Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (April 29, 1915) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur. The suit was instituted by the appellants against the respondents for possession of immovable property known as the Landhaura Estate. By the plaint the first appellant claimed that he was entitled to succeed to the property as reversionary heir of Raja Jagat Prakash Singh ; it was alleged that Rani Dharam Kunwar, the mother of the said deceased Raja, had no authority from her husband to adopt the first respondent; and that the adoption was invalid by Hindu law. The respondents pleaded that the Rani had authority to make the adoption, and that the adoption was valid; further, that the question of the validity of the adoption was res judicata, in that it had been decided by the Privy Council in favour of Balwant Singh in a suit brought by the Rani at a time when she represented the estate. The decision of the Privy Council referred to is reported at L.R. 39 I. A. 142. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge framed several issues, of which two only are material to this report, namely (1.) Are the plaintiffs bound by the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council? (7.) Was the defendant No. 1 (Balwant Singh) validly adopted to Raja Raghubir with his permission? In the previous suit, in addition to issues directed to the question of estoppel against the Rani, the following issue was settled (3.) Had or had not the plaintiff (the Rani) any authority from her husband to adopt the defendant (Balwant Singh) ? Both Courts in India decided in that suit upon the estoppel without recording any finding upon that issue. The facts as to the proceedings upon the appeal to the Privy Council appear from the report at L. R. 39 I. A. 142 and the present judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge held in the present suit that the appellants were bound by the previous decision of the Privy Council; he accordingly considered that it was unnecessary to deal with issue No. 7, and dismissed the suit. Upon appeal to the High Court, the learned judges, Sir Henry Richards C.J. and Sir P. C. Banerji J., differed. The Subordinate Judge held in the present suit that the appellants were bound by the previous decision of the Privy Council; he accordingly considered that it was unnecessary to deal with issue No. 7, and dismissed the suit. Upon appeal to the High Court, the learned judges, Sir Henry Richards C.J. and Sir P. C. Banerji J., differed. The Chief Justice was of opinion that the matter was not res judicata against the appellants because the trial judge in the former suit had excluded certain verbal evidence upon the issue as to authority, though he had recorded the documentary evidence thereon. Banerji J. agreed with the Subordinate Judge that, the Judicial Committee having considered the evidence upon the record as sufficient to enable them to decide the question of fact, the decision was binding. The matter was referred under s. 98 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to a third judge, Chamier J., who, upon a consideration of the former proceedings before the Board and their Lordships judgment, agreed with the view of Bannerji J. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. 1918. May 3, 6, 7, 9. Dunne K.C. and W. L. Richards for the appellants. In the former suit the Rani was estopped by her acts from denying that she had authority to adopt Balwant Singh; she consequently could not represent the estate upon that issue within the principle laid down in Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga. (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 539, 604.) That principle has never been applied where the female holder was estopped by facts personal to herself; it applies only where there has been a "fair trial of the right." That has not been the case here. Both Courts in India decided the former suit purely upon the ground of estoppel, and the trial judge excluded evidence as to the authority to adopt. Having regard to the exclusion of evidence, it is to be inferred that the Board did not intend to give a judicial decision binding upon the reversioners. The appellants not having been parties to the previous suit, s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, does not apply, the sole question being whether the appellants are bound under the rule laid down in the case above referred to. So far as English decisions apply, they support the view that there was no res judicata Concha v. Concha ((1386) 11 App. So far as English decisions apply, they support the view that there was no res judicata Concha v. Concha ((1386) 11 App. Cas. 541, 549.); Langmead v. Maple (( 1865) 18 C. B. (N.S.) 255, 270, 271.); Robinson v. Duleep Singh. (( 1878) 11 Ch. D. 798, 813.) De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondents. The widow represented the estate, and the appellants are bound by the previous decision of the Board upon the principle laid down in Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 539, 604.), which was followed and applied in Jugol Kishore v. Jotindra Mohun Tagore (( 1884) L. R. 11 LA. 66.), Partab Narain v. Trilokinath (( 1884) L. R. 11 I. A. 197.), and Harrinath Chatterji v. Muthoor Mohun. (( 1893) L. R. 20 I. A. 183.) There was within the rule there laid down a "fair trial of the right." It does not appear from the record that any evidence actually tendered was rejected. It