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1918 DIGILAW 295 (MAD)

Bachu Soorayya v. Toomuloori Chinna Anjaneyalu,

1918-10-08

S.AIYAR

body1918
JUDGMENT Sadasiva Aiyar, J. 1. Defendants 3 and 4 are the appellants in this second appeal. The 4th defendant is the purchaser in court-auction sale of the plaint property which belonged to the plaintiffs father who died before 1913. The decree in execution of which the sale took place, was a Small Cause decree passed in a suit of 1913 brought against the plaintiffs fathers brother as 2nd defendant, he being impleaded as the legal representative of the plaintiffs father Seethayya who was then dead. The 2nd defendant was divided from plaintiffs father and he was not the real legal representative of plaintiffs father, the minor plaintiff being such representative. The question is whether the court-auction sale is binding on the plaintiff. 2. In paragraph 6 of the plaint, it is alleged that the 2nd defendant was not only not the heir of the " plaintiffs father, but that the plaint property was never in the possession of the 2nd defendant after the plaintiffs fathers death. These allegations in the plaint were not expressly denied in the appellants written statements, The learned Vakil for the appellants relied, among other decisions, on the decision of Napier, J. and myself in Gnanambal Ammal v. Veerasami Chetty (1915) 29 M.L.J. 698. There a decree had been passed against a person in possession of the property of the deceased debtor, though that person was not the heir of the debtor. We held that if the plaintiff in good faith obtained a decree against a person who was in possession of his debtors property and whom the plaintiff believed to be the legal heir, execution proceedings taken in pursuance of that decree will bind the real heir. We held that the cases in The General Manager of the Raj Durbhanga v. Maharajah Coomar Ramaput Singh (1872) 14 M.I.A. 605 and Ramaswami Chettiar v. Oppilamani Ghttty (1909) I.L.R. 33 M. 9 : 19 M.L.J. 671 supported our view as also the new definition of " legal representative" found in Section 2, Clause 11 of the Civil Procedure Code Act V of 1908.). I might also refer to Bisseswar Lal Sahoo v. Maharajah Luchmessur Singh (1863) 6 I.A. 233 and Ishan Chundur Mitter v. Baksh Ali Souddagar (1863) 1 Marshalls Reports, 614. I might also refer to Bisseswar Lal Sahoo v. Maharajah Luchmessur Singh (1863) 6 I.A. 233 and Ishan Chundur Mitter v. Baksh Ali Souddagar (1863) 1 Marshalls Reports, 614. The case of a decree passed in a suit brought against a person in possession but who is not the heir of the deceased debtors estate, must of course be treated as an exception to the general rule, that proceedings in execution of a decree do not bind the interest of any person who was never brought on the record as a party to the proceedings in the suit. See Kishen Chunder Ghose v. Mussammat Ashoorvn (1863) 1 Marshalls Reports, 647 as regards the general rule. The decisions dealing with suits which had been instituted against a debtor before his death but were continued after his death till decree or after the decree in execution proceedings with the wrong person on record as legal representative are irrelevant for the consideration of the plaint before us, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Khiarajmal v. Daim (1904) I.L.R. 32 C. 296 at 314. In the present case defendants 3 and 4 contested the plaintiffs claim, not on the ground that the 2nd defendant was in possession of the plaint property and hence might be taken as the plaintiffs fathers legal representative in some sense, but on the ground that the decree was passed for a debt of the plaintiffs father and hence is binding on the plaintiff, the question who was sued as plaintiffs fathers legal representative or against whom the decree was obtained as such being immaterial according to the contention put forward by the appellants. I think such a contention cannot be supported, having regard to the decision in Khiarajmal v. Daim (1904) I.L.R. 32 C. 296. See also Madavarayadu v. Subbamma (1916) 31 M.L.J. 222 . 3. I would, therefore, dismiss the second appeal with plain, tiffs costs. Spencer, J. 4. I agree.