. 64 of the Penal Code the " punishable offence " and the offender are brought into juxtaposition :-- '' In every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine.. 45. According then to the ordinary meaning of the words which occur in sec. 561 they refer to and contemplate the punishment of offenders. Within the limits expressly prescribed the General Committee are empowered to make provisions for the punishment of those who commit breaches of their bye-laws. The words of the section are, in my opinion, wide enough to authorize provision being made for the punishment of joint offenders or persons who join in committing a breach of any bye-law not only in the manner described as single, but also in the manner describer as several. If, therefore, bye-law 85 per mits several punishments, the contention. that it is for that reason inconsistent with sec. 561 and therefore invalid falls to the ground. 46. Then what is the true meaning of bye-law 85? In my opinion, the bye-law read by itself is clearly capable of' being construed so as to' authorize several punishment. If, therefore, bye-law 85 per mits several punishments, the contention. that it is for that reason inconsistent with sec. 561 and therefore invalid falls to the ground. 46. Then what is the true meaning of bye-law 85? In my opinion, the bye-law read by itself is clearly capable of' being construed so as to' authorize several punishment. More than that, both by their own force and upon the analogy of the penalty sections of the Penal Code, such a construction is the obvious and natural striation of the words used'. The byelaws, it must be borne in mind, cannot be read; as providing for either mode of punishment in the alternative. Whichever mode is provided the "There is excluded. There are no alternative words and where the law imposes a several penalty a joint penalty is illegal and vice versa. Prima facie, the bye-law clearly imposes several punishment. 47. This conclusion is supported by certain provisions of a general character included in the codified criminal law of this country It is not disputed that offences under, the Penal Code are severally punishable Under sec. 40 of the Code, the word " offence " primarily denotes " a thing made punishable under this Code." but in certain specific sections of the Code if denotes '' a thing made punishable under this Code or under any special or local law," a " special law " being by definition a law applicable to a particular subject, and a " local law," a law applicable only to a particular part of British India. Among' the sections in which the word has the extended meaning are sees. 64 to 67 relating to imprisonment in default of payment of fine, sec. 71 relating to the punishment of offences made up of several parts and secs. 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116 and 117 which occur in the chapter relating to abetment. The result is to assimilate in these and other respects offense punishable under a special or Local law to offences punishable under the Penal Code, and I note in passion- that in the case which has been so much referred to, R v. Clarke ([1777] Cowper 610), Aston, J., gave the liability to punishment for abetment as a reason for considering that the offence in that case was a several " offence. 48. 48. I conceive that an offence created by, and punishable under, bye-laws is an offence under the special or local law under which the bye-laws were framed. But if there be any doubt as to the applicability of sec. 40 of the Penal Code to offences under bye-laws, no such doubt attaches to the provision, also a general provision, contained m sec. "26 of the Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899, to the following effect :--" Sees. 63 to 70 of the Indian Penal Code and the proving of the Code 'of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force in relation to the issue and the execution of warrants for the levy of fines, shall apply to all fines imposed under any Bengal Act or any rule or bye-Taw made under any Bengal Act, unless the Act, rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary." This enactment makes no mention of the sections of the Penal Code relating to abetment, but it is not necessary to press the argument founded on these sections and for all practical purposes that argument may he disregarded. It is sufficient in the present case to advert to the provisions relating to imprisonment in default of payment of fine. It may be that the proviso at the end of sec. 26 leaves room for the imposition of a single fine or a single punishment in any case in which the Legislature may choose by apt words to impose such a penalty and that accordingly the notion of " single offence," whatever the expression may mean, is not excluded. But clearly in the generality of cases, in all those cases such as the present where the provisions of the Penal Code referred to are not made inapplicable, the mode of punishment contemplated is several punishment. Under sec. 64 of the Penal Code " in every case in which.... an offence is punishable with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to fine, it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender-to direct by the sentence that in default of payment of the fine the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term." In such cases the term of imprisonment which may be imposed in default is regulated by sec. 67. 67. Now if it be supposed that the punishment to which the Petitioners are liable under bye-law 85 is a single punishment, only a single fine can be imposed. The fine cannot be apportioned among the Petitioners, because as soon as it is apportioned, the punishment becomes several. That being so, how is imprisonment in default of payment to be imposed? The imprisonment, as the Advocate-General pointed out, cannot be apportioned any more than the fine. 49. Some attempt was made to argue that the Petitioners as constituting a partnership were one person within the definition in sec. 3 (32) of the Bengal Clauses Act. But that definition only applies " unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context '' and for the present purpose it is quite impossible to regard them as one person. They might perhaps criminally be jointly liable to a fine, just as civilly they might be jointly liable under a decree for damages, but they are not liable to fine as one person and they cannot be imprisoned as one person. Mr. Norton admitted that if one of the partners took no part in continuing a performance after-1 A.M. he would not be liable at all. The Petitioners are clearly liable not as a partnership but as three individuals though as three individuals they might conceivably be' jointly liable. 