Judgement Consolidated Appeals, by special leave, from two judgments and twenty decrees of the High Court (November 25, 1909, and June 3, 1910) affirming, subject to a modification, decrees of the District Judge and the Subordinate Judge of Birbhum, which decrees affirmed decrees of the said Subordinate Judge and of the Munsifs Court of Rampurhat. The appellant was the proprietor of zamindaris in the Birbhum district which were settled with his predecessor at the permanent settlement in 1793. At various dates between 1834 and 1862 some of these zamindaris, or in some cases mauzas within them, had been settled by patni leases granted by the predecessors of the appellant, or by the appellant himself. These patnis covered in each case the entire interest of the zamindar in the lands within the boundaries specified. The patnidars under some of the patnis had assigned their rights thereunder by darpatni gran is. Within the boundaries of the patni grants there had existed from the time of the permanent settlement certain chaukidari chakaran tenures. In and between 1895 and 1900 the Collector of Birbhum, acting under the Village Chaukidari Act (Bengal Act VI. of 1870), resumed many of the above-mentioned chaukidari chakaran lands and transferred them to the appellant. Twenty suits were instituted upon dates between February, 1905, and June, 1906, against the appellant, by patnidars and darpatnidars above referred to, the present respondents. The plaints contended that the patni leases included such of the chaukidari chakaran lands as were within their respective boundaries, and that, after the transfer of them to the appellant, the plaintiffs respectively were entitled to khas possession, subject to payment to the appellant of the assessments fixed by the Collector upon the transfer under the Act. Some of the suits were heard by the Subordinate Judge of Birbhum, some by the Munsif of Rampurhat, and decrees were made for possession subject to the payment of the assessments made under Bengal Act VI. of 1870. The appellant appealed to the High Court. Judgments were delivered on November 9, 1909, and June 3, 1910, the former being reported at I. L. R. 37 Calc. 57. The learned judges held, with regard to the only question now raised, that in conformity with previous decisions of the High Court the patnidars and darpatnidars were entitled to possession. The appellant appealed to the High Court. Judgments were delivered on November 9, 1909, and June 3, 1910, the former being reported at I. L. R. 37 Calc. 57. The learned judges held, with regard to the only question now raised, that in conformity with previous decisions of the High Court the patnidars and darpatnidars were entitled to possession. It was, however, further held that the cases should be remanded to the lower appellate Courts to determine the conditions upon which the lands in suit should be held, and that those conditions should be ascertained upon the principles laid down in Gopendra Chandra Mitter v. Tarajprasanna Mukerjee (( 1910) I. L. R. 37 Calc. 598.) and cases there mentioned. 1916. Nov. 16, 17, 22. De Gruyther, K.C., and Eddis, for the appellant. The respondents are not entitled to possession of the chaukidari chakaran lands under the patnis. Before the transfer to the appellant under Bengal Act VI. of 1870 he had no interest in those lands, but only rights as to the services of the chaukidars. The form of the transfer provided by Sched. C of the Act shows that the Government owned the lands. At the permanent settlement the zamindars were recognized as proprietors of revenue-paying lands only. The lands in suit were held by chaukidars who formed part of the police force ; they came under s. 8, sub-s. 4, of Bengal Regulation I. of 1793, and were not revenue-paying lands. The chakaran lands referred to in s. 41 of Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1793 are revenue-paying lands. [Reference was made to Bengal Regulation VIII., ss. 4, 5? 34, 36 to 41, 66, and 67, sub-s. 4, and to Haringtons Analysis, vol. 1, pp. 459, 513.] The interpretation placed by the Board in Secretary of State for India v. Kirtibas Hari-chandan Mahapatra (( 1914) L. R. 42 Ind. Ap. 30.) upon the definition of chaukidari chakaran lands contained in s. 1 of Bengal Act VI. of 1870 supports this view. The judgment (at p. 43) refers to chaukidari chakaran lands as " lying within a mahal but not forming part of its assets." The appellants contention is consistent with the judgment in Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. of 1870 supports this view. The judgment (at p. 43) refers to chaukidari chakaran lands as " lying within a mahal but not forming part of its assets." The appellants contention is consistent with the judgment in Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16.) Lord Kingsdown no doubt there said that the chaukidars were not part of the police force ; he was, however, referring to the chaukidars there in question who were not chaukidars to whom Bengal Act VI. of 1870 would have applied, but private servants of the zamindar, as in the case of the paiks referred to in Ramchandra Branj Deo v. Secretary of State for India (( 1916) L. R. 43 Ind. Ap. 172.); the chaukidari lands in Burdwan were subject to assessment. The effect of s. 51 of Bengal Act VI. of 1870 is not to make the transferred lands subject to the patnis. The object of that section was to preserve any rights given to the chaukidars in other lands in the village in respect of extra services rendered to the zamindars. It is conceded that the decision of the High Court in Hari Narayan Mozumdar v. Mukunda Lal Mundal (( 1900) 4 Calc. W. N. 814.) supports the respondents, and that that case has been followed in India in later decisions, including Kazi Newaz Khoda v. Ram Jadu Dey (( 1906) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 109.), which is directly adverse to the appellant. In Kashim Sheikh v. Prasanna Kumar Mukerjee (( 1905) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596.), however, the High Court held that the effect of the resumption and transfer to the zamindar was to give the latter a new title. It is submitted that that decision was right. