Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and four decrees of the High Court (July 11, 1910) reversing two decrees and varying two further decrees of the First Subordinate Judge of Gaya. The appellants instituted a suit against each of the four sets of respondents in the present consolidated appeals to recover specified parcels of land. The first two appellants claimed as the sons and heirs of Hanuman Sahai, who died in 1906. They alleged that Hanuman Sahai had purchased the properties in suit from the reversionary heirs thereto upon the death, in 1894, of Mahasundar, who was his maternal grandmother. The third appellant, Mahesh Lai, had purchased a half share of the properties from the first two appellants. The respondents claimed the properties under kobalas (sale deeds) executed by Mahasundar. Two of the consolidated appeals had been compromised subsequently to the judgment of the High Court. The two appeals now contested were the second and the third on the record. The second appeal related to a half share in the village of Amhara, which the respondent (defendant). Mahant Thok Narayan, claimed under a kobala executed in 1880 in favour of his predecessor by Mahasundar Hanuman Sahai and his mother, Bhawani, had been joined as parties to the deed. In the third appeal the respondents. Massamat Ram Kunwar and others, claimed the properties therein in dispute under a kobala which was not produced, but was alleged to have been executed in 1854 by Mahasundar alone. The respondents, by their written statements, denied that the vendors to Hanuman Sahai were the reversionary heirs upon the death of Mahasundar ; they also contended, inter alia (1.) that Mahesh Lai, the third appellant (plaintiff), had purchased the half share in all the properties merely as benamidar for one Rafiuddin, and that he was consequently not entitled to sue ; (2.) that the appellants were estopped as to the village of Amhara, and certain property in dispute to one of the settled appeals, in that Hanuman Sahai had joined as a party in the conveyances by Mahasundar; and (3.) that the properties had been alienated by Mahasundar for necessity and the benefit of the estate. The subordinate judge decreed all four suits. The subordinate judge decreed all four suits. With regard to Mahesh Lai, he found that it was not proved that he was a benamidar, and upon a review of the authorities he held that, even if that were the case, Mahesh Lal could maintain the suit. He further held that no estoppel arose, and that no legal necessity had been proved. The High Court (Chatterji and Vincent JJ.) came to the conclusion that Mahesh Lal was merely a benamidar, and dismissed all four suits as to the half interest claimed by him. They said "So far as this court is concerned, it seems to be settled law now that a benamidar cannot maintain a suit for the recovery of property." They referred to cases reported at I. L. R. 16, C. 364 ; I. L. R. 25, C 98 ; and I. L. R. 30, C. 265 ; and said “We see no reason to differ from those cases." With regard to the estoppel relied on, they said that although s. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, did not apply, since the transfers had been executed before that Act was passed, the principle embodied in the section was not new, and had been applied in many cases. Though in Dooli Chanel v. Brojo Bhookun (( 1880) 10 Cal. L. R. 61.) the Privy Council seemed to have been inclined to hold that it did not apply to Hindu conveyances, it was recognised by the illustration to s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and by s. 18 {a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The principle was based mainly upon the doctrine of courts of equity that a person who enters into a contract without having at the time the power of performing it is bound to perform it if he subsequently acquires the power. Hanuman by the kobala asserted that as a result of the earlier litigation therein referred to it had been settled that Mahasundar was to hold for life, then Bhawani and then Hanuman, so that the three fully represented the absolute title to the property. At that time Hanuman claimed to have a vested remainder although in reality he had no right! If the purchasers were unaware of the real title, and relied upon the assertion, they could require Hanuman to convey his subsequently acquired title. At that time Hanuman claimed to have a vested remainder although in reality he had no right! If the purchasers were unaware of the real title, and relied upon the