Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (April 9, 1914) reversing a decree of the first class Subordinate Judge of Ahmedabad. The litigation related to land forming the greater part of the village of Piperia in the Ahmedabad District, The village was till some date prior to 1840 part of the taluqa of Gamph, a gadi or impartible estate of the Chudasama Girasias to which the rule of primogeniture was applicable. The village had then been granted by the thakur injivai—namely, for maintenance—to his younger son Rupsing. Rupsing died about 1866, leaving two sons, Kesharising and Kaliansing. The thakur thereupon alleged that the sons were illegitimate, and claimed that by custom the village, upon failure of the grantees male descendants, had reverted to the gadi. The dispute was referred to arbitrators, who made an award to which effect was given by two documents dated September 6, 1871. It was thereby agreed that part of the village should be the absolute property of the thakur, and that of the rest Kesharising and Kaliansing and their " vansa varas" should be " maliks, muktyars, dhanis." At the time when that agreement was made the estate was under the management of the taluqdari settlement officer. Kesharising died in 1881 unmarried. Kaliansing died in October, 1903, childless, but having a widow Bai Devla, who on March 12, 1904, adopted the first appellant to her deceased husband. The second appellant was a mortgagee from Kaliansing. The respondent, who had succeeded as thakur, instituted the present suit in July, 1907, against the widow (who died during the litigation), the adopted son (the first appellant), and the mortgagee (the second appellant) as defendants, claiming possession of the land in Piperia, which the widow claimed to hold on behalf of her adopted son. The respondent by his plaint alleged that by family custom land granted in jivai reverted to the taluqa upon a failure of the male descendants of the grantee ; he also alleged that the adoption was invalid, and that in any case it carried no title to the land in suit. The appellants, by their written statements, denied the custom alleged. The appellants, by their written statements, denied the custom alleged. They contended that the lands in suit had been the absolute property of Kaliansing both by virtue of the documents of 1871 and independently of them, and that upon Kaliansings death the land passed to his widow, and to the first appellant upon his adoption. The respondent in reply alleged that by custom among the Chudasama Ghirasias widows were precluded from making an adoption, and from inheriting a jivai grant. The Subordinate Judge rejected oral evidence on behalf of the respondent as to the custom of reverter as being tutored, and found that in all the proved instances of reversion of a jivai estate in Gamph the taluqdar would in any case have succeeded as heir. He, however, found the custom proved by evidence of the reversion of jivai estates among families in the Kathiawar states. He found that no custom had been proved excluding the right to adopt, and that the adoption was valid ; also that no custom had been proved excluding widows. He, however, thought that the onus was upon the appellants to prove a custom by which an adoption prevented a reversion of the estate, and found that no such custom had been proved. Finally he held that under the documents of 1871 Kesharising and Kaliansing obtained full proprietary rights, and that the transaction of 1871 was not an alienation of the taluqdari estate so as to be void under s. 12 of Bombay Act VI. of 1862. He accordingly dismissed the suit. The High Court reversed the decision, and made a decree for possession and mesne profits. The learned judges (Sir Basil Scott C.J. and Bachelor J.) differed from the trial judge as to the effect of the documents of 1871 ; they said that the words "#vansa varas " literally meant " descendants who are heirs," not " descendants and heirs " as they had been ren dered by the official translator. As both daughters and widows were, in their opinion, excluded by custom, the words confined inheritance to male descendants, and the compromise therefore did not confer an absolute title. They found upon the evidence as to custom among the Chudasama Ghirasias that a jivai estate reverted to the gadi upon a failure of male descendants. As both daughters and widows were, in their opinion, excluded by custom, the words confined inheritance to male descendants, and the compromise therefore did not confer an absolute title. They found upon the evidence as to custom among the Chudasama Ghirasias that a jivai estate reverted to the gadi upon a failure of male descendants. They said that the instances appeared to establish that a widow did not interfere with the reversion taking place immediately upon the death of the jivaidar, the evidence showing that no such impediment had ever in fact been recognized. They agreed that the factum of the adoption was proved. They held, however, following the judgment of Sir Charles Farren in Amarsangji Gulabsangji v. Dipsangji Jodsingji (( 1898) P. J. (Bomb.) 80.) (known as the Kadwal Case), that though the adoption was good for spiritual purposes and for inheritance of any private property of Kaliansing, the circumstances of the case were such as to shift the onus to the defendants to prove that by custom the adoption prevented the land from reverting to the gadi, and that it devested the estate which had passed to the reversioner. No instance, they said, had been adduced to show that the adoption had that effect. The rule of Hindu law as to the effect of an adoption was not affected, for that rule allowed the adopted sons title only to partible property of the coparcenary, while the property to be dealt with in the present case fell outside that category. They therefore held that the adopted son did not devest, or defer the vesting of, the estate which passed to the thakur of Gamph by the custom of reversion. 