JUDGMENT : 1. I am satisfied that this order must be quashed. I am not saying anything about the merits because I think it was made without jurisdiction, and I think also that this Court has no right to interfere on the merits so long as the Magistrate is acting within his jurisdiction. It may be that there is a danger of a breach of the peace between these two brothers and that it desirable that a Magistrate should inquire into the dispute from that point of view and should make the necessary orders within his jurisdiction to prevent it, if possible. With regard however to this particular order, there seem to me to be two serious objections. To enable a Magistrate to make an order relating to disputes about immovable property he must in accordance with Section 145 of the Cr PC, first make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute exists likely to cause a breach of the peace. The order in writing made by the Magistrate in this case refers to the report of the police. Now if the language of that reference showed that he was satisfied on all the grounds contained in the police report, it might be sufficient; but the Magistrate by his order has particularized the grounds on which he is acting, and he says that the report will show that the dispute is not likely to subside until an order is made. That is, to say the least of it, ambiguous, and not a clear finding that he is satisfied that there is likely to be breach of the peace. That being so, he has not made an order in my opinion complying with Section 145, sub-Section (1) of the Cr PC. 2. The second objection is that the order which has been made is an order of attachment. To entitle him to make an order of attachment; he must decide either that one of the parties was in possession as defined by Section 145 of the Cr PC, or that he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was. 3. I should hold that to be the plain meaning of the section apart from any authority. 3. I should hold that to be the plain meaning of the section apart from any authority. The Calcutta High Court has at least on two occasions some ten years or more ago held that is the meaning of the section, and that an order of attachment made without one or other of those findings is an order made without jurisdiction. I am satisfied that this order of attachment was made without jurisdiction, and following the authority of this Court in In the matter of the petition of Nathu Mal , (1902) 24 All. 315., I hold that this Court has power to interfere, not under Section 435 of the Cr PC, but under what was then Section 15 of the Charter Act, which has either been re-enacted or supplemented by one of the sections of the Government of India Act. I treat this application as having been made to this Court under that jurisdiction. 4. I would only make this further observation. The judgment of the Magistrate in this case, which is a very careful one, shows that he looked at the matter almost entirely from the point of view of a civil tribunal endeavouring to arrive at the nature of the possession of the parties who were in occupation, of their civil rights and of the genuineness of the alleged deed of sale. I think these considerations diverted him from the real point which he had to determine under the section under which the police ought to put the law into motion. I am not saying for a moment that it is not possible for a Magistrate, where a serious breach of the peace is feared, to attach a house, turn out two members of a family together with a tenant, such as a banking firm carrying on business on the upper storey, and to place it in the hands of a Receiver for some three or four years pending some litigation which has not been commenced. But that is an order more fit to be made in the majority of cases by a civil Court, where proper machinery is provided for arriving at the real taerits of the dispute. The order must be quashed without prejudice to other proceedings which the police may see fit to institute if there is serious danger of a breach of the peace.