assertion, they could require Hanuman to convey his subsequently acquired title. With regard to the village of Amhara the kobala recited the earlier litigation as to the property ; if the proceedings in that case had been examined with care the real title would have been apparent, and the mahant would be fixed with constructive notice. They considered, however, that a layman, not fully acquainted with the history of the family, could not be expected to investigate the title from a lawyers point of view, and that it would be pushing the doctrine of constructive notice too far to hold, without any other evidence, that the purchaser was aware of the real title. They consequently were of opinion that he had been misled by the assertion, and that the appellants were estopped. In the third of the present appeals they found upon the facts that Rs. 15,000 out of Rs.20,500, the price paid, had been applied to legal necessities, and that as to the balance of Rs.5,500 there was no evidence. They agreed with the subordinate judge that it was proved that the vendors to Hanuman were the reversioners upon the death of Mahasundar. The result as to the two appeals now contested, was as follows in the second appeal on the record, namely, that as to the village of Amhara, the decree in favour of the plaintiffs was reversed and the suit dismissed ; in the third appeal, the decree below was varied by decreeing the first and second of the present appellants possession of a half share of the disputed properties on payment of Rs.7,500 (with interest at 12 per cent.) to the representatives of the original purchaser from Mahasundar. 1918. June 6, 7. De Gruyther K.C., Dunne K.C., and Abdul Majid for the appellants. The decision that a benamidar of immovable property cannot sue in his own name for its recovery was erroneous. The High Courts in India have differed in their view of that question. 1918. June 6, 7. De Gruyther K.C., Dunne K.C., and Abdul Majid for the appellants. The decision that a benamidar of immovable property cannot sue in his own name for its recovery was erroneous. The High Courts in India have differed in their view of that question. The Calcutta High Court has held that such a suit cannot be maintained Hari Gobind Adhikari v. Akhoi Kumar (( 1889) I, L. R. 16 C. 364.), Iswar Chandra Dutta v. Gopal Chandra Dutta (( 1897) I. L. R. 25 C. 98.), Mahendra Nath Mukerji v. Kali Prasad Jahuri (( 1902) I. L. R., 30 C. 265.) ; in the last cited case, however, it was recognised that the two earlier decisions had been based upon a misreading of the judgment of the Board in Gopeekrist v. Gungapersaud, (( 1854) 6 Moo. I. A. 53.) At Allahabad and Bombay the contrary view has been taken Nand Kishore v. Ahmad Ata (( 1895) I. L. R. 18 A. 69.) ; Yad Ram v. Umrao Singh (( 1899) I. L. R. 21 A. 380.) ; Bachcha v. Gajadhar (( 1905) I. L. R. 28 A. 44.) ; Ravji v. Mahadev (( 1897) I. L. R. 22 B. 672.); Dagdu v. Balwant Natu. (( 1898) I. L. R. 22 B. 820.) So also by the Madras High Court in Shangara v. Krishnan (( 1891) I. L. R. 15 M. 267.) and Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Sandagopa Ayyangar (( 1905) I. L. R, 28 M. 205.), though in Kuthaperumal Rajali v. Secretary of State for India (( 1907) I. L. R. 30 M. 245.) that I Court held that a benamidar could sue upon a bond or mortgage in his name, but could not sue in ejectment. The true view-is that a benamidar is a trustee for the beneficial owner and represents him for all purposes. The right to sue to recover immovable property is supported and not disaffirmed by the judgment of the Board in Gopeekrist v. Gungapersaud. (6 Moo. I. A. 53.) The High Court at Calcutta has itself entertained suits of that kind by a benamidar e.g. Ram Bhurosee Singh v. Bissesser Narain Mahata (( 1872) 18 Suth. W. R. 454.) ; Sita Nath Saha v. Nobin Chunder Roy (( 1879) 5 Cal. L. R. 102.) ; Bhola Per shad v. Ram Lall (( 1896) I. L. R. 24 C. 34.); Sachitananda v. Baloram. W. R. 454.) ; Sita Nath Saha v. Nobin Chunder Roy (( 1879) 5 Cal. L. R. 102.) ; Bhola Per shad v. Ram Lall (( 1896) I. L. R. 24 C. 34.); Sachitananda v. Baloram. (( 1897) I. L. R. 24 C. 644.fs22) Secondly, Hanuman was not estopped as to the village of Amhara. There was no representation by the kobala that the entire interest was conveyed so as to bring the case within s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The purchaser was put upon inquiry and was not misled. The kobala referred to the earlier litigation, and the decision therein by the Privy Council (( 1873) 12 Beng. L. R. 