Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and two decrees of the High Court (June 15, 1915) affirming and reversing respectively decrees of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Shahjahanpur. The two suits out of which the consolidated appeals arose were instituted by the appellant and his brother under circumstances which fully appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The plaintiffs by their plaints claimed that upon the death of Ram Dei in 1912 they were entitled, under the Mitakshara law, to inherit the entire estate left by her husband, Bahadur Lal, who died in 1883. The sole question arising upon the appeals was whether the appellants claim was precluded by a compromise of a family dispute in 1892 and the appellants acts thereunder. The High Court, affirming the decree of the trial judge in one suit and reversing the decree of a different trial judge in the other suit, held that the appellant was so precluded. 1918. Feb. 19, 21. De Gruyther, K.C., and Dube, for the appellant. The compromise did not affect the appellants right to claim as reversioner. He was not competent in Hindu law to deal in anyway with-his right in expectancy Sumsuddin Goolam Husein v. Abdul Husein Kalimuddin (( 1906) I. L. R. 31 B. 165.); Amrit Narayan Singh v. Gaya Singh. (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. 35.) Further, the claim which the appellant compromised in 1892 was merely the claim which he was then making to succeed immediately as the adopted son of Badri Prasad; it did not affect his rights upon the succession opening. [Reference was made to the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 115.] Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Parikh, for the respondents, were not called upon. March 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. These are consolidated appeals from decrees dated June 15, 1915, of the High Court at Allahabad, made in appeals from decrees of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Shahjahanpur. There were two suits, in each of which Kanhai Lal and his brother, Ram Sarup, were the plaintiffs. Kanhai Lal is now the appellant in the consolidated appeals. Ram Sarups rights were established and are not now in question; he is not a party to these appeals. There were two suits, in each of which Kanhai Lal and his brother, Ram Sarup, were the plaintiffs. Kanhai Lal is now the appellant in the consolidated appeals. Ram Sarups rights were established and are not now in question; he is not a party to these appeals. In one of the suits Brij Lal and his daughter, Ram Kali, were defendants; they are now respondents to one of the appeals. In the other suit Kausilla and Sham Lal, who claims through her, were the defendants; they are the respondents to the other appeals. In each suit Kanhai Lal claimed as a reversioner to one Bahadur Lal, who died in 1883. Bahadur Lal was a member of a Hindu joint family descended from one Balak Ram. The pedigree of the joint family, so far as it is now material, is briefly as follows— BALAK RAM (dead). | | | | | Bhadur Lal. Died Badri Prashad Ganga Ram. Died Mt. Ram Piyari 1883. = Mt. Ram Died childless in childless in 1874. | Dei. Died 1812. 1877. = Mt. Parbati = Mt. Kausilla a Died 1898. respondent. | | | Mt. Kirpa Died Ram Sarup. Kanhai Lal. 1896. = Brij Lal a A plaintiff Plaintiff, respondent. but not a appellant. party to these appeals. | Ram Kali. A respondent. Upon the death of Ram Dei on May 14, 1912, Kanhai Lal and his brother, Ram Sarup, were the reversioners to Bahadur Lal. The only question which their Lordships have to consider in these appeals is the question whether Kanhai Lal has not been precluded from claiming as a reversioner by his having been a party to a compromise which was entered into in 1892. If he is not precluded from claiming as a reversioner he is entitled to succeed in these appeals. At the time of his death in 1883 Bahadur Lal was by survivorship the sole owner of the family estate, and on his death his widow, Ram Dei, became entitled to that estate for her life, Parbati and Kausilla being entitled only to maintenance. The title of Ram Dei was, however, disputed by Kanhai Lal, Parbati, and Kausilla. Kanhai Lal set up a claim to the family estate, alleging that he had been adopted by Parbati to her deceased husband, Badri Prasad, and was entitled to the whole estate as such adopted son. The title of Ram Dei was, however, disputed by Kanhai Lal, Parbati, and Kausilla. Kanhai Lal set up a claim to the family estate, alleging that he had been adopted by Parbati to her deceased husband, Badri Prasad, and was entitled to the whole estate as such adopted son. His case was that there was a custom in the family which enabled a brother to adopt his sisters son and that Parbati had received her husbands authority to make the adoption. It is not necessary to consider whether there was any foundation for that