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., Sir W. Garth, Dunne, and S. V. Sen, for the respondents, The patnidars and darpatnidars are entitled by s. 51 of Bengal Act VI. of 1870 to have possession of the lands under the patnis. Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1793, s. 41, is inconsistent with the title being in. the Government before the transfer. The judgment in Joykishen Mookerjees Case (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16.) is conclusive in favour of the respondents. of 1870 to have possession of the lands under the patnis. Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1793, s. 41, is inconsistent with the title being in. the Government before the transfer. The judgment in Joykishen Mookerjees Case (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16.) is conclusive in favour of the respondents. Lord Kingsdown there draws a distinction between tannahdars, who were part of the police force and within s. 8, sub-s. 4, of Bengal Regulation I. of 1793, and chaukidars to whose service lands s. 41 of Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1793 applied. In Secretary of State for India v. Kirtibas Harichandan Mahapatra (L. R. 42 Ind. Ap. 30.) the Board expressly adopted that judgment; the actual decision depended chiefly upon the sanads. There is a chain of decisions of the High Court in favour of the respondents. In Kazi Newaz Khoda v. Ram Jadu Dey (I. L. R. 34 Calc. 109.) the view expressed i Kashim Sheikh v. Prasanna Kumar Mukerjee (I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596.) that s. 41 had been impliedly repealed was expressly disapproved. The former case has been followed in Harak Chand v. Churn Chandra Singh (( 1910) 15 Calc. W. N. 5.) and Rakmal Das Mukerjee v. Madhab Chandra Singh. (( 1910) 15 Calc. W. N. 61.) Sect. 51 of Act VI. of 1870 was intended to apply to the circumstances of this case. The form of transfer provided by the Act was a convenient method of dealing with the matter ; it cannot be treated as showing that the Government were owners of the lands. Eddis replied. 1917. Jan. 24. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON. This is a consolidated appeal from decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal made in twenty suits, each of which, though relating to a distinct subject-matter, raised substantially the same questions of law. Each suit was in substance a suit to recover possession from the appellant, who is the registered proprietor of extensive zamindari in the Birbhum district of Bengal, of chaukidari chakaran lands recently resumed by Government and transferred to him under the provisions of Act VI. of 1870 of the Bengal Council. The plaintiff in each suit was the patnidar or darpatnidar of the village within the boundaries of which the lands the subject of the suit were situate. of 1870 of the Bengal Council. The plaintiff in each suit was the patnidar or darpatnidar of the village within the boundaries of which the lands the subject of the suit were situate. In those suits in which the darpatnidar was the plaintiff the patnidar was made a defendant, but took no part in the argument. The decree in each suit was in favour of the plaintiff and against the appellant. Their Lordships conside it unnecessary to deal at further length with the history of the litigation. It is abundantly clear from the facts found in the Courts below, and was not disputed before their Lordships Board, that any interest which the appellant, or his predecessors in title, originally had in the lands the subject of each suit had, prior to the resumption and transfer of such lands under the Act of 1870, been transferred to and become vested in the plaintiff patnidar or darpatnidar by virtue of the lease or sub-lease under which he held the villages in which these lands were situate. Two points only were argued before their Lordships. It was contended, first, that the proprietor with whom a zamindari was settled under the Bengal Permanent Settlement did not obtain or retain in the chaukidari chakaran lands situate within the territorial boundaries of a village comprised in his zamindari any interest capable of being made the subject of a patni lease ; and secondly, that even if he obtained or retained any such interest, the effect of the Act of 1870 was to confer on him a new title not in any way affected by any patni lease theretofore granted by him or his predecessors in title.. In order to arrive at a conclusion on these questions, it is necessary to consider (1.) the nature of chaukidari chakaran lands, (2.) the provisions of the Bengal Permanent Settlement, and (3.) the true meaning and effect of the Act. At the time of the British occupation a zamindar was responsible not only for the payment of the revenue, but for the preservation of peace and order within his district. For the latter purpose he maintained tannahdars, or police officials, and chaukidars, or village watchmen. At the time of the British occupation a zamindar was responsible not only for the payment of the revenue, but for the preservation of peace and order within his district. For the latter purpose he maintained tannahdars, or police officials, and chaukidars, or village watchmen. Both had from time immemorial been remunerated by allotments of land to be held in consideration of