Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (August 10, 1914), varying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (October 9, 1908). The suit was brought by the respondent against the appellants for a declaration " that the defendants Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 62 have no right to the village of Patharakudi and that the plaintiff as head of the math was entitled to possession . . . . ,and to receive the income of the same in the hands of the Receiver." The plaint alleged that the respondent was head of the ancient math of Patharakudi, which in the 16th century had been endowed by one of the Pandiyan kings with Patharakudi and other villages, the title of the math to the endowments having been confirmed by an inam title deed in 1864. That the plaintiff had been duly appointed head in 1867, and that being at the time young, he had allowed certain Nattukatai Chettys, disciples of the math, to manage its affairs under his control and supervision ; that for some years the Chettys had efficiently managed the affairs, but that from about 1901 they had improperly claimed to be trustees and that disputes and disorders had resulted. That in 1903 the Head Assistant Magistrate had ordered that the math should remain in the possession of the respondent, and that the village of Patharakudi should be attached, a Receiver being appointed later. That the Chettys had acted merely as the respondents agents, and that the respondent had throughout been in possession of the village of Patharakudi. The appellants by their written statement pleaded that the matam had been created by Chettys for their own private accommodation, and that it possessed none of the characteristics of a math; they alleged that from time immemorial the Chettys had been exclusively managing the villages and applying the income to the purposes of the institution ; that as a matter of convenience, eight families of Chettys were entrusted with the management, the senior members in rotation by immemorial custom administering the affairs ; that on the death of the gurukkal in 1863, the then representatives of the eight families had according to the usage appointed the plaintiff as their priest. The following issues among others were framed (1.) What is the nature of the institution described as the math and adhinam at Patharakudi ? . . . . (4.) Whether the alleged previous matathipathies, or the plaintiff, were the trustees of the institution at Patharakudi, and whether the plaintiff was, since his appointment, in possession of the plaint-mentioned villages within twelve years prior to suit or to the date of the Magistrates order of attachment ? (5.) Whether the trusteeship has been held by the eight families, represented by the defendants and one Kulandaivelan Chetty hereditarily as alleged by the defendants 1 (7.) Whether the Chettys had acquired the right of trusteeship by adverse possession for more than twelve years ? (9.) Whether the suit was barred by limitation ? The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge on October 19, 1908, delivered his judgment, in which he dealt exhaustively with the evidence, Dealing with issues 1 to 6, of which issue 4 was the important issue, he considered first the evidence, almost wholly documentary, as to the period ending with the death of the plaintiffs predecessor in 1863. He found that that evidence showed that the institution existed before the sixteenth century, and that the endowment of the village was then granted by a Pandiyan king to its gurukkal ; that the gurukkals always held and enjoyed the endowments of the institution, and were recognized as their owner, proprietor, and the ma tat hip at by or head of the institution ; and that the Chettys had nothing to do with the endowments except as disciples of their guru. There was some evidence to show that the Chettys assisted in the management, but insufficient to establish their right as trustees or hakdars. Passing to the period after 1863, in a passage set out at greater length in the judgment of their Lordships, he found that for this period the evidence showed " the full and complete management, control, and supervision of the endowments and their income by some Chettys or others, to the knowledge of the plaintiff," that management not being as agent for the plaintiff. He was of opinion that " the Chettys in 1863 claimed to be hakdars and trustees solely because there was not then a guru or head of the institution, and there was nobody else to represent the institution at the Inam inquiry," and that they subsequently call themselves hakdars and trustees, the plaintiff acquiescing in their management. He was inclined to believe that the Chettys appointed the plaintiff as gurukkal, and found that they had arranged for the construction of the agraharam, raising loans for the purpose. He concluded this part of his judgment as follows " Thus, on the whole, I think that the plaint institution is a religious institution of Acharayas or Gurus, whose disciples are the Nattukatai Chettys.....In the absence of any evidence about a special Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 63 constitution regarding its management, etc., the head of the institution is the beneficiary entitled to the income of the endowment, granted in this manner, subject perhaps to his liability to maintain and perpetuate the institution as a corporation sole.....Apart from the nature of this institution, which leads to the aforesaid conclusion, I am further of opinion on the clear evidence in the case, that the gurukkals of the plaint institution, as the successors of the original grantee of the endowments for this institution, are the persons who are the beneficiaries and trustees and managers of the endowments, and are entitled therefore to their possession and enjoyment, as well to the enjoyment of the income, so long as they are the gurukkals and the head of the math. I further hold that the defendants, Chettys, had no such right