Judgement Appeal and Cross-appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (March 4, 1907) and connected appeal from a judgment and decree of that Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 47 Court (January 21, 1909), each of the said decrees varying reports of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur. The present appeals were as to the effect, in the circumstances of the case, of an Order in Council made in 1905 upon an appeal (( 1905) L. R. 32 1. A. 203.) to the Privy Council in the suit. The facts, including the terms of the Order, appear from the judgment of their Lordships. In the arguments reliance was placed upon the further facts that the name of the taluqdar had been entered in lists 1 and 2 prepared under the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1869) and that the property purchased by the deceased taluqdar had been purchased out of income derived from the taluqa. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner remitted the matter to the Subordinate Judge for inquiry and report. A certified copy of the sanad of 1861 was in evidence, but there was no list of the villages included in it; the chief source of information on that point being the summary settlement concluded in October, 1859, and a decree of the Settlement-Officer in 1869 in the taluqdars favour. The Subordinate Judge reported that of the fifty-eight villages which remained in dispute twenty-seven were part of the taluqa, or accretions to or appurtenant to it, and that thirty-one were not. He held that the villages substituted by the Government after 1861 formed part of the taluqa. With regard to those villages which he found to have been purchased after 1861, save as to half of Hasnapur, he said that there was nothing to indicate that Balbhaddar Singh had intended to incorporate them with the estate; he accordingly held that they passed to the Rani. From the fact, however, that half the village of Hasnapur was part of the taluqa in 1861, he inferred that the other half had been purchased with the intention of incorporating it with the taluqa ; he therefore held that it passed to the appellant. Cross-objections to the report were made to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. From the fact, however, that half the village of Hasnapur was part of the taluqa in 1861, he inferred that the other half had been purchased with the intention of incorporating it with the taluqa ; he therefore held that it passed to the appellant. Cross-objections to the report were made to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Scott J.C. by his judgment thereon stated that the case had been argued upon both sides as depending upon intention. He, however, was of opinion that the words " accretions" and " appurtenant" in the Order must be given their technical meanings, and that even if Balbhaddar Singh had intended to add the purchased villages to the taluqa that did not bring them within the terms of the Order. He agreed with the report in holding that the substituted villages formed part of the taluqa. He found that the report should be varied by adding the villages of Sarkanpur Marhuma, Puraina, and Patti Bhupatpur to those awarded to the appellant, and by adding Chak Sarkhanpur, Chak Simri, and half of Hasnapur to those awarded to the Rani. Evans J.C. adopted the judgment of Scott J.C. The present appeal and cross-appeal were from their decree. The Subordinate Judge having omitted to deal in his report with two houses and movable property which were in dispute, the matter was remitted to him for further report. He found that a house at Lucknow (the facts as to which appear from their Lordships judgment) passed as taluqdari property, but that the other house and the movable property did not. Upon objections to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner the report was varied by decreeing both houses and the movable pro perty to the Rani as non-taluqdari property. Chamier J.C. in the course of his judgment rejected the view that the taluqdar by declaration or intention could cause property acquired by him after 1861 to descend with the taluqa ; on this point he repeated in substance his judgment (reported at 11 Oudh Cases, 256) in another suit to which the present parties were parties. With regard to the house at Lucknow, lie was of opinion that it could not be con cluded that the sanad granting the house, or the house for which it was substituted, contained Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. With regard to the house at Lucknow, lie was of opinion that it could not be con cluded that the sanad granting the house, or the house for which it was substituted, contained Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 48 language similar to the primogeniture sanad by which the taluqa was granted. The second appeal was by the taluqdar from that decree. 1918. Jan. 22, 24, 29, 31. De Gruyther, K.C., and Kyffin, for the appellant (taluqdar). The whole of the property in dispute passed to the appellant by virtue of family custom. The name of the taluqdar being entered in list 2, prepared under the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1869), a presumption arose, under s, 10, that there was a family custom of descent to a single heir, and that custom attached to all acquired property which the taluqdar intended by him to be incorporated with the family estate Thakur Ishri Singh v. Baldeo Singh (( 1884) L. R. 11 I. A. 135.) ; Janki Pershad Singh v. Dwarka Pershad Singh (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 170.) ; Murtaza Husain Khan v. Mahomed Yasin.