Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 1, 1913) reversing a decree of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum (April 6, 1910). The first appellant was the sole widow of Lingappa Jayappa Sar Desai of Navalgund. The deceased was the last of a series of Desais whose title came into existence in the time of the Bijapur monarchy in the 17th century. The Desai was the chief revenue officer of the district under both the Mahomedan rule and the Maratha rule which followed it. During the tenure of office of the family to which the deceased belonged many inam grants of villages had been made to the Desai for the time being. The services of the Desai as a revenue officer were not made use of during the British rule, and he was informed in 1848 by the Collector, under the provisions of s. 2 of Bombay Act. II. of 1843, that his services as a revenue official would not be required. At that time and for many years afterwards the officials of the British Government in the Southern Maratha country were occupied in investigating and coming to settlements regarding claims to inam lands held for service or as a reward for past services. As a result of those investigations, and on the request of the revenue commissioner, a Government resolution on February 6, 1862, sanctioned the treatment of the Navalgund Desais " potgee " as a personal holding continuable on the terms of summary settlement. In consequence of that sanction the offer of a settlement was made to the Desai in 1862, and was accepted on the terms that the commutation payment should be in the nature of a nazarana or quit rent. By s. 12 of Bombay Act II. of 1863 all settlements of the above character made in the district were expressly validated. The deceased Desai by his will and a codicil, dated respectively June 6 and August 13, 1906, disposed of all the vatan property to the respondents upon certain trusts, the first respondent being named as executor. The will stated j that the testator had not authorized his wife to make an (adoption, and that he did not intend to do so. The Desai died on August 23, 1906, without issue. The will stated j that the testator had not authorized his wife to make an (adoption, and that he did not intend to do so. The Desai died on August 23, 1906, without issue. The first respondent applied in the Court of the District Judge for probate, the application being opposed by the first and second appellants. It was alleged that the deceased had verbally revoked the will, and had given his wife authority to adopt a son to him, and that accordingly she had adopted the second appellant. After hearing evidence upon those allegations the District Judge on September 27, 1909, found against them, and ordered probate to issue. His decision was affirmed by the High Court. Meanwhile, on February 22, 1909, the appellants instituted the present suit in the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum against the respondents. They claimed, inter alia, (a) a declaration that the deceased had no power to make the will on the grounds that the deceased was mentally incompetent, and that the vatan lands were inalienable; (b) a declaration that the second appellant was the adopted son of the deceased; (c) an injunction restraining the respondents from recovering possession of the property in suit. By their plaint they valued each of the declarations at Rs. 130, and the injunction at Rs. 5, and paid court fees upon that basis. The Subordinate Judge delivered judgment on April 16, 1910. He declined to decide issues as to the due execution and alleged revocation of the will owing to the pendency of the probate proceedings, but he decided all other issues in favour of the appellants. On the same date he made a decree embodying the two declarations and the injunction prayed for. On July 19, 1910, the respondents lodged an appeal to the High Court. The appeal came oil for hearing on March 11, 1912, when a preliminary objection was taken that the appeal lay to the District Court. The learned judges (Chandavarkar and Batchelor JJ.), following previous decisions of the Court, held that the objection was valid, and directed that the memorandum of appeal be returned for presentation to the District Court. They, however, intimated that owing to the value of the property and the questions of law involved an application should be made to the High Court to transfer the appeal for hearing there. They, however, intimated that owing to the value of the property and the questions of law involved an application should be made to the High Court to transfer the appeal for hearing there. The memorandum of appeal was accordingly presented on March 18, 1912, to the District Court, and the present respondents applied ex parte that the appeal be admitted and the delay excused. The District Judge thereupon ordered as follows " The appeal is admitted to the file without prejudice to any objection that may be taken by the respondents as to limitation or otherwise/ On April 6, 1912, the High Court made an order transferring the appeal to that Court. An application was thereupon made by the present appellants to have the appeal taken off the file on the ground that it was out of time, affidavits on both sides being filed in the proceeding. The present respondents filed an affidavit by the District Judge, who in 1910 had been Legal Remembrancer, stating that the appeal had originally been presented to the High Court upon his advice, and an affidavit by the first respondent stating that he had acted upon that advice. On July 23, 1913, the High Court (Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Heaton J.) being satisfied that the appellants (the present respondents) had acted bona fide and with diligence, made an order under s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 1908, excusing the delay in the presentation of the appeal. The appeal was thereupon heard by the same learned judges, who delivered judgment on August 1, 1913, It was; held that the deceased Desai had full power of disposition over the lands covered by the summary settlement, but that there were certain lands which were held on a different footing, and, in default of agreement, an inquiry was ordered to ascertain their identity. It was further held that the finding of the trial judge that the first appellant had authority to adopt must be set aside, since the plaintiffs were estopped by the decree in the probate proceedings. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 38 B. 272. The facts as to the lands in dispute appeal more fully from that report. 1918. July 5, 8. Be Gruyther, K.C., and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. The High Court rightly held that the appeal lay to the District Court Suits Valuation Act (VII. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 38 B. 272. The facts as to the lands in dispute appeal more fully from that report. 1918. July 5, 8. Be Gruyther, K.C., and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. The High Court rightly held that the appeal lay to the District Court Suits Valuation Act (VII. of 1887), s. 8 (The Suits Valuation Act, 1887, s. 8 "Where, in suits other than those referred to in the Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 7, paras, v., vi., and ix., and para x., clause (d), court fees are payable ad valorem under the Court Fees Act, 1870; the value as do erminable for the computation of court fees, and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same."); Court Fees Act (VII. of 1870), s. 7, para. iv. (c) (The Court Fees Act, 1870, s. 7 as amended by Act XII. of 1801 " The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows (iv.) .... In suits . . . . (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or where consequential relief is prayed.....In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought."); Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV. of 1869), ss. 8, 26 (The Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1860, s. 26; "In all suits decided by a subordinate judge of the first class .... of which the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 5000, the appeal from his decision shall be direct to the High Court." Sect. 8 provides that, sub ject to s. 26 and toss. 16 and 17 (which are not material), the District Court shall be the Court for all decrees or orders passed by the Subordinate Courts.); Vacchani Keshabai v. Vacchani Naubha Bavaji (( 1908) I. L. R. 33 B. 307.); Hari Sa nicer Dutt v. Kali Kumar Patra. ((1005) I. L. R. 32 C. 734. R. 44 I. A. 218.) The time for appeal to the District Court allowed by sched. 1, art. 152 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, had expired when the appeal was there presented. It should have been dismissed under s. 3. The District Court alone had power under s. 5 to excuse the delay and admit the appeal, but the order made by that Court was not an order under the section. 1, art. 152 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, had expired when the appeal was there presented. It should have been dismissed under s. 3. The District Court alone had power under s. 5 to excuse the delay and admit the appeal, but the order made by that Court was not an order under the section. There was consequently no pending proceeding which could be transferred to the High Court, and that Court had no jurisdiction to make an order under s. 5. If, however, there was jurisdiction there was not " sufficient cause within the meaning of s. 5. [Dunne, K.C., referred to Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram. (( 1917) I. L. R. 44 I. A. 218)] That case does not apply because an appeal to the District Court was out of time when the appeal was presented to the High Court. On the merits, the vatan lands were inalienable by law and custom. [Reference was made to Bombay Regulation XVI. of 1827, s. 20, and Bombay Act II. of 1863, s. 12.] (The argument upon the question whether the lands were alienable was substantially that advanced in the High Court.) Dunne, JLC, and Kenworthy Brown for the respondents were not called upon. Oct. 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. This is an appeal from a decree, dated August 1, 1913, of the High Court at Bombay, which varied a decree, dated April 16, 1910, of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum. The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought on February 22, 1909, in the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum by the plaintiffs, who are appellants here. The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought on February 22, 1909, in the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum by the plaintiffs, who are appellants here. They allege that the property in suit was inalienable ; that Lingappa Jayappa, who had purported to dispose of that property by his will of June 6, 1906, and a codicil of August 13, 1906, had no power to alienate the property ; and that the plaintiff, Jayappa Lingappa, was the validly adopted son of Lingappa Jayappa ; and they claimed a declaration that Lingappa Jayappa deceased had no power to make a will dated June 6, 1906, and a codicil dated August 13, 1906, and that no right accrued to the defendants under the will and codicil; a declaration that the plaintiff, Jayappa Lingappa, was the adopted son of Lingappa Jayappa deceased ; and a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from recovering the properties in suit from the plaintiffs. The claim for the injunction was valued in the plaint at Rs. 5. In the written statement it was alleged that the claim of the plaintiffs was groundless ; that Lingappa Jayappa had full power to dispose of the property in suit, and did so dispose of it by his will and codicil; and that the alleged adoption was not authorized and was invalid. The widow of Lingappa Jayappa professing to act under an authority which she alleged had been given to her by the testator in his lifetime, adopted Jayappa Lingappa as a son to her deceased husband on December 10, 1906. Lingappa Jayappa, hereafter referred to as the testator, died on August 23, 1906, and the Court of Wards took charge of the property in dispute in this suit. In June, 1907, the Collector of Belgaum, ex officio an executor of the will, applied to the Court of the District Judge of Belgaum for a grant of probate of the will and the codicil. That application was opposed, but the Court of the District Judge granted probate of the will and codicil, and that grant was upheld on appeal. The first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum tried the suit. That application was opposed, but the Court of the District Judge granted probate of the will and codicil, and that grant was upheld