Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 16, 1914) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh (August 12, 1910). The question for determination in the appeal was whether the appellant (plaintiff), the Maharaja of Ramgarh, was entitled to resume a jagir of a village, granted in 1852 by-one of his-predecessors, upon failure of lineal descendants of the grantee. The village was in Raj Ramgarh, in Chota Nagpur, Hazaribagh district. The terms of the grant appear in full in the judgment of their Lordships. The following issues, among others, were settled (5.) What is the true character of the jagir grant now in question? Is it liable to be resumed upon failure of the male heirs of Kanhai Singh? (6.) Is there any Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 88 ( 1918- 1919) Maharaja Ram Narayan Singh V. Ram Saran Lal 206 custom of resuming jagir grants on the failure of the male heirs of the original grantee, as stated in the plaint ? If so, will the custom apply to the grant in question? Much documentary and oral evidence was called at the trial as to grants of jagirs in Raj Ramgarh, and reference was made to the following passage in Hunters Statistical Account of Bengal, vol. 16 (Districts of Hazaribagh and Lohardaga), p. 122 "Although the Raja of Ramgarh had the power to resume the jagirs and khairats on the death of the holder, they never exercised this power. But on the death of the holder, sometimes on receipt of a nazrana, but more frequently without any consideration, they confirmed the original grant to the heirs until, by efflux of time, they lost the power of redemption; and the life-tenures have now become permanent and liable to resumption only on the failure of heirs of the original grantees. In confirming this jagir grants the Rajas only recognized the eldest son or the eldest branch of the original holder. In confirming this jagir grants the Rajas only recognized the eldest son or the eldest branch of the original holder. After the permanent settlement, the Rajas of Ramgarh created by sanads fresh jagir and khairat grants, either as reward for good service or for some good consideration, assimilating the nature of the new grants to those of the old jagir and khairat grants the difference being that the old jagirs and khairats, granted before the permanent settlement, are held on unwritten while those subsequently created are held by written, contract." The Subordinate Judge found that the custom alleged by the appellant that jagirs in Raj Ramgarh were resumable upon a failure of the grantees male lineal heirs was abundantly proved, and he held that, in the absence of evidence differentiating a jagir granted to a man and his putra-poutradi, the grant in question was resumable. The High Court reversed the decision. The learned judges (Stephen and Mullick JJ.) held that, having regard to decisions of the Privy Council as to the effect of the words putra-poutradi, the grant was of an absolute estate of inheritance. The appeal is reported at I. L. R. 42 C. 305. 1918. Oct. 18, 21. Dunne K.C. (Picciotto with him) for the appellant. It is well established that a jagir is prima facie an estate for life Gulabdas Jugivandas v. Collector of Surat (( 1878) L. R. 6 I. A. 54.); Bengal Regulation XXXVII. of 1793, s. 15. The onus was upon the respondents to show that the grant carried an estate of absolute inheritance. The evidence conclusively showed that jagirs in the locality were resumable on a failure of male heirs. See, too, Hunters Statistical Account of Bengal, vol. 16, pp. 117, 121, 122. There was no evidence that putra-poutradi jagirs stood upon a different footing. Those words in themselves are not sufficiently clear to satisfy the onus in the face of the evidence as to custom Perkash Lal v. Rameshwar Nath Singh. (( 1904) I. L. R. 31 C 561.) That case related to a jagir in Chota Nagpur, and the terms of the grant—namely, al aulad— make it an a fortiori case. The High Court wrongly applied the decisions of the Board in Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 8 I. A. 46.), and Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Led Roy. The High Court wrongly applied the decisions of the Board in Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 8 I. A. 46.), and Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Led Roy. (L. R. 24 I. A. 76.) Those cases related to the construction of the expression putra-poutradi occurring in a will. A gift by will, even without words of limitation, would carry a general estate of inheritance; a jagir, however, is prima facie an estate for life. The decisions were therefore not applicable. Parikh for the respondents. All jagirs are not prima facie estates for life Wilsons Glossary, s. v. "jagir." Cases in which it has been held that they are related to jagirs granted by a ruling power, either British or native. This jagir was not of that character. The High Court rightly applied the decisions of the Board as to the effect of the words putra-poutradi. By those words, whether used in a will or a grant, and in whatever part of India they are used, a general estate of inheritance is conveyed. The appellants construction would create an estate in tail male, which is unknown in Hindu law Ganendra Mohan Tagore v. Upendra Mohan Tagore. (( 1869) 4 Beng. L. R. (0. C.) 103,182.) The Subordinate Judge gave no effect to the words putra-poutradi. A condition or limitation upon the words used in the grant could not be introduced by oral evidence. [Reference was also made to Bhoobun Mohini Debya v. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 88 ( 1918- 1919) Maharaja Ram Narayan Singh V. Ram Saran Lal 207 (( 1878) L. R. 5 I A. 138.); Dosibai v. Ishwandas Jagjiwandas (( 1891) L. R. 18 I. A. 22.) ; Roopnath v. Juggumnath Sahee Deo (( 1836) 6 Sel. Rep. S. D. A. 133.) and Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., pars. 394, 398.] Dunne K. C., replied. Dec. 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. This is an appeal from a decree, dated June 16, 1914, of the High Court at Calcutta, which set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, dated August 12, 1910, and dismissed the suit. 394, 398.] Dunne K. C., replied. Dec. 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN EDGE. This is an appeal from a decree, dated June 16, 1914, of the High Court at Calcutta, which set aside a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, dated August 12, 1910, and dismissed the suit. The suit in which this appeal was brought was commenced by Maharaja Sri Sri Ram Narayan on February 4, 1909, for khas possession of Mauza Salga in Raj Ramgarh in Chota Nagpur, and for mesne profits. Mauza Salga had been granted as jagir in 1852 to Kanai Singh by Maharaja Sambunath, ancestor of the plaintiff, who was the zamindar, then possessed of the mauza. The original plaintiff has died, and the appellant is his legal representative. The grant of the jagir, as translated, is as follows— "3rd Falgun Sudi 1908 Sambat Patta of agreement granted by order of His Highness Maharaja Sri Sri Sambhu Nath Singh Bahadur is as follows The jagir of Salga, one village, in pargana Karanpura, is granted to Kanai Singh, of which the jumma is Co.s Rs. 300. Out of that the landlords 6 annas share is Rs. 112-8, from which a remission of Rs. 75 is made, the balance of landlords share, Rs. 37-8, shall be paid by you year by year. You, with your descendants, will continue to enjoy the same. The village is granted together with trees, wells, tinils, fish. This is granted by His Highness in the presence of Bakshi Joynandan Das, Bakshi Lachman Das, Mahta Bissambhar Das, Bakshi Bhawani Ram, and Bakshi Bhagwan Das." The vernacular word in the grant which has been translated as "descendants" is putra-poutradi, which, according to the plaintiffs case, meant in the grant male descendants in the male line. Kanai Singh died before suit, having had a son, Sheo Bakhsh, who predeceased him, and had died without issue, and one other son, Bansi Lai, who survived him, and died without issue before suit. The defendants are Ram Saran Lal and his minor sons, and Shib Saran Lal and his minor sons. The defendants are not descended from Kanai Singh, the grantee; they are descended in the male line from Piari Lai, who was a brother of Kanai Singh. The defendants are Ram Saran Lal and his minor sons, and Shib Saran Lal and his minor sons. The defendants are not descended from Kanai Singh, the grantee; they are descended in the male line from Piari Lai, who was a brother of Kanai Singh. The plaintiffs case was that, on the death of Bansi Lai, without male issue surviving him, Mauza Salga reverted to him, he being the legal representative of the grantor. The defendants put forward two different cases in defence to the suit, the first of which was that the jagir had been originally granted to Raghu Singh, who was the father of Piari Lal and Kanai Singh, and that as they are the male descendants in the male line of Raghu Singh, the mauza had not reverted, and they are entitled to the possession of it under the grant alleged by them. The defendants failed to prove that the grant of the jagir had been made to Raghu Singh, and not, as the fact was, to his son, Kanai Singh. It may be observed that in setting up that defence the defendants were obviously adopting the plaintiffs construction of the vernacular word putra-poutradi, according to which it meant, in the grant of a jagir in Raj Ramgarh, male descendants in the male line. Having failed to prove that the original grant was made to their ancestor, Raghu Singh, the defendants then contended that the grant to Kanai Singh and his putra-poutradi created an estate of inheritance which descended to them as collaterals. The Subordinate Judge considered that a grant of a jagir to a man and his putra-poutradi was a grant Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 88 ( 1918- 1919) Maharaja Ram Narayan Singh V. Ram Saran Lal 208 to him and his lineal male descendants, and that in Chota Nagpur the term putra-poutradi could