433.) ; the real title appears from the judgment of the Board in that appeal, and the purchaser thereby had constructive notice of it Patman v. Harland. (( 1881) 17 Ch. D. 3o6.) Hanuman purported to convey only his contingent interest in succession to Bhawani. That interest did not accrue to him ; he acquired the property by an independent title. The conveyance consequently does not operate upon his subsequently acquired interest, the principle of s. 43 of the Transfer of Property being inapplicable Nurul Hossein v. Sheosahai. (( 1892) L. R, 19 I. A. 221.) Lastly, with regard to the third appeal, the evidence did not establish that there was legal necessity for the alienation. The respondents did not appear. Oct. 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI This consolidated appeal from a judgment and four decrees of the High Court of Calcutta arises out of four suits brought by the plaintiffs in June, 1906, in the Court of the First Subordinate Judge of Gay a. The object of the suits was to obtain possession of certain specific landed properties which originally belonged to one Ram Dyal Singh, who died so long ago as 1845. These four actions were separately decreed by the Subordinate Judge. On the defendants appeals the High Court dismissed two of the suits, and in the two others varied the first Courts decrees. The plaintiffs preferred four appeals to their Lordships Board which were subsequently consolidated. After the appeals were filed two of the suits were compromised. The present appeal is thus confined to the two decrees of the High Court in suits 99 and 101 of 1906 respectively. The plaintiffs preferred four appeals to their Lordships Board which were subsequently consolidated. After the appeals were filed two of the suits were compromised. The present appeal is thus confined to the two decrees of the High Court in suits 99 and 101 of 1906 respectively. A short statement of the facts relating to this family will explain the nature of this litigation. Ram Dyal had left him surviving a widow named Birja Kunwar and two married daughters named respectively Shamsundar Kunwar and Mahasundar Kunwar. It is stated that before his death he had made an oral disposition by which he had devised the bulk of hi3 property to his two grandsons, one named Ajodhya, the son of Shamsundar, and the other Sheo Charan, the son of Mahasundar, subject to a life interest in his widow Birja Kunwar. Both the Courts below have found in favour of this disposition, and it may now be accepted as undisputed that the two grandsons under Ram Dyals will obtained vested interests in the properties specifically devised to them. The villages which form the subject of the four suits were given to Sheo Charan. Birja Kunwar died in 1851, and on her death the properties devised to Ajodhya and Sheo Charan vested in them absolutely. Sheo Charan died in 1852, and on his death the villages devised to him under the will of his grand father came into the possession of Mahasundar Kunwar by virtue of her right to succession as a Hindu mother. Maha- sundar purported to deal with these properties in her lifetime ; she borrowed money on mortgages, created mukarraris, and sold several of the villages. Two of the sales form the subject of dispute in the present appeal. Mahasundar died on June 15, 1894, when the succession opened to Sheo Charans agnatic relations. The plaintiffs claim to have derived title under assignments from the reversioners, and their case is that the alienations made by Mahasundar in her lifetime in favour of the defendants or their predecessors are invalid, as they were not made for purposes which make them binding on the reversioners. They accordingly seek to recover possession of the villages purported to have been sold by her to the defendants or their predecessors in title. They accordingly seek to recover possession of the villages purported to have been sold by her to the defendants or their predecessors in title. The defendants in their written statements in the two suits raised a number of objections which, in the course of the trial, resolved themselves into the three main points which their Lordships have to determine on this appeal. The relative position of the parties and the nature of these objections will appear from the following pedigree — RAM DYAL SINGH (d. May 1845), m. Birja Kunwar (d. October 1851). | || Shamsundar Kuuwar. Mahasundar Kunwar | (d. June 15, 1894),m. Kali Charan. | | | | | | | | Bhawani | | Gyan Ajodhya Chalhan K unw a r Sheo Gir Kuuwar (son, d. Kunwar (daughter, d. Charan Kunwar. (daughter) 1859) (daughter) June, 1884),m. (d. an m. Ram Tukanath. infant Anugra in 1852). Narayan.. | Hanuman Sahai (d. 1906) | | | | Gurnarain Sheo Charan Lal Plaintiff No. 1. Plaintiff No. 2. Sheo Charans father, Kali Charan, had a grand-uncle of the name of Jiwan Lal. Jiwan Lall’s two grandsons, Sheo Sahai and Bal Gobind Sahai (A pedigree of Sheo Charans family was also given, but is not, necessary to this report.), were admittedly the nearest male agnates of Sheo Charan, surviving at the time of Mahasundar’s death in 1894. it will be observed also that Mahasundar’s had a daughter, Bhawani Kunwar, who was married to one Tukanath. She appears to have died in 1884, leaving her surviving a son, Hanuman Sahai, and on April 30, 1895, Sheo Sahai and Bal Gobind Sahai, as the nearest reversioners, conveyed all their right, title, and interest in the properties in suit to Hanuman Sahai. Hanuman died in February, 1906, leaving him surviving the plaintiffs, Gurnarain and Sheo Charan, his sons and heirs. On July 2, 1906, Gurnarain and Sheo Charan conveyed a half share of their interest in the said properties to one Mahesh Lai, and these three persons brought the four suits against the different alienees of Mahasundar for setting aside her transactions and for recovery of possession.’ The defendants among other pleas challenged the right of Mahesh Lal to maintain the action in respect of his share as he was only a benamidar for a person named Rafiuddin. Secondly, they contended that as Hanuman Sahai was a party to the conveyance by Mahasundar in respect of mauza Amhara, he and his heirs were estopped from questioning that particular transaction. And they pleaded generally that all the transactions that were impugned were entered into for justifiable necessity. The trial judge held against the defendants on all points, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned judges of the High Court of Calcutta, on the appeal of the defendants, have taken a different view. They found that Mahesh Lal was a benamidar, and held that therefore his claim in respect of the moiety claimed by him must be dismissed. They also held, differing from the trial judge, that in respect of the village of Amhara, Hanuman Sahai being a party to the transaction, his heirs, the plaintiffs, were estopped from disputing the validity of the sale. With regard to the three villages involved in suit 101, they came to the conclusion that a part of the consideration for the sale was proved to have been applied in the payment of debts due from the estate. They accordingly dismissed the claim of the plaintiff No. 3 in that suit, and made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs 1 and 2 in respect of half of the property conditioned on their payment of Rs.7500, with interest at 12 per cent, per annum, to the representatives of the original purchaser, Jai Lai, they on their part accounting for the profits " enjoyed by them in respect of that half." On the question whether a person who has no beneficial interest in the property which stands in his name, or is acquired in his name, can maintain an action in respect thereof, there seems to be considerable diversity of judicial opinion in India. The system of acquiring and holding property and even of carrying on business in names other than those of the real owners, usually called the benami system, is and has been a common practice in the country. There is nothing inherently wrong in it, and it accords, within its legitimate scope, with the ideas and habits of the people. The rule applicable to benami transactions was stated with considerable distinctness in a judgment of this Board delivered by Sir George Farwell (Bilas Kunwar v. Dasraj Ranjit Singh (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 242.)). There is nothing inherently wrong in it, and it accords, within its legitimate scope, with the ideas and habits of the people. The rule applicable to benami transactions was stated with considerable distinctness in a judgment of this Board delivered by Sir George Farwell (Bilas Kunwar v. Dasraj Ranjit Singh (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 242.)). Referring to a benami dealing, their Lordships say "It is quite unobjectionable and has a curious resemblance to the doctrine of ou English law that the trust of the legal estate results to the man who pays the purchase-money, and this again follows the analogy of our common law that where a feoffment is made without consideration the use results to