(( 1916) L. R. 43 1. A. 269.) If the property devolved upon a single heir it cannot be denied that the present taluqdar was entitled to succeed. The sanad of 1861 recognized the existence of a family custom of primogeniture and perpetuated it. The villages were purchased out of the income of the taluqa ; it is consequently to be inferred that the intention was to incorporate them with the estate Gonda Kooer v. Kooer Oodey Singh (( 1874) 14 Beng. L. R. 159.) ; Isri Dut v. Hansbutti (( 1883) L. R. 10 I. A. 150.) ; Sheo Lochun v. Saheb (( 1887) L. R. 14 1. A. 63.) ; Sarabjit v. Indarjit (( 1905) 1. L. R. 27 A. 203.) ; Lal Bahadur v. Kanhai Lal. (( 1907) L. R. 34 I. A. 65.) The villages purchased out of the income of the taluqa were accretions to it within the meaning and intention of the previous judgment of the Board; so also was the movable property, since it was derived from the taluqa. The house in dispute was intended by the Government to form part of the taluqdari estate. Dunne, K.C., and Dube, for the respondent (the Rani). The house in dispute was intended by the Government to form part of the taluqdari estate. Dunne, K.C., and Dube, for the respondent (the Rani). The facts as to the property now in dispute were not before the Board upon the previous hearing, and no view as to its descent was intended to be expressed. There was no evidence that the taluqdar intended to incorporate the purchased villages with the taluqa. But in any case he was not competent by intention to make them descend in a manner at variance with their descent under the ordinary Hindu law. It was not suggested in the suit that there was a family custom of primogeniture ; the only custom alleged was that females were excluded from succession ; that custom was negatived by concurrent findings. The taluqdar, therefore, could not make the non-taluqdari property descend according to the rule of primogeniture impressed by the sanad upon the taluqa. The judgments of the Board referred to as to the descent of non-taluqdari property of a taluqdar whose name is entered in list 2 consequently do not support the appellant. The decisions referred to as to j3roperty purchased by Hindu widows out of the family estate, and as to members of a joint Hindu family incorporating self-acquired property with the joint family property, have no application, there being there a choice of two modes of descent under Hindu law according to the nature of the property. With regard to the house, the sanad was not produced, and it cannot be inferred that it was in the same terms as the primogeniture sanad constituting the taluqa. [Reference was also made to the Crown Grants Act (XV. of 1895), s. 2, and the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1869), s. 7.] De Gruyther, K.C., replied. Feb. 25. The judgment of their Lodships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. The suit in which these consolidated appeals have arisen came on appeal before the Board in 1905. [Reference was also made to the Crown Grants Act (XV. of 1895), s. 2, and the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1869), s. 7.] De Gruyther, K.C., replied. Feb. 25. The judgment of their Lodships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. The suit in which these consolidated appeals have arisen came on appeal before the Board in 1905. The Board which heard the appeal finally decided several important questions which were in dispute between the parties, but did not finally dispose of some other questions which related to portions of the property which were in dispute in the suit, and in respect of the questions which were not then finally decided advised His Majesty that these questions should be remanded to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, with power to that Court to remit the case to the Court of the Subordinate Judge for inquiry. The judgment of the Board is reported at L. R. 32 I. A. Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 49 203. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner on March 4, 1907, made a decree which dealt with some of the questions in dispute, and on January 21, 1909; a further decree, which dealt with the remaining questions in dispute, and from those decrees these consolidated appeals have been brought. The original parties to the suit are dead, and to understand the position of the parties to these consolidated appeals it is advisable to state, so far as it is material for that purpose, the pedigree of the family to which they belong, so far as it has been proved or admitted in this litigation. The members of the family are Hindus. BHUP SINGH | | | | Gajraj Singh. Died childless in Girwar Singh. Died without issue Dunia Singh. Survived his January, 1860. of his body January 2, 1865. brother Girwar Singh. | | | | | Balbhaddar Singh. Adopted Rani Raghubans Kunwar. Show Singh. Original by his uncle Girwar Singh, Original plaintiff, now dead. defendant, now dead. whom he succeeded, and | died childless on December | 12, 1898. | | | | | Rajindra Bahadur Singh, Rani Bijaikoer Living. Mahindra Bahadur Singh. eldest son. Party to the Narindra Bahadur Singh, appeal of 1905. Died in 1912. and Shiva Indra Bahadur Singh. Show Singh. Original by his uncle Girwar Singh, Original plaintiff, now dead. defendant, now dead. whom he succeeded, and | died childless on December | 12, 1898. | | | | | Rajindra Bahadur Singh, Rani Bijaikoer Living. Mahindra Bahadur Singh. eldest son. Party to the Narindra Bahadur Singh, appeal of 1905. Died in 1912. and Shiva