Lord Dunedin:- The present appeal is a consolidated appeal against judgments in two actions arising out of the same state of facts. According to the allegations of the plaintiff, the defendants, who are the proprietors of ground conterminous to and at lower level than the ground which belonged to the plaintiff, stopped up a hole in a wall on the plaintiff's property through which water had been in use to descend from the ground of the plaintiff to the ground of the defendants, with the result that regurgitation ensued and damage was caused. The plaintiff thereupon raised two actions : one craving a mandatory injunction to compel the defendants to restore the hole and refrain from stopping it up, the other for damages. The Courts in Guernsey dismissed both actions, on the ground that there was no registered instrument of servitude. On appeal to His Majesty in Council, this Board advised the recall of the judgments, pointing out that the plaintiff's rights upon the facts alleged did not depend on any grant, but were based upon the law of neighbourhood, which constituted a natural servitude in favour of the superior tenement to discharge the natural water on to the inferior; but recognising that there might be a defence that the damage caused was not due to interference on the part of the defendants, but was caused by some act of the plaintiff himself ; and remitted the causes to the Guernsey Court to receive such pleadings as the defendants might put forward, and then, after enquiry into the facts, to proceed to judgment. The causes having gone back to the Guernsey Court, and being still pending, the plaintiff parted with the property by conveying the same to a limited company, of which he himself was managing director. The plaintiff avers that while conveying the property he reserved to himself the tenancy for a period of years. This is not admitted by the defendants, but, as will be presently seen, it is immaterial whether this is so or not. After he had executed the conveyance the plaintiff, at his own hand, altered his designation as plaintiff in both actions. As originally served the actions ran at the instance of "A.J.F. Gibbons, proprietaire de . . . ." and then followed a description of the property. After he had executed the conveyance the plaintiff, at his own hand, altered his designation as plaintiff in both actions. As originally served the actions ran at the instance of "A.J.F. Gibbons, proprietaire de . . . ." and then followed a description of the property. The alteration made consisted in making it run "tant comme ci-devant proprietaire que comme Direct-eurgerant de la compagnie dite Arthur gibbons and sons Limited, dont le siege social est a Suffolk House en la cite de Londres en Angleterre, presentement proprietaire de . . . ." Upon this change being brought to the notice of the Court, they, in both actions, by judgment of the 4th November, 1916, decided that such a change made the action a new action so that if the plaintiff wished to continue the old actions he must revert to the former designation. He accordingly did so revert by striking out the alterations he had made. The fate of the two actions must now be followed separately. In the injunction action the defendants put in a " pretention " to the following effect :- "Quele dit acteur a perdu ses droits d'action a 1'effet que dessus ayant depuis 1'action commencee baille-a-rente les dites premisses le vingtquatre fevrier mil neuf cent douze et consequemment ne peut continuer la dite cause en vertu des premises qui ne lui appartiennent plus." This "pretention" was rejected by the ordinary Court. Appeal being taken the Full Court on the 20th February, 1917 recalled the judgment and allowed proof of the "pretention." It is admitted by the appellant that allowing proof of the "pretention." i. e., of the fact of the transference is tantamount to upholding it. For there is no dispute as to the fact of the transference and the appellant further admits that by the law of Guernsey an injunction will not be granted to anyone other than the proprietor of the subjects. It is accordingly against this judgment that this appeal is taken. Their Lordships cannot say that the judgment was wrong. Injunction is an equitable remedy which, quite apart from the right on which it is founded, will not be granted unless that right is either being actually infringed or there is good ground for supposing it will soon be infringed. It is accordingly against this judgment that this appeal is taken. Their Lordships cannot say that the judgment was wrong. Injunction is an equitable remedy which, quite apart from the right on which it is founded, will not be granted unless that right is either being actually infringed or there is good ground for supposing it will soon be infringed. In other words, an injunction must always suit the state of affairs as they exist at the date at which the judgment is pronounced. Once, therefore, it is conceded that no person other than the actual proprietor can obtain an injunction, the right of the appellant as an individual to obtain the remedy is gone, and the state of affairs when he raised his original complaint is no criterion of whether the company, the present proprietor, is or is not entitled