not in a grant of a jagir possibly include collateral or female heirs. A great deal of evidence,, documentary and oral, was before the Subordinate Judge as to grants of jagirs which had been made in Raj Ramgarh, and that evidence satisfied the Subordinate Judge that all jagirs granted in Raj Ramgarh were resumable on failure of male heirs in the male line of the original grantees. A great deal of evidence,, documentary and oral, was before the Subordinate Judge as to grants of jagirs which had been made in Raj Ramgarh, and that evidence satisfied the Subordinate Judge that all jagirs granted in Raj Ramgarh were resumable on failure of male heirs in the male line of the original grantees. The Subordinate Judge in his judgment said "I have before stated that in Perkash Lal v. Rameshwar Nath Singh (I.L. R. 31 C. 561.) al aulad jagirs/ which is a term of much broader significance than putra-poutradi jagir/ were held to be resumable on proof of a custom that jagirs generally were resumable on failure of male issue. Also looking to Hunter, there cannot be any doubt that jagirs of all sorts, without any exception, were resumable. The language of the sanad is ambiguous, the word putra-poutradi does not clearly mean an absolute estate of inheritance, and jagirs generally are proved, both by oral and documentary evidence, to be resumable. No instances were proved of putra-poutradi jagirs not being resumed, but being held by females and collateral heirs. It is for the defendants, therefore, to prove the exception in the case of jagirs containing the word putra-poutradi. Nothing has been done in this connection. It is not established that Ramgarh Raj used to grant two distinct sorts of jagirs—one resumable on failure of male issue, and the other (with the words putra-poutradi contained in the sanad) an absolute estate of inheritance not resumable. On the contrary, the evidence is that all jagirs, by whatever name called, condition or no condition attached, were primarily life-tenures, and which, by efflux of time, became permanent and resumable, and liable to resumption only on failure of male heirs of the original grantees. In the face of the strong documentary evidence of the custom alleged by the plaintiff, it is needless to comment at length on the oral evidence that was also given to prove custom. The Rajas old servants all deposed to the existence of the custom, and they stated specific cases of the resumption of some jagir villages that were within their knowledge and time, in addition to the cases to which the judgments filed relate. The case already referred to was also a case in Chota Nagpur, and is a much stronger case than the present. The case already referred to was also a case in Chota Nagpur, and is a much stronger case than the present. Thus the custom being fully established, all the ambiguity in the word putra-poutradi is removed, and it must be taken to mean lineal male descendants only." In the case to which the Subordinate Judge referred, Perkash Lal v. Rameshwar Nath Singh, a proprietor of a Chota Nagpur Raj in a deed of gift had granted to, a Brahmin and his al aulad a mauza in pargana Kanda, and it was held by the High Court at Calcutta that although the words al aulad etymologically include female as well as male descendants, yet according to a custom which was proved to have prevailed at the time of the grant, and subsequently in that part of the country, the words al aulad must be interpreted to mean lineal male descendants only. The learned judges who decided that case in the High Court at Calcutta in 1904 referred in their judgment to a case in which the Deputy Commissioner of Chota Nagpur had decided in 1845 that a grant to a man and his putra-poutradi did not convey an estate of inheritance, and that the grantor was entitled to resume the lands granted on the death without issue of the grantee. The reference in the Subordinate Judges judgment to Hunter was, without doubt, a reference to Sir William Hunters statistical account of the districts of Hazaribagh and Lohardaga, which was printed in 1877. When he wrote that account he was Mr. W. W. Hunter, Director-General in India of Statistics, and at pp. 121 and 122 he gave a historical account of jagirs in Ramgarh. The Subordinate Judge gave to the plaintiff a decree for possession and for mesne profits to be subsequently ascertained. When he wrote that account he was Mr. W. W. Hunter, Director-General in India of Statistics, and at pp. 121 and 122 he gave a historical account of jagirs in Ramgarh. The Subordinate Judge gave to the plaintiff a decree for possession and for mesne profits to be subsequently ascertained. From that decree the defendants appealed to the High Court at Calcutta, The learned judges of the High Court who heard the appeal said as to the evidence "There is evidence which may be summarized by saying that it shows that jagirs granted by the Raj were terminable on the death of male heirs, though there is no case to show that this was so when the words putra-poutradi