Indra Bahadur Singh. Brought upon the record in place of Rani Raghubans Kunwar on her death. The property to which the suit related was property, movable and immovable, of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed on December 12, 1898. On his death his widow Rani .Raghubans Kunwar and his brother Sheo Singh each claimed adversely to the other all the property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed ; the Court of Revenue made an order for the mutation of names in favour of Sheo Singh, and he obtained possession of all the property, movable and immovable. Rani Raghubans Kunwar on February 6, 1900. brought this suit against Sheo Singh for possession of all the movable and immovable property. She alleged that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by his uncle Girwar Singh, and that Girwar Singh had by his will devised all his property to Balbhaddar Singh, who had enjoyed it until his death. Her suit was resisted by Sheo Singh, who alleged that all the property claimed by her appertained to taluqa Mahewa and was impartible ; that by a custom in the family females were excluded [from the inheritance ; that the succession to the taluqa was governed by s. 22 of the Oudh Estates Act (I. of 1809), under which he claimed that a brother was entitled in priority to the widow; and he denied that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by Girwar Singh. Sheo Singh relied upon a sanad of October 19, 1859, by which the Government had granted taluqa Mahewa to Gajraj Singh and his heirs without other limitation of the line of inheritance. At some period of the litigation a copy of a sanad which was granted by the Government to Girwar Singh in 1861 was produced, and the Board in 1905 held that the copy was admissible in evidence, and that Girwar Singh had in fact surrendered to the Government the sanad which had been granted to Gajraj Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 50 Singh in 1859 and the estate which had been granted by it, and in lieu of that sanad had accepted the sanad of 1861. The sanad of 1861 said expressly k4 It is another condition of this grant that in the event of your dying intestate, or of any of your successors dying intestate, the estate shall descend to the nearest male heir according to the rule of primogeniture.” The Courts in India had held that the sanad of 1861 could not in law operate to substitute the line of descent prescribed by it for the line of descent prescribed by the earlier sanad of 1859, and having found that Balbhaddar Singh had been adopted by Girwar Singh and had succeeded to taluqa Mahewa under the will of Girwar Singh, and that the alleged custom excluding females from the inheritance had not been proved, gave Rani Raghubans Kunwar a decree for possession. That alleged custom excluding females from inheritance was the only custom of the family which Sheo Singh attempted to prove. In the appeal which came before the Board in 1905 from the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner it was contended on behalf of Rani Raghubans Kunwar that Girwar Singh was not competent to surrender to the Government the sanad of 1859 ; that the Government, having granted by the sanad of 1859 the estate to Gajraj Singh and his heirs, had nothing left to grant to Girwar Singh in 1861 ; and, further, that the Government had no power to create by the grant of 1861 an estate descending by any rule or inheritance that was contrary to the ordinary law, which, as the family were Hindus, was the Hindu law. The Board, however, held that Girwar Singh, being entitled by inheritance to everything that had passed to Gajraj Singh under the sanad of 1859, was competent to surrender the sanad of 1859 and to accept instead of it the sanad of 1861, and had surrendered the sanad of 1859 and the estate which had passed under it, and that the Government was competent to grant the sanad of 1861. As to the contention that the Government had no power to grant to a Hindu, as it did by the sanad of 1861, an estate which should descend on an intestacy to the nearest male heir according to the rule of primogeniture, their Lordships said " Whatever force such a contention might otherwise have had appears to their Lordships to be removed by the Act to which their attention was called, the Crown Grants Act (Act XV. of 1895). That Act recites, amongst other things, that doubts have arisen as to the power of the Crown to impose limitations and restrictions upon grants and other transfers made bf it or under its authority, and it is expedient to remove such doubts. And s. 3 enacts that all provisions, restrictions, conditions, and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer, as aforesaid, shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute, or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.” When the appeal was being argued before the Board in 1905 the arguments addressed to their Lordships related only to the right to the possession of taluqa Mahewa on the death of Balbhaddar Singh, and it appears to have been overlooked by counsel during the arguments that the appeal also related to other property which was alleged to have been acquired by Balbhaddar Singh, and which had not formed part of the property granted by the sanad of 1861. Before the judgment of the Board was delivered in 1905 the atten tion of their Lordships was drawn by counsel to the fact that the appeal also related to such other property. In their judgment of 1905 their Lordships consequently said " The present appeal relates mainly to taluqa