was for the Board to determine whether the material evidence was before it. Further, s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, since the effect of the above decisions is that the reversioners are to be regarded as being parties to the suit although they do not claim through the widow Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu (( 1906) I. L. R. 29 M. 390.); Venkatanarayana v. Sub- bammal. (( 1915) 1. L. R. 42 I. A. 125.) Under s. 11 the question is whether the same issue was finally decided in a former suit, not whether the cause of action is the same Tirbhuban v. Rameshar. (( 1906) L. R. 33 I. A. 156, 164.) Here in the former suit an issue was settled as to whether the Rani had authority to] adopt Balwant Singh. That issue was finally decided by the Board ; it is not material that it was not decided by the Courts in India. [Reference was also made to Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh ((1801) L. R. 18 I. A. 165, 176.), Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Doss (( 1917) L. R. 44 1. A. 213.), and, as to successive adoption, to Kannepalli v. Pucha Venkata. (( 1906) L. R. 33 1. A. 145.)] Dunne K.C. in reply. Sect. 11 does not apply. [Reference was also made to Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh ((1801) L. R. 18 I. A. 165, 176.), Ashgar Ali Khan v. Ganesh Doss (( 1917) L. R. 44 1. A. 213.), and, as to successive adoption, to Kannepalli v. Pucha Venkata. (( 1906) L. R. 33 1. A. 145.)] Dunne K.C. in reply. Sect. 11 does not apply. The whole basis of the rule as to reversioners being bound rests upon the consideration that the widow represented the estate. In this case, having regard to the estoppel, the Rani could not represent the estate. In her plaint in the former suit she asked merely that the adoption be declared not binding upon her. Further, it appears that evidence was excluded, as the record in the former suit shows that that was made a ground of appeal and a ground for the application for leave to apply to the Privy Council. June 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. This is an appeal from a decree, dated April 29, 1915, of the High Court at Allahabad, which affirmed a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur by which the suit of the plaintiffs had been dismissed. The suit was dismissed on the ground that a decision of the Board on April 23, 1912, in an appeal to His Majesty in Council in a previous suit, in which Balwant Singh, the principal defendant in this suit, was the defendant, and the late Rani Dharam Kunwar was the plaintiff, operated as a bar to the maintenance of this suit, which is brought by plaintiffs, who were not parties to the previous suit, and do not represent either party to the previous suit. That decision is reported at L. R. 39 I. A. 142. In this suit the plaintiffs are Chaudhri Risal Singh, and Fateh Chand. The plaintiff Chaudhri Risal Singh claims possession of part of the Landhaura Raj, which is a large estate of great value; his claim is based on an allegation that he is the heir of Raja Jagat Prakash Singh, whom he alleges to have been the last male owner of the estate. The other plaitiff, Fateh Chand, alleges that before suit Chaudhri Risal Singh conveyed to him the other part of the estate, and he claims possession of that other part as the grantee of Chaudhri Risal Singh. The other plaitiff, Fateh Chand, alleges that before suit Chaudhri Risal Singh conveyed to him the other part of the estate, and he claims possession of that other part as the grantee of Chaudhri Risal Singh. The plaintiffs also claim mesne profits. The principal defendant is Balwant Singh, through whom the other defendants claim title. Balwant Singhs case is that the estate vested in him as the adopted son of the late Raja Raghubir Singh, to whom he alleges that he was validly adopted by the late Rani Dharam Kunwar, the widow of Raja Raghubir Singh, who admittedly died possessed of the estate. The factum of the adoption was denied by the plaintiffs, but it is no longer disputed, and cannot now be disputed; the plaintiffs, however, allege that Rani Dharam Kunwar had no authority to adopt a son to her husband, and further that, if she had, the authority was a limited authority, and was exhausted by previous adoptions made by her before she went through the form of adopting Balwant Singh. The decision of the Board, which has been held by the Courts below to operate as a bar to the maintenance of this suit, related to the adoption of Balwant Singh as a son to her late husband by Rani Dharam Kunwar. The plaintiffs allege and the defendants deny that on the death of Rani Dharam Kunwar on November 12, 1912, the plaintiff Chaudhri Risal Singh was the next nearest reversioner, and was as such entitled to the estate of Landhaura. That issue as to the status of Chaudhri Risal Singh has not been tried, and is irrelevant if the suit is barred by the decision of the Board of April 23, 1912. There has been much litigation relating to the title to the estate of which Raja Raghubir Singh died possessed, and in order to understand the case which was before the Board in 1912 it is necessary briefly to refer to that previous litigation and to the position of the several parties to it. Raja Raghubir Singh died on April 23, 1868, and at the time of his death he left no son living; his widow, Rani Dharam Kunwar, was then enceinte, and after his death she, on December 16, 1868, gave birth to Raja