Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (June 10, 1913) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya. The suit was instituted by the first respondent against the appellant and defendants now joined as respondents, namely, Rani Chandra Deo and Rajeshwari. The claim was for a declaration of the plaintiffs title to the village of Badam under a deed of sale dated February 28, 1908, from Rajeshwari, for possession and other relief. The facts are fully stated in the judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. The High Court (Chatterjee and Newbould JJ.) reversed the decision, holding that the appellant was estopped by the conduct of his father, through whom he claimed, from denying the title of Rajeshwari. 1918. Feb. 26, 28. Dunne, K.C., and T. B. W. Ramsay, for the appellant. Having regard to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1884, Rajeshwari, and consequently the first respondent, obtained no title to the village. There being no registered deed of transfer from the late Raja, or the manager, to Kashinath, he was incompetent under s. 54 of that Act to transfer any title. By the terms of that section no title can arise by contract. No question of a gift was raised in the Courts below, the respondents case being founded on a title in Kashinath and a denial of the late Rajas title. Under s. 123, however, Rajeshwari could not obtain a good title by gift from the Raja in the absence of a registered transfer from him. The authorities are clear that between Hindus a transfer of possession is not sufficient. The policy of ss. 54 and 123 was to nullify every purported transfer not made in accordance with the Act. The first respondent took the conveyance from Rajeshwari without any reasonable inquiries and obtained no title under s. 41. [Viscount Haldane. Was not the late Raja estopped from denying the title of Rajeshwari?] Rajeshwari did not change her position in consequence of any representation by the late Raja, therefore no estoppel arose Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), s. 115. Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha (( 1892) L. R. 19 1. A. 203.) was clearly a case of a representation acted on and a consequent change of position. Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha (( 1892) L. R. 19 1. A. 203.) was clearly a case of a representation acted on and a consequent change of position. Rajeshwari paid no consideration, and advanced no money on the faith of the representation, if there was one. If assuming liability for the revenue is a sufficient change of position, every donee of immovable property acquires a title by estoppel notwithstanding the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Further, the evidence established that Rajeshwari was a minor at the date of the transfer to the first respondent; he therefore took no title Transfer of Property Act, 1884, s. 7 ; Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 11. Sir William Garth, for the first respondent, was not called upon. March 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. In this suit Syed Abdullah sues the Raja of Deo for possession of a village called Badam. The plaintiff is purchaser from a dancing girl, Rajeshwari Koer, who is the natural daughter of the late Raja Bhikham of Deo, father of the present Raja, defendant. The history of the matter is this Raja Bhikham having got into involved circumstances, his estate was put under management under the provisions of the Chota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, which had been made to apply to Deo by a special Act. The manager appointed under the Act one Bhuan Lal, who had, in terms of the Act powers of sale, put up to public auction the village of Badam. It was bought by Kashinath Singh for the sum of Rs.2000. As a matter of fact, Kashinath had been put forward by the Raja himself, who provided him with the money. No conveyance was executed by Bhuan Lal in favour of Kashinath, The management came to an end in 1896 and the Raja was restored to his estate. In 1897 the Raja, who had expressed his desire to benefit Munni Bibi, the mother of Rajeshwari, and his infant daughter by her, caused Lajjadhari, the adopted son of Kashinath, who had by this time died, to execute a conveyance of Badam in favour of Rajeshwari. The deed of conveyance bore to be in respect of a consideration of Rs.5000, but in reality no money passed—Lajjadhari merely acted on the command of the Raja. The deed of conveyance bore to be in respect of a consideration of Rs.5000, but in reality no money passed—Lajjadhari merely acted on the command of the Raja. On April 22, 1898, Rajeshwari, being a minor, applied through her mother as guardian for registration and mutation of names in respect of the village of Badam. On the same day the Raja presented a petition in which he narrated the fact of Badam having been sold by Bhuan Lal, the manager, set forth that Kashinath had died without having obtained a conveyance and that Lajjadhari his son had sold the property to Rajeshwari, and prayed that Rajeshwari’s petition should be granted and her name inserted in the register, “to which your petitioner has no objection whatever." Rajeshwaris name was accordingly entered in the Government register as proprietrix of the village of Badam. In October, 1898, Raja Bhikham died, and the present Raja being a minor the estate came under the management of the Court of Wards. Some time in 1899 Mr. Wright, the manager, turned out Rajeshwari, who was in possession, via facti and without process. In 1901 Mr. Wright conveyed Badam to Rani Chandra Koer, the surviving widow of Raja Bhikham, on the idea that it was gar property descending from Rani to Rani. In 1902 the Rani applied for mutation of names. Her application