Mahewa, and the argument before their Lordships dealt only with it. The principle adopted in this judgment only applies to that taluqa, including, of course, any property that may have accreted to it since the date of the sanad under which it is held. It has been pointed out by counsel that the suit out of which the appeal arises related also to property said to have been acquired apart from the taluqa. It has been pointed out by counsel that the suit out of which the appeal arises related also to property said to have been acquired apart from the taluqa. It seems clear that their Lordships have not materials before them to enable them to define what property (if any) other than the original contents of the taluqa now passes as part of it." Their Lordships held that taluqa Mahewa, as constituted at the date of the sanad of 1861, with accretions (if any) or properties (if any) appurtenant to the taluqa, had, on the death of Balbhaddar Singh, passed in accordance with the limita- Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 51 tions of that sanad to Sheo Singh as the next male heir according to the rule of promogeniture, and humbly advised His Majesty to make a declaration that the taluqa Mahewa, as constituted at the date of the sanad, with accretions (if any) or properties (if any) appurtenant to the taluqa, has passed to the appellant, and that as to any other property of the deceased the decrees of the Courts below are not affected, and to order that it be left to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, if it be found that there is real controversy on the point, either itself to determine what property falls under one category and what under the other, or to remit the case for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and to order that, so far as may be necessary to give effect to the first part of the foregoing declaration, the decrees of the Courts below ought to be discharged and the suit dismissed. That declaration was made by the Order in Council, and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner remitted the case for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The Court of the Subordinate Judge made two reports, one relating to the villages in dispute, and the other to a house at Sitapur, a house at Lucknow, and movable property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed. Objections which were taken to each of those eports came at different dates before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and from the decrees of that Court made upon those reports these consolidated appeals have been brought. Objections which were taken to each of those eports came at different dates before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and from the decrees of that Court made upon those reports these consolidated appeals have been brought. Some of the learned judges of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner misunderstood what their Lordships meant in 1905 by the terms "accretions" and "properties appurtenant" to taluqa Mahewa. Their Lordships obviously did not mean to limit accretions to accretions to land which had gradually and imperceptibly by the action of water gone to the owner of the adjacent soil. No accretion of that nature had apparently been suggested by the parties to the suit. What was suggested was that Balbhaddar Singh had acquired property by purchase and had added it to the estate which had been granted by the sanad of 1861 to Girwar Singh. The facts were not before their Lordships in 1905 which would have enabled them to decide whether any lands had accreted to taluqa Mahewa as it was constituted at the date of that sanad. The Crown has in British India power to grant or to transfer lands, and by its grant, or on the transfer, to limit in any way it pleases the descent of such lands. But a subject has no right to impose upon lands or other property any limitation of descent which is at variance with the ordinary law of descent of property applicable in his case. Sir Edward Chamier, then Mr. Chamier, Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, in his judgment on some objections taken to the second report of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, correctly stated the law in this respect as to the power of a subject, thus " I take it that it is settled law that a subject cannot make his property descendible in a manner not recognized by the ordinary law, and that he cannot subject it to a rule of descent such as is contained in the primogeniture sanad granted to Girwar Singh. If this is so, it appears to me to follow that Balbhaddar Singh could not by express declaration, still less by mere volition, whether actual or presumed, subject property acquired by him to the rule of succession entered in the primogeniture sanad granted to Girwar Singh." With that statement as to the law their Lordships agree. If this is so, it appears to me to follow that Balbhaddar Singh could not by express declaration, still less by mere volition, whether actual or presumed, subject property acquired by him to the rule of succession entered in the primogeniture sanad granted to Girwar Singh." With that statement as to the law their Lordships agree. It follows that, in ascertaining what were the lands claimed by Rani Raghubans Kunwar in respect of which her suit was not dismissed in 1905, it must be ascertained what were the lands of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed which were acquired by him and did not form part of taluqa Mahewa as it was constituted at the date of the