1918. July 8,9,11,12,15. De Gruyther K. C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. The documents of 1871 by their terms conferred an absolute estate in the land on Kasharising and Kaliansing Fateh Chand v. Rup Narain(( 1916) L. R. 43 I.A. 183.); Surajmani v. I Rabi Nath Ojha(( 1907) L. R. 35 I. A. 17.)\ Harihar Buksh v. Uman Parshad(( 1886) L. R, 14 I. A. 7.); Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India. (( 1881) L. R. 8 LA. 46, 61.) The first appellant succeeded to that estate subject to the mortgage in favour of the second appellant. The compromise did not amount to an "alienation" of the taluqdari estate within 8. (( 1881) L. R. 8 LA. 46, 61.) The first appellant succeeded to that estate subject to the mortgage in favour of the second appellant. The compromise did not amount to an "alienation" of the taluqdari estate within 8. 12 of Bombay Act VI. of 1862. There was no alienation, but merely a recognition of a pre-existing right as in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Khrishna Narain (( 1911) L.R. 38 I. A. 87.) ; also there was no con veyance of any part of the estate, but only of a contingent reversionary interest therein. But if the land was held merely as under a jivai grant, the plaintiffs who were suing in ejectment did not satisfy the onus upon them. The alleged custom of reversion was not satisfactorily established by evidence relating to this family, nor are any custom proved excluding either widows or adopted sons. Evidence as to custom in other families was not admissible Ram Nundum Singh v. Janki Koer. (( 1902) L. R. 29 I. A. 178, 194, 195.) [As to the custom reference was made to J. S. Peiles Taluqdars in the Ahmedabad Zillah, 1867 (Select Records of the Bombay Government).] The first appellant as the adopted son of Kaliansing was in the same position as a natural born son Nagindas Bhagwandas v. Bachoo Hurkisondas. (( 1915) L. R. 43 I. A. 56.) In Rameshwar Singh y. Jibender Singh (( 1905) I.L.R.32 0.683,689.) it was assumed in the case of a babuana grant that an adopted son was in the same position as a natural son. Upon appeal to the Privy Council it was not suggested that that view was wrong Durgadut Singh v. Rameshwar Singh. (( 1909) L. R. 30 I. A. 170.) The decision in Amarsangji Gulabsangji v. Dipsangji Jodsingji ( 1898, P. J. (Bomb.) 60.) referred to a different family, and therefore was not applicable. Further, that decision was erroneous in principle. Even if it was proved that the widow was excluded, the adoption evested any estate which would have been devested by a posthumous son Raghunadha v. Brozo Kishoro (( 1871) L. R. 3 I. A. 154.), Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushothama Deo (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 156.); Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai (( 1907) L. R. 34 I. A. 107.); Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., pars. 185, 191. 185, 191. The first two of those cases related to impartible estates, and therefore did not depend upon coparcenary interest Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur. (( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 148.) The rule as to the devesting of an estate by adoption is not confined to joint property Surendra Nandam v. Sailaja. (( 1891) I. L. R. 18 C. 385.) A custom excluding an adopted son from inheritance, if valid at all, would have to be proved very strictly. The respondents tried to prove a custom excluding the widows right to adopt without authority, but failed. A similar attempt failed in Verabhai Ajubhai v. Bai Hiraba. (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 234.) Their Lordships desired to hear counsel for the respondent only on the evidence as to custom, and the validity and effect of the adoption. Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. The family custom as stated in the plaint, and as found by both Courts, is that a jivai grant reverts to the taluqa upon failure of the grantees male descendants. Those concurrent findings necessarily exclude the last holders widow and a son adopted after his death. Upon the jivaidars death the jivai estate was extinguished, and in the absence of proof of a special custom enabling the widow to revive the estate by an adoption the suit failed. That was the ground of the decision in Amarsangji Gulabsangji v. Dipsangji Jodsinghji. (2) That case related to the same caste and the circumstances were identical with those in the present case. The jivai estate having come to an end, the cases as to devesting of an estate do not apply. The rights of an adopted son date from his adoption; they do not relate back as though he were a posthumous son Ramundoss Mookerjee v. Tarini (( 1858) 7 Moo. I. A. 169.); Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Ragunath (( 1894) I. L. R. 19 B. 809.); Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilkomul Lahiri(( 1885) L. R. 12 I. A. 137.); Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., par. 197. Raghunadha v. Brozo Kishoro(L. R. 3 I. A. 154.) is further distinguishable as the impartible property was there regarded as joint, and in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama (L. R. 45 I. A. 156.) the judgment expressly states that the family was joint. But apart from the devesting question, the adoption itself was invalid. 