JUDGMENT 1. The respondents do not appear before us to support the findings. 2. We are unable to accept the finding that the mortgages executed by the lt defendant, Exhibit C series, in favour of Nallathural are unenforceable on the ground of their consideration having been for immoral and illegal purpose. 3. The 1st defendant admitted that he was paid cash consideration by his brother for the mortgage-deeds in question and that the mortgages were taken in Nallathurals name at his instance. It may be that his brother did this to further his immoral purpose. But following the view held in the case of Tenant v. Elliot (1797) 126 E.R. 744 : 1 Bos. & Pul. 3 : 4 R.R. 755 we must hold that the question of immorality and illegality as between Nallathural and the brother cannot be pleaded as a defence by the 1st defendant. If in getting the mortgage-deeds in Nallathurals name the brother intended to make a gift of the mortgage right to her, the transaction had passed beyond the executory stage and no objection that the purpose for which the gift was made was immoral can be pleaded to affect it. 4. If, on the other hand, the brother took the deeds in the womans name merely as a benamidar for himself, which seems to be the contention here, Nallathural could have sued as such benamidar and her assignee could also sue. See Singa Pillai v. Govinda Reddy 43 Ind. Cas. 905 : 41 M. 435 : (1918) M.W.N. 107 and also Vaitheeswara Aiyar v. Srinivasa Raghava Iyengar 50 Ind. Cas. 309 : 42 M. 348 : 36 M.L.J. 296 : 9 L.W. 362 : 26 M.L.T. 351 : (1919) M.W.N. 299 (F.B.). If this suit is viewed as one by the assignee of a benamidar, it cannot be treated as in any way involving the enforcement of an immoral contract between Nallathural and the 1st defendants brother Chinrjaswami. A benamidar, recovers money for the use of the real owner who could get it paid over to himself, and no question of the nature of the relation between the benamidar and the real owner arises in such a suit. 5. In any view, therefore, it was not open to the 1st defendant to raise any objection to Exhibit C series on the ground of immorality. 5. In any view, therefore, it was not open to the 1st defendant to raise any objection to Exhibit C series on the ground of immorality. As he himself admitted having received full cash consideration for them, he was bound to repay Rs. 150. Rs. 25 was already found to be due under Exhibit G by the lower Appellate Court. 6. We must, therefore, hold that Exhibit F is supported by consideration to the extent of Rs. 175. First defendant is now dead but defendants Nos. 2 and 3 his sons are on record. They have raised no question here that even if Exhibit F is binding on the 1st defendant it is not binding on them. We must, therefore, allow the second appeal and give a mortgage decree for Rs. 175 to be realised by sale of the mortgaged property, under Section 68, Clause (c), Transfer of Property Act, as, though the mortgage was a usufructuary one, possession was not given to the mortgagee, See Marturu Subbamma v. Gadde Narayya 43 Ind. Cas. 4 : 41 M. 259 : 33 M.L.J. 623 : 22 M.L.T. 429 : 6 L.W. 738 : (1917) M.W.N. 828 (F.B.). Plaintiff does not now want a decree for possession. The plaintiff will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout. Defendants will have three months time for payment from this date.