the feoffor." So long, therefore, as a benami transaction does not contravene the provisions of the law the Courts are bound to give it effect. As already observed, the benamidar has no beneficial interest in the property or business that stands in his name ; he represents, in fact, the real owner, and so far as their relative legal position is concerned he is a mere trustee for him. Their Lordships find it difficult to understand why, in such circumstances, an action cannot be maintained in the name of the benamidar in respect of the property although the beneficial owner is no party to it. The bulk of judicial opinion in India is in favour of the proposition that in a proceeding by or against the benamidar, the person beneficially entitled is fully affected by the rules of res judicata. With this view their Lordships concur. It is open to the latter to apply to be joined in the action; but whether he is made a party or not, a proceeding by or against his representative in its ultimate result is fully binding on him. In case of a contest between an alleged benamidar and an alleged real owner, other considerations arise with which their Lordships are not concerned in the present case. Here the learned judges of the High Court, differing from the trial judge, have held that there were grounds for supposing, or rather suspecting, that the purchase by Mahesh Lal of a moiety of the villages in suit was for the benefit of Rafiuddin, and as he did not join in the action they dismissed Mahesh Lais claim. Here the learned judges of the High Court, differing from the trial judge, have held that there were grounds for supposing, or rather suspecting, that the purchase by Mahesh Lal of a moiety of the villages in suit was for the benefit of Rafiuddin, and as he did not join in the action they dismissed Mahesh Lais claim. Mahesh Lal had persistently denied the defendants allegation that he was a benamidar for Rafiuddin and had no beneficial interest in the property; nor does Rafiuddin appear to have put forward a claim adversely to Mahesh Lai. In these circumstances it appears to their Lordships that the decree of the High Court dismissing his claim in both suits on the ground that as a benamidar he was not entitled to maintain the actions is unsustainable. The High Court further held that the plaintiffs are estopped from questioning the sale by Mahasundar of the 8 annas share of Amhara, as Hanuman Sahai was a party to the transaction. This village forms the subject of suit 99 of 190(>. In support of their view the learned judges have relied on the provisions of s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act and the general doctrine of equitable estoppel embodied in that section, to which their Lordships will presently refer. The High Court also considered that Hanuman Sahais purchase from the reversioners accrued to the benefit of Mahasundar’s vendees in consequence of the fact that he had joined with her in conveying the property to the predecessors of the defendants. And they rested their judgment on the equitable doctrine of what is called " feeding the estoppel," and on the provisions of s. 43 of the Indian Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882), which practically reproducer, this rule. To consider how far the learned judges are right in their view on the question of estoppel. It is necessary to examine the clause in Mahasundars conveyance which is said to create the estoppel. It bears date March 19, 1880, and, as already observed, purports to be executed by Mahasundar in conjunction with her daughter, Bhawani Kunwar, and the grand- son, Hanuman Sahai. It is necessary to examine the clause in Mahasundars conveyance which is said to create the estoppel. It bears date March 19, 1880, and, as already observed, purports to be executed by Mahasundar in conjunction with her daughter, Bhawani Kunwar, and the grand- son, Hanuman Sahai. The description of the vendors is in the following terms " We are Mahasundar Kunwar, younger daughter and heiress of Birja Kunwar, deceased, widow and heiress of Ramdayal Singh, deceased, inhabitant of mauza Jagarnathpur pargana Maher, and at present of mauza Sugrigrandi, pargana Pachrukhi; Bhawani Kunwar, eldest daughter of Mahasundar Kunwar aforesaid and Hanuman Sahai, son of Bhawani Kunwar aforesaid and grandson by daughter of Mahasundar Kunwar aforesaid, all inhabitants of mauza Samhri, pargana Roh, district Gaya, by occupation zamindars.” The deed then goes on to say as follows " Whereas the entire 10 annas of mauza Amhara, appertaining to lot Sugrigrandi.....has been and is in the possession of me, Mahasundar, subsequently I, Mahasundar Kunwar, had granted in gift mauzas Sugrigrandi, Kulna Surajpura, Amhara, Harna Sikaria, Buksouti, Ghazipur, and Bahpuri Majrahi, appertaining to the said lot Sugrigrandi, to Bhawani Kunwar, my eldest daughter, and Gir Kunwar, my youngest daughter, with a view to avoid future disputes under deeds of gift, dated August 28. 