JUDGMENT Spencer, J. 1. This suit was brought by the mohant of the Thiruvannamalai Mutt to recover possession of certain lands sold by his predecessor in 1895 to the father of defendants 1 and 2. He alleged that the sale was for no necessity, and that it was not binding on the mutt. The suit was decreed in the court of the District Munsif, but on appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed it as barred by limitation. 2. The questions raised in the second appeal are first whether the mohant of a mutt is a trustee or a life-tenant; secondly whether Article 134 of the Limitation Act applies to this case; and thirdly whether the alienation was void or voidable, it being suggested that if it was only void-able the cause of action to set it aside would only arise on plaintiffs accession to the headship of the mutt. 3. On the first point, in Ram Perkash Das v. Anand Das (1916) I.L.R. 13 C. 707 : 31 M.L.J. 1 and in Basudeo Roy v. Mahant Jugal Kishore Das (1918) 35 M.L.J. 5 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council have laid down that the mohant of a mutt is a trustee of the mutt properties. In Baluswami Aiyar v. Venkataswami Naicken (1916) I.L.R. 10 M. 745 : 32 M.L.J. 24, it was held that a mohant was a trustee and not a life tenant as regards the properties of the mutt. In Obla Venkatachalapathi v. Thirugnana Sambanda Pandara (1917) 33 M.LJ. 297 a doubt was raised whether this proposition had not been too broadly expressed in Baluswami Aiyar v. Venkatasami Naicker (1916) I.L.R. 10 M. 745 : 32 M.L.J. 24. 4. In Kailasam Pillai v. Nataraja Thatmbiran (1909) I.L.R. 33 M. 265 : 19 M.L.J. 778, this question was again discussed and Benson and Wallis, JJ. said that it could not be predicated that a mohant was a trustee in all cases, but it must depend on the consitution of the particular insititution. Sankaran Nair, J, said that in the absence of evidence to the contrary that Mohant was not a trustee and that he was not a life tenant cither. said that it could not be predicated that a mohant was a trustee in all cases, but it must depend on the consitution of the particular insititution. Sankaran Nair, J, said that in the absence of evidence to the contrary that Mohant was not a trustee and that he was not a life tenant cither. In Muthusamier v. Sree Sree-Melhanithiswamiar (1913) I.L.R. 38 M. 366 : 25 M.L.J. 393, it was said that the position of a Mohant was analogous in many ways to that of the estate of a Hindu female heir and in Vidyapurna Thirthaswami v. Vidyanithi Thirthaswami (1904) I.L.R. 27 M. 435 : 14 M.L.J. 105, it was observed that the mohant was not a mere trustee, but was a corporation sole. 5. The last named authorities contain attempts to strictly define the position of a mohant by comparing it to the position of Hindu Females or corporations sole in English Law. But they do not show that, generally speaking, the mohant is not a trustee. The learned Judges who decided these cases were careful not to say that the mohant of a mutt was not a trustee. I think that he is not the less a trustee, because his position has been in some respects compared to that of a Hindu female or to that of a corporation sole in English Law. On the whole there is no good reason for distinguishing the case of this mutt from those which came under the consideration of the Privy Council in their latest rulings. 1 hold that the plaintiff and his predecessor were trustees in law. 6. The next question is whether the suit property was "conveyed or bequeathed in trust " within the meaning of Article 134 of the Limitation Act. Ex. II is the document under which this property was conveyed by the perpetual lessees under the Devastanam. It is dated 28th July 1886, and the mutt became the perpetual lessee from that date subject to an annual payment to the Devastanam. As the property was not conveyed to the mohant for his personal use but sold to him for the benefit of the mutt there can be no doubt that the transaction was a conveyance in trust. 7. As the property was not conveyed to the mohant for his personal use but sold to him for the benefit of the mutt there can be no doubt that the transaction was a conveyance in trust. 7. Lastly, the Privy Council case in Abhiram Goswami v. Shyania Charan Nandi (1909) I.L.R. 36 C. 1003 which is relied on for the appellant as showing that an alienation by a mohant for a purpose not beneficial to the mutt would be good for the life-time of the mohant for the time being, was the case of a lease in which the personal right of the mohant was put forward. There would have been no injury to the estate of the mutt by the granting of a lease for the mohants life-time, but a permanent lease would have been an alienation beyond his powers, and in this sense the Privy Council must be understood as holding that the lease was only valid during the life-time of the mohant in office. Ex. I being a document of out and out sale executed in October 1895, this suit brought in 1915 more than 12 years after the sale, was clearly barred, and the Subordinate Judge was right in deciding this point in favour of the defendants. 8. The second appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Sadasiva Aiyar, J. 9. I entirely agree with the conclusion and the reasoning of my learned brother in the judgment just now pronounced by him. 8. The second appeal is therefore dismissed with costs. Sadasiva Aiyar, J. 9. I entirely agree with the conclusion and the reasoning of my learned brother in the judgment just now pronounced by him. I only wish to add (with the greatest respect to the decision in Kailasam Pilial v. Nataraja Thambiran (1909) I.L.R. 33 M. 265 that it has always seemed to me a very startling proposition that the ascetic head of a mutt who is supposed to have renounced the world and all its vanities, whose fall from a strict life of convenience or Brahmacharya disqualified him from holding the office of Matadhipathi (which involves the initiation of others spiritually fitted into Holy Order of Sanyasa) but who was (in degenerate medeival ages) however allowed to be the manager and the trustee and thus the legal owner of properties dedicated to the support and advancement of religion and charity generally and of a particular school of Monastic institution and doctrine specially should be considered to be a trustee of any institution at all unless the person who alleges him to be a trustee proves that fact by evidence. 10. In the case in Muthusamier v. Sree Sree Methanithiswamiar (1916) I.L.R. 38 M. 358, I had with great respect to the decision in Vidyapurna Thirthaswami v. Vidhyanidhi Thirthaswami (1904) I.L.R. 27 M. 435 ventured to express serious misgivings about the soundness of the view conferring on the heads of these mutts, the status of corporation sole. I had also expressed grave doubts of the soundness of the prevailing view that these heads could spend the income of their mutt institutions in even immoral, extravagant and inappropriate ways without question and without liability to removal for any misconduct and even for patent unfitness (through a notoriously profligate and unascetic life) to hold the position of head of a monastic institution. 11. However, I am clear that their Lordships of the Privy Council have in their recent decision referred to in my learned brothers judgment not accepted the view enunciated in Kailasam Pillai v. Nataraja Thambiran (1909) I.L.R. 33 M. 265 or Vidyapurna Thirthaswami v. Vydhyanidhi Trithaswami (1904) I.L.R. 27 M. 435 and that these decisions are therefore no longer of binding force. 12. 12. As regards Abhiram Goswami v. Shyamacharan Nandi (1909) I.L.R. 35 C. 1003 (P.C.) both Miller, J. and myself considered it carefully in Muthuswamier v. Sree Sree Methanithiswamiar (1916) I.L.R. 38 M. 358 and our opinion as to the exact scope of their Lordships decision in that case is (I am glad to find) supported by the opinion of my learned brother.