was opposed by Rajeshwari and was refused. In 1904 the Rani raised a civil suit for a declaration that the property w7as hers. To this suit she called as defendants Rajeshwari and the young Raja, the present defendant. The whole facts were gone into. The Rani had based her case on an allegation that Kashinath was a benamidar for her. The Subordinate Judge held that Kashinath was the benamidar of Raja Bhikham, and not of the Rani, and dismissed the suit, adding an opinion that Raja Bhikham himself would have been estopped from denying that the property belonged to Rajeshwari. On appeal the District Court affirmed the judgment, but did not repeat the dictum as to estoppel. In 1908 Rajeshwari executed a conveyance in favour of the present plaintiff, who in the same year raised the present suit. On appeal the District Court affirmed the judgment, but did not repeat the dictum as to estoppel. In 1908 Rajeshwari executed a conveyance in favour of the present plaintiff, who in the same year raised the present suit. The defence to the suit was, after discounting irrelevant pleas, based on two grounds—first, a denial of Rajeshwaris title to convey anything to the* plaintiff ; second, a denial that Rajeshwari had conveyed to the plaintiff on the allegation that she was a minor at the time of the conveyance. The learned Subordinate Judge upheld both defences and dismissed the suit. The Appeal Court reversed and gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff. It will be convenient to dispose of the second ground of defence first, as it depends on a pure question of fact. The Subordinate Judge, while commenting on the unreliability of the witnesses, three in number, adduced by the defendant to prove the minority, gave judgment on the ground that the rebutting evidence was not it it might have been. The High Court, agreeing with the criticism on the defendants witnesses, came to the conclusion that the defendant had not made out his allegation. Their Lord- ships agree with the High Court. The onus to prove minority is on the defendant who asserts it. He brings no reliable evidence to prove this assertion. This defect in his proof cannot, their Lordships think, be cured by a mere criticism of the evidence brought by the plaintiff. It would further seem to their Lordships that the evidence tendered by the brother is not open to any obvious objection. But it is enough to say that, the matter being left in doubt, the defendant fails to prove his assertion. The sole question, then, is whether there was a title in Rajeshwari, Formal title by progress there was not. Both Courts find that the sale by auction, though it gave a right to the purchaser to get a title, did not give him an actual title. Admittedly Kashinath never got the actual title, to which as purchaser he was entitled. The plaintiff in the Court below attempted to prove that Kashinath was a true purchaser for value. In this he failed, and both Courts are agreed as to this. He was only trustee for the Raja Bhikham. Admittedly Kashinath never got the actual title, to which as purchaser he was entitled. The plaintiff in the Court below attempted to prove that Kashinath was a true purchaser for value. In this he failed, and both Courts are agreed as to this. He was only trustee for the Raja Bhikham. The argument in the lower Court then turned mostly on the effect of the judgments of 1905 and 1906 in the suit by the Rani. The plaintiff urged that as between Raja Bhikham and the defendant, who were both co-defendants to the Ranis suit, these judgments formed a res judicata to the effect that the property belonged to Rajeshwari. In deciding rightly that this was not so, the learned Subordinate Judge overlooked the fact that, though the dictum of the Subordinate Judge in the Ranis suit that Raja Bhikham was in a question with Rajeshwari estopped from denying that the property was hers was an obiter dictum, yet on the emergence of the same facts as were found in that suit the question to be decided in this suit, it being obvious that if Raja Bhikham from him, was equally estopped. But the High Court took up that point and decided it in favour of the plaintiff. The question before their Lordships is whether that view was right. Their Lordships think that it was. In the first place, they are satisfied that the facts are as have been stated above. When, therefore, Lajjadhari executed the conveyance in favour of Rajeshwari at the instance of Raja Bhikham, he (Raja Bhikham) was the true owner. Kashinath was a trustee for Raja Bhikham, and . Lajjadhari could only succeed to his fathers trusteeship. Further, Raja Bhikham was the proprietor of the estate of which Badam was a part. So that if by renunciation or limitation the right of Ka3hinath to get a conveyance became extinct, the full right as well as the title was in him. In this position of affairs not only did Rajah Bhikham cause Lajjadhari to execute the conveyance, but when Rajeshwari proceeded to give effect to that conveyance by applying for registration he actively assisted her. By so doing he caused her to change her position, for by registration she became bound for all the State liabilities which attach to the registered holders of immovable property. By so doing he caused her to change her position, for by registration she became bound for all the State liabilities which attach to the registered holders of immovable property. If then Raja Bhikham had lived and attempted to regain the property these actings of his would, in their Lordships view, have estopped him from making the claim. He did not do so. The present defendant is his son and succeeded by gratuitous title, and he therefore cannot do what his father would have been unable to do. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal with costs.