Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and decrees of the High Court (March 18, 1914), affirming decrees of the District Judge of Kistna, which reversed decrees of the District Munsif. Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 123 ( 1918- 1919) Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu V. Divi Seetharamudu 10 The appellant brought suits in the Court of the District Munsif to eject persons to whom in 1907 he had let several parcels of land amounting to about sixty acres and forming part of an inam village. The tenancy agreements expired in 1908, and each contained a declaration that the tenant had no right except that of cultivating for a year under the agreement. The defendants by their written statements alleged that they had rights of permanent occupancy, and that the village was an " estate " within the meaning of s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of Madras Estate Land Act, 1908, so that (by s. 189 of that Act) the revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. The suits were tried together throughout. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The following issues were framed together with others which are not material to this report (1.) Whether the plaint agraharam is an " estate" coming within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Estates Land Act; (2.) whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit; (3.) whether the plaintiff has the inherent right to eject the defendants, or he acquired such right under the exception to s. 8, or whether the defendants have occupancy rights. The District Munsif delivered judgment for the plaintiff. He held that the village and the lands in question were not an " estate," or part of an " estate," within the Act ; and that both according to the express contract between the parties and by virtue of the general custom of the agraharam the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendants. He also thought that the plaintiff had that right under the exceptions to s. 8 of the Act. The District Judge, on appeal, reversed the decisions. He relied upon certain decisions of the Bombay and Madras High Courts as establishing that there was a presumption of law that an inam grant did not carry the " kudivaram " interest, and that the burden was upon the agraharamdar to show that the tenants had no occupancy rights. The District Judge, on appeal, reversed the decisions. He relied upon certain decisions of the Bombay and Madras High Courts as establishing that there was a presumption of law that an inam grant did not carry the " kudivaram " interest, and that the burden was upon the agraharamdar to show that the tenants had no occupancy rights. In his view the terms of the sanad of 1783 and the use of the word " mouje " indicated that the village had been occupied. He therefore held that the village was an " estate " within s. 3, sub-s. 2 (d), of the Act, and that consequently the civil Court had no jurisdiction. He accordingly ordered that the plaints be returned for presentation in the revenue Court. Upon appeal to the High Court, that Court called for precise findings on two questions, and the findings thereon were as follows (1.) That the lands were waste, as claimed by the plaintiff, at the time of the grant; (2.) that the tenants who had surrendered the lands in fasli 1313 ( 1904) had not occupancy rights. The cases coming on for final disposal, the High Court affirmed the decrees of the District Judge. The learned judges (Sadashiva Aiyar and Seshagiri Aiyar JJ.) were of opinion that there was a presumption of law as held by the District Judge, and that the fact that the land in question was waste at the date of the grant was immaterial ; they considered that whatever inhabitants there then were had rights of occupancy in the further 240 acres forming part of the village included in the inam grant, those 240 acres not being shown to have been waste. Their conclusion was that the lands were an " estate " within, the Act. They also held that the exception in s. 8 of the Act was not applicable. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 38 M. 891. 1919. Feb. 21. Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. The judgments of the District Judge and of the High Court were based upon there being a presumption of law that an inam grant did not include the kudivaram interest. The appeal to the High Court is reported at I. L. R. 38 M. 891. 1919. Feb. 21. Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. The judgments of the District Judge and of the High Court were based upon there being a presumption of law that an inam grant did not include the kudivaram interest. That view has since been rejected by the Board in Suryanarayana v. Patanna, (L. R. 45 I. A. 209.) The grant in the present case was of the entire interest of the grantor in the whole village ; there is no evidence that the grantor did not own the Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 123 ( 1918- 1919) Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu V. Divi Seetharamudu 11 kudivaram interest. It was found and admitted that the sixty acres were waste at the time of the grant. As to that part at any rate the grantee got the kudivaram, and consequently the grant was not a grant of the revenue alone. There was not at any time any claim by any tenant that he had a permanent occupancy right, and the evidence is inconsistent with there having been any such right. The reference to gardens, shrines, and tanks in the sanad