Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and three decrees of the High Court (October 9, 1913) affirming decrees of the District Court of Kistna, which set aside decrees of a District Munsif s Court. The appellants held about two-thirds of the inam village of Korragunta in the Northern Circars. The respondents severally held from them parcels of land therein under leases entered into at recent dates but prior to 1908. Bach lease contained the following or a similar clause "As I have taken the land temporarily for cultivation, and as I have no zeroyati thereto, you shall take possession thereof at the end of the term without need of relinquishment by me." It appeared from the evidence that at, or shortly before, the date of each lease the parcel leased had been vacant. The appellants brought three suits in the Court of the District Munsif of Masulipatam to eject the respondents, each of whom pleaded that the parcel leased to him constituted an "estate," or part of an "estate," within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and that consequently under s. 189 the Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. The suits were tried together throughout. The terms of the inam grant under which the appellants held could not be proved. The earliest history of the village appeared from the back of a dumbala dated 1789. It was there stated to have been granted by a Reddi king in 1373 to Brahmins as a " sarva " agraharam, paying nothing to the circar, and to have been confirmed by succeeding rulers at various dates. Dumbalas dated 1785, 1796, and 1797 allowing the inamdars to remove the crops were produced. The village was entered in inam registers, the earliest being dated 1797, as a sarva agraharam, the original grant being stated to have been as above mentioned. There was no evidence that at the date when the grant was made or confirmed any person other than the inamdars was in occupation of the lands under any claim of permanent right, or at all. A considerable body of evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs to show that for a period of about twenty years the inamdars had dealt with the land and the tenants upon the basis of being owners of the soil. A considerable body of evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs to show that for a period of about twenty years the inamdars had dealt with the land and the tenants upon the basis of being owners of the soil. Some evidence to the contrary was adduced by the defendants, and it was also proved that in 1846 the inamdars, who prior to that date had not resided in the village, came to live there in order to facilitate the collection of the rent. The District Munsif made decrees for ejectment. He held that there was no presumption that the grantees did not own the kudivaram, and that the respondents, upon whom the onus lay to show that the Court had not jurisdiction, had failed to prove the necessary facts. The District Judge upon appeal set aside the decrees, holding that the village was an estate within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act. He said that it had been laid down in a series of judgments and in the Fifth Report that the ancient Indian rulers had no ownership in the soil, but only a share in its produce ; it was therefore to be inferred that the grant was only of the royal revenue. That view was supported by the fact that the grant was to Brahmins, and by the evidence that prior to 1846 the inamdars had not resided in the village. He considered that the evidence did not prove that the appellants owned the kudivaram, so as to displace the presumption of law which he held arose. He further held that the exception in s. 8 of the Act applied only when an inamdar, who had not previously the kudivaram, acquired it in the whole of the inam lands. The decision of the District Judge was affirmed by the High Court; the appeal is reported at I. L. R. 38 M. 608. The learned judges (Sadasiva Aiyar and Spencer JJ.) upon their view of the authorities agreed with the view of the District Judge that there was a presumption of law that the grant had been only of the royal revenue from the land ; they concurred in his finding that that presumption was not displaced by the evidence. They further held that the inamdars had not subsequently acquired the kudivaram so as to bring the cases within the exception to s. 8 of the Act. They further held that the inamdars had not subsequently acquired the kudivaram so as to bring the cases within the exception to s. 8 of the Act. 1918. May 30, 31; June 3, 4, 6. De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The lands in suit are not an "estate," or part of an "estate," within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. The respondents were seeking to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Court the onus was therefore upon them. It was not shown that at the date of the grant, or when it was confirmed, there were any persons in occupation other than the grantees ; it is probable that in 1372 the land was waste. Under these circumstances it cannot be presumed that the grant was of the revenue only. The decisions relied on do not establish as a general proposition that a grant to an inamdar is to be presumed to have been a grant of the revenue only. [Reference was made to Vaman v. Collector of Thana (( 1869) 6 Bom. H. C. (A.C.J.) 191.), Ravji Mandlik v. Dadaji (( 1875) I. L. R. 1 B. 523.), Rajya v. Balkrishna Gangadhar (( 1905) I. L. R. 29 B. 415.), and Bhadrayya v. Bapayya. (( 1910) 21 Mad. L. J. 803.) Cases in which it appeared, or was to be inferred, that there were tenants other than the grantees at the date of the grant are to be distinguished ; so also are cases of grants for services. The Madras High Court in the present and some other cases has given effect to the presumption, but the decisions of that Court in Kadambi Jagannatha v. Pidikiti Kutumbarayudu (( 1914) I. L. R. 39 M. 21.) and Virabhadrayya v. Sonti Venkamma (( 1913) 24 Mad. L. J. 659.) support