197. Raghunadha v. Brozo Kishoro(L. R. 3 I. A. 154.) is further distinguishable as the impartible property was there regarded as joint, and in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama (L. R. 45 I. A. 156.) the judgment expressly states that the family was joint. But apart from the devesting question, the adoption itself was invalid. The power of a Hindu widow in the Bombay Presidency to adopt without authority is subject to the qualification that her husbands property must be vested in her as heir Ramji v. Gamau (( 1879) I. L. R. 6 B. 498.); Dinkar Sitaram Prabhu v. Ganesh Shivaram Prabhu (( 1879) I. L. R. 6 B. 505.); Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., par. 130. That was not the case here. Further, the evidence showed that by the custom of this caste there is no right to adopt. Evidence as to the custom in the same group of families is relevant Mohesh Chunder Dhal v. Satringhan Dhal (( 1902) L. R. 29 I. A. 62.) [Reference was also made to Ekradeshwar Singh v. Janeshivari. (( 1904) L. R. 41 I. A. 275.)] Dec. 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI. This is an action in ejectment brought by the thakur of Gamph in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the Ahmedabad District for possession of a village called Piperia. His suit is based on the ground that the village in question forms part of the estate of Gamph, that many years ago it was granted for maintenance or jivai by one of his ancestors to a junior member of the family to be held and enjoyed so long as the grantees male line lasted, and that on. the death of the last holder named Kaliansing in 1903 without male issue, it reverted to him as the owner of the original estate under the custom attached to such jivai grants. The action was brought on July 15, 1907, against Bai Devla, the widow of Kaliansing, who was admittedly in possession of the village claiming to hold the same for her minor adopted son (joined as defendant No. 2), whom she alleged she had taken in adoption shortly after the death of her husband. Devla has since died, and the adopted son is the present appellant before this Board. The third defendant is a mortgagee claiming under a bond executed by Kaliansing. Devla has since died, and the adopted son is the present appellant before this Board. The third defendant is a mortgagee claiming under a bond executed by Kaliansing. Both the plaintiff and the defendant Shivsing are Chudasama Girasias, a caste of Hindu Rajputs who, it is said, settled several generations ago in the Dhanduka taluqa appertaining to the Ahmedabad District. The thakur of Gamph appears to have been one of their principal chiefs, and possessed at one time a considerable number of villages which, by successive grants to junior members of the family, have dwindled now to eight or nine, and the thakur is naturally anxious to get back as many of these grants as possible. The plaintiff states in his plaint that the grant in question in this case was made by one Milaji, his ancestor in the fifth degree, in favour of his third son Rupsing, that on the death of Rupsing it came into the possession of his two sons Kesarising and Kaliansing; that subsequently on Kesarisings death without issue, the entire village came into the hands of Kaliansing, who held it until his death in 1903 ; that Kaliansing also died without leaving any male issue, and that accordingly the village reverted to the grantors estate, but the defendants were holding the property wrongfully and illegally without any title. The relief sought was of a twofold character— namely, (1.) a decree for possession; and (2.) for a declaration that the second defendants adoption was " void and illegal." The widow and the adopted son, Shivsing, denied the right of reversion claimed by the plaintiff ; they alleged that in 1871 there were disputes between the plaintiffs father and Kaliansing regarding his title to Piperia, which were settled by arbitration, and documents were exchanged between the parties by which the plaintiffs father acknowledged the absolute title of Kaliansing to the village in question excepting a small area which was taken by the plaintiffs father as consideration for the settlement. They also alleged that there was no failure of Kaliansings male line as the second defendant had been validly adopted. To this the plaintiff demurred, and alleged on his side a custom among the Chudasama Girasias which precluded the widow from making an adoption to her deceased husband or inheriting a jivai grant. They also alleged that there was no failure of Kaliansings male line as the second defendant had been validly adopted. To this the plaintiff demurred, and alleged on his side a custom among the Chudasama Girasias which precluded the widow from making an adoption to her deceased husband or inheriting a jivai grant. This latter allegation was evidently put forward in order to strengthen the first, for it seems to have been thought that she could not make an adoption unless she could vest the adopted son with any rights to property owned by the deceased in his lifetime, the idea apparently being that the sons right was dependent on the widows right to inheritance. Upon these allegations a number of issues were framed by the trial judge, but, as usually happens in India, the case was overladen with a variety of considerations which had only an indirect bearing on the main questions for determination. The Subordinate Judge held that, although there was no definite evidence from examples within the taluqa of Gamph regarding the custom relating to the right of reversion, judging, however, from cases in neighbouring estates, the plaintiff had succeeded in establishing