of 1783, and the use of the word " mouje," are insufficient to prove that in 1748 there were ryots with occupancy rights in the village. Further, if the grant did not include the kudivaram, that interest was acquired by the inamdor by surrender when, in 1906, the tenancies were all relinquished; the case therefore comes within the exception to s. 8 of the Act Ponnusamy Padayaehi v. Karuppadayan. (( 1914) I. L. R. 38 M. 843.) [Reference was also made to Madras Regulation XXXI. of 1802, and to Wilsons Glossary, s.v. " inam," " agraharam," " mauza."] The respondents did not appear. March 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT CAVE. These are consolidated appeals against a judgment delivered by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on March 18, 1914, and decrees made in pursuance thereof in eleven suits. The High Court by its judgment affirmed a judgment of the District Judge of Kistna whereby he set aside the decision of the Munsif of Gudivada, and directed the return of the plaints in all the suits for presentation in the revenue Court. The High Court by its judgment affirmed a judgment of the District Judge of Kistna whereby he set aside the decision of the Munsif of Gudivada, and directed the return of the plaints in all the suits for presentation in the revenue Court. The suits out of which these appeals arose were suits for ejectment in respect of different parts of the inam village of Billapadu, in the Gudivada sub-district of the Kistna district. The appellant, who was the plaintiff in all the suits, is the inamdar of the village, holding under a grant made to his ancestor in or about the year 1748, and since confirmed and recognized by the British Government. The defendants were persons who at various dates in the year 1907 had been let into possession by the plaintiff under tenancy agreements, expiring in 1908. Each of these agreements contained a declaration by the tenant to the effect that except the right of cultivating the land for a year under the agreement he had no other right whatever thereto, and accordingly that he agreed to the landlord (the plaintiff) taking possession of the land at the end of the year of tenancy without any relinquishment by the tenant. The tenancies having expired, and these suits having been brought for possession, the defendants pleaded that they were ryots having permanent zeroyati rights, and that as the inam village was an " estate " governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suits. The Munsif overruled this plea, and granted decrees in favour of the plaintiff ; but the District Judge, holding that the property was an " estate " under the Act of 1908, set aside the Munsifs decision and directed the plaints to be returned. This decision was affirmed by the High Court, and thereupon this appeal was brought. The decision on the appeal must turn on the question whether the property is or is not an " estate " within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 ; and for the purpose of determining this question reference must be made to the definition of the term "estate" contained in s. 3 of the Act. That definition, so far as it is applicable here, is as follows " In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context . . . . That definition, so far as it is applicable here, is as follows " In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context . . . . (2.) Estate means . . . . (d) any village of which the land revenue alone has been granted in inam to a person not owning the kudivaram thereof, provided that the grant has been confirmed or recognised by the British Government, or any separated part of such village." The term " kudivaram " is not defined in the Act; but in Suryanarayana v. Patanna (L. R. 45 I. A. 209.) it was explained as being a Tamil word, literally signifying a cultivators share in the produce of land as distinguished from the landlords share, which is sometimes designated Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 123 ( 1918- 1919) Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu V. Divi Seetharamudu 12 " melvaram." The kudivaram " or " kudivaram interest," as it is called in s. 8 of the Act, is in fact a species of tenant-right or right of permanent occupancy. The question, therefore, to be considered in this case is whether the inam grant was a grant of the land-revenue alone to a person not having a permanent right of occupancy, or whether it vested in the grantee the whole proprietary interest in the village. In the former case this appeal will fail, but in the latter it should succeed. In dealing with this question the District Judge and the High Court acted upon a supposed presumption of law that an inam grant of a village, particularly if made to a Brahman, is prima facie a grant of the " melvaram " right only and does not include the " kudivaram." This view was supported, when the High Court gave its decision, by some previous decisions of the High Courts of Madras and Bombay ; but in the case above cited of Suryanarayana v. Patanna, it was held by their Lordships that no such presumption exists. Each case must therefore be considered on its own facts ; and in order to ascertain the effect of the grant in the present case, resort must be had to the terms of the grant itself and to the whole circumstances so far as they can now be ascertained. Each case must therefore be considered on its own facts ; and in order to ascertain the effect of the grant in the present case, resort must be had to the