Judgement Appeal from a judgment and seven decrees of the High Court (March 5, 1913) reversing seven decrees of the District Judge of Birbhum. The respondent was patnidar or darpatnidar of villages included in seven patni grants from the appellant as zamindar. The Government having resumed possession under Bengal Act VI. of 1870 of chaukidari chakaran lands within the villages, at various dates between December 12, 1896, and March 8, 1899, transferred them under that Act to the appellant. The respondents right to possession of the lands being denied, he instituted in September, 1904, seven suits against the appellant in the Munsif s Court. By his plaint in each suit the respondent claimed a declaration that the chaukidari chakaran lands formed parcel of the patni mahal in question and that he was entitled to a settlement, and he further claimed khas possession. The appellant pleaded, inter alia, that the suits were barred by limitation. His contention was that they were not suits for possession of immovable property within art. 144 of Sched. II. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, but were suits for the specific performance of contracts within art. 113, and that they were barred under art. 113 since they were not instituted within three years from the dates fixed for performance or from the date when the plaintiff had notice that performance was refused. The District Judge, on appeals from the Munsif’s Court, accepted the above contention and dismissed the suits. Upon consolidated appeals to the High Court Rampini and Sharfuddin JJ. agreed that art. 113 applied, but remanded the suits for determination of an issue whether the suits were instituted within three years of the respondent attaining his majority. On appeal from the Munsif on remand, the District Judge decided that issue in favour of the appellant in each suit and again dismissed the suits. Upon a further appeal to the High Court Chitty and Teunon JJ. disagreed with the view previously taken by the Court. They held that art. 113 did not apply and that the suits were governed by art. 144, by which the period of limitation was twelve years from the date when possession became adverse. There being on the findings and contentions no other question of law involved, they made decrees as prayed. 1918. April 16. De Gruyther K.C. and OGorman (for Eddis, serving with His Majestys Forces) for the appellant. 144, by which the period of limitation was twelve years from the date when possession became adverse. There being on the findings and contentions no other question of law involved, they made decrees as prayed. 1918. April 16. De Gruyther K.C. and OGorman (for Eddis, serving with His Majestys Forces) for the appellant. The suits were for specific performance of contracts and were barred by art. 113. The right of the respondent arose solely out of covenants to be implied in the patnis, and by virtue of s. 51 of Bengal Act VI. of 1870, which provides that the transfer shall be subject to rights of contract Ranjit Singh v. Kali Dasi Debi. (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 117.) The Board in that appeal affirmed the decree of the High Court for possession subject to a fair and reasonable assessment. Until the assessment was made there was no right to possession; the suits cannot therefore be regarded as suits for possession to which art. 144 applies. [Reference was also made to Hart Narain Mozumdar v. Mukund Lal Mundal. (L. R. 44 I. A. 117, 125.)] Upjohn K.C. and Sir William Garth for the respondent. Art. 113 applies only to a suit to enforce specific performance of a purely personal obligation. Under the patnis the respondent had a real interest in the chaukidari chakaran lands, not merely a right founded on a personal obligation. The word "contract" in s. 51 of Bengal Act VI. of 1870 is used in a wide sense, and includes a right in realty. In Ranjit Singh v. Kali Dasi Debi (( 1900) 4 Cal. W. N. 114.) the section is referred to as preserving the rights of third parties in the lands, and the decision was upon that basis. The suits were for possession within art. 144? and the period of limitation was therefore twelve years. De Gruyther K.C. replied. May 30. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. This is an appeal against seven decrees of the High Court of Calcutta dated March 5. 1913. These decrees were made in seven suits instituted by the respondent on September 10 and 20, 1904, against the appellant and others claiming to recover possession and settlement of certain chaukidari chakaran lands in villages of which the appellant is the zamindar. This is an appeal against seven decrees of the High Court of Calcutta dated March 5. 1913. These decrees were made in seven suits instituted by the respondent on September 10 and 20, 1904, against the appellant and others claiming to recover possession and settlement of certain chaukidari chakaran lands in villages of which the appellant is the zamindar. It is unnecessary to deal with the history and vicissitudes of the litigation, as the only question that now arises for determination is whether the suits were barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. That statute, as is well known, fixed different periods of limitation within which suits of different characters should be brought. The appellant contends that art. 113 of Sched. II. of that statute regulates the rights of the parties in the present case, while the respondent asserts that the period is fixed by art. 144 of the same schedule. By the terms of the schedule, art. 113 is stated to apply to a suit for specific performance of a contract, the period of limitation is fixed at three years, and the time from which the period begins to run is stated to be the date fixed for the performance or, if no such date is fixed, the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Art. 144, on the other hand, relates to a suit for possession of immovable property or any interest therein not thereby otherwise specially provided for ; the period is twelve years, and the time from which the period begins to run is when the possession