JUDGMENT Fletcher, J. - This case comes before me under the provisions of sec. 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Appellant Sri Lal Chamaria was tried along with one Mimraj Benia by the 3rd Presidency Magistrate and convicted on charges framed under secs. 161 and 109 of the Indian Penal Code. Mimraj was also convicted, but his conviction has been set aside by this Court. The Appellant Sri Lal was sentenced by the learned Magistrate to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Es. 1,000 or in default to undergo a further period of two months' rigorous imprisonment. 2. Sri Lal appealed to this Court. His appeal was heard by Richardson and Huda, JJ. The learned Judges were divided in their opinion. Richardson, J., was for upholding the conviction, whilst Huda, J., was of opinion that the conviction ought to be set aside. 3. The facts in the case are fully set out in the judgment of the Magistrate as well as in the judgments of the two learned Judges. Richardson, J. remarks in the course of his judgment:--" The outstanding feature of the case is that on the night of the 5th February, a sum of Rs. 2,500 was admittedly handed over by Sri Lal to the witness Karuna Bhusan Banerjee, the Bench Clerk and Interpreter of the Court of the 5th Presidency Magistrate, Mr. Asutosh Mookerjee. A case was at that time pending before Mr. Mookerjee, in which the complainant was a Marwari, named Ram Gopal Khemkar and the accused was a wealthy Marwari merchant, named Bilas Roy Chowdhury. Ram Gopal had been the tenant of a room in a building belonging to Bilas Roy. It is said he was adjudicated insolvent, locked up the room and paid no rent for two months. Bilas Roy had the room opened and certain things were removed therefrom. The complaint preferred by Ram Gopal was in respect of that entry. I am not dealing with the merits. The hearing began on the 3rd January and by the 13th of January a number of witnesses for the prosecution had Been examined. On the 31st January charges were framed against Bilas Roy under secs. 448, 453 and 380 of the Penal Code. I am not dealing with the merits. The hearing began on the 3rd January and by the 13th of January a number of witnesses for the prosecution had Been examined. On the 31st January charges were framed against Bilas Roy under secs. 448, 453 and 380 of the Penal Code. It is clear that the case was fought with great personal animosity on both sides though after the present case had been instituted against the Appellants a settlement seems to have been arrived at between the parties and Bilas. Roy was acquitted on the 22nd February." The facts contained in the above statement are not disputed. Sri Lal is a gomasta or partner of Bilas Roy and in the course of his dealings with Karuna he was acting on behalf of Bilas Roy. He intended that the bribe should be made over by Karuna to the 5th Presidency Magistrate in order to secure the acquittal of Bilas Roy. 4. The main controversy in this case has been as to whether the suggestion that the Magistrate should be bribed came originally from Sri Lal or Karuna. 5. The case for the prosecution is that Sri Lal visited Karuna on the 13th of January and on subsequent occasions at his house, that Karuna on the 28th of January saw Mr. Swinhoe with reference to the matter, after which Karuna played the part of a police spy and that on the night of the 5th February Sri Lal made over to him Rs. 2,500 in the presence of a Police Inspector and two other witnesses who were concealed in Karuna's house and the money was seized by the Inspector. On the side of the defence it was stated that the first suggestion of a bribe came from Karuna and that he subsequently saw Sri Lal at his Office at 2, Royal Exchange. Witnesses were called in support of this defence. I may say at the outset that I do not accept the evidence adduced by the defence. 6. The question, therefore, is whether it is safe to convict Sri Lal on the evidence on the record. So far as regards the evidence apart from the incidents of the 5th February, I think it would not be safe to convict the Appellant. 6. The question, therefore, is whether it is safe to convict Sri Lal on the evidence on the record. So far as regards the evidence apart from the incidents of the 5th February, I think it would not be safe to convict the Appellant. I am not on the whole impressed with the evidence of Karuna, although I think it is not improbable that he is right in his statement that Sri Lal first approached him. But apart from the incidents of the 5th of February, I should hesitate to act on the evidence of Karuna without corroboration. 7. The incidents of the 5th of February, however, stand on a different basis. They are amply corroborated, in fact they are not denied. 8. On that day Sri Lal went to Karuna's house voluntarily. He was under no sort of coercion or threat. The conversation between Sri Lal and Karuna was overheard by witnesses and deposed to by them, Sri Lal wanted to be satisfied that the money reached the Magistrate. He wanted the case to be declared false and sanction to prosecute Earn Gopal to be granted. 9. There seems to have been a clear incitement by Sri Lal of Karuna to instigate the Magistrate to accept a bribe which Sri Lal then handed over to Karuna. 10. The question is whether on these facts the conviction of Sri Lal can be supported. The answer depends on the meaning of secs. 107, 108, 109 and 116 of the Penal Code. No bribe was actually offered to the Magistrate. It was argued) on behalf of the defence that the Code does not make it an offence for a man to instigate another to instigate the commission of bribery unless the second abetment is actually committed. Under sec 107 a person abets the doing of a thing who instigates any person to do that thing. 11. Sec. 108 defines what is meant by the abetment of an offence. There are five Explanations to this section. The second Explanation provides that to constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. 11. Sec. 108 defines what is meant by the abetment of an offence. There are five Explanations to this section. The second Explanation provides that to constitute the offence of abetment it is not necessary that the act abetted should be committed or that the effect requisite to constitute the offence should be caused. Explanation 4 is in the following terms : "The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence." The prosecution read the Explanation as follows: "When the abetment of an offence is an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is also an offence." Both Richardson and Shamsul Huda, JJ., adopted this view. On consideration I am of the same opinion. As Richardson, J., points out in his judgment the words 'when the abetment of an offence is an offence' do not mean ''when an abetment of an offence is actually committed." They mean when the abetment of an offence is by definition or description an offence under the Code, that is, when an abetment of an offence is punishable under sec. 109 or sec. 116 or some other provision of the Code, then the abetment of such abetment is also an offence. Now, if that be the true reading of Explanation 4 to sec. 108, there can, to my mind, be no doubt about the correctness of the conviction of Sri Lal. Sri Lal, when he handed over on 5th of February Rs. 2,500, committed a distinct incitement of Karuna to instigate the Magistrate to accept a bribe. It makes no difference in the guilt of the abettor if the agent " falls in with the plans of the abettor knowing his criminal purpose, but intending to cause its detection " (Mayne's Criminal Law, 2nd Edition, p. 469; R. v. Troylakhya Nath (I.L.R. (1878) Cal. 366). In the circumstances, I hold that the Appellant Sri Lal was rightly convicted and accordingly dismiss his appeal. The Appellant must surrender and serve out his sentence.