on appeal. The first class Subordinate Judge of Belgaum tried the suit. He having found that the property in suit was inalienable ; that the testator had no power to alienate it; and that the plaintiff Jayappa Lingappa had been validly adopted ; by his decree of April 16, 1910, made the declarations and granted the injunction claimed in the plaint. From that decree the defendants appealed to the High Court at Bombay. For the necessary purposes of that appeal they applied for copies of the judgment of the trial judge, but did not obtain them until June 11, 1910. They presented their appeal to the High Court on July 19, 1910, which if the appeal lay to the High Court was well within the ninety days allowed for an appeal to the High Court. On objection taken on behalf of the defendants, the High Court on March 11, 1912, rightly decided that the appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge of Belgaum and not to the High Court, and affirmed a principle, which had been previously applied by the High Court at Bombay, that " where a plaintiff sues for a declaratory decree and asks for conse quential relief, and puts his own valuation upon that consequential relief, then for the purposes of court fee, and also for the purposes of jurisdiction, it is the value that the plaintiff puts upon the plaint that determines both." The High Court directed that the memorandum of appeal should be returned to the defendants for presentation to the District Judge of Belgaum, and the learned judges intimated in this judgment that the appeal would be removed into the High Court. On March 16, 1912, the defendants presented the memorandum of appeal to the Court of the District Judge, and alleging that the appeal had been presented to the High Court of Bombay under the bona fide belief that the appeal lay to that Court, prayed that it might be admitted. On March 18, 1912, the District Judge made the following order " The appeal is admitted to the file without prejudice to any objection that may be taken by the respondents as to limitation or otherwise. On March 18, 1912, the District Judge made the following order " The appeal is admitted to the file without prejudice to any objection that may be taken by the respondents as to limitation or otherwise. The District Judge in making that order does not appear to have decided that the defendants, who were the appellants before him, had sufficient cause within the meaning of s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act IX. of 1908), for not preferring the appeal to his Court within the period of limitation, which by art. 152 of the first schedule to that Act was thirty days from the date of the decree appealed from. It so happened that the District Judge to whom the memorandum of appeal was presented for admission in 1910, as Legal Remembrancer to the Bombay Government, had advised that the appeal from the decree of the trial judge lay to the High Court, and on his advice the appeal had been preferred on July 19, 1910, to the High Court. The District Judge, knowing that the appeal would probably be removed into the High Court, may reasonably have preferred that the High Court should decide the question under s. 5 of the Act. It appears to their Lordships that when a memorandum of appeal is presented beyond the prescribed period of limitation the proper order which a judge should endorse upon it would be to the following effect "Presented for admission on the (date when the memorandum of appeal was handed into the office of his court). Let notice go to the respondents (date of the order)." The Board in Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar (( 1917) L. R. 45 LA. 25.) impressed on the Courts in India the urgent expediency of adopting a procedure which should secure at the stage of admission the final determination (after due notice to all parties) of any question of limitation affecting the competence of the appeal. After the District Judge had admitted the appeal, it was by order of the High Court removed into that Court. The learned judges of the High Court, after hearing the parties and considering the affidavits which were filed, were rightly satisfied that the defendants had sufficient cause for not having preferred their appeal to the Court of the District Judge within the period of limitation. The learned judges of the High Court, after hearing the parties and considering the affidavits which were filed, were rightly satisfied that the defendants had sufficient cause for not having preferred their appeal to the Court of the District Judge within the period of limitation. The fact that the defendants had acted on mistaken advice as to the law in appealing to the High Court in 1910 did not preclude them from showing that it was owing to their reliance on that advice that they had not presented the appeal to the Court of the District Judge within the prescribed period of limitation. (See Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram.) (I. R. 44 1. A. 218.) The High Court, after a very full and careful consideration of the history of the title to the property in suit, of the Government Resolution of February 6, 1862, of the Bombay Act II. of 1863, and of the proceedings which were affirmed or authorized by that Act and of the will and codicil in question, came to the conclusion that some of the properties claimed by the plaintiffs in this suit was alienable and the private property of the testator, and dismissed the suit as to them, and as to other of the properties claimed by the plaintiffs came to the conclusion that they were inalienable, and as to them did not interfere with the decree of the trial judge; the High Court rightly found that the widow of the testator had no authority to adopt a son to her deceased husband, and consequently the suit, so far as it claimed a declaration that Jayappa Lingappa was an adopted son of the testator, must be treated as dismissed. The High Court made an order of remand as to some of the property in question in the suit. The return to that order of remand was accepted as correct, and the High Court, on December 11, 1914, made the necessary order upon it. Their Lordships agree with the conclusions of the High Court and with their reasons for those conclusions, and will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed. The appellants must pay the costs of this appeal.