it. He further held that the plaintiff had failed to establish the custom debarring the widow of a jivaidar from inheriting his estate or from making an adoption to him. But, throwing the onus on the defendant, he also held that although the defendant was validly adopted he had not shown that his adoption affected the plaintiffs right to resume the jivai. And he went on to hold that the documents executed in the proceedings of 1871 amounted to an acknowledgment on the part of the plaintiffs father of an absolute title and interest in Kaliansing in the village of Piperia which descended to Shivsing, and that the plaintiff was estopped from questioning his title. Proceeding on these grounds the learned judge dismissed the plaintiffs claim. Proceeding on these grounds the learned judge dismissed the plaintiffs claim. On the plaintiffs appeal from this decree the learned judges of the Bombay High Court have affirmed the finding of the first Court with regard to the factum and, as their Lordships understand the judgment of the High Court, the validity of Shivsings adoption ; they agreed with the trial judge as to the existence of a right of reversion in the owner of the taluqa in respect of the jivai on the death of the last jivaidar without male issue. But they disagreed with him on the construction of the documents of 1871 ; they considered that the words on which the Subordinate Judge rested his judgment that the plaintiffs father acknowledged an absolute title in Kaliansing did not bear that meaning ; and that even if those words did have that meaning, the agreement entered into would amount to an "alienation," and as the estate of Gamph was at the time in charge of the taluqdari settlement officer the transaction was inoperative under the provisions of s. 12 of Bombay Act VI. of 1862. Finally they considered that although the first defendant was validly adopted and was entitled to succeed to other property left by his adoptive father, yet as his adoption took place after the reversion had taken effect and after Piperia had vested in the plaintiff, which occurred immediately Kaliansing died, the plaintiff became entitled to possession to this jivai village free of any burden created by the jivaidar. They accordingly reversed the order of the Subordinate Judge and decreed the plaintiffs claim. The present appeal to His Majesty in Council is by the defendants, and the points in issue have been elaborately argued on both sides. Their Lordships are disposed to agree with the Subordinate Judge with regard to the intent and meaning of the documents of 1871, but in the view they take of the principal question involved in the case, they do not consider it necessary to decide whether the transaction evidenced by those documents amounted to ”alienation" within the meaning of 8. 12, Bombay Act VI. of 1862, and was consequently invalid. They wish to deal with the case on the assumption that the nature of the grant and the status of the jivaidar remained unchanged since the grant, and that what took place in 1871 did not enlarge his rights. 12, Bombay Act VI. of 1862, and was consequently invalid. They wish to deal with the case on the assumption that the nature of the grant and the status of the jivaidar remained unchanged since the grant, and that what took place in 1871 did not enlarge his rights. They also accept the conclusion at which the Courts in India arrived regarding the existence of a right of reversion in the holder of the Gamph estate. Now it is to be observed that when a hereditary grant of the nature in dispute is made by a Hindu subject to the limitation that it shall be descendible in the direct male line, or, in other words, that it shall enure so long as the grantees male line lasts, the existence of the line must be determined by the rules and provisions of the Hindu law, unless there be any custom varying those rules. The limitation itself is a variation of the Hindu law. Where a further custom is alleged confining the line to natural-born issue alone, it must be proved affirmatively and conclusively, and not derived from implications. The plaintiff, in order to prove this further limitation, put forward a custom among the Chudasama Girasias prohibiting widows from making an adoption—a custom wholly at variance with the Hindu law and Hindu religious conceptions. It is not necessary to determine in this case whether such a custom, even if proved to exist in certain localities, would be recognized in the British Indian courts. But here the plaintiff has entirely failed to establish the custom alleged by him. In the case of Verabhai Ajubhai v. Bai Hiraba (L. R. 30 I A. 234.), which also arose among the Chudasama Girasias, the same custom was put forward with the same result. Both the Courts in India have in this case found that the second defendant was duly taken in adoption by Devla Bai. With that conclusion their Lordships concur. Their Lordships also hold that she had the power to make the adoption, and that Shivsing has the status of a validly adopted son. Now it is an explicit principle of the Hindu law that an adopted son becomes for all purposes the son of his father, and that his rights unless curtailed by express texts are in every respect the same as those of a natural-born son. Now it is an explicit principle of the Hindu law that an adopted son becomes for all purposes the son of his father, and that his rights unless curtailed by express texts are in every respect the same as those of a natural-born son. And a learned authority on Hindu law has explained that the only express text by which the heritable rights of an adopted son are " contracted " refers to the case of