JUDGMENT 1. This is a somewhat peculiar case. Three persons, Naimaddi, Ashimaddi and Musti, were placed upon their trial before the Sessions Judge of Dacca and a jury on charges under secs. 465, 467 and 193, I. P. C. The offence alleged against the accused was that, by personating Mir Baksha, the husband of one Sabjan and brother-in-law of the accused Naimaddi, before the Mahomedan Marriage Registrar in Dacca, they had induced the Registrar to make an entry of the divorce of Sabjan by her husband Mir. Baksha, to which entry they had affixed their thumb impressions and thereby made a false document within the meaning of secs. 463 and 464, I. P. C At the trial it appeared that the accused Musti, who was said to have been present in the Registrar's office, had taken no active part in the proceeding, and he was accordingly acquitted by the jury. Nothing more turns upon his share in the case. As to the other accused, in the case of Asimaddi, the jury, by a majority of three to two, found him not guilty. The Judge, disagreeing with that verdict, has referred the case to this Court under sec. 307, Cr. P. G. In the case of Naimaddi, the jury, by a majority of three to two, found him guilty of an offence under sec. 465, I. P. C. The Judge accepted the verdict of the majority in his case and sentenced him to five years' rigorous imprisonment. We may state in passing that this sentence was illegal inasmuch as the maximum sentence. under sec. 465, I. P. C, is imprisonment for two years. Naimaddi appealed to this Court from jail. We directed that his appeal should be put up before us at the time the reference in the matter of Asimaddi was taken up. This was done, and Naimaddi has also instructed the same pleader as Asimaddi. The case made for Naimaddi was that there had been misdirection on the part of the Judge and that the sentence was illegal. We accordingly admitted his appeal; and the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer waiving service of notice of this appeal on behalf of the Crown, Naimaddi's appeal has been argued along with the Reference in the matter of Asimaddi. We can, therefore, dispose of the two cases in one judgment. It will be convenient to take the case of Naimaddi first. We accordingly admitted his appeal; and the learned Deputy Legal Remembrancer waiving service of notice of this appeal on behalf of the Crown, Naimaddi's appeal has been argued along with the Reference in the matter of Asimaddi. We can, therefore, dispose of the two cases in one judgment. It will be convenient to take the case of Naimaddi first. The trial being by jury, he could only appeal on a question of law and that in this case would be misdirection by the Judge. In his grounds of appeal he gives two instances of misdirection which, in our opinion, do not amount to any misdirection at all; but a perusal of the heads of charges shows that there was a misdirection on the part of the Judge on another point. The Judge says : "If the person who put his thumb impression in the register as Mir Baksha was not really Mir Baksha, it is clear that he made a false document within the meaning of sec. 364, and that his intention was that fraud should be committed, also that injury should be caused to Mir Baksha. He therefore committed ' forgery.' There are two questions : (1) Is the page of the register, Ex. 8, a forgery? (2) Did accused Naimaddi and Asimaddi forge it? 'Throughout the rest of the charge we find nothing stated by the learned Judge on the question of fraud or dishonest intention on the part of the two accused. He states (in the words which we have quoted) an apparently self-evident fact, and has not left it to the jury as he should have done to say whether on the evidence they found that the intention of the accused or either of them was dishonest or fraudulent. This might under certain circumstances have been a reason for setting aside the verdict of the jury. But sec. 423 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code says : " Nothing herein contained shall authorise the Court to alter or reverse the verdict of a jury, unless it is of opinion that such verdict is erroneous owing to a misdirection by the Judge, or to a misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him." Here we are asked to set aside the verdict of the jury and to order a retrial. The question is whether we should do that in a case where we are of opinion that the verdict is not erroneous and has not been made erroneous owing to the misdirection by the Judge, but which, on the evidence which we have perused in the course of the hearing of these two cases, is perfectly correct. Though the Judge may have been wrong in not directing the jury more explicitly with regard to the fraudulent or dishonest intention of the accused, it cannot be said that owing to that the jury have arrived at an erroneous verdict. It appears to us that, so far as the facts of the case and the conviction of Naimaddi on these facts are concerned, it would be idle to send the case back because it appears to be a perfectly clear case on the evidence against both the accused. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal of Naimaddi so far as it relates to the misdirection by the Judge. But the sentence upon him of five years' rigorous imprisonment was clearly illegal. We think that the circumstances of the case will be met by a sentence upon Naimaddi of one year's rigorous imprisonment. 2. Turning to the case of Asimaddi, that is before us on a Reference under sec. 407, Cr. P. C, and we are not only entitled but bound to go into the facts, and, giving due weight to the opinions of the Judge and the jury, to decide the case upon the evidence. The case as we have already intimated in speaking of Naimaddi, is perfectly clear against both the accused and it is impossible to understand why one member of the jury should have pronounced in favour of Asimaddi when convicting Naimaddi. It is clearly proved that these two men went to the office of the Mahome-dan Registrar of Marriages in Dacca on 12th September 1917. Thai; they had been there came to the notice of Mir Baksha, the complainant. He knew (as he has sworn) that Naimaddi had his sister Sabjan (the wife of Mir Baksha) in his house at that time and was reluctant to let her return to her husband. Mir Baksha also had reason to suppose that Naimaddi wanted a divorce to be brought about between the two in order that he might marry his sister to somebody else. Mir Baksha also had reason to suppose that Naimaddi wanted a divorce to be brought about between the two in order that he might marry his sister to somebody else. Mir Baksha accordingly went to the Registrar's office and found that an entry had been made attested by the thumb impressions of two persons, one personating himself and one posing as Sk. Nimai to identify the husband. Nimai was found not to have been there and has given evidence to say that he never went. A complaint was lodged, and then attempts were made to bring about a compromise between the parties. A baitakh was held at the house of the witness Nagendra; but, as apparently Naimaddi did not carry out the terms of the arrangement then arrived at, the proceedings were instituted. It was clear in the trial that the offence was one under sec. 465, and not under sec. 467 as the document was not in any sense "a valuable security." But that Naimaddi and Asimaddi both made a false document by putting their thumb impressions to the entry, Ex. 8, admits of no doubt. The proof of it rests mainly, it is true, on the evidence of the expert who has been examined in this case, but there seems to be no reason whatever to discredit the expert's statements, or the conclusion which he drew. It is quite plain that the thumb impressions in Ex. 8 are those of the two accused and not of Mir Baksha or Sk. Nimai. There can be no question whatever as to the intention of these two men in getting that document drawn up and signing it as they did. It was undoubtedly dishonest and a fraud upon Mir Baksha. That it was a false document under sec. 464, I. P. C, cannot be disputed for a moment. If Naimaddi and Asimaddi put their thumb impressions on that document intending, as they did intend, that it should be taken as a signature by Mir Baksha and Sk. Nimai, their action would come directly within the first definition in sec. 464. We do not think that there is any distinction to be drawn in the guilt of the two men. We accordingly convict Asimaddi under sec. 465, I. P. C, and sentence him also to one year's rigorous imprisonment. Nimai, their action would come directly within the first definition in sec. 464. We do not think that there is any distinction to be drawn in the guilt of the two men. We accordingly convict Asimaddi under sec. 465, I. P. C, and sentence him also to one year's rigorous imprisonment. Asimaddi, if on bail, must surrender to his bail and serve out his sentence.