50. In my opinion these provisions of the Penal Code made applicable by sec. 26 of the Bengal General Clauses Act strongly support the view that the punishment ad missible under bye-law 85 is several and not single. 51. Lastly, it is said that there is something in the nature of the offence created by by-law 83 such that bye-law 85 must be read, if this is at all possible as imposing only a single punishment. The offence, it is said, is by its nature a " single " offence. The argument was based by Mr. Norton on the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in R. v. Showdar Ghenar (7 Bom. H. C R. (Cr.) 39 (1870)) where nearly all the English cases are cited by Westropp, C. J. It would be tedious to go through these cases again. The mainstay of the whole contention is to be found in the observations of Lord Mans field in R. v. Clarke ([1777] 1 Cowper 610) which have already been read. H. C R. (Cr.) 39 (1870)) where nearly all the English cases are cited by Westropp, C. J. It would be tedious to go through these cases again. The mainstay of the whole contention is to be found in the observations of Lord Mans field in R. v. Clarke ([1777] 1 Cowper 610) which have already been read. 52. The difficulty, I have, is in understanding the conception of a " single offence " which is involved in those observations, nor was much light thrown upon the point at the Bar. The Advocate-General (for the Municipality) felt himself pressed by the weight of Lord Mansfield's authority and it is impossible not to share that feeling. Speaking with diffidence, I confess that t cannot in my own mind see how any offence which " several persons may join in committing " can by its nature be repugnant or antagonistic to the notion of several punishment. The illustrations given do not help me. As the learned Chief Justice observed in the course of the argument, a man, like a hare, has only one life, yet several persons may 6e severally hanged or transported for life for the same murder. I have tried to think of an explanation, but the only explanation I can suggest is that a term which may be appropriate to the punishment provided in particular cases is sometimes ascribed to the offence. In such cases what is really single is the punishment and not the offence. I have not examined the cases to see whether this suggestion is well-founded. Nor would such an inquiry serve any useful purpose. For, if the suggestion accounts for the original employment of the term " single offence," the term might afterwards come to be employed in cases where it could not be so easily justified. Another suggestion which may be hazarded as regards the earlier English cases, especially cases under the game laws, is that they were decided according to what the Judges conceived to be " the equity of the statute," a mode of construction which has gone out of favour and fashion in consequence of the more precise legislation of modern times. 53. The term '' single '' has other uses: it sometimes denotes one complete offence as distinguished from other and separate offences of the same kind. In this sense the theft of a book is a single offence. 53. The term '' single '' has other uses: it sometimes denotes one complete offence as distinguished from other and separate offences of the same kind. In this sense the theft of a book is a single offence. There is not a separate theft of each leaf. So by " exercising his ordinary calling on a Sunday " a man only commits one offence (Crepps v. Durden ([1777] 1 Cowper 640). Curiously enough in that case the hare was again referred to in illustration, " killing a single hare is an offence but the killing ten more on the same day will not multiply the offence or the penalty imposed by the statute for killing one." 54. The term again may perhaps be applied to offences, such as perjury, which an offender can only commit alone. 55. But neither of these uses of the word affords any clue for the determination of offences which several persons may join in committing but which nevertheless are so single in their nature as to demand only a single punishment. I do not know by what tests such " single " offences are to be distinguished from '' several " offences. I confess, therefore, that I can find nothing in the Bombay case or in the English cases there cited which really throws any light on the question how this bye-law 85 made under the Calcutta Municipality Act is to be construed. The offence of continuing a performance later than 1 A.M. seems in a sense single enough, but is it more single than stealing a book? If, however, the distinction between single and several offences as explained in R. v. Clarke ([1777] 1 Cowper 610) is to be applied, an offence according to that case appears to be " several " if it is the product of different persons doing different things, and I can easily conceive that the offence in the present case, the continuance of a performance after 1 A.M., was on each occasion on which it was committed the result of different acts done by each of the three Petitioners. 56. From whatever point of view the question before us be approached the considerations which arise point to the conclusion that the words of bye-law 85 must be taken in their ordinary meaning. " Every person guilty of a breach.. 56. From whatever point of view the question before us be approached the considerations which arise point to the conclusion that the words of bye-law 85 must be taken in their ordinary meaning. " Every person guilty of a breach.. shall be punishable..." means that every person convicted of a breach shall be liable to the penalty. This conclusion is consistent with the most recent of the English cases cited before us which is also apparently the last reported case in England on the point, R. v. Littlechild (2). There without going into the question whether the offence committed was in its nature single or several, separate.penalties were upheld, because a penalty was imposed by the Act upon each person convicted. So in the passage from Paley on Summary Convictions (6th Ed., p. 276) which was quoted by Hannen, J., "If either the penalty be imposed by the Act on each person convicted, even where the offence would in its own nature be single or if the quality of offence be such that the guilt of one person may be distinct from that of the other--in either of these cases the penalties are several." Paley's summary of the result of the English cases supports the suggestion above ventured that a '' single offence '' in this connection means an offence for which a single punishment is expressly provided by law, For the reasons indicated, I agree that the question put to the Full Bench should be answered in the negative.