sanad of 1861, and were not lands acquired by him from the Government in exchange for lands which were included in that sanad. The Government had power to give to Balbhaddar Singh in exchange for sanad lands other lands which had not been granted to Girwar Singh in 1861, and the lands so acquired by him in exchange would be subject to the rule of descent prescribed in the sanad of 1861. By the sanad of 1861 the Government granted to Girwar Singh " the full Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 52 proprietary right, title, and possession of taluqa Mahewa, consisting of the villages as per list attached to the kabuliyat you have executed/ subject to the payment of rent and the other conditions in the sanad mentioned. The estate, which was granted to Girwar Singh in 1861, was the same estate which had been granted to Gajraj Singh in 1859 and had been surrendered to the Government by Girwar Singh. Unfortunately neither the kabuliyat which was executed by Girwar Singh in 1861 nor the kabuliyat which was executed by Gajraj Singh in 1859 has been found, but the lands granted in 1861 were lands of which the Government was then in a position to grant "the full proprietary right and title " to Girwar Singh. Unfortunately neither the kabuliyat which was executed by Girwar Singh in 1861 nor the kabuliyat which was executed by Gajraj Singh in 1859 has been found, but the lands granted in 1861 were lands of which the Government was then in a position to grant "the full proprietary right and title " to Girwar Singh. When the case was remitted for inquiry to the Court of the Subordinate Judge, that Court reported that of the 166 villages for which Rani Raghubans Kunwar had obtained her decree, which was the subject of the appeal in 1905, there was no controversy as to 108 of them; it was admitted that the 108 villages were taluqdari villages, that is, that they were villages which were included in the sanad of 186.1. As to the remaining fifty-eight villages, the Subordinate Judge reported that Sheo Singh was entitled to twenty-seven specified villages, and that Rani Raghubans Kunwar was entitled to thirty-one villages, which also were specified in the report. Rani Raghubans Kunwar filed objections to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to nineteen of the twenty-seven villages which the Subordinate Judge had reported to be taluqdari villages, and on the other side objections were filed as to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to the thirty-one villages which he had reported to be non-taluqdari villages, that is, villages not covered by the sanad of 1861. On the consideration of the report the Court of the Judicial Commissioner allowed the objections of Rani Raghubans Kunwar to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to Chak Sarkhanpur, Chak Simri, and one-half of Hasnapur, and held that they were non-taluqdari; and, on the other hand, allowed the objections to the findings of the Subordinate Judge as to Sarkhanpur Marhuna, Puraina, and Patti Bhupatpur, and held that they were taluqdari villlages, and overruled all the other objections, and made the decree of March 4, 1907, which is one of the decrees now under appeal. Their Lordships will now deal with the appeals in which the title to the villages is disputed before them. They will consider only those cases in which it appears from the record that the objections to the report of the Subordinate Judge which had been filed were persisted in by one or other of the parties in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. They will consider only those cases in which it appears from the record that the objections to the report of the Subordinate Judge which had been filed were persisted in by one or other of the parties in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. It must be taken that the findings of the Subordinate Judge were correct in all those cases in which the objections to his findings were not supported in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The villages Parai, Unchgaon, and Khandwa Mitmau, which were non-taluqdari villages, and were not included in the sanad of 1861, are villages which the Government subsequently transferred to Balbhaddar Singh in exchange for three of the taluqdari sanad villages or parts of them; and consequently must be treated as taluqdari villages which on Balbhaddar Singhs death descended to Sheo Singh. The village Sarkhanpur Marhuna, which is distinct from Chak Sarkhanpur, must be taken to have been a taluqdari village at the time when the sanad of 1861 was granted, and to have been included in that sanad. It descended on Balbhaddar Singhs death to Sheo Singh. The pleader for Rani Raghubans Kunwar gave up on her behalf all claim to the village. Puraina was entered in the summary settlement of 1859 in the name of Janki Pershad as the proprietor. It had been mortgaged to Thakur Umrao Singh, under a mortgage with possession of 1245 Fasli ( 1837- 1838); which became irredeemable by reason of Act XIII. of 1866, and the Settlement Officer on June 30, 1868, gave Balbhaddar Singh, who was the legal representative of Thakur Umrao Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 53 Singh, a decree for the full proprietary possession. Puraina was non-taluqdari property at the time of the sanad of 1861. Patti Bhupatpur was entered in the summary settlement in the names of Jangu and Lachman as the proprietors. Balbhaddar- Singh obtained a decree for one-third of the village on February 7, 1868, under a mortgage of conditional sale which had been