his sharing the heritage with an after-born natural (aurasa) son. " In every other instance the adopted son and the son of the body stand exactly in the same position." (Rajk umar Sarvadhik aris Lectures on Hindu Law," p. 557.) Again, it is to be remembered that an adopted son is the continuator of his adoptive fathers line exactly as an aurasa son, and that an adoption, so far as the continuity of the line is concerned, has a retrospective effect whenever the adoption may be made there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line. In fact, as West and Buhler point out in their learned treatise on Hindu law, the Hindu lawyers do not regard the male line to be extinct or a Hindu to have died without male issue until the death of the widow renders the continuation of the line by adoption impossible. (West and Buhler, 3rd Edition, p. 996, note (a).) Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent on the case of Ramundoss Mookerjee v. Tarini. (( 1858) 7 Moo. I. A. 169.) The only point decided in that case was that a mere power given to a widow to adopt does not preclude her from maintaining an action in her own name and in her own right in respect of the property in her possession as her husbands widow. But it was also pointed out that there was no power under the Hindu law to compel a widow to adopt. Unless there is a time limit imposed in the authority which empowers her to adopt, or she is directed to adopt promptly, she may make the adoption so long as the power is not extinguished or exhausted. The circumstance under which her power becomes extinguished is clearly pointed out by their Lordships in Bhoobun Moyees Case(( 1865) 10 Moo. Unless there is a time limit imposed in the authority which empowers her to adopt, or she is directed to adopt promptly, she may make the adoption so long as the power is not extinguished or exhausted. The circumstance under which her power becomes extinguished is clearly pointed out by their Lordships in Bhoobun Moyees Case(( 1865) 10 Moo. I. A. 279.)and in the judgment of this Board delivered by Lord Haldane in Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushothama Deo. (L. R. 45 I. A. 156.). The right of the widow to make an adoption is not dependent on her inheriting as a Hindu female owner her husbands estate. She can exercise the power, so long as it is not exhausted or extinguished, even though the property was not vested in her. In Raghunadha v., Brozo Kishoro (L. R. 3 I. A. 154.), on the death of an elder brother in an undivided family the estate, which was impartible, had devolved on the younger brother. Two years after the death of her husband the widow of the elder brother adopted a son to him. And this Board held that the adoption had the effect of defeating the right of the younger brother to the estate, and that the adopted son was entitled to possession. The rule there enunciated was followed in Bachoo Hurkisondas v. Mankorebai. (L. R. 34 1. A. 107.) In that case two brothers, Hurkisondas and Bhagwandas, were members of a joint undivided Hindu family. Hurkisondas died on September 14, 1900, leaving his widow pregnant. On November 20 following Bhagwandas made a will authorizing his widow to adopt a son for him. Bhagwandas died on December 17, 1900. Hurkisondas widow gave birth to a son Bachoo next day, and in the then state of the family Hurkisondas son became entitled to the entire family property. On February 17, 1901, Bhagwandas widow adopted Nagar Dzss. This Board affirmed the right of the adopted son to the share of his father, holding that the case was governed by the principle laid down in Raghunadha’s Case. Their Lordships consider that the rule enunciated in these two cases supplies the governing principle for the determination of the present case. On February 17, 1901, Bhagwandas widow adopted Nagar Dzss. This Board affirmed the right of the adopted son to the share of his father, holding that the case was governed by the principle laid down in Raghunadha’s Case. Their Lordships consider that the rule enunciated in these two cases supplies the governing principle for the determination of the present case. It was contended with considerable force and some degree of plausibility that in the case of a jivai grant on the death of the holder thereof there is no property left for the adopted son to take, as it reverts to the grantors estate immediately the jivaidar dies. But it was admitted that a posthumous son would prevent the reversion. If the widow happened to be enceinte the reversion naturally would remain in suspense until the birth of the child, to see whether it was a male or a female. It is futile, therefore, to say that the property reverts to the grantors estate immediately the breath leaves the body of the jivaidar. Here the adoption was made within the period of natural gestation, and the property was at the time of the adoption in the possession of the widow and still is in the possession of the adopted son. It may be that if a Hindu widow lies by for a considerable time and makes no adoption, and the property comes into the possession of some one who would take it in the absence of a son, natural or adopted, and such person were to create rights in such property within his competency whilst in possession, in such case totally different considerations would arise. But here there is nothing of the kind to modify the true application of the Hindu law. Their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court of Bombay should be reversed, and the suit of the plaintiff dismissed with costs in all the courts, including the costs of this appeal. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.