Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 29, 1914) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge, Third Court, Patna. The litigation related to the property of one Deonarayan Singh, deceased, and arose under the following circumstances. Four brothers, Mahipat, Saligram, Het Narayan, and Drigpal, who were governed by the Mitakshara law, were at one time joint-owners of family property, but were all dead at the date of the suit. Saligram was succeeded by his only son, the said Deonarayan, and the property was then partitioned. Deonarayan died leaving a widow, Jaibasi Koer, and a daughter, Sakalbati Koer, who were the third and fourth respondents. The appellant Saudagar 26 Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 21 ( 1917- 1918) Saudagar Singh V. Pardip Singh 127 was the only son of Mahipat. Het Narayan died childless. Drigpal had three sons, namely, Jagdip, who died during the litigation, and the respondents Pardip Narayan and Barhamdeo. On April 25, 1906, Jaibasi Koer and Sakalbati Koer executed a tamliknama, or deed of gift, by which they absolutely conveyed to Saudagar the property which had belonged to Deonarayan, and put him into possession. The sons of Drigpal in 1908 instituted the present suit against Saudagar, Jaibasi Koer, and Sakalbati Koer. The plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that the ladies had no right to execute the tamliknama, and that the appellant Saudagar had acquired no title thereunder. They also claimed possession, but that claim was abandoned upon the appeal to the High Court. The appellant by his written statement contended that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. He alleged that Drigpal was only a half-brother of Saligram and that he, the appellant, was the only reversionary heir. He contended that the effect of the tamliknama was to make him absolute owner of the properties according to the principle of acceleration, and that the plaintiffs had not, and could not in future have, any right in it. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action during the life of Jaibasi Koer and Sakalbati Koer ; he, however, found as a fact that Drigpal and Saligram were brothers of the whole-blood, the plaintiffs consequently being presumptive heirs equally with Saudagar. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action during the life of Jaibasi Koer and Sakalbati Koer ; he, however, found as a fact that Drigpal and Saligram were brothers of the whole-blood, the plaintiffs consequently being presumptive heirs equally with Saudagar. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court, limiting their appeal to a claim for a declaration that the tamliknama of April 25, 1906, was not valid, nor operative against them after the deaths of Jaibasi Koer and Sakalbati Koer. The High Court (Stephen and Mullick JJ.) agreed with the finding of fact, and made the declaration as prayed. In the course of their judgment they said " the fact that such a declaration must be founded upon reasons that would support a declaration that the plaintiffs are heirs to Deonarayan, were it open to us to make such a declaration, cannot shut them out from their right to a declaration as to the validity of the document in question." 1917. Oct. 19. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Dunne, K.C., for the appellant. In substance the object of the appeal to the High Court was to obtain a declaration that the plaintiffs were presumptive heirs equally with the present appellant. Under these circumstances a declaratory decree should not have been made Kathama Nachiar v. Dorasinga Tever (( 1875) L. R. 2 I. A. 169.); Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer. (L. R. 43 I. A. 207.) The suit contemplated by s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is one on behalf of all the reversioners, impeaching a transaction as against those who may eventually become heirs Venkataranarayana Pillai v. Subbammal. (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 125.) The present suit was not of that nature. [Reference was also made to Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., pars. 647, 648.] De Gruyther, K.C., and Parikh, for the first and second respondents, were not called upon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PARKER OF WADDINGTON. Their Lordships do not consider it necessary to call upon counsel for the respondents in this appeal. The question is a very short one. It appears that the High Court from which the appeal has been 26 Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 21 ( 1917- 1918) Saudagar Singh V. Pardip Singh 128 brought has made a certain declara tion. Their Lordships do not consider it necessary to call upon counsel for the respondents in this appeal. The question is a very short one. It appears that the High Court from which the appeal has been 26 Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 21 ( 1917- 1918) Saudagar Singh V. Pardip Singh 128 brought has made a certain declara tion. There is absolutely no ground for saying that that declaration is in any way erroneous, nor has counsel for the appellant suggested any error. The point is simply whether, under the practice prevalent in India, such a declaration ought to have been made. In order to show that no declaration ought to have been made, reference has been made to various cases, and in particular to the case of Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyer. (2) The point of that case is this There was a Hindu widow entitled to an estate, and a suit was brought by a person, presumptively entitled as heir after her death, to prevent waste. It was held that there was no waste at all, and the question arose whether, under those circumstances, it was proper to give the persons presumptively entitled a declaration of their title as presumptive, or as sometimes called reversionary, heirs, and it was held by this Board that no such declaration ought to be made-It is said that this case is analogous to that, and that no declaration ought to have been made. On the other hand, if s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, is referred to, it will be seen that one of the illustrations given is this " The widow of a sonless Hindu alienates part of the property of which she is in possession as such. The person presumptively entitled to possess the property if he survive her, may, in a suit against the alienee, obtain a declaration that the alienation was made without legal necessity and was therefore void beyond the widows lifetime." It appears to their Lordships to be clear on this section that where any deed is executed, the result of which may be to prejudice the interests of the reversionary heirs, those heirs, though still reversionary and though they may never get any title because events may preclude them from doing so, may have a declaration as to the effect of the deed. The declaration here is simply confined to that. The declaration here is simply confined to that. It is a declaration that a certain deed which was executed by the Hindu widow in possession, and purporting to confer the absolute estate in the property on one of the reversionary heirs, is not binding on the other reversionary heirs. It was intended that this deed should operate to confer the whole interest on the grantee, on the footing that the other reversionary heirs, being of the half-blood only, could not come in competition with the grantee, and the real question in the suit, as far as their Lordships can make out, was simply whether the claimants were claimants of the half-blood or of the whole-blood, and it was decided by both Courts that they were not of the half-blood, but of the whole-blood. Under these circumstances it appears to their Lordships that this is an exact illustration of that which s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act was meant to provide for. It is quite true that it involves a finding that the plaintiffs in this case are reversionary heirs, but that must always be the case where a declaration is made following the illustration (e) of the section, because it is only in virtue of the persons claiming the declaration being reversionary heirs, and therefore presumptively entitled, that the declaration is made. Under these circumstances their Lordships can see no possible ground for interfering with the decree of the High Court, and the appeal therefore should be dismissed with costs. Their Lordships will tender their humble advice to His Majesty accordingly.