were used." They rightly held that the grant of a jagir, without any words to show that it was not for life only, would be a grant only for the life of the grantee, but they considered that the Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 88 ( 1918- 1919) Maharaja Ram Narayan Singh V. Ram Saran Lal 209 addition of putra-poutradi extended the estate for life. They said "The words literally translated are as we understand, putra = son, poutra = grandson, and adi = others but the expression must, of course, be construed, in the first place, according to any construction that has been legally recognized." As the Board had decided in Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 8 I. A. 46.), that the words putra-poutradi krame, which occurred in a devise in a Bengali will, though importing the male sex in their primary signification, apply also to the female heirs of a female where by law the estate would descend to such heirs, and were apt words for conferring an estate of inheritance upon either male or female, the learned judges of the High Court considered that the term putra-poutradi in this jagir grant must be construed as conveying an estate of inheritance which would descend to collaterals of the grantee. They also referred to another decision of the Board, Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (L. R. 24 I. A. 76.), which also was a case of a devise in a Bengali will, and they allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. From that decree of the High Court this appeal has been brought. They also referred to another decision of the Board, Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (L. R. 24 I. A. 76.), which also was a case of a devise in a Bengali will, and they allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. From that decree of the High Court this appeal has been brought. There can be no doubt that a jagir must be taken prima facie to be an estate only for life, although it may possibly be granted in such terms as to make it hereditary. That was so decided by the Board in Gulabdas Jagjiwandas v. Collector of Surat (L. R. 6 I. A. 54.) which was an appeal from the High Court at Bombay. But the terms which will make the grant !of a jagir a grant of an estate of inheritance must, if they are to be considered alone, be terms which are not ambiguous, and must clearly show whether it was intended by the grantor that the right of inheritance should be general or should be confined to a particular class of heirs. In Dosibai v. Ishwandas Jagjiwandas (L. R. 18 L A. 22.) there was no ambiguity in the terms of the grant. In that case the Governor of Bombay in Council by a sanad in English, which was not ambiguous, had granted to Ardeser Bahadur " and his heirs for ever as jaghir " four villages, and the Board held that " where there is a grant to a man and his heirs, and nothing to control the ordinary meaning of the words, the grantee takes an absolute interest." In the case now before this Board the term putra-poutradi, standing by itself, and without any evidence to show whether in Raj Ramgarh collaterals or females succeeded to jagirs, is ambiguous. But the evidence shows that in Raj Ramgarh those who have succeeded to jagirs have been always males in the male line of the grantee. But the evidence shows that in Raj Ramgarh those who have succeeded to jagirs have been always males in the male line of the grantee. The cases of Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (L. R. 8 L A. 46.) and Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (L. R. 24 I. A. 76.) were not cases of grants of jagirs; they were cases of the construction of vernacular words in devises in Bengali wills, and it was obvious that the testators, in employing terms which usually in Bengal were understood as apt to pass an estate of inheritance, did employ them to pass such an estate. It may well be that in a grant of a jagir in Bengal by a Bengali; similar words in the grant would imply that an estate of inheritance had been granted to the grantee if there was nothing to show a contrary intention. But there is nothing here to prove, or even to suggest, that the term putra-poutradi has ever been understood in Chota Nagpur, or in Raj Ramgarh, as including heirs collateral, and there is no evidence that any one of the many jagirs which have been granted in Raj Ramgarh has ever descended to a collateral heir of the grantee. So much impressed was the Subordinate Judge by evidence, documentary and oral, that he came to the conclusion that there is a custom in Raj Ramgarh that jagirs are resumable on a failure of heirs male in the male line of the grantee. In their Lordships opinion the Subordinate Judge was justified in making the decree which he made in this case, and it should not have been set aside. They will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court should be set aside with costs, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge should be restored. The respondents must pay the costs of this appeal.