Jagat Prakash Singh, who was his posthumous child. Raja Raghubir Singh died on April 23, 1868, and at the time of his death he left no son living; his widow, Rani Dharam Kunwar, was then enceinte, and after his death she, on December 16, 1868, gave birth to Raja Jagat Prakash Singh, who was his posthumous child. Raja Jagat Prakash Singh died in childhood on August 31, 1870, and on his death Rani Dharam Kunwar succeeded to the possession of the family property in right of her interest for life in it as his mother and heiress. The fact that she alleged that she obtained title to the property under an oral will of her husband, Raghubir Singh, is immaterial. On March 4, 1877 Rani Dharam Kunwar adopted Tofa Singh as a son to Raja Raghubir Singh. Tofa Singh, then known as Raja Narendra Singh, died in childhood about two and a half years after his adoption. On January 20, 1883, Rani Dharam Kunwar adopted another boy, named Ram Sarup, as a son to Raja Raghubir Singh. Ram Sarup, then known as Ram Padab Singh, died in June, 1885. On January 13, 1899, Rani Dharam Kunwar adopted Balwant Singh, the principal defendant in this suit, as a son to Raja Raghubir Singh. On January 13, 1899, Chaudhri Ram Niwaz, who was the father of Balwant Singh, executed a deed, by which he acknowledged that he had given his son, Balwant Singh, then sixteen years old, to Rani Dharam Kunwar, widow of Raja Raghubir Singh, deceased, Rais of Landhaura, as an adopted son for her and her husband, and stated that " the usual religious ceremonies and those connected with the biradri have been performed with all publicity to-day. From to-day the said son has no connection left with his natural family. From to-day the said son will have those rights in the whole of the property left by Raja Raghubir Singh, deceased, and possessed by the said Rani, which an adopted son legally acquires. From to-day the said son has no connection left with his natural family. From to-day the said son will have those rights in the whole of the property left by Raja Raghubir Singh, deceased, and possessed by the said Rani, which an adopted son legally acquires. But it has been agreed between me, the executant and the said Rani, according to the provisions of the will and permission of Raja Raghubir Singh, deceased, that she shall, till the end of her life, continue to be the owner and possessor of the whole estate and property of every description belonging to the said Raja which exists at present or may be acquired in future ; and as long as she lives all sorts of management and supervision of the estate shall rest with her as its owner." On May 1, 1900, one Baldeo Singh, claiming to be the reversionary heir of Raja Raghubir Singh, brought a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur against Rani Dharam Kunwar and Balwant Singh to have the adoption of Balwant Singh set aside. In that suit evidence as to the alleged adoption was taken. The main contention of Baldeo Singh, so far as the adoption of Balwant Singh was concerned, was that Raja Raghubir Singh had not given to Rani Dharam Kunwar authority to adopt a son to him, and that any authority which Raja Raghubir Singh might have given was not an authority which enabled her to make successive adoptions. The main contention of Baldeo Singh, so far as the adoption of Balwant Singh was concerned, was that Raja Raghubir Singh had not given to Rani Dharam Kunwar authority to adopt a son to him, and that any authority which Raja Raghubir Singh might have given was not an authority which enabled her to make successive adoptions. No oral evidence to prove that an authority to adopt had not been given to Rani Dharam Kunwar by Raja Raghubir Singh was apparently procurable ; in that suit Rani Dharam Kunwar did not give evidence, but in her written statement she alleged that she had " under valid authority and after due proclamation adopted Balwant Singh, defendant No. 2, and the aforesaid adoption is every way proper." Her pleader in that suit stated to the Court that the authority to adopt was oral, and as to the nature and scope of her authority to adopt, said that Raja Raghubir Singhs object in giving his wife authority to adopt was that " in the event of Rani Dharam Kunwar, who was then pregnant, giving birth to a daughter, or of a son being born and dying, she should adopt, and in the event of the death of that adopted son, she should again adopt, and in the event of the last-named also dying, she had authority to adopt again, and so on." There was documentary evidence put before the Subordinate Judge, and four witnesses were called to prove the oral authority to adopt, but the Subordinate Judge did not believe those witnesses, and he found that Rani Dharam Kunwar had not authority to adopt Balwant Singh, as the authority was not one authorising her to make successive adoptions. Having found, however, that Baldeo Singh had failed to prove that he was a reversioner, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, but in his decree he inserted his finding against the validity of the adoption. That decree came on appeal before the High Court at Allahabad, and the appeal was dismissed; but the High Court, on the application of Balwant Singh, struck out of the decree of the Subordinate Judge his finding as to the invalidity of the adoption on the ground that, Baldeo Singh having failed to prove that he was a reversioner, the issue as to authority to adopt did not arise and was irrelevant. That