the appellants; the latter related to a sarva agraharam and is therefore particularly applicable. The contention that the ancient rulers of India claimed no ownership of the soil is not established by authority. It is entirely inconsistent with the preamble to Madras Regulation XXXI. of 1802 see also Fifth Report, vol. 2, p. 84. The Government, whether before or after British sovereignty, was competent to grant all rights in the land, subject to rights of occupancy tenants, if any. It is entirely inconsistent with the preamble to Madras Regulation XXXI. of 1802 see also Fifth Report, vol. 2, p. 84. The Government, whether before or after British sovereignty, was competent to grant all rights in the land, subject to rights of occupancy tenants, if any. The entries in the inam registers kept under s. 15 of the Regulation show that the soil was granted, and that view is supported by the dumbalas. The tenants by the leases, which were prior to 1908, expressly recognized that no occupancy right existed and covenanted to give up possession. Further, at the date of the leases the parcel leased was vacant, or was being cultivated by the inamdars; if any outstanding kudivaram had existed it was therefore acquired by the appellants by surrender, and the cases fall within the exception to s. 8 of the Act Ponnusamy Padayachi v. Karuppudayan. (( 1914) I. L. R. 38 M. 843.) The statutory presumption under s. 6 of the Act does not arise, as the kudivaram was in the appellants when the Act was passed. Dube for the respondents. Sect. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act applies. Decisions in India establish that in the absence of evidence as to the terms of an inam grant it is to be presumed that it was only a grant of the revenue Krishnarav Ganesh v. Rangrav (( 1867) 4 Bom. H. C. (A.C.J.) 1.); Vaman v. Collector of Thana (6 Bom. H. C. (A.C.J.) 191.) Ravji Mandlik v. Dadaji (I. L. R. 1 B. 523.); Ramchandra Mantri v. Venkatarao (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 B. 598.); Rajya v. Balkrishna Gangadhar (I. L. R. 29 B. 415.); Narasimhulu v. Narasimhulu (( 1906) 16 Mad. L. J. 333.); Lakshmi Narasimha Rao v. Sitaramaswami (( 1913) 24 Mad. L. J. 288.); Venkata Narasimha v. Subba Reddi (( 1913) 24 Mad. L. J. 655.); [@ page LRIA213] Venkata Sastrulu v. Sitaramudu. (( 1914) I. L. R. 38 M. 891.) A cultivating tenant in Madras is prima facie the owner of the kudivaram Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya (( 1897) I. L. R. 20 M. 299.); Cheekati Zamindar v. Ramasooru. (( 1900) I. L. R. 23 M. 318.) The ancient rulers were not owners of the soil, but had a right only to the royal share of the produce Mitra, Land Law of Bengal " (Tagore Lecture, 1895), pp. (( 1900) I. L. R. 23 M. 318.) The ancient rulers were not owners of the soil, but had a right only to the royal share of the produce Mitra, Land Law of Bengal " (Tagore Lecture, 1895), pp. 6, 22, 24; B. H. Baden-Powell, " Village Communities in India," ch. 5, ss. 2, 3 ; so also as to rajas in the Northern Circars Fifth Report, vol. 2, pp. 2, 3, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14. The word "land" as used in Madras Regulation XXXI. of 1802, in the Report of the Inam Commission, and in the title deed issued by it, does not mean the land itself as distinguished from the revenue out of the land. The inam grants regranted by the Inam Commission were grants of revenue Inam Commission Report, Appx., p. xiii. It cannot properly be inferred that the land was uncultivated at the date of the grant; so far back as the evidence extended it was under raiyats. It was found as a fact that the land was zaraiti land. The fact that the grant was to Brahmins, who moreover appear to have resided elsewhere prior to 1846, strongly supports the view that the kudivaram was not granted. The kudivaram right did not come to an end upon the land being temporarily unoccupied, but was merely in abeyance. The right exists until taken away by transfer or succession; it cannot be acquired by an implied surrender Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Somaya (( 1914) 1. L. R. 39 M. 341.) ; ss. 10, 62, of the Act. [Reference was also made to the preambles to Madras Acts IV. of 1862 and VIII. of 1869, and to Madras Act VIII. of 1865, passim.] July 1. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. This is a consolidated appeal from three decrees dated October 9, 1913, of the High Court at Madras, which affirmed decrees dated March 1, 1912, of the District Judge of Kistna, by which decrees dated April 18, 1911, of the Additional District Munsif of Masulipatam were set aside and the plaintiffs suits were dismissed. The suits in which these appeals have arisen were brought on July 10, 1909, in the Court of the District Munsif of Gudivada, and were suits of ejectment from agricultural lands situate, within the agraharam village of Korragunta in the Northern Circars of the Presidency of Madras. The suits in which these appeals have arisen were brought on July 10, 1909, in the Court of the District Munsif of Gudivada, and were suits of ejectment from agricultural lands situate, within the agraharam village of Korragunta in the Northern Circars of the Presidency of Madras. The plaintiffs are inamdars of the village, holding under an inam grant of 1373 from a Reddi king of the district. The defendants are agricultural tenants who, or whose predecessors in title, at various times within very recent years and before July, 1908, were respectively let into possession by the inamdars under agreements for terms, which expired in each case before the suits of ejectment were brought. By these documents of tenancy the defendants or their predecessors in title agreed with the inamdars to quit possession of their holdings on the determination of the term for which the lands were let to them, and without claiming any zeroyati right in the lands. In their written -statements the defendants alleged that the agraharam village is an estate within the meaning of s. 3 of Act I. of 1908 (the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908), and in the alternative, and if the agraharam is not an estate within the meaning of the Act, then the defendants alleged in their written statements that they or their predecessors in the holdings had been cultivating the lands long before the formation of the agraharam, had acquired permanent rights of occupancy in the lands, and had enjoyed the lands with such rights to the present time. It was denied that the defendants held the lands for temporary terms as alleged in the plaints, and it was stated that if it were proved that agreements of tenancy had been executed by which the lands were to be held for terms and were to be quitted on the expiration of the terms it was not admitted that such documents were executed willingly by the defendants or their predecessors or with any knowledge of their provisions. If the last statement meant anything it must have meant that the inamdars had by fraud and the exercise of undue influence procured the execution by the defendants or their predecessors of the agreements of tenancy under which the defen dants held the lands occupied by them. If the last statement meant anything it must have meant that the inamdars had by fraud and the exercise of undue influence procured the execution by the defendants or their predecessors of the agreements of tenancy under which the defen dants held the lands occupied by them. It may be mentioned at once that no evidence to suggest that there was any foundation of truth for that statement has been brought to the attention of their Lordships, and it may be dismissed from consideration as unfounded. If the lands from which the inamdars are seeking to eject the defendants are part of an estate within the meaning of s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 (Act I. of 1908), as the defendants allege, the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits. The Munsif, who tried the suits, found on the evidence that the agraharam village in question was not an estate within the meaning of the Act, and, finding the other issues in favour of the plaintiffs, made a decree of ejectment and for mesne profits in each suit. The District Judge on appeal decided that the agraharam village was an estate within the meaning of s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act, and dismissed the suits. The High Court on appeal directed that the plaint in each case should be returned to the plaintiff in order that it might be presented to the Court of Revenue. It is from these decrees of the High Court that this consolidated appeal has been brought. As the decision of this appeal mainly depends on the question as to whether the agraharam village is or is not an estate within the meaning of s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act, it is necessary to see how an estate for the purpose of the Act is thereby defined. Clauses (a), (b), (c), and (e) of s. 3, sub-s. 2, do not apply in this case, and need not be referred to. Sect. 3, so far as it is applicable here, is as follows “ In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context . . . . (2.) ‘Estate means . . . . Clauses (a), (b), (c), and (e) of s. 3, sub-s. 2, do not apply in this case, and need not be referred to. Sect. 3, so far as it is applicable here, is as follows “ In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context . . . . (2.) ‘Estate means . . . . (d) Any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been confirmed or recognised by the British Government, or any separated part of such village;...." The term “kudivaram" is not defined in the Act. It is a Tamil word, and literally signifies a cultivators share in the produce of land held by him, as distinguished from the landlords share in the produce of the land received by him as rent. The landlords share is sometimes designated “melvaram." The “ kudivaram interest,” an expression occurring in s. 8 of the Act; is apparently understood by the High Court at Madras as meaning a right to occupy land permanently. The grant of the village by the Reddi king to the predecessor in title of the plaintiffs has not been produced. It would be unreasonable to expect that at this long distance of time it is still in existence. But that grant has been recognized and confirmed by the British Government, and the question is, was it a grant of the revenue only of the village, or was it a grant of the proprietary right in the village, that is, of the soil of the village ? If it was a grant merely of the revenue obtainable from the village, the village is an estate within the meaning of the Act. On the other hand, if the grant included the soil of the village, the village is not an estate within the meaning of the Act, and the decree of the Munsif was right and should not have been set aside. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that in the times when the Reddi kings ruled in this district the ownership of the soil of land in India was not in the sovereign or ruler, and that the right of the ruler was confined to a right to receive as revenue a share in the produce of the soil from the cultivator. Upon that assumption it was contended that the inam grant of 1373 could have been only a grant of the kings share in the produce of the soil, that is, that the grant was a grant of land revenue alone and did not include the kudivaram. That is an assumption which no Court is entitled to make, and in support of which there is, so far as their Lordships are aware, no reliable evidence. The fact that rulers in India generally collected their land revenues by taking a share of the produce of the land is not by itself evidence that the soil of lands in India was not owned by them and could not be granted by them ; indeed, that fact would support the contrary assumption, that the soil was vested in the rulers who drew their land revenue from the soil, generally in the shape of a share in the produce of the soil, which was not a fixed and invariable share, but depended