1860 .... in equal shares of 8 annas, with conditions that during the lifetime of mine, Mahasundar Kunwar, I shall continue in possession of the same, and that after the death of me, Mahasundar Kunwar, Bhawani Kunwar should get possession of 8 annas and Gir Kunwar of the other 8 annas. But the said Gir Kunwar died in 1862 and Ram Anugrah Narayan, husband of the said Gir Kunwar, deceased, instituted a suit in the civil court of Gaya in respect of 8 annas of the said mauzas, and fought the case from the District Court to the Privy Council, and according to the final judgment of the Privy Council, dated June 27, 1873, it was held that I, Mahasundar Kunwar, one of the executants, should remain in possession of all the aforesaid properties ; that, after the death of me, Mahasundar Kunwar, I, Bhawani Kunwar, eldest daughter, should obtain possession of 8 annas, and Ram Anugrah Narayan, husband of Gir Kunwar, deceased, should obtain possession of the other 8 annas share. In accordance with the same, I, Mahasundar, am in possession of 16 annas up to this time, and I, Bhawani Kunwar, eldest daughter, and after me Hanuman Sahai, son of me, Bhawani Kunwar, are entitled to take possession of 8 annas, mentioned in the deed of gift, as absolute proprietor after the death of me, Mahasundar Kunwar.....Therefore we, Bhawani Kunwar and Hanuman Sahai, have absolutely sold and vended our future proprietary interest and right to possession in 8 annas out of 16 annas of the said mauza Amhara, in which we, Bhawani Kunwar and Hanuman Sahai, have acquired the right of possession after the death of Mahasundar Kunwar, and I, Mahasundar Kunwar, have absolutely sold and vended my life-interest to obtain possession in 8 annas of mauza Amhara, in short, all the right, title, and interest of us, the executants, in the 8 annas of the said mauza Amhara." It is to be noticed that in this document Mahasundar makes no reference to the fact that the properties were in her pos session as a Hindu mother by right of succession to her son Sheo Charan. She describes herself as the " daughter and heiress " of her mother, Birja Kunwar, and claims to be absolutely entitled to the property in question, and purports to deal with it as such. It cannot be said that this misdescription or assumption of absolute ownership could possibly have misled the purchaser. For the proceedings in the suit of Ram Anugrah v. Mahasundar and the decision of this Board (12 Beng. L. R. 483.) are recited in the conveyance in question. Their Lordships in that case expressly confined the adjudication to the parties to the suit. They did not enter upon a consideration of the question whether Mahasundar had the power to make the gift or gifts which were in controversy in that action. The declaration made by the Board could not enlarge the power of Mahasundar to deal with the properties she held as the heiress to her son to the prejudice of the sons reversioners. The vendee was entering into a transaction with a Hindu female. It lay upon him to acquaint himself with the extent of her powers. He was in full possession of the proceedings in Ram Anugrahs suit and the facts connected with the Mitakshara family. The vendee was entering into a transaction with a Hindu female. It lay upon him to acquaint himself with the extent of her powers. He was in full possession of the proceedings in Ram Anugrahs suit and the facts connected with the Mitakshara family. The evidence of his witnesses shows that inquiries were made on his behalf and that he had even some legal advice. Whether these measures were adopted with the object of creating grounds of defence in some future action by reversioners or were bona fide inquiries, their Lordships have little doubt on the facts that the mahant purchaser had full knowledge of the powers and disabilities of the vendor. At this time Hanuman had no interest of any kind in the property. Mahasundar had held it as a Hindu mother by right of succession to her son Sheo Charan. On her death it would pass to his heirs. Hanumans mother was alive at the time of the sale ; whatever interests