Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 9, 1914) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Purneah (April 14, 1910). The suit was instituted on September 14, 1908, by Hukumchand Boid (since deceased, and represented by the appellants) against the respondent. The material facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge, upon the issues framed, held, inter alia that the plaintiff had purchased benami for the patnidar; that the suit was for money paid for a consideration which had failed; that time began to run on August 24, 1905, when the sale was set aside; and that consequently it was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, Sched. II. Art. 97; that the remedy given to a purchaser by s. 14 of Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1819 did not exclude other remedies. He dismissed the suit. The High Court affirmed the decree. The learned judges (Fletcher and Richardson JJ.) doubted whether the suit lay having regard to the terms of s. 14 of the Regulation; they disagreed with the finding that the plaintiff had purchased benami for the patnidar, pointing out that the Subordinate Judge had not found that the patnidar had provided the purchase money; upon the question of limitation, they held that the suit was barred by art. 97, except as to the last two items claimed; as to those items—namely, rent paid to the zamindar after the sale and interest thereon—they said that the plaintiff having been in possession there had been no failure of consideration. 1914. Oct. 24. P. O. Lawrence K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. The suit was not barred by limitation. There was not a complete failure of consideration until August 28, 1906, when the plaintiff gave up possession Hanuman Kamu v. Hanuman Mandar (( 1891) L. R. 18 I. A. 158.); Narsing Shivbakas v. Pachu Ram-bakas. (( 1913) I. L. R. 37 B. 538.) With regard to the rent, the sale being set aside the zamindar was not entitled to it. The High Court overlooked that under the decree setting aside the sale the purchaser had to pay mesne profits to the darpatnidars. If time ran from the setting aside of the sale it ran from the decree of the High Court of August 3, 1906, and the suit was brought in time Venkatanarasimhulu v. Peramma. The High Court overlooked that under the decree setting aside the sale the purchaser had to pay mesne profits to the darpatnidars. If time ran from the setting aside of the sale it ran from the decree of the High Court of August 3, 1906, and the suit was brought in time Venkatanarasimhulu v. Peramma. (( 1894) I. L. R. 18 M. 173.) The remedy given by s. 14 of Bengal Regulation VIII. of 1819 is not exclusive of other remedies Radha Madhub Samonta v. Sasti Ram Sen. (( 1899) I. L. R. 26 C. 826.) There is no statutory provision taking away a purchasers ordinary right of action. The Subordinate Judge, not having found that the patnidar paid the purchase price, should not have held that the plaintiff was a benamidar Faek Buksh v. Fukeeboodeen. (( 1871) 14 Moo. I. A. 234.) De Gruyther K.C. and Dunne K.C. for the respondent. The suit was barred by art. 97, if it lay at all. The contention that time ran from the relinquishment of possession is based upon a misapprehension of the nature of patni tenure and of the proceedings under the Regulation. The zamindar had no right to possession or in ejectment. If there was any right of action against the zamindar it arose on August 25, 1905, when the sale was set aside. The suit could have been brought although the decree was under appeal. But in fact there was no contract between the zamindar and the plaintiff, the sale not being by the zamindar but by the Collector under the Regulation. It is for that reason that s. 14 give, a remedy to the purchaser, there being no remedy by action. Further the plaintiff upon the appeal to the High Court from the decree under s. 14 could have asked for an indemnity, not having done so he is barred by res judicata. If there was any cause of action for the rent paid after the decree it was against the patnidar. But in any case the claim to those amounts was barred. Upon the facts the plaintiff was benamidar for the patnidar, and the whole claim, therefore, necessarily failed. P. O. Lawrence K.C. in reply. The Regulation treats a sale as one by the zamindar. But in any case the claim to those amounts was barred. Upon the facts the plaintiff was benamidar for the patnidar, and the whole claim, therefore, necessarily failed. P. O. Lawrence K.C. in reply. The Regulation treats a sale as one by the zamindar. It is not analogous to a sale in execution (Sheorutton Singh v. Net Loll Sahu (( 1902) I. L. R. 30 C. 1, 11.)), but to one by a trustee with a power of sale. Dec. 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. On May 14, 1904, a patni taluk known as lot Mirzapur was put up for sale for arrears of rent under the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation 1819 (Beng. Regulation VIII. of 1819) at the instance of the zamindar, Mussumat Bhagwanbati Chowdurain. The defendant-respondent, Pirthichand Lal Chowdhury, as her successor in title, is the present zamindar. The defaulting patnidar was Chhatrapat Singh. Hukumchand Boid, now represented on this appeal by his heirs the plaintiffs-appellants, was the highest bidder, and the tenure was knocked down to him. The purchaser paid in the entire amount of the purchase money, and on May 23, 1904, he received from the officer conducting the sale a certificate of payment under s. 15 of the Regulation. On May 28, 1904, the purchaser received the usual amaldustak or order for possession, but on June 30 following, a darpatnidars, being desirous of contesting the right of the zamindar to make the sale, sued her for its reversal. Three similar suits for the same purpose were instituted by other darpatnidars in July and August. A decree for reversal of the sale was passed in each of these suits. That in the first, suit No. 248 of 1904, was passed in the Court of first instance on August 24, 1905. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed on August 3, 1906. The decrees in the other suits, Nos. 262, 273 and 277 of 1904, were passed on August 28, 1906. By the present suit the purchaser seeks to recover from the zamindar the sum of Rs. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed on August 3, 1906. The decrees in the other suits, Nos. 262, 273 and 277 of 1904, were passed on August 28, 1906. By the present suit the purchaser seeks to recover from the zamindar the sum of Rs. 57,99636, the aggregate of several sums of money being (a) the amount of rent arrears due and paid by the Collector to the zamindar out of the purchase money; (6) the expenses of the sale appropriated by the Collector out of the purchase money; (c) the patni rents paid to the zamindar subsequent to the sale ; and (d) interest on these several sums and on the balance of purchase money left in the hands of the Collector. In the Court of first instance the suit was dismissed as barred by limitation, and that decree was affirmed by the High Court on appeal. From this decision the present appeal has been preferred. The principal point discussed has been the plea of limitation, and in the argument as well as throughout the earlier stages of the suit it has been assumed that this question is governed by art. 97 in the second schedule to the Limitation Act. That article prescribes the period of limitation for a suit there described as one "for money paid upon an existing consideration which afterwards fails." If regard be had to the peculiar character of a sale under the Regulation it is manifest that the facts but imperfectly fit the phrase; they perhaps more nearly approach the formula of " money had and received by the defendant for the plaintiffs use," if read as a description and apart from the technical qualifications imported in English law and procedure. But however that maybe, their Lordships feel that in view of the course the suit has consistently taken and also of the attitude on both sides here that they ought to deal with the case on the assumption, made for the purpose of this present appeal alone, but without affirming its correctness, that the present suit is competent and that it comes within the terms of art. 97. It is from this assumed basis that they will approach the case. The period of limitation prescribed by art. 97 is three years, and the time from which the period begins to run is the date of the failure of consideration. 97. It is from this assumed basis that they will approach the case. The period of limitation prescribed by art. 97 is three years, and the time from which the period begins to run is the date of the failure of consideration. The suit was instituted on September 14, 1908, and it is alleged in the plaint that the cause of action arose " on August 3, 1906, the date of the appellate decree in connection with suit No. 248 of 1904, and subsequently August 28, the date of decree in the three suits Nos. 262, 273, and 277 of 1904." These are the decrees already mentioned, and the case here made is that it was the reversal of the sale that was the cause of action. But by the decision in the first suit, No. 248 of 1904, the sale was reversed in its entirety and for all purposes irrespective of the decrees in the three later suits, so that if the reversal of the sale is the cause of action the only question is whether time began to run as the plaint alleges from August 3, 1906, the date of the appellate decree, or, as the defendant-respondent contends, from August 24, 1905, the date of the original decree in suit No. 248 of 1904. Both Courts have held that the failure of consideration was at the date of the first Courts decree. Their Lordships feel no doubt that as between these two decrees this is the correct view, for whatever may be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by presentation of an appeal nor is its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is one of dismissal. To escape from this position and its consequence a new starting point was suggested in the course of the argument here it was contended that the period of limitation began to run when possession was lost. There may be circumstances in which a failure to get or retain possession may justly be regarded as the time from which the limitation period should run, but that is not the case here. There may be circumstances in which a failure to get or retain possession may justly be regarded as the time from which the limitation period should run, but that is not the case here. The quality of the possession acquired by the present purchaser excludes the idea that the starting point is to be sought in a disturbance of possession or in any event other than the challenge to the sale and the negation of the purchasers title to the entirety of what he bought involved in the decree of August 24, 1905. If further support of this view be required it may be found in the express provision of s. 14 of the Regulation which directs that in the suit for reversal itself the purchaser to be indemnified against all