case. Parbatis case was that the brothers Bahadur Lal, Badri Prasad, and Ganga Ram had separated ; that also was the case set up by Kausilla. Each of these widows claimed for life one-third of the family estate. Parbati also alleged that she had validly adopted Kanhai Lal to her deceased husband Badri Prasad. In order to protect her own interests and the interests of her daughter Kirpa, who was then living, Ram Dei brought two suits in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Shahjahanpur. The earlier of those suits was brought on January 20, 1891, against Kanhai Lal and Parbati, and in that suit Ram Dei claimed a declara tion that the alleged adoption of Kanhai Lal by Parbati was null and void. That suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on the technical objection that the plaint had not been properly verified. From the decree dismissing that suit Ram Dei appealed to the High Court at Allahabad. The later of those two suits was brought on February 4, 1892, against Parbati and Kausilla, and in it Ram Dei claimed amongst other relief’s a declaration that her late husband, Bahadur Lal, had been the owner and in possession of the entire property of the joint family; that after his death she, Ram Dei, was in possession of and entitled to that property according to Hindu law ; and that Parbati and Kausilla had no right other than that of maintenance. Before the suit of February 4, 1892, came on for trial Ram Dei, Parbati, Kausilla, Kirpa, and Kanhai Lal had entered, on August 1, 1892, into the following agreement of compromise — [The deed of compromise, which was set out in full in their Lordships judgment, was shortly to the following effect After reciting the existence of disputes between the parties, of whom Kanhai Lal was referred to as " the adopted son of Parbati," the parties declared that they had appointed a named referee, and that he should divide the property left by Bahadur Lal into four equal lots ; Ram Dei, Parbati, Kausilla, and Kirpa were each to draw one lot and to apply for mutation of names in respect of the lot drawn ; Kirpa and Kanhai Lal declared that she and he would have no claim against any sharer; every sharer was to be the owner and possessor of her lot with power to transfer. The deed was executed by each of the parties.] The arbitrator made two awards dated respectively January 12 and 13, 1893. That of January 12, 1893, was filed in the suit of February 4, 1892, in which Parbati and Kausilla were defendants, and that suit was dismissed as withdrawn by Ram Dei. The appeal to the High Court in the suit of January 20, 1891, was not supported, and was dismissed. Under the awards of the arbitrator one-fourth of the family property was allotted to each of Ram Dei, Kirpa, Parbati, and Kausilla, and they respectively obtained possession of the properties allotted to them. In the award of January 13, 1893, the arbitrator stated " Kanhai Lal has been adopted by Parbati, but he has nothing to do with the other messmate property as such adopted son. Nor has he now any claim to their property. As regards the matter between Parbati and Kanhai Lal, it is not necessary to explain his rights in this award. Kanhai Lals rights in the property comprised in Parbatis lot are quite safe." So far as appears by the agreement of compromise and the awards, Kanhai Lal got no share in the family property, but in fact he got the one-fourth share which was allotted to Parbati, and he further obtained the benefit of having the validity of his adoption by Parbati left undecided by a Court of law. On August 22, 1898, Parbati executed in favour of Kanhai Lal a deed of relinquishment of the property which had been allotted to her under the compromise and the award of January 13, 1893. [The deed, which was set out in full in their Lordships judgment, recited that the executant, with the permission of her deceased husband, had adopted Kanhai Lal, and declared that Kanhai Lal was the owner of all her deceased husbands property, and that the executant relinquished her claim to the said property (scheduled to the deed); it j3rovided that the said property, which was standing in her name, should be entered in the name of Kanhai Lal.] In accordance with that deed of relinquishment Kanhai Lal obtained mutation of names in his own favour, and he has hitherto enjoyed that share of Parbati as his own property, and his right to it has not been questioned in either of the present suits. The properties which Kanhai Lal has claimed in these suits as a reversioner to Bahadur Lal are the properties which were allotted in January, 1893, to Ram Dei, Kirpa, and Kausilla respectively. The suits in which these appeals have arisen were not tried by the same Subordinate Judge. In one of these suits the Subordinate Judge held that Kanhai Lal was precluded by his having been a party to the compromise from now claiming as a reversioner. In the other of these suits a