Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Resident at Hyderabad (September 27, 1915) (As to the right of appeal to His Majesty in Council from the above-named Court see the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890(53 & 54 Vict. c. 37), s. 9, the Indian Foreign Jurisdiction Order in Council (September 12, 1902), and further Order in Council of March 22, 1913; the effect is that the Code of Civil Procedure is made applicable subject to modifications which do not affect the matter. Special leave to appeal from the Residents Court at Hyderabad was given in other cases on March 22, 1913, and December 30, 1916,) reversing a decree of the Assistant Resident and restoring that of the District Judge of Secunderabad. The appellant sued the respondents to recover Rs. 39,825 as principal and interest due upon fourteen hundis drawn in his favour. The question upon the appeal was whether the Resident had rightly held that having regard to the terms of the hundis, which appear from the judgment of their Lordships, the suit could not be maintained against the first respondent. 1918. Oct. 28, 29. Sir Erle Richards, K.C., and Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. The first respondent was made a party to the hundis by their terms, and the appellant should have been allowed an opportunity to prove by evidence that he was in fact a principal. The Indian Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, does not provide, as the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (Imp.), does, by s. 23, that no person is liable as a party unless he signs the bill. The effect of ss. 26, 27 and 28 of 70 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 33 ( 1918- 1919) Sadusuk Janki Das V. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad 171 the Indian Act is that with regard to the liability of a principal the same rules apply to a negotiable instrument as to any other contract. If the effect of the words "acting in his name" in s. 27 is that the name of the principal must be disclosed, that requirement is satisfied by the terms of the hundis. [Reference was also made to the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 233; and to Kometi Naicker v. Gopala. (( 1913) 1. L. R. 38 M. 482.)] The respondents did not appear. Nov. 1. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. [Reference was also made to the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872), s. 233; and to Kometi Naicker v. Gopala. (( 1913) 1. L. R. 38 M. 482.)] The respondents did not appear. Nov. 1. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. On April 14, 1910, Mohan Lal borrowed from the plaintiffs, who are the appellants on this appeal, the sum of Rs. 35,000, and to secure repayment drew and accepted in their favour fourteen hundis—each for the sum of Rs. 2,500—the first payable ten months after April 14, 1910, and the remainder at successive intervals of one month. Each hundi was in the same form, and it is agreed that the true translation is as follows— "By order of Sirkar may his happiness increase. To Mohan Lai, son of Hira Lai Six months from the date of the execution of this hundi, please pay to Seth Sadasuk Janki Das Sahu of the Residency Bazars or to his order the sum of H. S. Rs. 2,500 (half of which is Rs. 1,250) which sum I have received in cash in the Residency Bazars from the said Seth Sahib. Dated 3rd Rabi-us-sani 1328-H (April 14, 1910) Mohan Lal (In Urdu), Acting Superintendent of the Private Treasury of His Excellency Sir Maharaja, the Prime Minister of H.H. the Nizam.” [On the back] "This hundi has been accepted by Mohan Lai, son of Hira Lai, in favour of Seth Sadasuk Janki Das, inhabitant of the Residency Bazars, Hyderabad. Dated 3rd Rabi-us-sani 1328, Hijri Mohan Lal (In Urdu)" The whole of the hundis were dishonoured, and the appellant accordingly took proceedings, on August 15, 1913, against Mohan Lal and the Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad Bahadur, the respondents on this appeal, claiming the amounts due upon the hundis with interest. It would, of course, have been open to the plaintiffs had they thought fit to have framed their case in an alternative form, and to have sued both on the hundis and alternatively upon the consideration. It is indeed urged by the appellants that the plaint in fact embraced both these forms of relief, but their Lordships are unable to accept that contention, which does not appear to have been raised in the courts below. It is indeed urged by the appellants that the plaint in fact embraced both these forms of relief, but their Lordships are unable to accept that contention, which does not appear to have been raised in the courts below. In their opinion the plaint was confined to an action brought upon the hundis themselves, and the sole question for decision upon this appeal is whether upon the form of the hundi the first respondent, the Maharaja, was properly included as a defendant to the suit, or whether as against him 70 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 33 ( 1918- 1919) Sadusuk Janki Das V. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad 172 the claim is demurrable. The District Judge on September 19, 1914, dismissed the suit against the Maharaja, but passed a decree against Mohan Lai. The plaintiff appealed from this judgment to the First Assistant Resident at Hyderabad who, on April 28, 1915, reversed the judgment of the District Judge and remanded the case to be disposed of on the merits, holding that the hundis were drawn in a form sufficient to charge the Maharaja upon these if agency were proved; but this judgment was reversed by the Resident at Hyderabad on September 27, 1915, and from this judgment the present appeal has been brought. The real point for decision is whether the hundis have been so drawn that in form they bind the Maharaja. If they have, it will then become necessary to determine whether in fact Mohan Lal had authority for the purpose. If they have not, this question of agency does not and cannot arise in the present suit. Now, in the actual operative part of the hundis there is nothing by which the Maharaja can be bound. Each one is drawn in the name of Mohan Lal alone, and accepted by him without qualification, for the addition of the words, " Acting Superintendent of the Private Treasury of His Excellency Sir Maharaja, the Prime Minister of H.H. the Nizam," is, in their Lordships opinion, nothing but a description of Mohan Lais position, and is certainly not a signature in the form necessary for an agent signing on a principals behalf. The appellants, however, place great reliance on the preliminary words—" By the order of Sirkar may his happiness increase," and contend that such a preface to the instrument implies that subsequent signatures are signatures on behalf of the Sirkar. Their Lordships cannot accept this contention. It is of the utmost importance that the name of a person or firm to be charged upon a negotiable document should be clearly stated on the face or on the back of the document; so that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand. In this case the preliminary words mention no more than that Mohan Lal has been directed to execute the hundis, and they do not necessarily imply that he has been clothed with authority to execute them in any other form than that in which they were actually prepared— a form which it has already been shown constituted nothing more than a personal liability on behalf of Mohan Lai. The statement, to which reference has been made, which appears on p. 99 of Messrs. Iyenger and Adigas book on negotiable instruments, that "outside evidence is inadmissible on any person as a principal party unless his—the principal partys—name is in some way disclosed in the instrument itself," is not in itself an adequate statement of the law. It is not sufficient that the principals name should be " in some way " disclosed; it must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bill. Their Lordships attention was directed to ss. 26, 27 and 28 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the terms of those sections were contrasted with the corresponding provisions of the English Statute. It is unnecessary in this connection to decide whether their effect is identical. It is sufficient to say that these sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rules, that in an action on a bill of exchange or promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal. 70 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 70 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 33 ( 1918- 1919) Sadusuk Janki Das V. Maharaja Sir Kishan Pershad 173 The judgment of the Resident appears to their Lordships to place the correct interpretation upon the documents in this case, and to state accurately the principles of law that are to be applied. For this reason they think that the appeal must fail, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that it should be dismissed.