Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (February 26, 1915) affirming a decree of the first Subordinate Judge of Midnapur. The suit was instituted by the appellant against the respondent on May 31, 1912, for a declaration that two conveyances of immovable property dated June 7, 1890, and February 11, 1901, respectively were not binding upon her, and for possession of the properties. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The first of ft large number of issues settled was, "Is the suit barred by limitation?" The Subordinate Judge ordered that issue to be tried first under Order XIV., r, 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He held that the suit was barred whether it fell within art. 142 (as he held that it did), or within art., 144 of Sched. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The High Court upon appeal affirmed the decision, Save as to two villages which had been conveyed within twelve years of the suit being commenced. 88 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 60 ( 1918- 1919) Rani Kuar Mani Mandhata V. Nawab of Murshidabad 189 1918. Nov. 7, 8. De Gruyther K.C., and H. N. Sen for the appellant. Time did not run against the suit while the property was under the charge of the Court of Wards. Under s. 35 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, the Court of Wards had possession, though not adversely to the proprietors within the 3 meaning of art. 144 of Sched.1 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and under Part VII., of the Act the proprietors could not themselves sue or be sued see ss. 51,55 and Kumar Biseswar Roy v. Kumar Shoshi Roy. (( 1889) L. R. 17 I. A. 5.) No suit by the proprietors against the Court of Wards to obtain a release of the property was maintainable. The principle of Tukaram v. Sujangir (( 1884) I. L. R. 8 B. 585) applies, namely, that time does not run against a plaintiff while his property is in the custody of the law, and he is not legally able to sue for its possession. The order taking the property into charge was made under s. 6 (a) of the Act of 1879. The Subordinate Judge wrongly held that s. 6 (e), added by Bengal Act IV. The order taking the property into charge was made under s. 6 (a) of the Act of 1879. The Subordinate Judge wrongly held that s. 6 (e), added by Bengal Act IV. of 1892, s. 3, was applicable, and that the proprietors had the powers given by that Act. No declaration under s. 56 (e) of that Act was made. Dunne K. C., and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. Time began to run, both under art., 142 and art., 144, when the purchaser got possession, and the suit was consequently barred. It is conceded that the order was made under s. 6 (a) and not under s. 6 (e), but no title vested in the Court of Wards the possession was on behalf of the proprietors and was analogous to that of a receiver, with statutory powers of management. [Reference was made to ss. 5, 6, 9, 14, 15, 18, 35 of the Act of 1879.] There was no disability expressly or impliedly recognised by the Indian Limitation Act. De Gruyther K.C. replied. Dec. 3. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. Raja Prithwi Nath Singh Mandhata died on October 4, 1882, without male issue and was succeeded by his two widows. At his death he was heavily indebted, and on March 1, 1886, the widows presented a petition to the Commissioner of their division praying that he would recommend the Court of Wards to take charge of the estate. On July 30, 1886, the Court of Wards under s. 27 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, declared the widows to be disqualified proprietors under s. 6 (a) of the Act, and by the same order declared under s. 35 that it had determined to take under its charge the property of the widows and directed that possession be taken of the property on behalf of the Court. On June 7, 1890, a part of the property called Killa Nazagram was sold to the defendants father and predecessor in title, and the transfer was executed by the Collector. The purchaser obtained possession- admittedly not later than April 30, 1891. The defendants father subsequently obtained a transfer of two villages called Pirote and Sukdubi, and this was executed by the Collector on February 11, 1901. On August 1, 1911, the Court of Wards withdrew from the charge of the property. The purchaser obtained possession- admittedly not later than April 30, 1891. The defendants father subsequently obtained a transfer of two villages called Pirote and Sukdubi, and this was executed by the Collector on February 11, 1901. On August 1, 1911, the Court of Wards withdrew from the charge of the property. On May 31, 1912, the surviving widow instituted this suit impugning the two sales and transfers and praying that she might be restored to possession. At the first hearing 16 issues were framed. The fight was whether the suit was barred by limitation. On the defendants application under Order XIV., r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Court tried this and two other issues first, and disposed of the suit as barred by limitation. On appeal the High Court set aside the decree of the first Court in so far as it related to the two villages Sukdubi and Pirote comprised in the kabula of February 11, 1901, and ordered that the case be remanded to that Court to be dealt with according to the directions contained in the High Courts judgment, but in other respects affirmed the decree then under appeal. 88 Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 60 ( 1918- 1919) Rani Kuar Mani Mandhata V. Nawab of Murshidabad 190 From the High Courts decree the present appeal has been preferred. Though the grounds of appeal attack the procedure adopted at the trial the argument before this Board has been limited to the question whether the plaintiffs claim to the properties comprised in the transfer of June 7, 1890, is barred by limitation. The purchasers possession began not later than April 30, 1891, so that at the date this suit was instituted the defendant and his father, from whom he derives his liability to be sued, had been in possession of the property on the strength of their title more than 21 years. It is, however, contended that time did not run against the plaintiff during the period that the Court of Wards was, as it has been termed, in possession, and to lend the greater force to the contention it is argued that a disqualified proprietor has no right to sue so long as the property remains in charge of the Court of Wards. This curtailment of the rights of a disqualified proprietor depends on the provisions contained in Part VII. This curtailment of the rights of a disqualified proprietor depends on the provisions contained in Part VII. of the Court of Wards Act. To meet this objection the Subordinate Judge held that the plaintiff came within clause (e) of s. 6 of the Act, and so was unaffected by the restrictive provisions of Part VII. But this view cannot be supported clause (e) had not been enacted when the widows were declared disqualified to manage their own property, and this declaration was expressly based on clause (a) of the section. But while this ground of decision is misconceived, the plea of limitation has been rightly held a bar to the suit so far as it relates to the property comprised in the transfer of June 7, 1890. Before that transfer and until the purchaser acquired possession under it the plaintiff and her co-widow were in possession of the property, and none the less because it was in the charge of the Court of Wards. This possession was dis continued, and the possession of the defendants father began as a result of that transfer, and was continued without interruption for a period far in excess of the statutory limit of 12 years, first by the father and then by the defendant, his son, each claiming as of right and on his own behalf adversely to the plaintiff. These facts, standing alone, present a complete bar to the suit so far as it seeks the restoration of this part of the suit property; nor is the position altered because the plaintiff was a disqualified proprietor until August 1, 1911. The Limitation Act, it is true, recognizes and enumerates certain conditions as legal disabilities entitling the persons affected by them to an extended period of limitation. But the plaintiffs disqualification under s. 6 (a) of the Court of Wards Act is not one of them, nor has any case been made which could suspend or modify the ordinary law of limitation as applicable to this case. The objection taken in argument has been directed not to that part of the High Court decree which ordered a remand, but to so much of it as affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and the discussion at the Bar has been confined to the plea of limitation. The objection taken in argument has been directed not to that part of the High Court decree which ordered a remand, but to so much of it as affirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge, and the discussion at the Bar has been confined to the plea of limitation. Their Lordships, therefore, are not called on to consider any other question which may affect this litigation, and they wish to guard themselves against being supposed to have decided either directly or inferentially anything beyond that particular plea. From the view they take of this plea it necessarily follows that this appeal fails, and they will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that it should be dismissed, and the appellant must pay the cost of this appeal.