Lord Dunedin :- These actions were raised in the Supreme Court of British Columbia by the Dominion Trust Co. in liquidation and its liquidator, as executors of the deceased W. R. Arnold against three insurance companies with whom Arnold had effectuated policies on his life. The first action against the New York Life Insurance Co. was in respect of two policies, one term and one life, for 50,000 dollars, each, the policies having boon taken out in September, 1916, just about a fortnight before the death occurred. The second action was against the Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, in respect of a life policy for 50,000 dollars of date 27th November, 1912, and the third against the Sovereign Life Assurance Co. of Canada in respect of a policy for 10,000 dollars dated 23rd October, 1912. Arnold died on 12th October 1914, from a gunshot wound through the heart in a garage belonging to him in the neighbourhood of Vancouver. In each of the policies there was a clause exempting from liability if the death was self-inflicted within the period of two years from the date of the policy. The main defence of each of the defendants was the same - namely, an allegation that Arnold"s death was self-inflicted. There were other defences which were not common to the three actions. They were based on various alleged misrepresentations. The learned Chief Justice, Hunter before whom the actions depended consolidated the three actions in spite of-the protests of the various defendants. Evidence was then led in the consolidated actions, and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that none of the defences had been made out and gave judgment for the amount sued for. Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeal, and it was argued that the consolidation of the actions was not within the power of the Court; and further, that the conclusions arrived at on the facts were wrong. In that Court MacDonald, C. J. and Galliher, J., held that the consolidation order was within the power of the Judge, but that the evidence proved that Arnold committed suicide. Martin, J., and McPhillips, J., held that the consolidation order was not within the power of the Judge, and that consequently the trial was nugatory, and they expressed no opinion on the facts. Martin, J., and McPhillips, J., held that the consolidation order was not within the power of the Judge, and that consequently the trial was nugatory, and they expressed no opinion on the facts. In this state of opinion a formal judgment was pronounced allowing the appeal with costs, and setting aside the judgment of the Chief Justice, but not further dealing with the actions. Against this judgment an appeal was lodged to this Board, asking for restoration of the judgment of Hunter, C. J. Leave was obtained on a petition by the respondents to raise on the appeal before this Board the contention that judgment ought to have been entered de piano for the respondents. It appears to their Lordships that it is first of all necessary to settle the point as to the consolidation, for if the consolidation was ultra vires of the Judge, then there is no proper material on which judgment can be given as to the defences on the facts. On this point their Lordships agree with Macdonald, C.J., and Galliher, J. Consolidation is regulated by Order 49, r. 1, which is as follows : "Causes, matters, or appeals may be consolidated by order of the Court or Judge in such manner as to the Court or Judge may seem meet." This rule differs essentially from the corresponding rule in the English Courts, which provides that the power is "to be exercised in the manner in use before the commencement of the principal Act," thereby introducing a reference to the course of previous decisions. The rule of the British Columbian Court is absolute, and seems to their Lordships to leave the matter, so far as ultra vires is concerned, entirely in the hands of the Judge. Whether consolidation in such cases is expedient is quite another question where actions, although having a common feature, have distinctive defences, it would seem more than doubtful to take such a course. Nor does it alter the matter to say that in the event no prejudice was suffered. It might have been, and the decision had to be taken at the beginning. But though, perhaps, ill judged, it was not, in their Lordships" opinion, ultra vires. There was, therefore, proper material before the Court on which a judgment on the facts could be given. So far the appellants are right in their contention. It might have been, and the decision had to be taken at the beginning. But though, perhaps, ill judged, it was not, in their Lordships" opinion, ultra vires. There was, therefore, proper material before the Court on which a judgment on the facts could be given. So far the appellants are right in their contention. The learned trial Judge gave a very careful and considered opinion, in which he set forth the chief considerations on the one side and on the other. The learned Judges of the Court of Appeal who disagreed with him on the facts contented themselves with stating that they had come to an opposite conclusion from that reached by the trial Judge. Accordingly the learned counsel for the appellants strongly pressed on their Lordships the consideration that a finding of pure fact arrived at by the Judge who had tried the case and seen the witnesses ought not to be interfered with. Their Lordships are of opinion that there must be discrimination as to what is the class of evidence being dealt with: whether the result arrived at depends on the view taken of conflicting testimony, or depends upon the inferences to be drawn from facts as to which mere is no controversy. They may cite the words of Lord Halsbury in the case of Montgomerie and Co. v. Wallace-James [1904] A. C. 73. "Where a question of fact has been decided by a tribunal which has seen and heard the witnesses, the greatest weight ought to be attached to the finding of such a tribunal. It has had the opportunity of observing the demeanour of the witnesses and judging of their veracity and accuracy in a way that no appellate tribunal can have. But where no question arises as to truthfulness, and where the question is as to the proper inferences to be drawn from truthful evidence then the original tribunal is in no setter position to decide than the Judges of an appellate Court." Lord Davey in the same case used much the same language. Now, that this is a case of the latter class, there can be no doubt. It cannot be more strongly put than it was by the learned trial Judge himself. He says : "I feel fortunate in coming to a conclusion that I have not to deal with any question of untruthful testimony... Now, that this is a case of the latter class, there can be no doubt. It cannot be more strongly put than it was by the learned trial Judge himself. He says : "I feel fortunate in coming to a conclusion that I have not to deal with any question of untruthful testimony... in respect of any of the witnesses... I think that the only matter left for the Court is to decide as to what is the proper inference to be drawn from the facts, the material portion of which, if not actually the entirety of these facts, not being in serious controversy. The only question is as to what is the true inference to be drawn." Their Lordships, therefore, feel that they are here dealing with the opinions of one learned Judge who thought that suicide had not been proved, and of two learned judges who thought that it had; and the question for them is, which of these two opinions is to be preferred? The evidence to be examined in such a case falls at once into two distinct divisions. There is the evidence which bears on the motive for such an act, and there is the evidence of the facts as to the method of death, which include all actions of the deceased antecedent to, and possibly leading up to, the catastrophe. After discussing the evidence as to the motive, the judgment proceed :- In the whole circumstances, if ever there can be said to be motive for self-destruction, such motive was present in this case. Motive, however, can never be of it self sufficient. The utmost that it can do is to destroy or attenuate the inference drawn from the experience of mankind that self-destruction, being contrary to human instincts, is unlikely to have occurred. The proof of suicide must be sought in the circumstances of the death. The judgment then considered in detail the evidence as to the circumstances of Arnold"s death, and held that death was self-inflicted by the deliberate intention of the deceased. Nor was there, in their Lordships" view, any great cogency in the argument that various facts made it unlikely that he would choose of settled purpose that particular morning for the deed. The judgment then considered in detail the evidence as to the circumstances of Arnold"s death, and held that death was self-inflicted by the deliberate intention of the deceased. Nor was there, in their Lordships" view, any great cogency in the argument that various facts made it unlikely that he would choose of settled purpose that particular morning for the deed. If he had entertained the idea of putting an end to his troubles by suicide, the particular moment might be uncertain to the last, and indeed suggested by some circumstances accidental in itself. But the determining element in the case was the real evidence afforded by the wound, its position, and its relation to the clothes worn, by the presence of the stick, which all pointed to the practical impossibility of the injury being caused by any accidental handling of the gun however clumsy. The case must go back with a declaration that judgment should be entered for the defendants and the action dismissed. The defendants must have their costs in the Courts below and before this Board. The costs of the petitions of the respondents for leave to cross-appeal must, as was settled when leave was granted, be borne by the petitioners. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. Appeal dismissed.