terms of the grant itself and to the whole circumstances so far as they can now be ascertained. The original grant of 1748 is not now forthcoming, although it is referred to in exhibit Z (an extract from the Cazulet Register of 1802), and there is no doubt of its having existed. The earliest deed which is produced is a " gift deed of agraharam," executed in September, 1783, by the zamindars in favour of the plaintiffs ancestor, which appears to be a confirmation of the original grant. The operative part of this deed is as follows " We have conveyed to you, as sarva agraharam, the village of Billapadu, attached to Gudivada pargana, together with gardens, holy shrines, wells, big and small tanks, &c. So you shall cultivate the same and enjoy the produce thereof every year as a dedication to the God Sri---, hereditarily from son to grandson and so on. (Sanskrit sloka) To administer (or confirm) the gift of another is twice as meritorious as ones own gift-making. " Other confirmatory documents were executed at or about the same date ; and in one of these, being a " hakikhat " (or representation) made to William Oram, Esquire, the Collector, by officials of the district, dated July 23, 1788, it was stated that the village of Billapadu Agraharam had continued to be in the enjoyment of the plaintiffs ancestor, who is referred to as " a resident of the aforesaid place." There are also some dumbalas (or orders) dated in the year 1793 requesting that the plaintiffs ancestor shall be allowed to reap and enjoy the crops pertaining to Billapadu. In the Cazulet Register of 1802, above referred to, and in similar registers dated 1860 and 1865, the property is entered in the name of the plaintiffs ancestor ; and on June 27, 1865, a Recognition of Title was duly granted to the plaintiffs ancestor. In the Cazulet Register of 1802, above referred to, and in similar registers dated 1860 and 1865, the property is entered in the name of the plaintiffs ancestor ; and on June 27, 1865, a Recognition of Title was duly granted to the plaintiffs ancestor. There is not in any of the documents above referred to any trace of a claim by any person other than the inamdar to a permanent right of occupancy ; and the fact that by the terms of the grant the grantee is desired to cultivate the lands, and that he is referred to as residing in the village, tend to show that no such right existed in any other person. In the judgments under appeal stress is laid on the fact that the confirmatory grant of 1783 refers to the existence on the property at that date of gardens, wells, tanks, &c, and also on the fact that in the Register of 1802 Billapadu is called a mouje (or mauza), these expressions indicating (it is suggested) that the village was the home of proprietary inhabitants who had planted gardens and dug wells ; but it does not appear to their Lordships that it would be safe to build on the use of expressions of this character in 1783 and 1802 an inference as to the existence in 1748 of tenants having permanent rights of occupancy. And when the subsequent history of the estate comes to be examined, it is found to be wholly inconsistent with the existence of any permanent occupancy rights. Tenancies have been continually granted by the inamdars for short periods and at variable rents. Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 123 ( 1918- 1919) Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu V. Divi Seetharamudu 13 When tenancy lands were compulsorily acquired by Government and compensation was paid to the agrahamdar, no claim to compensation was put forward by the tenants. In the year 1904 all the tenants formally relinquished their lands to the plaintiff and put them in his possession, and from that date until tenancies were granted in the year 1907 the property remained vacant. When the defendants were admitted as tenants, they severally declared (as stated above) that they had no right of occupancy except such as was given to them by the tenancy agreements. When the defendants were admitted as tenants, they severally declared (as stated above) that they had no right of occupancy except such as was given to them by the tenancy agreements. It has been found in these suits on issues specially directed that the land in question was waste land at the time of the grant of the inam, and that at the time of the letting to the defendants they had no occupancy right. Having regard to all the facts, it appears to their Lordships to be impossible to resist the conclusion that the inam grant carried, not the land-revenue alone, but the whole proprietary interest in the property ; and it appears probable that, but for the supposed presumption above referred to, the High Court would have come to the same conclusion. If so, it follows that the property is not an " estate " within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, and that s. 189 of that Act does not apply. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider the effect, having regard to s. 8 of the Act, of the relinquishment of tenancy rights made in the year 1904. Sect. 153, as amended by s. 8 of Madras Act IV. of 1909, appears to have no application to this case. For the above reasons their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be allowed and the decrees under appeal should be set aside and the decrees of the Munsif restored, and that the defendants should pay the plaintiffs costs in all the courts and his costs of this appeal j and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.