application was resisted by Rani Dharam Kunwar, and her advocate frankly informed the High Court that her object in wishing to have the finding as to the invalidity of the adoption retained in the decree of the Subordinate Judge was that it might be used as res judicata in future litigation between her and Balwant Singh. Before Baldeo Singhs suit was dismissed Rani Dharam Kunwar and Balwant Singh had quarrelled. Balwant Singh was claiming his full rights as an adopted son and was refusing to be bound by the terms as to Rani Dharam Kunwars position with regard to the ownership, management, and control of the property that had come from Raja Raghubir Singh, which had been agreed to by Chaudhri Ram Niwaz in the deed of January 13, 1899, and she determined to repudiate the adoption. On January 7, 1905, Rani Dharam Kunwar brought a suit against Balwant Singh in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur, and in her plaint alleged that Raja Raghubir Singh had never given her authority to adopt a son, and prayed that it might be declared that she had no power to adopt Balwant Singh, and had in fact never adopted him according to any ceremony under the Hindu law, and that a document of January 13, 1899, in her name as the executant which purported to be a deed of adoption in favour of Balwant Singh was void and ineffectual as against her. The deed of adoption of January 13, 1899, which Rani Dharam Kunwar sought to have declared void was a registered deed in her name and under her seal in which she alleged that Raja Raghubir Singh when he became hopeless of recovery in his last illness made the following will in her favour, she being then pregnant "If (God forbid!) you give birth to a daughter, or if a son be born but die after his birth, I strictly order you to adopt some boy to me, so that he might perform my stradh ceremony and yours, and perpetuate my name, and after your death become the absolute owner and possessor of the whole of my estate. If (God forbid!) the son who might be adopted under this authority should die in your lifetime you will have power to adopt another boy." In that deed Rani Dharam Kunwar, amongst several other things, also alleged that she on the day on which the deed bears date, after performing the necessary ceremonies, adopted Balwant Singh, son of Chaudhri Ram Niwaz, to herself and her husband in the presence of the gentry, the district authorities, and other European gentlemen, and the members of her biradri; and that Chaudri Ram Niwaz gave Balwant Singh to her as an adopted son. That deed was on January 19, 1899, duly registered by the Sub-Registrar of Rurki, Rani Dharam Kunwar having first personally admitted in the presence of the Sub-Registrar its execution by her. In her plaint in her suit against Balwant Singh she endeavoured to explain away that deed by alleging that she had no knowledge of it before July, 1904; that she had not got it registered; that it was written in her name without her knowledge on January 13, 1899, by one Tahauwar Ali, who was her diwan in charge of her entire business, and was her adviser, and that he had got it registered. She also alleged in her plaint that having learnt during the pendency of Baldeo Singhs suit that Tahauwar Ali was secretly in collusion with Balwant Singh she dismissed him, and she also endeavoured to explain away her written statement in the suit of Baldeo Singh, admitting the adoption of Balwant Singh, and her pleaders statement in that suit as to her authority to make an adoption, by denying that her written statement and her pleaders statement had been authorized by her. In the suit of Rani Dharam Kunwar against Balwant Singh he in his written statement, amongst other things, alleged that Rani Dharam Kunwar had authority to adopt him to Raja Raghubir Singh and that he had been validly adopted. The Subordinate Judge held that Rani Dharam Kunwar was by her acts estopped from denying that Balwant Singh had been validly adopted to Raja Raghubir Singh, and did not try any other issue. The High Court at Allahabad, agreeing with the Subordinate Judge, dismissed the appeal of Rani Dharam Kunwar, and thereupon she appealed to His Majesty in Council and again failed. The High Court at Allahabad, agreeing with the Subordinate Judge, dismissed the appeal of Rani Dharam Kunwar, and thereupon she appealed to His Majesty in Council and again failed. The facts which this Board has stated as to the history of the litigation and as to the positions of the parties and their acts have been derived from the record of the appeal to His Majesty in Council in which the Board gave its decision of April 23, 1912. The evidence upon which that decision was arrived at was before the Board in the record of that appeal. It is said that evidence to show that Rani Dharam Kunwar had no authority to adopt Balwant Singh had been excluded in her suit, and that consequently the Board in 1912 ought not to have found that Balwant Singh had been validly adopted. It is true that Rani Dharam Kunwar applied to the Subordinate Judge that evidence should be taken, but it does not appear that she ever applied to have witnesses summoned or tendered any evidence which was rejected. It is difficult to conceive what oral evidence Rani Dharam Kunwar could have produced, except her own personal evidence, to prove that she had received from Raja Raghubir Singh no authority to adopt, and if she had given evidence that she had no authority to make the