the services they Tendered to the zamindar, either rent free or at a low rent, but whereas the police official rendered police service only, the chaukidar not only assisted the police, but rendered acts of service personal to the zamindar. Chakaran lands are lands held by service tenure. Generically the term includes all lands so held, whether by police officials, chaukidars, or persons whose only duties are personal to the zamindar. The expression " tannahdari lands or tannahdari chakaran lands " means lands held on service tenure by tannahdars or police officials. The expression " chaukidari chakaran lands " means lands held on service tenure by chaukidars, or village watch- men. As one would naturally expect, it had long been customary, in fixing the revenue or jamma payable for the zamindari, to leave tannahdari and chaukidari chakaran lands out of account. Passing to the settlement of 1793, it appears to their Lordships to be beyond controversy that whatever doubts be entertained as to whether before the British occupation the zamindars had any proprietary interest in the lands comprised within their respective districts, the settlement itself recognizes and proceeds on the footing that they are the actual proprietors of the land for which they undertake to pay the Government revenue. The settlement is expressly made with the " zamindars independent talukdars and other actual proprietors of the soil" see Regulation I., s. 3, and Regulation VIII., s. 4. It is clear that since the settlement the zamindars have had at least a prima facie title to all lands for which they pay revenue, such lands being commonly referred to as malguzari lands see the case of Rajah Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Doorgapersand Tewarree. (1) Bearing this in mind, their Lordships will proceed to consider the regulations of the permanent settlement so far as they deal with chakaran lands. The leading authority on this subject is Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (1) Bearing this in mind, their Lordships will proceed to consider the regulations of the permanent settlement so far as they deal with chakaran lands. The leading authority on this subject is Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (2) To use Lord Kingsdowns expression in that case, the effect of the settlement is to divide chakaran lands into two classes—namely, (( 1868) 12 Moo. Ind. Ap. 286, at p. 331..) tannahdari chakaran lands, that is, lands held on service tenure by police officials, and (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16..) all other chakaran lands. As to chakaran lands of the former class, they were by Bengal Regulation L, s. 8, sub-s. 4, made resumable by Government, the Government relieving the zamindar from the duty of maintaining a police establishment. These tannahdari chakaran lands were, in fact, shortly afterwards resumed and became Government lands, the title of the zamindar being extinguished by such resumption. As to all other chakaran lands, whether held by public officers or private servants in lieu of wages, they are dealt with by Bengal Regulation VIIL, s. 41. In order to understand s. 41 of the last-mentioned Regulation it is necessary to refer to some of the preceding sections. By virtue of s. 36 the assessment is to be fixed exclusive and independent of all existing lakhiraj lands, that is, lands exempted from the public revenue. Such lands are therefore in effect withdrawn from the settlement, and the zamindar, though these lands might be locally situate within his district, could claim no title therein by virtue of the settlement Sects. 37 to 40 deal with certain lands referred to as " private lands " of the zamindars. By s. 37 these are not to be included in the lakhiraj lands referred to in s. 36, and special directions with regard to them are given in ss. 38, 39, and 40. Speaking generally, such lands are not excluded from, but on the contrary are included in, the settlement. Then comes s. 41, dealing with chakaran lands ; these, whether held by public officers or private servants in lieu of wages, are also not to be included in the lakhiraj lands referred to in s. 36. They are to be annexed to the malguzari lands and declared responsible for the public revenue assessed on the zamindari, in which they are included in common with all other malguzari lands therein. They are to be annexed to the malguzari lands and declared responsible for the public revenue assessed on the zamindari, in which they are included in common with all other malguzari lands therein. Sects. 37 to 41 inclusive appear to their Lordships to suggest that neither the " private lands " of the zamindars nor chakaran lands had theretofore been taken into account in fixing the revenue for which the zamindar was responsible to Government. Otherwise there would be no point in excluding them from the lakhiraj lands dealt with by s. 36. However this may be with regard to the private lands of the zamindar or with regard to chakaran lands, the services for which were purely personal to the zamindar, it is quite clear that tannahdari and chaukidari chakaran lands, the services for which involved the performance of duties in which the public was interested, had not, as a rule, been taken into account for the purpose of increasing the jamma. The effect of s. 41 appears to be this The question whether any of the chakaran lands therein referred to ought to be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the jamma is left to be determined by the custom which had hitherto prevailed or any special directions contained in the Regulations. But, whether or not so taken into account, all chakaran lands are to be considered malguzari for the purpose of ascertaining the lands in respect