of the defen dant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. If art. 113 applies the appellant is entitled to succeed. But it is admitted that he must fail if art. 144 prescribes the true period- The circumstances out of which the action arose can be briefly stated. The respondent is the patnidar of half and darpatnidar of the other half of the village of Gopalpur, and is patnidar of six other villages, all of the said villages being within the zamindari of the appellant. Some of the lands in these villages included in the patnis and the darpatnis were originally held as chaukidari chakaran lands, but in June, 1898, these lands were all resumed by the Collector under the Bengal Act VI. of 1870, and then transferred to the appellant. Some of the lands in these villages included in the patnis and the darpatnis were originally held as chaukidari chakaran lands, but in June, 1898, these lands were all resumed by the Collector under the Bengal Act VI. of 1870, and then transferred to the appellant. It is unnecessary to state the history of these lands, the circumstances attaching to their tenure, and the respective rights of the parties when they were resumed by the Collector, for all these matters have been fully dealt with in a judgment of this Board in the case of Ranjit Singh v. Kali Dad Debi. (L. R. 44 I. A. 117.) It was there decided that upon such resumption and transfer to the zamindar, as is provided by the Bengal Act VI. of 1870, the patnidar or the darpatnidar is entitled under s. 51 to possession of the chaukidari chakaran lands. That right depended upon the interpretation given by the Board to s. 51 of Act VI. of 1870. This section operates to transfer the land to the zamindar, " subject to all contracts theretofore made in respect of, under, or by virtue of which any person other than the zamindar may have any right to any land, or portion of his estate or tenure in the place in which such land may be situate." Lord Parker, in delivering the judgment of the Board, while com menting upon the fact that these words were not happily chosen, expressed the opinion that their obvious intention was to preserve the rights of third parties. He said " They contemplate a case in which the village in which the resumed lands are situate has been made the subject of a contract by the zamindar or those through whom he claims, and that under this contract some third party may have an interest in the lands resumed. He said " They contemplate a case in which the village in which the resumed lands are situate has been made the subject of a contract by the zamindar or those through whom he claims, and that under this contract some third party may have an interest in the lands resumed. They are wide enough to include, and in their Lordships opinion do include, the rights of a patnidar under a patni grant by virtue of which the patnidar is lessee of the zamindars interest in the lands resumed, and also the rights of a darpatnidar under a darpatni grant." There is, therefore, no longer any question as to the right of the respondent to the lands, but the appellants contention is that as the rights of the patnidar are reserved under the words referred to they must be assumed to be contractual rights, that consequently a suit to enforce those rights must be a suit for specific performance, and that the date from which the statute begins to run must be the date of the grants to the zamindar. Their Lordships are unable to accede to that contention. It does not follow that because the rights originally arose by virtue of a grant declared to be a contract within the meaning of s. 51 they are therefore rights, contractual in the sense that the contract by its terms creates and regulates the personal obligations and duties of the grantor in the circumstances that have arisen. At the time when the patni grants were made the resumption of the chaukidari chakaran lands was not even contemplated, and the grant necessarily contains no reference whatever to the circumstances that would arise and the relationships that would exist in the event of the Government resuming possession. Upon resumption of such possession the rights of the patnidar were those conferred on him by the ; ate and interest created by the patni leases, and it was these rights that were kept alive by s. 51 of Act VI. of 1870 of the Bengal Council. It is only necessary to examine the words which prescribe the date from which the period begins to run in art. 113 of Sched. II. of the Limitation Act to show the difficulties in the way of any contrary contention. of 1870 of the Bengal Council. It is only necessary to examine the words which prescribe the date from which the period begins to run in art. 113 of Sched. II. of the Limitation Act to show the difficulties in the way of any contrary contention. This date, as has already been pointed out, is either the date fixed for performance or the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance has been refused, but no date whatever has been fixed for performance in such a case as the present, either by the original grant or by the terms of the statute, nor has there been any refusal to perform a contract, for there was no unexecuted contract which had to be performed. A suit for specific performance is essentially a suit for enforcing a stipulated obligation relating to property. The word "contract" itself primarily means a transaction which creates personal obligations, but it may, though less exactly, refer to transactions which create real rights. It is in this latter sense that the word was used in s. 51, and the rights thereby reserved to the patnidars, comprehensively included in the word "contracts," are real rights, the enforcement of which is secured not by a suit for specific performance, but by a suit for possession, and it is this which, in their Lordships opinion, is the character of the suits in the present case. From this it follows the period of limitation is that fixed by art. 144; consequently the judgment appealed from is in their Lordships opinion correct, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.