adoption such evidence, having regard to her own acts and documentary evidence on the record, could not have been accepted as true. Their Lordships in this appeal pressed the learned counsel who appeared for the appellants to state what oral evidence there was available to prove or to suggest that Raja Raghubir Singh had not in his final illness given to Rani Dharam Kunwar his authority to adopt, but the learned counsel was not in a position to suggest what oral evidence could have been produced. The Board in 1912 was satisfied, and rightly satisfied, that no further evidence as to the authority or absence of authority to adopt could be expected to be produced by anybody beyond the evidence then already taken. As appears from the report of the case in Allahabad Law Journal Reports, vol. The Board in 1912 was satisfied, and rightly satisfied, that no further evidence as to the authority or absence of authority to adopt could be expected to be produced by anybody beyond the evidence then already taken. As appears from the report of the case in Allahabad Law Journal Reports, vol. 9, p. 730, the learned counsel for Rani Dharam Kunwar contended in argument before the Board in 1912 that if it were held that Rani Dharam Kunwar was not estopped from denying that Balwant Singh had been validly adopted, the question arose whether she had any authority to adopt him ; and further contended that such authority as she alleged would not extend to the adoption in question. There was ample material in the appeal record before the Board in 1912 upon which the Board might find that Raja Raghubir Singh had given authority to Rani Dharam Kunwar to adopt a son to him, and that such authority was a general authority and was not limited to making one or more successive adoptions. It is clear that the Board in 1912 did intend to decide the question of authority to adopt as a question of fact. In the judgment of the Board it is said "The third question, viz., as to whether the Rani had authority from her husband to adopt the defendant gives rise to the point which has been argued before their Lordships." And then their Lordships dealt with the contentions on that subject, and found that Raja Raghubir Singh had given to Rani Dharam Kunwar a general power to adopt which justified her adoption of Balwant Singh, and said " Their Lordships, in reviewing the facts of the case, are of opinion that the question may well be decided as one of fact on the Ranis own statements without recourse to the doctrine of estoppel. In their view she was speaking the truth in Baldeo Singhs action when pleading as to her authority." It is clear that the reasons of the Board in 1912 for deciding thus as to the facts and for not confining the decision to the question of the estoppel were to quiet any religious scruples, which might have arisen if Raja Raghubir Singh could be said to have a son only by estoppel to perform religious duties, and also to put a stop to further litigation as to the validity of the adoption of Balwant Singh. There can be no doubt, in their Lordships opinion, that Rani Dharam Kunwar in her suit against Balwant Singh did, notwithstanding the personal estoppel under which she laboured, represent the estate on the question of fact as to whether Balwant Singh had or had not been validly adopted, and that she represented the estate within the meaning of the rule in Katama Natchiar v. Raja of Shivagunga. (9 Moo. I. A. 539.) The principle of law to be applied in such cases was, their Lordships consider, correctly summarized by Banerji J. in his judgment in this case thus " Where the estate of a deceased Hindu has vested in a female heir a decree fairly and properly obtained against her in regard to the estate is, in the absence of fraud or collusion, binding on the reversionary heir." It cannot be said that there had not been a fair trial by the Board in 1912 of the right in the suit of Rani Dharam Kunwar against Balwant Singh. The right in that suit was his right to the estate as a son validly adopted to Raja Raghubir Singh. It is true, as was pointed out in a judgment of the High Court in this suit, that the rule of res judicata, as enacted in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is not strictly applicable in this case, as the plaintiffs were not parties to the suit of Rani Dharam Kunwar against Balwant Singh, and do not claim under a party to that suit, but the principle of res judicata has been applied rightly by the Courts in India so as to bind reversioners by decisions in litigation, fairly and honestly conducted, given for or against Hindu females who represented estates, as Rani Dharam Kunwar did in her suit against Balwant Singh. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the appellants here that Rani Dharam Kunwar cannot be regarded as having represented the estate in her suit against Balwant Singh, as by her acts she was personally estopped from denying that she had validly adopted him to Raja Raghubir Singh. In the absence of all authority, their Lordships cannot decide that a Hindu lady, otherwise qualified to represent an estate in litigation, ceases to be so qualified merely owing to personal disability or disadvantage as a litigant, although the merits are tried and the trial is fair and honest. The principle is that reversioners must risk that, so that there may be an end to litigation. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal fails, and should be dismissed with costs.