JUDGMENT Ayling, J. 1. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment which my learned brother, Seshagiri Aiyar, J., is about to pronounce; and I agree in the conclusion arrived at by him. It is impossible to contend that the power of appointing a testamentary guardian is supported by anything in the ancient texts; and the attractive doctrine that anything which is not expressly forbidden should be held lawful, if expedient, seems to me one which has its dangers and requires careful consideration before application. In the present case, the power claimed seems to run counter to the conception of a Hindu joint family in which every member obtains an interest at birth. I can only agree with Sadasiva Aiyar, J.s remark in Chidambaram Pillai v. Veerappa Ohettiar 43 Ind. Cas. 865 : 6 L.W. 640 : (1917) M.W. 744 : 22 M.L.T. 380 in which that learned Judga says, On principle I find it difficult to hold that a man who cannot deal with a particular species of property he Will can make arrangement for the management of that property by Will after his death or can appoint guardians to manage that property for minor owners who obtain it by survivorship after his death. 2. This seems to me to sum up the whole matter. 3. I am not even clear that considerations of general expediency support respondents contention. The reference covers the case, not only of the adult coparceners own minor sons, but of his minor nephews, and even minor brother regarding whom the natural right of a father discussed by Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in his order of reference can have no application. Even as regards sons, I think the interests of the minors are sufficiently protected by the power of the Court to appoint a guardian; and while the expressed wishes of the father are sure to receive attention at the Courts hands, nothing further is required. 4. I would answer the question in the negative. 5. Coutts Trotter, J.--I also have had the advantage of perusing my learned brother Seshagiri Aiyars judgment. I only abstain from simply expressing my own concurrence in it, because my doing so might seem to be associating myself with a familiarity with the ancient authorities which I cannot pretend to possess. I, therefore, put what I have to say in my own words. 6. I only abstain from simply expressing my own concurrence in it, because my doing so might seem to be associating myself with a familiarity with the ancient authorities which I cannot pretend to possess. I, therefore, put what I have to say in my own words. 6. To speak of natural rights has always been recognized as a slippery path for the political thinker to tread from the days of Hobbes and Rousseau. It is an even greater pitfall to a lawyer. To appoint a guardian to the person of his infant children may be, a natural right vested in the father. To clothe him with authority over property which belongs to so complex an institution as a Hindu joint family may be, seems to me to be something which cannot be derived from nature, but must be founded on some legal warrant. In England the warrant is statutory, and it is not pretended that there is any statutory, authority in force in India. The citations from Manu seem to show that the original conception was that the custody of properties of the joint family where there was no adult member should be the care of the King, which in modern language means the Courts of the country. No case has been cited which can be said to recognize the suggested right. The case in Soobah Pirthee Lal Jha v. Soobah Doorgah Lal Jha 7 W.R. 73 at p. 74 contains expressions which tend to show that the learned Judges supposed that such a power would be possible; but they do not definitely so decide. Mr. K. Srinivasa Aiyangar supported that judggment on the ground that as the properties dealt with were the properties of the father absolutely and were not joint properties, his right to appoint a guardian for them might be considered as an inherent part of his total right of ownership. That again seems to me to be lapsing into abstract speculation, and it may be that Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyars attack on this theory--which not insignificantly formed almost the whole of his argument was well-founded. Beyond that his argument seemed to me to come merely to this. The thing is convenient; it is consonant with all right notions of what a father ought to be able to do for his children; it is nowhere expressly prohibited; therefore, it can be done. Beyond that his argument seemed to me to come merely to this. The thing is convenient; it is consonant with all right notions of what a father ought to be able to do for his children; it is nowhere expressly prohibited; therefore, it can be done. To me on the contrary it seems that to put a person in a definite legal relation to property of which he is not the owner, is a step which cannot be taken unless there is legal authority for taking it. Its convenience and justice may be admirable reasons for the Legialature to take action. They cannot, in my opinion, suffice to Set in motion a Court of law. 7. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.--The question referred for our consideration is whether it is competent to, the only adult coparcener of a Mitakshara family consisting of himself and his minor coparceners to appoint a testamentary guardian to the coparcener properties of the minor coparceners. 8. It was argued before us that the real point for decision is whether the manager of a Hindu family, be he the father, the uncle or an elder brother, can appoint a testamentary guardian for the property of his minor coparceners. In the Hindu Law there is no provision for the appointment of a testamentary guardian. That may be due to the fact that the idea of making a Will is of recent origin. The only texts of Hindu Law which relate to this subject are all collected in Colebrookes Digest, Volume If, pages 574 to 577. These authorities cast upon the King the duty of protecting the property of a minor. 9. Mr. T.R. Ramachandra Aiyar for the respondents drew our attention to the commentary of Kullookha Bhatta on Manus text and argued that the protection of the King should be invoked only where the infant was otherwise unprotected, I do not understand the commentator to indicate by the use of the expression Anadha that the deceased father or manager is competent to appoint a guardian and that it is only in default of such an appointment the King can step in. On the other band it is clear from Manus Verses that the primary right of guardianship is in the King, and it is only by reflection that the father during his life-time exercises that right (as if by delegation by the Sovereign). 10. On the other band it is clear from Manus Verses that the primary right of guardianship is in the King, and it is only by reflection that the father during his life-time exercises that right (as if by delegation by the Sovereign). 10. On principle, it appears to me that a parson who is not capable of making a gift pf his property or to dispose of it by testament cannot be in a position to control