Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (April 16, 1915) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hooghly. The suit was brought by the first group of respondents against the appellants and three limited companies (joined as pro forma respondents) in the Munsifs Court. The plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners of certain land in village Char Ramkrishtopur, known as jama Nidhi Ram, which was in possession of the appellants as their tenants from year to year at an annual rent of Rs.25, and that the tenancy had been determined by a notice to quit at the end of the Bengali year 1317 (April 11, 1911). They claimed possession. The appellants by their written statement admitted that the land in suit consisted of 2 bighas 2 ½ cottahs and that they paid to the plaintiffs a yearly rent of Rs.25; they, however, pleaded that they held the land in ancestral mokurari mourashi right; they also disputed the validity of the notice and its service. The Munsif dismissed the suit, holding that the terms of the notice were insufficient and the service improper. The Subordinate Judge reversed the decision on both points and remanded the suit for trial, and the High Court, upon appeal, affirmed that decision. The only questions before their Lordships consequently were whether the notice to quit was sufficient and properly served. The terms of the notice and the facts as to the service, which was by registered post, appear from the judgment of their Lordships. With regard to the notice, it was admitted by the appellants that the 2 bighas 2½ cottahs of land of which they were in possession, and for which they paid Rs.25 rent to the plaintiffs, had formerly been in the possession of Nidhi Ram referred to in the notice. They disputed the validity of the notice owing to the reference to 6 cottahs, and they denied that the boundaries stated were those of the land which they held. It appeared that the appellants had leased to the defendant No. 116 cottahs of the land; the respondents alleged that the notice stated that 6 cottahs was the extent of the holding because it was so entered in their books. 1918. June 7, 10, 11. De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. It appeared that the appellants had leased to the defendant No. 116 cottahs of the land; the respondents alleged that the notice stated that 6 cottahs was the extent of the holding because it was so entered in their books. 1918. June 7, 10, 11. De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The notice was not an effectual notice as to the holding having regard to the reference to 6 cottahs. It was deliberately given as to that part of the holding in order to embarrass the appellants in proving their title to mokurari rights in the whole. The service was insufficient under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. [Reference as to service by registered post was made to Jogendro v. Dwarka Nath (( 1888) I. L. R. 15 C. 681.) and Subadini v. Durga Charan Law. (( 1900) I. L. R. 28 C. 118.)] Branson and Dube for the respondents (being called on only as to the sufficiency of the notice). The appellants must have understood that the notice referred to the entire holding formerly in the possession of Nidhi Ram. Having regard to the authorities, it was a sufficient notice to quit. [They were stopped.] De Gruyther K.C. replied. July 16. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKINSON. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William, Bengal, dated April 16, 1915, which dismissed an appeal from the Subordinate Court of Hooghly, dated May 19, 1914. The action out of which the appeal has arisen is one of ejectment, brought, not by owners or occupiers of land against persons trespassing upon it, but by landlords of a particular piece of land against their former tenants of the same to recover possession thereof on the ground that the tenancy of those tenants has been determined by an effective notice to quit duly served. [The judgment referred at length to the proceedings upon a former suit brought by the first respondent against the appellants for arrears of rent in which Rs.25 rent was stated by the plaintiff to issue from 6 cottahs held by the appellants, and the appellants admitted that they were in possession of 2 bighas 2 ½ cottahs formerly held by one Nidhi Ram, and to the pleadings in the present suit, and continued as follows] In their Lordships view there is nothing whatever to show that the plaintiffs were actuated by a desire to play any trick or effect any fraudulent purpose in connection with the notice to quit or the ejectment suit consequent upon it, or to show that they did not serve the notice and institute the suit in the honest desire to exercise legitimately the rights which the law conferred upon them in reference to the possession and enjoyment of their own property. If this were a case arising in England, the English authorities would therefore be applicable. It has not been suggested, and could not, their Lordships think, be successfully contended, that the principles they lay down are not equally applicable to cases arising in India. They establish that notices to quit, though not strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in them, may still be good and effective in law ; that the test of their sufficiency is not what they would mean to a stranger ignorant of all the facts and circumstances touching the holding to which they purport to refer, but what they would mean to tenants presumably conversant with all those facts and circumstances ; and, further, that they are to be construed, not with a desire to find faults in them which would render them defective, but to be construed ut res magis valeat quarn pereat. To take a few of the authorities out of many to illustrate these principles. In Doe v. Culliford ((1824) 4 Dow. & Ry. 248.) the defendant went into possession of a house and an acre of land in the parish of