to an injunction. The citations which the appellant made from Pothier, have no application. They all went to the point that a successor in real property will have the benefit of a res judicata as to a matter litigated as to the property by a predecessor. That is a doctrine common to many otherwise dissimilar systems of real property law. It may be that when the appellant sought to introduce the company into the suit the Court might have allowed him to do so. They did not do so, and their Lordships cannot say that they were as a matter of practice obliged by making the company a co-plaintiff along with the original plaintiff, to give them the benefit of the pending process. All this is said on the assumption that the proper instance of a company in Guernsey is the instance of the managing director. This appeal therefore fails. If the company has under the present state of affairs a right to an injunction in respect of a breach of the law of neighbourhood on the part of the defendants, nothing in these proceedings will hinder them from raising an action to get that injunction pronounced. Next as to the action of damages. In this case the right of action obviously remained with the appellant and was not affected by the transference of ownership. Accordingly, no "pretention" similar to that upheld in the injunction action was tabled. Next as to the action of damages. In this case the right of action obviously remained with the appellant and was not affected by the transference of ownership. Accordingly, no "pretention" similar to that upheld in the injunction action was tabled. But the defendants did two things: they denied the facts alleged, and they also put in a "pretention" which will be quoted in the judgment presently to be mentioned. On this the Ordinary Court on the 19th May, 1917, pronounced a judgment, in which, after narrating the earlier steps of the case, and the reversal by this Board of the first judgment, which remitted the cause to be tried on its merits, they say :- "Sur la niance des fails allegues dans la dits cause et sur la pretention des dits defendeurs que sile dit dommage a etc cause il est attributable en tout ou en partie aux changements a la nature des lieux du dit Gibbons faits par le dit Gibbons ses ouvriers ou employes lesquels avant le mois d'avril mil neuf cent cinq avaient mis des tuyaux afin de transporter 1'eau qui venait sur le terrain du dit Gibbons a des reservoirs dans plusieurs parties du dit terrain et fait generalement des travaux pour conserver la dite eau et d'en renvoyer la sufabondance sur les premisses du dit Lenfestey par 1'entremised'autres tuyaux ou autres voies. Avant que faire droit il a eteordonne que les temoins de part et d'autre seront ouis, les exceptions et objections des parties sauves." The case was then set down for the examination of witnesses. The date was fixed for the 2nd July. But in the meantime the appellant obtained special leave to appeal. This leave was granted because there was already an appeal pending in the injunction action, and the two cases arose out of the same alleged wrong and had on the former occasion been consolidated. It is necessary to mention this, as it must not be supposed that their Lordships would ordinarily entertain an appeal from the Ordinary Court passing over the Full Court. The appellant could not deny that the judgment, so far as it ordered witnesses to be heard in support of the appellant's allegations, and of the "niance des faits allegues," was right. But he said that the further "pretention" was contrary to the former judgment of this Board, and consequently irrelevant. The appellant could not deny that the judgment, so far as it ordered witnesses to be heard in support of the appellant's allegations, and of the "niance des faits allegues," was right. But he said that the further "pretention" was contrary to the former judgment of this Board, and consequently irrelevant. In particular he referred to that part of their Lordships' opinion which dealt with the former exception 2, and pointed out that "changer" and "aggraver" were not controvertible terms. Their Lordships do not, however, find that the present "pretention," though somewhat loosely expressed, is in conflict with what their Lordships said on the former occasion. It was carefully pointed out that the right of the superior proprietor to discharge water on the inferior tenement was not absolute, that the limits could not be fixed by definition, and that each case must depend on its own circumstances. The present "pretention" does no more than open up such an enquiry. The enquiry is: Was the damage if any, caused by the wrongful act of the inferior proprietor, or was it caused by some ultroneous act of the plaintiff himself? Mere alteration of his premises would not of itself constitute such an ultroneous act, and the "pretention" must not be read to affirm the contrary. More cannot be said till the facts are disclosed. But the right of the defendants to prove what they can so as to shift the real cause of damage, if any, from their own on to the plaintiff's shoulders cannot be denied. This appeal therefore also fails. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss both appeals with costs. Appeals dismissed.