JUDGMENT 1. This appeal arises out of a suit for establishment of the Plaintiff's right to, and possession of, the properties in dispute which are described in the four schedules to the plaint. The Plaintiffs are the daughter's sons find sole heirs of one Radha Krisna Roy. Radha Krishan left a daughter, Sitalmoni, and the Plaintiff's grandson, by that daughter. The Defendants are the heirs of Ram Kanai and Dinabandhu who were the brothers of Radha Krisna. The name of one Kumada Charan Roy who was the father of the Defendants Nos. 1 to 4, may be mentioned here. It appears that after the death of Radha Krisna, Kumada Charan asserted that he had been adopted by Radha Krisna and laid claim to the estate left by him. In the year 1883 Sitalmoni brought a suit for establishment of her right to a one-third share of the estate as the heiress of her father Radha Krisna. The suit was brought against Kumada Charan and the other heirs of Ram Kanai and Dinabandhu. If was contested by Kumada alone and it appears that the other Defendants were subsequently discharged from the action. The suit was terminated by a solenama, entered into between Sitalmoni and Kumada Charan on the 24th July 1883. Under this solenama, the dispute between the parties was settled; Kumada Charan, Defendant No. 1 in that suit, gave up his claim as the adopted son of Radha Krisna and his claim to certain properties; Sitalmoni also gave up certain properties in favour of Kumada Charan and her right to the rest of his properties was declared. There was subsequently a suit for partition brought by Sitalmoni which was based upon the solenama : and lastly there was a suit for mesne profits brought by the lady against the Defendants which again ended in a compromise. Sitalmoni died in January 1902 and the present suit was instituted by her sons, Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, for establishment of their right in respect of certain properties their title to which had been denied, or of which they had been dispossessed by the Defendants. 2. The Court of appeal below agreeing with the Court of first instance has given a decree declaring the right of the Plaintiff in respect of the lands of Sch. 1 and 2, for establishment of their right in respect of certain properties their title to which had been denied, or of which they had been dispossessed by the Defendants. 2. The Court of appeal below agreeing with the Court of first instance has given a decree declaring the right of the Plaintiff in respect of the lands of Sch. I and disagreeing with that Court has given a decree for possession and mesne profits in respect of a one-third share of the lands of Sch. II. The claim with respect to the lands of Sch. Nos. 3 and 4 has been dismissed by both the Courts below. 3. The Plaintiffs have appealed with reference to the lands of Sch. Nos. 3 and 4 and the Defendants have preferred a cross-objection in respect of the lands of Sch. No. II. 4. The main question for consideration in this appeal is whether the compromise entered into by Sitalmoni is binding upon the Plaintiffs. 5. There can be no doubt that there was a final settlement of disputes and of the rights of each party and that if the settlement was bona fide, it was binding upon the reversioners. 6. In the case of Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain L.R. 38 IndAp 87 (102) : S.C. 15 C.W.N. 347 (1911), the Judicial Committee observed that they had no hesitation in adopting the view taken in the case of Lala Oudh Beharee v. Ranee Mewa Kunwar 3 Agra H.C.R. 84 (1867), where the learned Judges say as follows : "The true character of the transaction appears to us to have been a settlement between the several members of the family of their disputes, each one relinquishing all claim in respect of all property in dispute other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others as they had previously asserted it to the portion allotted to them respectively. It was in this light rather than as conferring a new distinct title on each other that the parties themselves seem to have regarded the arrangement and we think that it is the duty of the Courts to uphold and give full effect to such an arrangement." 7. That case was followed by their Lordships in the case of Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi 18 C.W.N. 929 (P.C.) (1914). That case was followed by their Lordships in the case of Hiran Bibi v. Sohan Bibi 18 C.W.N. 929 (P.C.) (1914). Their Lordships were of opinion that the facts of the case brought it within the decision of Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain L.R. 38 I.A. 87 (102) : S.C. 15 C.W.N. 347 (1911), in other words, that the compromise in question was in no sense of the word an alienation by a limited owner of the family property but a family settlement in which each party took a share of the family property by virtue of the independent title which was to that extent and by way of compromise admitted by the other parties. See also the cases of Mahendra Nath Biswas v. Shamsunnessa Khatun 21 C.L.J. 157 (162, 163) (1914) and Shyam Lal Ghosh v. Rameswari Bose 23 C.L.J. 82 (89) (1915). 8. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that no independent title was recognised by the petition of compromise and that therefore the case does not come within the purview of the decisions of the Privy Council. This argument is based upon the ground that the petition of compromise does not state that Kumada Charan had set up his right as the adopted son of Radha Krisna; but we have to take the petition of compromise along with the plaint and written-statement in that case. The plaint in that case distinctly stated that Kumada had set up his rights as the adopted son and had dispossessed, the Plaintiff in that suit from her father's share in the family estate, and that it was for that reason that the suit was instituted. There is no doubt, therefore, that there was a dispute between the parties and it had been proved that Sitalmoni and the present Plaintiffs who are the reversioners would have been entirely deprived of the estate but for the compromise which was arrived at. By the compromise Sitalmoni gave up some of the properties. Similarly Kumada Charan gave up some of the properties to which he had asserted his right as adopted son. The Plaintiff No. 1, one of the sons of Sitalmoni, was an attesting witness to the petition of compromise. By the compromise Sitalmoni gave up some of the properties. Similarly Kumada Charan gave up some of the properties to which he had asserted his right as adopted son. The Plaintiff No. 1, one of the sons of Sitalmoni, was an attesting witness to the petition of compromise. The Plaintiff No. 1 appears to have been an accountant in the District Judge's Office and was quite capable of protecting the interest of his mother and his future interest as a reversioner. After a decree had been passed upon this petition of compromise, a suit was instituted by Sitalmoni for partition of the estate. The estate was accordingly partitioned and it appears that Sitalmoni and after her death her sons, Plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, have been in enjoyment of the properties according to the result of the partition. Lastly, there was a suit for mesne profits brought by Sitalmoni and that suit was ultimately compromised by her. Both the present Plaintiffs looked after that case and were attesting witnesses to the petition of compromise. That there was a bond fide compromise entered into in 1883 cannot be and is not disputed. The very fact that one of Sitalmoni's sons was an attesting witness to the petition of compromise negatives the possibility of any collusion between the parties. In the circumstances under which the suit was instituted by the lady, the compromise was beneficial to the estate and was certainly not entered into for the personal benefit of the lady herself. In all these circumstances, the Courts below were right in holding that the compromise is binding on the Plaintiffs so far as the lands of Sch. IV are concerned. 9. With regard to the lands of Sch. 1, the lands which the Plaintiff's claim us having been allotted to Sitalmoni on partition, the Court below has declared the right of the Plaintiff. The Defendants in this Court say that they did not dispossess the Plaintiffs from this land and that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against the Defendants. The Respondents do not dispute the right of the Plaintiffs to these lands and have no objection to the decree passed by the Court below for lands of this schedule provided there is no decree for mesne profits. We think that the decree of the lower Court, in so far as the lands of Sch. I are concerned, should stand. The Respondents do not dispute the right of the Plaintiffs to these lands and have no objection to the decree passed by the Court below for lands of this schedule provided there is no decree for mesne profits. We think that the decree of the lower Court, in so far as the lands of Sch. I are concerned, should stand. 10. With regard to lands of Sch. II, the lower Appellate Court gave a decree to the Plaintiff for a one-third share of these lands. A cross-objection has been filed on behalf of the Defendants, so far as these lands are concerned. 11. It is contended that the lower Court has proceeded upon some presumption. It appears, however, that there was no denial in the written statement that the lands of this schedule formed part of the joint family property and we are told that there is some evidence in support of the finding of the lower Court. We think that the cross-objection should be dismissed. 12. There remain only the lands of Sch. III. Both the Courts below have held that no cause of action has been disclosed in the plaint and that it does not appear that these lands belong to the estate held by Radha Krisna. We are not disposed to interfere with the order of the lower Court so far as these lands are concerned. 13. On behalf of the Appellant, objection was taken to the order for separate sets of costs to the Defendants. The question of costs, however, is in the discretion of the Court and we do not wish to interfere in the matter. The result is that both the appeal and the cross-objection are dismissed. Each party will bear his own costs in this Court.