Ilchester on August 4, 1821, as tenant to the plaintiff. To take a few of the authorities out of many to illustrate these principles. In Doe v. Culliford ((1824) 4 Dow. & Ry. 248.) the defendant went into possession of a house and an acre of land in the parish of Ilchester on August 4, 1821, as tenant to the plaintiff. On September 28, 1822, the plaintiff served upon the defendant a notice dated September 27, 1822, to quit the house and land " at Lady Day next or at the end of your current year." Acting on the above-mentioned principles, it was held to be a good notice to quit on Lady Day, 4823, i.e., March 25, 1823. Abbott C. J., in delivering judgment, said "There is one rule of construction in cases of this nature, which is no less sound than ancient, namely, to give such a sense to ambiguous words as will effectuate the intention of the parties. Applying that rule to this case, it appears to me the words; at the end of your current year, may be understood to mean the end of the current year ending at the ensuing Lady Day." Bayley J. said "We are to look at the intention of the landlord. When general language is used which is open to doubt, the rule is to make it sensible, not insensible. The state of the defendants holding shows it to be clear that the landlord did not mean the year ending at Michaelmas Day. He could not intend to give notice to quit in two days, because that would be no notice whatever. By mentioning Lady Day next it is clear he meant to give a six months notice, or such notice as the law requires. He intended to give an effective notice, and it is quite sufficient if the tenant understands what is meant." [Reference was also made to Doe v. Smith ((1816) 5 A. &. E. 350.22), followed and approved in Wride v. Dyer. ([ 1900] Q. H. 23,)] The case of Doe v. Archer ((1811) 14 East, 245.) is very applicable to the present case. There a farm was leased for twenty-one years at a rent of 180l. per annum. The farm, as described in the lease, consisted of Town Barton and its several parcels described by name at a rent of 83l., other closes named at rents of 5l. 5s. There a farm was leased for twenty-one years at a rent of 180l. per annum. The farm, as described in the lease, consisted of Town Barton and its several parcels described by name at a rent of 83l., other closes named at rents of 5l. 5s. and 11l., and the Shippon Barton and several parcels described by name at 86l. There was reserved to either party power to determine the lease at the end of fourteen years on giving two years previous notice. It was held that a notice by the landlord to the tenant to "quit Town Barton, &c, agreeably to terms of the covenant between us on the expiration of the fourteen years of your term" was sufficient. Lord Ellenborough, in delivering judgment, said " The landlord must have intended to give such a notice to quit as the lease reserved to him the liberty of giving, and not a void notice to quit a part only and so the notice in question must have been understood by the tenant. The notice to quit Town Barton, where the mansion was, meant the Town Barton cum sociis; especially with reference to the lease, which only gave him power to determine the tenancy as to the whole, which was let together." Le Blanc J. said "There being no power under the lease to determine the tenancy as to part only, the notice to quit could have no operation at all unless taken, as it must have been intended, to apply to the whole." Bayley J. said "We are to construe a notice to quit in such a way lit res magis valeat quam pereat." In order to judge of what the notice to quit in this case conveyed to those of the principal defendants upon whom it was served it is necessary by examination of the evidence given at the trial before the Munsif to ascertain what were the material facts in reference to the connection of those defendants with the lands in suit. [After an examination of the evidence the judgment continued] In the face of this evidence it is not surprising that when the case came before the Subordinate Judge it is stated in his judgment that it was admitted on both sides that the defendants, i.e., the Banerjis, tenancy consisted of the holding of Nidhi Ram. [After an examination of the evidence the judgment continued] In the face of this evidence it is not surprising that when the case came before the Subordinate Judge it is stated in his judgment that it was admitted on both sides that the defendants, i.e., the Banerjis, tenancy consisted of the holding of Nidhi Ram. It is not suggested that the knowledge of this fact was recently acquired by the principal defendants, and the sufficiency or insufficiency of the notice to quit must therefore be determined having regard to the fact that admittedly the principal defendants were, to their own knowledge, tenants of Nidhi Ram. In their written statement they do not deny this fact, but studiously evade admitting it, while they have given no evidence whatever to disprove it; all these circumstances suggest that they were well aware who their predecessor in occupation was. It is almost impossible to believe that the counsel for the principal defendants would have omitted to confine his clients admission to their state of knowledge subsequent to the service of the notice t^ quit if he could have honestly and truthfully done so. Turning to the contents of the notice to quit, the material part of it is “You are informed by this notice that Char Ramkrishtopur, pargana Boro, recorded in towzi Nos. 3994 and 3994a in the Collectorate of district Hooghly, within station Shibpur, is our zamindari. The bastu land, bounded as below, within the said char, is land, bearing a yearly jama of Rs.25, standing in the name of the late Nidhi Ram. You have been in possession of the said land on payment of rent at the said rate and taking dakhilas in the name of the said Nidhi Ram as thika tenants at will of the said one jama only under us. Now it being necessary