they had were of a purely contingent character. It was quite evident that they were joined as parties to the conveyance at the instance of the vendee as a piece of precaution. Whether the vendee entered into the transaction in the belief that Mahasundars title was derived, as she described in the sale deed, from her mother, or whether he knew, as is more probable from the circumstances, that she was in possession of the property as heiress to her son, he must have known that Hanuman had no assignable interest which he could convey or the assignment of which he could assure to the purchaser. His interest, if it can be so called, in either view of the facts, was a mere expectancy, contingent, firstly, on his mother surviving Mahasundar, and, secondly, on his surviving his mother. His association in the deed of sale was, in their Lordships opinion, wholly futile and had no legal effect in validating the transaction if otherwise invalid. His interest, if it can be so called, in either view of the facts, was a mere expectancy, contingent, firstly, on his mother surviving Mahasundar, and, secondly, on his surviving his mother. His association in the deed of sale was, in their Lordships opinion, wholly futile and had no legal effect in validating the transaction if otherwise invalid. The High Court have rested their judgment on the question of estoppel on the provisions of s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act (I. of 1872), which provides as follows "When one person has, by his declaration, act, or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing." There is absolutely no evidence that the vendee was induced to alter his position in any respect in consequence of Hanumans representation contained in the deed of conveyance. The Subordinate Judge in his able judgment has given abundant reasons for holding that in the whole transaction Hanuman must have been a mere passive instrument in the hands of his elders, and that his so-called statement could not have materially influenced either the vendors or the vendees conduct in the matter. As regards the theory that Hanumans subsequent purchase of the property in 1895 from the reversioners should accrue to the benefit of the purchaser from Mahasundar, it is based on the assumption that what happened in 1880 created an estoppel against Hanuman. In their Lordships opinion there is no estoppel. Besides, it should be observed that Hanuman did not acquire the property as a contingent reversioner to Mahasundar. The title on which the plaintiffs have brought their suit is based on an independent purchase by Hanuman from the rightful heirs. Their Lordships are of opinion that the view of the learned judges on the question of estoppel cannot be sustained. Suit 101 relates to three properties called respectively Thali Khurd, Budhwara, and Korianna, which were sold by Mahasundar in 1854 for alleged legal necessities to the predecessors of the present defendants. Their Lordships are of opinion that the view of the learned judges on the question of estoppel cannot be sustained. Suit 101 relates to three properties called respectively Thali Khurd, Budhwara, and Korianna, which were sold by Mahasundar in 1854 for alleged legal necessities to the predecessors of the present defendants. The sale deed is not forthcoming, and some evidence has been given of its loss which the High Court have accepted, and their Lordships are not prepared to dissent from their decision that the defendants had proved the sale of 1854. Their Lordships further agree with the learned judges that legal necessity to the extent found by them has been established. In the result, therefore, their Lordships are of opinion that in suit 99 of 1906 (Appeal 2 of 1911) the decree of the High Court should be reversed and that of the Subordinate Judge restored and that in suit 101 of 1906 (Appeal 3 of 1911) the decree of the High Court should be varied by the inclusion of the name of Mahesh Lai, and that the decree should be in favour of the three plaintiffs (including Mahesh Lai) to the full extent of the properties claimed, subject to the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of Rs.7500 under the terms and conditions set forth in the decree of the High Court. The appellants are entitled to their costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the High Court in suit 99. In the appeal to the High Court arising out of suit 101, they will get their costs as decreed by that Court. And their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.