on the will of the rulers. The assumption contended for on behalf of the respondents was not recognized in Regulation XXXI, of 1802. The opening words of that Regulation are instructive; it is there recited " Whereas the ruling power of the provinces now subject to the Government of Fort St. The assumption contended for on behalf of the respondents was not recognized in Regulation XXXI, of 1802. The opening words of that Regulation are instructive; it is there recited " Whereas the ruling power of the provinces now subject to the Government of Fort St. George has, in conformity to the ancient usages of the country, reserved to itself and has exercised the actual proprietary right of lands of every description ; and whereas, consistently with that principle, all alienations of land, except by the consent and authority of the ruling power, are violations of that right; but whereas considerable portions of land have been alienated by the unauthorised encroachments of the present possessors, by the clandestine collusion of local officers, or by other fraudulent means ; and whereas the permanent settlement of the land-tax has been made exclusive of alienated lands of every description it is ex-pedient that rules should be enacted for the better ascertainment of the titles of persons holding, or claiming to hold, lands exempted from the payment of revenue to Government under grants not being badshahie or royal, and for fixing an assessment on such lands of that description as may become liable to pay revenue to Government ; wherefore the following rules are enacted for that purpose." By that Regulation all grants for holding lands exempt from the payment of revenue made previously to February 26, 1768, in the Northern Circars shall be deemed to be valid, "provided that such lands may not have escheated to the State, or may not have been resumed and assessed for the public revenue since the period of those dates respectively ; and provided also that the present incumbents or their ancestors did obtain and hold actual possession of the said lands previously to the dates hereinbefore specified." The date thereinbefore specified, so far as the Northern Circars were concerned, was February 26, 1768. By s. 15 of Regulation XXXI. of 1802 it was enacted that a register should be kept in each zillah of the lands held exempt from the payment of revenue previously, in the case of the Northern Circars, to February 26, 1768, and that the registers should specify the denomination of each grant or sanad, the names of the original grantors or grantees, and the names of the present possessors, with other particulars. The earliest of such registers from which an extract was put in evidence in these suits was Mr. Oakes inam register. It appears from Mr. Oakes inam register that the whole of the agraharam village of Korragunta was granted by Sri Madana Vein a. Reddi to Ivaturi Naganaradhyulu, and had been enjoyed by his successors in title for 429 years. That entry in Mr. Oakes inam register affords, in their Lordships opinion, conclusive evidence that the grant of the agraharam village by the Reddi king was a grant not only of the revenue but of the soil of the village, and that conclusion is supported by the dumbalas which have been put in evidence in these suits, and it is also supported by the reliable evidence in these suits showing how the inamdars dealt with the lands of the village. It is not proved, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that at the date of the grant there were any tenants in the village holding lands with any rights of occupancy by custom or otherwise. By Act VIII. of 1865 (Madras) it was enacted that inamdars and other landholders should enter into written agreements with their tenants, the engagement of the landowner being termed puttah and those of the tenant being termed muchilka. The puttah should contain, amongst other things, "all other special terms by which it is intended the parties shall be bound." The muchilka should, at the option of the landholder, be a counterpart of the puttah, or a simple engagement to hold according to the terms of the puttah. By the muchilkas which were executed by the defendants respectively or their predecessors in title the term for which the lands were let to them was specified; it was admitted that they held no zeroyati rights, and they agreed to quit the lands at the end of their term. All these muchilkas were made before the coming into force of Act I. of 1908, and it has not been proved that when these tenancy agreements were entered into, and the defendants or their predecessors in title were let into possession under them, any of the lands were, or had been, held by a raiyat with a permanent right of occupancy. The District Judge in setting aside the decrees of the Munsif and dismissing the suits, and the learned judges of the High Court in the decrees which they made, acted upon what they conceived to be a presumption of law, deduced by them from some decisions of the High Court at Madras and of the High Court at Bombay, to the effect that in the case of an inamdar it should be presumed, in the absence of the inam grant under which he held, that the grant was of the royal share of the revenue only, and they cited the decisions upon which they relied as authorities. Some of those decisions to which they referred do not, upon an examination of them, support the opinions of those judges as to the presumption which they applied in these suits. In their Lordships opinion there is no such presumption of law. But a grant of a village by or on behalf of the Crown under the British rule is in law to be presumed to be subject to such rights of occupancy, if any, as the cultivators at the time of the grant may have had. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this consolidated appeal should be allowed with costs ; that the decrees of the District Judge and of the High Court should be set aside with costs ; and that the decrees of the Munsif should be restored and affirmed.