JUDGMENT : RICHARDS, C.J.:— This appeal arises out of execution proceedings. The following are the facts. In the year 1909, a mortgage suit was instituted against a father and son based upon two mortgages (one in the year 1895 and the other in the year 1899). These mortgages were executed by the father alone. The first mortgage was to secure a sum of Rs. 500, with compound interest at the rate of twelve annas per cent, per mensem. The second was to secure the sum of Rs. 200, with like interest. In each bond the time specified for repayment was a period of six years. There was a provision however that the mortgagee might at his option sue at an earlier date if default was made in the payment of interest. The father it appears confessed judgment on behalf of himself and his son. Later on the son appeared and succeeded in getting the claim dismissed as against him on the ground that the father had no authority to confess judgment for him and that there was no necessity for the loan. It is unnecessary for us to say whether under these circumstances there ought to have been a decree for sale of the property at all. As a matter of fact the property mentioned in the mortgage was sold and realised a considerable sum. In the year 1913 the decree-holder sought a personal decree under Order XXXIV, rule 6, against both father and son. Again the son was successful in resisting the making of a decree as against him but a personal decree was given against the father for the balance left unsatisfied on the mortgage decree. The father then died and the decree-holder is now seeking to attach the joint family property which has come to the son by right of survivorship and not by right of inheritance. Both the courts below have refused the application for execution in this way. 2. It is contended on behalf of the decree-holder that the money decreed against the father is a debt for which under Hindu law the joint family property is liable and that therefore he ought to be allowed to attach and sell the joint family property in the hands of the son. We have not had the advantage of hearing arguments on behalf of the judgment-debtor. We have not had the advantage of hearing arguments on behalf of the judgment-debtor. We think, however, that under the circumstances of this case the order of the court below should be maintained. It appears that at the date of the institution of the suit all personal remedy under the first mortgage, which was the larger of the two, was time-barred and that the personal decree which was subsequently obtained against the father was made up in part at least of the time-barred debt. The son was no party to this decree. We think under these circumstances that the decree-holder ought not to be allowed to execute the decree by the sale of the joint family property. We dismiss the appeal. We make no order as to costs, as no one appears on the other side.