granted in 1248 Fasli ( 1840- 1841) by the then proprietors. In an application for partition Balbhaddar Singh described Patti Bhupatpur as not comprised in any taluqa, and in 1894 he purchased another one-third of the Patti. It was non-taluqdari, and was not included in the sanad of 1861. In an application for partition Balbhaddar Singh described Patti Bhupatpur as not comprised in any taluqa, and in 1894 he purchased another one-third of the Patti. It was non-taluqdari, and was not included in the sanad of 1861. Munda Nizampur was inherited by Balbhaddar Singh from Anand Kunwar, and could not have been included in the sanad of 1861. It is not taluqdari. [Their Lordships further found upon the facts that the villages Benipur, Chak Sarkhanpur, Chak Simri, and half of Hasnapur had been purchased by Balbhaddar Singh after 1861 and were consequently non-taluqdari, but that the villages Kasba Kheri, Rechan, Nausar Jogipur, Mukaddarpur, Bastanli, Saharwa, Asawa, Banjargaon, Bhargawan, Jamnaha, Saunkia, Sansarpur, and Kaimahra were included in the sanad of 1861 and passed to the appellant; the judgment continued as follows] The result of their Lordships view as to the villages is that to the list of villages set out in the decree of March 4, 1907, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, in respect of which Rani Raghubans Kunwar was entitled to maintain her decree for possession, the villages Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur should be added, and that no village should be struck out of that list. Their Lordships will now consider the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of January 21, 1909, which was made on the hearing of the objections which were filed to the report of the Subordinate Judge which dealt with disputes as to a house in Sitapur, a house in Lucknow, and the movable property of which Balbhaddar Singh had died possessed. The house in Sitapur was acquired by Balbhaddar Singh, and never at any time was part of the taluqdari estate which was granted to Gil war Singh by the sanad of 1861. It is non-taluqdari. The house in the Kaiser Bagh at Lucknow. The right to the possession of this house does not depend upon the sanad of 1861, which was granted to Girwar Singh upon the surrender by him to the Government of the sanad of 1859, which had been granted to Gajraj Singh. The house in the Kaiser Bagh was not included in the sanad of 1861. It is common ground that a house in the Kaiser Bagh was allotted by the Government to Girwar Singh in 1864 or 1865 for his use as the taluqdar of taluqa Mahewa. The house in the Kaiser Bagh was not included in the sanad of 1861. It is common ground that a house in the Kaiser Bagh was allotted by the Government to Girwar Singh in 1864 or 1865 for his use as the taluqdar of taluqa Mahewa. That house was demolished when the Canning College was built, and in place of it another house, the house now in dispute, was allotted by the Government to Balbhaddar Singh for his use as the taluqdar of the taluqa Mahewa. No sanad relating to the house has been produced, nor has it been proved that any sanad relating to the house was granted. But it may be inferred from the fact that the house was allotted to Balbhaddar Singh for his use as taluqdar of Mahewa that such right to possession of it as he had passed not to his widow but to his successor in the taluqdari of Mahewa. The movable property of which Balbhaddar Singh died possessed was not subject to the limitation of descent which was by the sanad of 1861 prescribed for the villages which were included in that sanad, and passed on his death to his widow, Rani Raghubans Kunwar. The decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, dated January 21, 1909, should be varied by Law Rep. 45 Ind. App. 134 ( 1917- 1918) Rajindra Bahadur Singh V. Rani Raghubans Kunwar 54 decreeing that the suit of Rani Raghubans Kunwar should stand dismissed so far as her suit related to her claim for the possession of the house at Lucknow. Thakur Rajindra Bahadur Singh, who was brought upon the record as the representative of his late father, Sheo Singh, died in 1912, and Rani Raghubans Kunwar died in 1910, and their Lordships have been much pressed to advise His Majesty as to who is now entitled to the property other than taluqa Mahewa as it was con stituted at the date of the grant of 1861, in respect of which Rani Raghubans Kunwar brought her suit in 1900 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sitapur, but their Lordships are not in a position to tender such advice, and can only advise His Majesty as to the rights of the parties as they existed at the time when the decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner now under appeal were made. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of March 4, 1907, should be varied by adding to the list of villages set forth in that decree the villages Puraina and Patti Bhupatpur, and that the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of January 21, 1909, should be varied by decreeing that the suit of Rani Raghubans Kunwar should stand dismissed so far as her suit related to her claim for possession of the house at Lucknow, and that so varied those decrees should be affirmed as of the dates when they were made respectively by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, and should have effect accordingly as to the rights of the parties who were concerned at those respective dates and of those claiming under them. No costs of these consolidated appeals as between the parties to them shall be allowed.