loss. Moreover, the argument suffers from the infirmity that necessarily attaches to a belated plea advanced for the first time when the stage for investigating the necessary facts had passed. It is enough then to say that the facts disclosed afford no ground for preferring any other event than the decree of August 24, 1905, as marking the time from which the period of limitation ought to run. Their Lordships in arriving at this conclusion have not overlooked the authorities cited in argument. When the facts in Hanuman Kamut v. Hanuman Mandar (L. R. 18 I. A. 158.) are examined they lend no support to this contention. It is true that there the resistance to obtaining possession was regarded as the crucial date, but that was in circumstances bearing no real resemblance to the present, and nothing was decided which would sanction the view that the time for limitation could be postponed to a period later than the first decree in suit 248 of 1904. The decision in Narsing Shivbakas v. Pachu Rambakas (I.L. R.37 B. 538.), though cited in argument, does not call for serious consideration. But then it has been contended that at any rate the claim, so far as it relates to the patni rents paid to the zamindar subsequent to the sale, is not barred by limitation. These rents were paid on November 17, 1904, and May 17, 1905, and if, as is suggested, they are governed by a different article it can only be art. 62 which would be an equal bar to the suit. These rents were paid on November 17, 1904, and May 17, 1905, and if, as is suggested, they are governed by a different article it can only be art. 62 which would be an equal bar to the suit. Further than this, their Lordships think it was rightly decided by the High Court that no suit for this amount would lie. These conclusions are sufficient for the determination of this appeal, but there is another branch of the case that calls for notice, not so much for the purpose of this appeal as for its general bearing on litigation under s. 14 of the Regulation. That section authorizes a suit against the zamindar for the reversal of a sale under the Regulation, and then provides that " the purchaser shall be made a party in such suits, and upon decree passing for reversal of the sale the Court shall be careful to indemnify him against all loss at the charge of the zamindar or person at whose suit the sale may have been made." There is no ambiguity in this provision it is imperative, and imposes on the Court without qualification the duty it indicates. To discharge this duty a distinct issue should be framed as between the purchaser and the person chargeable under the section whether, in case the sale is reversed, the purchaser has suffered any and what loss against which he ought to be indemnified by that person. On that issue there ought to be a finding and a decision, and then any contest on this head would be finally closed subject to such right of appeal as there might be. Though, in the judgment pronounced in suit No. 248 of 1904, there is a finding as to Hukumchands benami character which would be conclusive against any right to indemnity, no decision as to this right is recorded, nor has it been possible to ascertain whether any such decision is embodied in the decree, for by an unexplained and regrettable omission it forms no part of the record. In the three other decrees the claim is apparently negatived, but there is no finding recorded in the judgment that could justify this decision. And so the Courts in that series of suits failed to apply the provision of s, 14 in a manner that would be conclusive as to the purchasers right to be indemnified. In the three other decrees the claim is apparently negatived, but there is no finding recorded in the judgment that could justify this decision. And so the Courts in that series of suits failed to apply the provision of s, 14 in a manner that would be conclusive as to the purchasers right to be indemnified. How far the remedy provided by s. 14 in a purchasers favour excludes all other remedies, apart from any determination of an issue, is a question of some nicety. There is much to be said in favour of its exclusive character on the score of policy and convenience. No actual decision, however, one way or the other has been brought to their Lordships notice; for though the language of the Chief Justice in Radha Madhub Samonta v. Sasti Ram Sen (I. L. R. 26 C. 826, 829.) seems to favour the view that the effect of the section is not to exclude all other remedies, to the actual facts of that case the provision of the section could have had no application. This is brought out in the more guarded judgment of Banerji J, Obviously, too, the remark in Brojo Kishore Rukhit v. Bashi Mundal (( 1874) 21 Suth. W. R. 252.) cannot be regarded as in any sense conclusive. It was conceded in argument that this suit appeared to be one of first impression, but in the absence of more complete information as to the cursus curiae in India their Lordships will not say more than that the question will demand careful consideration should it hereafter arise. But they again desire to emphasize the point that if the Courts observe the duty cast on them by s. 14 this difficulty never can arise. And they would only add this, that their decision of this appeal on other grounds is due to the particular course this litigation had taken, and must not be regarded as indicating an opinion that the suit is competent. The result, then, is that in their Lordships opinion this appeal should be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.