for us to take khas possession of all the lands comprised in the said jama, you are informed by this notice that you should vacate that kind, by removing the huts, &c, that exist on the said land on or before the last day of the month of Chaitra of the current year 1317 B.S. We shall take khas possession of all the lands comprised in the said jama on the expiry of the said fixed time. In case we do not get khas possession of the said land on the expiry of the said time fixed, we shall take khas possession of that land by instituting a suit in proper Court against you, and you shall be liable for all damages. “The 9th Assin, 1317 B.S. (September 26, 1910.) “SCHEDULE-1 (one) plot of bastu land, about 6 cottahs in area, situate in village Char Ramkrishtopur. within station Sibpur, pargana Boro (6 cottahs). Boundaries North Ramkrishtopur Ghat Road. West jamai land of the late Thakurdas Banerji. South jamai land of the late Bhuban Mohan Banerji. East land included in the said towzi." The question is what must that notice have conveyed to an ordinary reader, more especially to tenants who were aware, as the principal defendants have admitted, that they held Nidhi Rams holding. The notice begins by stating that the bastu lands, bounded as below within the char of Ramkrishtopur, are lands bearing yearly jama of Rs.25 standing in the name of Nidhi Ram. It is then averred that the principal defendants have been in possession of these lands on payment of rent at the aforesaid rate, taking dakhilas in the name of the said Nidhi Ram, asthika tenants at will, of " the said one jama only under” the plaintiffs. It is then averred that it is necessary for the plaintiffs to take khas possession of all the lands comprised in the jama already mentioned. The principal defendants are then required to vacate that land, that is, all the land comprised in the aforesaid jama, before a day named, and they are inform that on the expiry of that time the plaintiffs will take possession of all the lands comprised in the aforesaid jama. If the boundaries alone were added it could not, their Lordships think, be successfully contended that the meaning of this notice to any ordinary reader was not that possession of the entire jama in the tenancy of the principal defendants, which has stood in the name of Nidhi Ram, and for which he and they paid a rent of Rs.25 per annum, should be delivered up to the plaintiffs. To tenants who, like the principal defendants, were admittedly in possession of the entire jama and paid that rent, that must have been clear to demonstration, but it is contended that all this clearness is obscured by the statement in the schedule that the lands the possession of which is to be delivered up are one plot of bastu lands 6 cottahs in extent. The principal defendants knew perfectly well that a plot of 6 cottahs in extent is only a fraction, one-sixth or one-seventh, of the lands in the entire jama ; they must presumably have known the Jaw that a notice requiring a tenant to quit only a portion of the holding of which he was tenant was bad and ineffective. But the presence of the words " 6 cottahs " in the schedule, it was, in effect, contended, necessitates that the landlord should be presumed to have intended to serve a notice bad and ineffectual to his own knowledge rather than a valid and effectual one, and that the notice itself should be construed ut res magis pereat quam valeat instead of the contrary. No argument has been addressed to their Lordships and no authority produced to show that the principles of the above-recited English cases are inapplicable to Indian cases. From the very nature of a notice to quit, which is merely the formal expression of the landlords will that the tenancy of his tenant shall terminate, it would prim a facie appear that they are applicable. In addition it may well be that the description of the lands of the jama as bastu lands may refer to their condition as originally held by Nidhi Ram, and not to their condition after the defendants 8 and 9 had, during the years subsequent to the year 1905, built pucca buildings upon them, and defendant No. 11 had erected huts upon his 6 cottahs. In their Lordships view the erroneous statement of the contents of the jama does not predominate over the description given of it in the earlier portion of the notice to quit. They have not the slightest doubt that the principal defendants were perfectly well aware that the notice required the .defendants, as the plaintiffs desired and intended that it should, to quit and deliver up possession of the entire jama for which they for years paid the rent of Rs.25. They have not the slightest doubt that the principal defendants were perfectly well aware that the notice required the .defendants, as the plaintiffs desired and intended that it should, to quit and deliver up possession of the entire jama for which they for years paid the rent of Rs.25. If anything additional were needed to convince one that this was so it would be the evidence of the only witness examined for the defendants. He says not a word about the principal defendants and their predecessor having from time immemorial had ancestral mokurari rights in the property containing 2 bighas 2½ cottahs bearing an annual rental of Rs.25, not a word to the effect that although he got, as he admits, the notice to quit he did not understand that it referred to the whole jama for which Nidhi Ram formerly and the principal defendants in succession to him paid this rent of Rs.25 per annum. Their Lordships are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the notice was a good notice to quit the holding in its entirety, whatever its area might be. What its actual area is can be determined at the trial, and the possession of that area can be recovered in these proceedings. Next and lastly as to the service of the notice to quit. Sect. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, only requires that such a notice should be tendered or delivered to the party intended to be bound by it either personally or to one of his family or servants at his residence, or, if such tender or delivery be not practicable, affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The personal tender or delivery may take place anywhere; the vicarious tender or delivery must take place at the residence of the person intended to be bound by the notice. In the case of joint tenants, each is intended to be bound, and it has long ago been decided that service of a notice to quit upon one joint tenant is prima facie evidence that it has reached the other joint tenants Macartney v. Crick ((1805) 5 Esp. 196.); Doe v. Watkins ((1806) 7 East, 551.); Pollok v. Kelly, (( 1856) 6 Ir. C. L. R, 367.) It was proved and found that defendants Nos. 196.); Doe v. Watkins ((1806) 7 East, 551.); Pollok v. Kelly, (( 1856) 6 Ir. C. L. R, 367.) It was proved and found that defendants Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are members of a joint Hindu family, and that of these No. 5 was duly served with a duplicate of the notice to quit. The mode of service adopted was this Hira Lal Kar, the gomashta of all the plaintiffs, who knew all the defendants and their addresses, sent to each by registered letter addressed to them at these addresses duplicates of the notice to quit signed by all the plaintiffs. For these notices Re received receipts on the registration of them. The peon of the post office, who, the defendants only witness admitted, knew all their houses, got from all of them receipts for the letters when delivered. These receipts were produced. [The receipts, examined in detail, purported in some cases to be signed by the addressee, and in some by some person on his behalf.] The Munsif held there was no proof of the service of the notice to quit on any of the defendants other than those numbered 1, 4, and 5. He seemed to be of opinion that a registered letter must be presumed to have been delivered to the person who signed on behalf of the addressee the receipt for it, but not to the addressee himself in the first instance or at all, and that as there was no proof that the persons other than the addressees who so signed were the duly authorized agents of the addressees to receive these notices the proof of service was defective. Service of a notice upon or delivery to such an agent would be good service or delivery to the principal though in fact the notice was destroyed by the agent and never was seen or heard of by the principal Tanham v. Nicholson (( 1872) L. R. 5 H. L. 561.); but it is an entire mistake to suppose that the addressee must sign the receipt for a registered letter himself, or that he cannot do so by the hand of another person, or that if another person does sign it on the addressees behalf the presumption is that it never was delivered to the addressee himself mediately or immediately. For instance, if a servant in the addressees house saw a notice handed in by the postman carried to the addressee and handed to him, that servant could certify that it was delivered to his master and could, if requested by the master, sign the receipt on the latters behalf, though he was not the agent of the master authorized to take delivery on his, the masters behalf. The latest, clearest, and most conclusive authority upon the question of the sufficiency of the service or delivery of a notice to quit by post probably is the case of Gresham House Estate Co. v. Rossa Grande Gold Mining Co. ([ 1870] W. N. 119.) There the defendants, who were sued for rent, contended that they had, before the rent accrued due, terminated their tenancy by a notice to quit enclosed in a letter which they had put into the post correctly addressed to the plain tiffs, and which, if delivered in due course, would have been received in time to determine the tenancy. The plaintiffs called evidence to show the letter had never been received. The learned judge presiding at the trial directed the jury that a notice to quit enclosed in a letter sent through the post was prima facie evidence that it had been received, and left to the jury the question whether it had, in fact, been received or not. The jury found it had been received. On a motion for a new trial on the ground of misdirection, the Court, consisting of Cockburn C.J., Blackburn, Mellor, and Hannen JJ., held that if a letter properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the post office, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. That presumption would appear to their Lordships to apply with still greater force to letters which the sender has taken the precaution to register, and is not rebutted, but strengthened, by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. The only one of the defendants who appeared as a witness admitted he had received through the post office the notice addressed to him. The only one of the defendants who appeared as a witness admitted he had received through the post office the notice addressed to him. None of the other defendants appeared as witnesses to deny that they had received the notices properly addressed to them and properly posted. In their Lordships view the evidence of delivery of the notices to quit to all the principal defendants was, under these circumstances, adequately and sufficiently proved, and constituted good service of them within the meaning of s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. They are therefore of opinion that the appeal fails upon both the points raised for decision and should be dismissed, and will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. As they think that the erroneous mode in which the plaintiffs shaped their claims in the years 1906, 1907, and 1908 in the letters and litigation already referred to may have misled the defendants and brought about this appeal, they think the parties should be left to abide their own costs incurred in it.