JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge of Salem in a suit brought by a Mittadar to eject the defendants, who claim to hold under a permanent lease. 2. Two questions have been argued before us: we whether the defendants hold on a permanent tenure; and (2) whether, if they did so hold, they have forfeited their tenure by renouncing their character as lessees by setting up a title in a third person, within the meaning of Section 111 (g~, of the Transfer of Properly Act. 3. As regards the first point we have been referred to the cases reported as Rajaram v. Narasinga 15 M. 199 : 5 Ind. Dec. (n.s.) 400, Fonlkes v. Muthusami Goundan 21 M. 503 : 8 M.L.J. 207 : 7 Ind. Deo. (n.s.) 712, Venkataramanna v. Venkatapathi Nayani Varu 29 Ind. Cas. 188 : 28 M.L.J. 510 : 17 M.L.T. 269 : (1915) M.W.N. 313 and Rama Iyengar v. Anga Guruewami Chetti 46 Ind. Cas. 62 : 8 L.W. 109 : 35 M.L.J. 129, in which the meaning of the words "Saswatham" and "kayam" occurring in leases have been construed. We do not think it necessary again to discuss the meaning of these terms or the correctness of the decision in Rajaram v. Narasinga 15 M. 199 : 5 Ind. Dec. (n.s.) 400, because it has been abundantly established in later cases that, even if literal effect is not to be given to these words so as to involve as a necessary inference a permanent tenancy, yet the surrounding circumstances may be looked at and a permanent tenancy may be inferred from the "use" of these words. In the present case, we find that the lease in the suit was a renewal of previous documents, and that previously to the execution of this instrument the lessees had been held to hold on a permanent tenure in the suit of 1819. That consideration, in our opinion, is sufficient to show that it was intended to confer a permanent tenure in favour of the lessees by virtue of Exhibit J in this case. Therefore, on that ground, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge. 4. The next question is a somewhat interesting one which has been very ably argued by Mr. That consideration, in our opinion, is sufficient to show that it was intended to confer a permanent tenure in favour of the lessees by virtue of Exhibit J in this case. Therefore, on that ground, we agree with the learned Subordinate Judge. 4. The next question is a somewhat interesting one which has been very ably argued by Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the appellant, namely whether the denial by the present defendants of the title under which the Mittadar claims the whole Mitta in a previous suit, brought by the Mittadar not in respect of the suit land but to recover Jodi in respect of certain Inam lands in the Mittra which were also held by the defendants, is a sufficient setting up by the lessees of a title in a third person to the suit lands. Mr. Krishnaswsmi Aiyar has argued that directly and by necessary implication, the. written statement in that suit Exhibit G should be held to contain a setting up of the title in a third person to the suit lands. We asked him to cite the strongest cases which he could in support of that proposition and he referred us to Doe d. Deviesv. Evans (1841) 9 M. & W. 48 : 11 L.J. Ex. 9. : 60 R.R. 664 : 152 E.R. 21, Doed. Calvert v. Frowd (1828) 4 Bing. 557 L : 1 Moo. & P. 480 : 130 E.R. 883 : 29 B.B. 624 : Doe d. Phillips v. Rollings (1847) 4 C.B. 188 : 17 L.J.C.P. 268 : 136 E.R. 476 : 72 R.E. 686 In every one, of these cases, the denial of title, whether it was direct or whether it was inferential, was in respect of leasehold premises and there is no case in which a denial of the landlords title to some other lands has been held to operate as a forfeiture of his title to the "suit lands, merely because one thing would logically follow from the other. Mr. K. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the respondents has contended that the denial by the defendants of the Mittadara right in the suit for the Jodi of the Inam lands is consistent with the plaintiffs having the rights of a lessor in respect of the suit lands which he might have acquired in other ways than by transfer of the Mit-tadars title from the plaintiffs predecessor; to the plaintiff. The doctrine of forfeiture, which is embodied in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is not one to be extended, and we think we should be extending it if we were to treat the denial in the written statement Exhibit G in this case as a setting up of a title of a third person to the lands in this suit. Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar for the respondents desired to take other objections, but we do not think it necessary to hear them, because on the ground which we have stated, we think that the appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs.