Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 28, 1911) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur. The suit was instituted by the deceased appellant, who claimed possession of a share of 7 aim as and a fraction in four villages formerly held under ghatwali tenure. The plaintiff claimed as purchaser from certain members of the family of the ghatwals. There were two sets of defendants, namely mortgagees who had purchased under decrees against the ghatwal, and the vendors to the plaintiff. The facts material to this report appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The suit was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge and his decision was affirmed by the High Court. 1918. June 27, 28; July 1. Upjohn K.C., De Gruyther K.C., and Parikh for the appellant. Ghatwali tenure being admittedly hereditary, the onus of proving that the succession was not governed by the ordinary rules of succession under Hindu law was upon the respondents, and they failed to discharge that onus. As an incident of ghatwali tenure the villages were originally held by the four ghatwals on behalf of all the members of the family ; the pottah was granted in lieu of the ghatwali tenure and the villages were held thereunder subject to the same rights. [Reference was made to the authorities mentioned in the judgment.] (It was also argued on the facts that the appellants vendors had had actual possession under the pottah; further, that they were entitled to a share under an ck rarnama executed by Dharmu Roy on September 22, 1873. Upon those points neither the arguments nor the judgment contained matter of which a report would be useful.) Dube for the respondents was called on only as to the effect of the ekrarnama. July 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PHILLIMORE. The suit to which this appeal relates is brought to recover certain lands formerly held under ghatwali tenure, in the zamindary of Kharakpur in Bengal. These lands were originally held by the zamindar under the ruling power upon terms that the zamindar should perform by himself or his tenants the duty of guarding the ghats or passes against marauders, and preserve the peace of the district and discharge other police services. These lands were originally held by the zamindar under the ruling power upon terms that the zamindar should perform by himself or his tenants the duty of guarding the ghats or passes against marauders, and preserve the peace of the district and discharge other police services. In the year 1838 the Government, being of opinion that these duties could be, and indeed were being, better performed by their own officers, and that the Government was entitled to resume these lands, as the services for the performance of which they were originally held were no longer needed, claimed to resume them accordingly. Litigation ensued, and the Government was successful in the Courts in India, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council, and the Raja zamindar was quieted in his possession. The case was decided in 1855, and is reported as Raja Lelanund Singh Bahadoor v. Government of Bengal, (( 1855) 6 Moo. I. A. 101.) As it was still possible that the Government might insist upon the zamindar performing certain of the original duties, a compromise was entered into, and a settlement was arrived at by which the zamindar paid a jama of Rs.10,000 per annum, and was released from further performance of these duties. Thereupon he in turn endeavoured to resume their tenures from the several ghatwals on the ground that their services were no longer required. This led to much litigation with varied fortune. In two cases reported together, the first being Rajah Lelanund Singh Bahadoor v. Thakoor Munoorunjun Singh (( 1873) L. R. Sup. Vol. I. A. 181.), the ghatwals were successful both in India and before the Privy Council. In a third case heard at the same time the ghatwal got better success before the Privy Council than he had in India. These cases were decided in 1873. Further, it appears from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge that there were some other cases, apparently not reported, in which the judgments in India were in favour of the zamindar, but the decisions in the Privy Council in favour of the ghatwals. These cases were decided in 1873. Further, it appears from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge that there were some other cases, apparently not reported, in which the judgments in India were in favour of the zamindar, but the decisions in the Privy Council in favour of the ghatwals. In the case of the particular lands now in dispute, they were held by four ghatwals, and the decision went against them and in favour of the zamindar in the High Court at Calcutta, and they appear to have neglected to appeal in time ; but on learning that other ghatwals in a similar position had been successful before the Privy Council, they became much dissatisfied, and were endeavouring to see if they could not by some means reopen the question, when a compromise was arrived at, and the zamindar gave a pottah to the four ghatwals granting the lands in perpetuity at an annual uniform jama of Rs.1031. That pottah was dated July 6, 1873. The grantees Dharmu Roy, Chaman Roy, Gokul Roy, and Mangal Roy are described in it as former ghatwals of the mauzas named in the pottah, and it is recited that " the said mauzas, original with dependency, had from the time of the former rajas been in the possession and occupation of you and your ancestors by virtue of ghatwali right." The litigation and the agreement of the parties to come to an amicable settlement are then recited, and the raja proceeds to make the grant in the following words " Therefore I have made in favour of you the permanent istamrari mokurari settlement in perpetuity, descendible to progeny and generation after generation in respect of mauza Khadawa, Sec, original with dependencies in existence from before ....at an annual uniform jama of Rs.1031." The four grantees thereafter dealt with the property as their own, as property held by each severally, in respect of his 4-anna share as a member of a Hindu family, holding jointly with his sons and grandsons. The four grantees, as managers or kartas of a Hindu family, jointly made mortgages and leases, and, in particular, in the year 1884 they, with their sons and other descendants, executed two mortgages in favour of Shitabi Singh. The four grantees, as managers or kartas of a Hindu family, jointly made mortgages and leases, and, in particular, in the year 1884 they, with their sons and other descendants, executed two mortgages in favour of Shitabi Singh. Upon these mortgages decrees were ultimately obtained, and the villages were sold in execution to the first party defendants, whose representatives are the respondents appearing before the Board to support the judgments under appeal. Delivery of possession was made on March 6, 1897. It should be added that since the date of delivery the first patty defendants or their predecessors have been in possession. The case made for the plaintiff appellant accepts a large part of that of the defendants respondents. The pottah is admitted, as also are the apparent title thereby created in favour of the four grantees, Dharmu, Chaman, Gokul, and Mangal, the title deduced from them to the first party defendants, and the possession by the latter from the date of delivery upon the sale. The case made is that the pottah was granted to the four grantees as representatives of one great family descended from a common ancestor, and that all the male-descendants have beneficiary interests in the several mauzas according to their respective shares per stirpes, and that the plaintiff is the assignee of interests of several of these descendants in respect of shares amounting to 7 annas and a fraction, or nearly half. ((1) A pedigree was here given but does nut appear to be necessary or the purpose of this report,) On the assumption made on behalf of the plaintiff Rupdeo, a brother of Chaman and his descendants have a claim to some beneficiary share, presumably a 1-anna share; Chintaman, brother of Dharmu and uncle of Chaman and his descendants, would have a 2-anna share; in the other line, Ajit and his descendants would have a 4-anna share, and Chauthi and his descendants a 2-anna share. The plaintiff has bought up all these shares, except those of some of the descendants of Chauthi. Lachman Roy, the common ancestor, flourished about 1750. He was probably in his day the ghatwal. His son Bahore was ghatwal; so was Bahores son Ajit. Sukdeo, the grandson by the other line, was ghatwal apparently with Bahore, and later on with the latters grandson Anandi. Lachman Roy, the common ancestor, flourished about 1750. He was probably in his day the ghatwal. His son Bahore was ghatwal; so was Bahores son Ajit. Sukdeo, the grandson by the other line, was ghatwal apparently with Bahore, and later on with the latters grandson Anandi. In 1854 Digan, father of Mangal, was ghatwal in conjunction with some member of the other line, probably Dharmu; and then in 1864, when the zamindar sought to eject them, the four grantees were the ghatwals. The plaintiff suggests that they were chosen as the representatives of the several branch families, and held their shares of the family estate on behalf of all the male members. This case is rested upon three grounds; the nature of the ghatwali tenure as determined by the several decisions of the Privy Council, the alleged enjoyment by the beneficiaries of their respective shares from the grant of the pottah to the sale by the Court, and upon an ekrarnama executed on September 22, 1873, that is between two and three months after the pottah. As regards the first ground there are several decisions of the High Court and of this Board on the nature of this tenure. Some have already been cited, and in addition special reference may be made to Rajah Nilmoni Singh v. Bakranath Singh (( 1882) L. R. 9 I. A. 104.), decided in 1882, a case not so much in point, as the ghatwali lands were in another zamindary, and to Tekait Kali Pershad Singh v. Anund Roy (( 1887) L. R. 15 I. A. 18.), decided in 1887, concerning other lands in the zamindary of Kharakpur. The result of the decisions is that the ghatwali tenure is ordinarily hereditary, the estate descending to such male member of the family as the zamindar approves as competent, and that it is the right of the family, so long as they have male members competent to perform the duties, to have one or more of them appointed ghatwals. It was certainly an advantage to the whole family that one of their members should hold the office and the tenure. He could put other members of the family into minor offices and grant them subordinate interests commonly called jotes, and he could and would generally provide for the family in the manner expected of its head. It was certainly an advantage to the whole family that one of their members should hold the office and the tenure. He could put other members of the family into minor offices and grant them subordinate interests commonly called jotes, and he could and would generally provide for the family in the manner expected of its head. But this is a long way off making him a trustee for the family or treating the ghatwali estate as possessed by the family and reducing the ghatwal to the position of karta or managing head of the family. Their Lordships do not find that the incidents of ghatwali tenure are such as to give the family any rights over the property while it is in the hands of the ghatwal, and they find themselves upon this point in full agreement with the Courts in India. So far, therefore, if the assumption were to be made that the scheme of the pottah was to preserve family rights, there would still be no reason for holding that they extended so as to give any beneficiary interest in the mauzas to the male members of the family other than the actual grantees. [Their Lordships rejected the appellants further contentions. They found that neither the vendors nor their predecessors had been in possession of the shares claimed, thus agreeing with the finding of the Subordinate Judge, from which the High Court had not differed. They also held that the claim to a share based upon the ekrarnama of September 22, 1873, was barred by the Limitation Act. The judgment concluded] Upon the whole, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove title to any portion of the property in suit, and the decrees of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court dismissing his suit were right, and their Lordships will humbly recommend His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.