different Subordinate Judge decided that Kanhai Lal was as a reversioner not bound by the compromise. The decrees of the Court of the Subordinate Judge were appealed to the High Court, and the appeals were considered by the High Court in one judgment. The High Court decided that Kanhai Lal having been a party to the agreement of compromise of 1892, and having taken a benefit under that settlement of the dispute, was bound by it and could not go behind it. The result was that Kanhai Lals suits were dismissed. From the decrees of the High Court made in accordance with that judgment these appeals have been brought. The result was that Kanhai Lals suits were dismissed. From the decrees of the High Court made in accordance with that judgment these appeals have been brought. It has been contended on behalf of Kanhai Lal that the agreement of compromise of 1892 could not deprive him of his right to claim as reversioner unless it is capable of being treated as a con veyance of his right as a reversioner, and that he did not intend in 1892 to convey or assign such right when it might accrue to him. As it now appears. Kanhai Lal was not a reversioner in 1892, and did not become a reversioner until Ram Dei died in 1912. All the interest which he had in the property of the family in 1892 was the mere possibility of becoming an immediate reversioner in case he should be living when Ram Dei might die, and when Bahadur Lals daughter, Kirpa, might die without a son. It was also contended on his behalf that Kanhai Lal in 1892, whatever his intention may have been, was not in law competent to convey or relinquish any future possible right as a reversioner, and as an authority in support of that contention the decision of the High Court at Bombay in Sumsuddin Goolam Husein v. Abdul Husein Kalimuddin (I.L. R. 31 B l65.) was relied upon. That decision is not in point. There is no question here of a conveyance of, or of an agreement to convey any future right or expectancy, or of an agreement to relinquish, any future right or expectancy. The question here is whether Kanhai Lal did not by his acts in 1892 debar himself from now claiming as a reversioner. The facts in this case are simple. In 1892 the family was a Hindu joint family to which the ordinary Hindu law applied. All the sons of Balak Ram had died. Ganga Ram had died childless in 1874, and Badri Prasad had died childless in 1877. Bahadur Lal had died sonless in 1883, leaving his widow, Ram Dei, surviving him. Ram Dei became, on the death of Bahadur Lal, entitled for life to a L Hindu widows right to the whole of the family property. Ganga Ram had died childless in 1874, and Badri Prasad had died childless in 1877. Bahadur Lal had died sonless in 1883, leaving his widow, Ram Dei, surviving him. Ram Dei became, on the death of Bahadur Lal, entitled for life to a L Hindu widows right to the whole of the family property. Kanhai Lal had then no right of any kind to any share in the family property, but he set up a claim to the whole property based on the allegation that he had been validly adopted by Parbati to her deceased husband, Badri Prasad. If that claim had been substantiated by proof of a valid adoption, Kanhai Lal would have been entitled to the whole family property, and Ram Dei would have been entitled merely to maintenance. Although as a general rule of Hindu law a man cannot adopt his sisters son, the claim was a serious one. Kanhai Lals case was that, according to an Agarvwal custom (the family was of the Agarvwal caste), which governed, the family, a man could lawfully adopt his sisters son, and he alleged that Badri Prasad had given Parbati authority to make the adoption, and that he, Kanhai Lal, had been validly adopted to Badri Prasad. That Kanhai Lal might have found it difficult or impossible to prove that he had been validly adopted is immaterial. He made the claim; it was a serious one, and it was supported by Parbati and it must have influenced Ram Dei, who was induced, doubtless mainly by that claim, to consent to a division of the family property, in which she obtained for herself merely a one-fourth share. The claims which were set up by Parbati and Kausilla that the three sons of Balak Ram had separated must also have influenced Ram Dei to agree to the compromise of 1892. Kanhai Lal was a party to that compromise. He was one of those whose claims to the family property, or to shares in it, induced Ram Dei, against her own interests and those of her daughter, Kirpa, and greatly to her own detriment, to alter her position by agreeing to the compromise, and under that compromise he obtained a substantial benefit, which he has hitherto enjoyed. In their Lordships opinion he is bound by it, and cannot now claim as a reversioner. In their Lordships opinion he is bound by it, and cannot now claim as a reversioner. Their Lordships will advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed with costs.