of which the jamma is paid and upon which it is secured. The prima facie title of the zamindar to chakaran lands within his district is thus recognized by the settlement. Tannahdari chakaran lands may be resumed under Regulation I., s. 8, sub-s. 4, but with regard to all other chakaran lands, if resumable at all, they can be resumed by the zamindar alone. In the case, however, of chaukidari chakaran lands not even the zamindar may be entitled to resume them, for chaukidars have public duties to perform, and the lands which they hold on service tenure as remuneration for the performance of such duties are to that extent appropriated or assigned for public purposes. Subject, nevertheless, to the requirements of the public interest, the zamindar is the owner, and as such is entitled to the enjoyment of any personal services which the chaukidars ought to render, and when vacancies occur to appoint others in their place. Subject, nevertheless, to the requirements of the public interest, the zamindar is the owner, and as such is entitled to the enjoyment of any personal services which the chaukidars ought to render, and when vacancies occur to appoint others in their place. All this follows from what was said by Lord Kingsdown in Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (10 Moo. Ind. Ap. 16.) Such, then, being the zamindars interest in chaukidari chakaran lands within his district, it is difficult to see why this interest should not be made the subject of a patni grant. That it could be so made appears to have been admitted in the last-mentioned case, and the whole of Lord Kingsdowns judgment proceeds on that footing. In their Lordships opinion, there can be no reasonable doubt on this matter. Indeed, the only argument to the contrary advanced by the appellants counsel was based on certain expressions used by Mr. Ameer Ali in giving the reasons of the Board in the recent case of Secretary of State for India v. Kirtibas Harichandan Mahapatra. (L. R. 42 Ind. Ap. 30.) In that case, which has little, if any, bearing on the questions now in controversy, the point for decision was whether the power of resumption conferred by Act VI. of 1870 extended to certain chakaran lands which the Government had affected to resume thereunder. Here it is admitted by every one that the powers of the Act were applicable. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that Mr. Ameer Ali, whatever expressions he used, did not intend to depart in the smallest degree from what had been laid down by Lord Kingsdown in Joykishen Mookerjee v. Collector of East Burdwan. (1) Under these circumstances, any argument based on a meticulous examination of isolated expressions used by him can, in their Lordships opinion, have little weight. It remains to consider the effect of a resumption by the Government of chaukidari chakaran lands under the provisions of Act VI. of 1870 of the Bengal Council. It should be observed that the definition of chaukidari chakaran lands contained in the Act refers not only to the public duties of chaukidars, but also to their personal duties to the zamindar. It is apparently for this reason that the revenue assessment in the lands resumed is, by s. 49, fixed at only one-half of the annual value of such lands. It is apparently for this reason that the revenue assessment in the lands resumed is, by s. 49, fixed at only one-half of the annual value of such lands. If the zamindar had no interest, the effect of this provision would be to make him a free gift of half of the value of the lands resumed. It appears to be for the same reason that the zamindar is, under s. 50, entitled to contest the correctness of any assessment which is made. After the assessment is complete the collector is, under s. 50, by order in the scheduled form to transfer the land to the zamindar subject to the assessment. By s. 51 the order operates to transfer the land to the zamindar subject to such assessment and " subject to all contracts theretofore made in respect of, under or by virtue of which any person other than the zamindar may have any right to any land, portion of his estate, or tenure in the place in which such land may be situate." The latter words may not be very happily chosen, but their obvious intention is to preserve the rights of third parties. They contemplate a case in which the village in which the resumed lands are situate has been made the subject of a contract by the zamindar or those through whom he claims, and that under this contract some third party may have an interest in the lands resumed. They are wide enough to include, and in their Lordships opinion do include, the rights of a patnidar under a patni grant by virtue of which the patnidar is lessee of the zamindars interest in the lands resumed, and also the rights of a darpatnidar under a darpatni grant. In their Lordships opinion, therefore, not only does the Act recognize the existing title of the zamindar to the lands resumed, but the estate taken by the zamindar under the order of transfer is in confirmation and by way of continuance of his existing estate, and when the zamindar or those through whom he claims has or have entered into contracts affecting his existing estate the rights of third parties under these contracts are preserved. It is a satisfaction to their Lordships to find that the view above expressed is that hitherto almost universally adopted in the Indian Courts, The result is that the appeal fails and should be dismissed, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. With regard to costs, the appellant should pay to the respondents who have appeared one set of costs between them, but these should, having regard to the terms on which leave to appeal was granted, be as between solicitor and client.