as managers or trustees in their own right either by virtue of the original constitution or of any special custom or valid scheme for management. I further hold that the defendants, Chettys, had no such right as managers or trustees in their own right either by virtue of the original constitution or of any special custom or valid scheme for management. On the evidence I cannot find this to be in its nature a caste institution.....Thus, for these reasons, I find the first part of issue 4 for the plaintiff, and hold that, according to the nature of this institution and according to the evidence in the case, the plaintiffs predecessor and the plaintiff have been the holders, superintendents, and managers and the beneficiaries of the endowments of the plaint institution and are therefore entitled to its income subject only to its maintenance ; and I further find on issue 5, that the hereditary title of eight families of Chettys on behalf of Nagarathars to be its hakdars and trustees, either according to the original constitution of the institution or the terms of the original grant of the endowments or according to any custom sprung up subsequently, has not been made out." On issue 7 the Subordinate Judge held that from 1867 there had been a discontinuance of the gurukkals exclusive possession within the meaning of art. 142 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, Sched. II, and that the Nagara Chetty community had held the management without break through some one or more of its members, but not to the exclusion of the plaintiff from the management. In the result a decree was drawn up as follows " It is ordered and declared that the plaintiff as the gurukkal and head of the plaint Patharakudi institution, and consequently as a trustee and manager of the same conjointly with the Eliathagudy Nagara Chettys, is entitled to the possession and management of the plaint village of Patharakudi and its hamlets, item No. 1 in the plaint schedule, forming part of the endowments of the said nstitution, along with the defendants representing and forming part of the said Nagara Chetty community, without prejudice to the rights of the latter to continue in actual possession and direct management of the same as they have been holding and managing them till now from 1863. And that he, as such head and gurukkal of the institution, is further entitled to the entire beneficial enjoyment of the income of the said villages during his life and continuance as the spiritual head of the institution, subject only to the maintenance of the said institution, .consisting of his own maintenance as gurukkal and spiritual head, and the performance of the poojah of Palampathinathaswami, and the feeding of Brahmins as appurtenant thereto, according to the usage till now. It is hereby further declared that the plaintiff is entitled to draw the surplus income in deposit to the credit of the suit as he is the sole beneficiary entitled to such surplus income." Cross-appeals to the High Court were heard by the officiating Chief Justice (Sir John Wallis) and Kumaraswami Sastri J., who allowed the plaintiffs appeal and dismissed the defendants appeal. The learned officiating Chief Justice, while not prepared to say that a community, such as the Nattokottai Chettys, could not acquire a right of joint management by prescription against the head of the institution, was of opinion that the defendants had failed to prove their right. He agreed with the Subordinate Judges view that the endowment was granted to the plaintiffs predecessors, and was enjoyed by them for a lengthy period, subject to the trusts of the endowment, and that the defendants had not shown that in 1867 they acquired the right of management. He said " It is not easy to imagine what sort of joint management there could be by the guru and the whole Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 64 Chetty caste, but it is not necessary to go into this as, in my opinion, the large part in the management taken by certain influential and energetic Chettys is not shown to have been adverse to the plaintiff. It is not enough to show that the plaintiff knew of the large part in the management taken by individual Chettys, it must be shown clearly that it was adverse to him ; and this in my opinion should be very clearly made out where the relation between the parties was that of religious teacher and adherents, and for some time after the plaintiffs succession the facts proved admit of the interpretation that they were acting as de facto guardians of the minor. In view of the intimate and confidential relations of the parties, the Courts, I think, should require adverse possession to the knowledge of the plaintiff to be very clearly made out and, I think, that in this respect the defendants have failed to discharge the burden which lies on them.....The Subordinate Judge has come to the conclusion that the acts of the Chettys must be considered to have been done on behalf of the caste as a whole and adversely to the plaintiffs right of exclusive management. The evidence appears to me to lend itself as readily to the view that the acts done by these individual Chettys were done on behalf of the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge has not taken the view contended for by either side, but has come to the conclusion that the Chettys acquired a right of managing jointly with the plaintiff. I do not say such a right of joint management could not be acquired but I should certainly expect evidence of incidents of joint management, and it cannot be based upon the ground that, though the Chettys actually managed, there is no evidence that the plaintiff was excluded from the management. I find no evidence of such joint management or of the manner in which it was to be enjoyed." Kumaraswami Sastri J. in the course of his judgment said " I have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the Subordinate Judge to the effect that the plaint-mentioned institution was an ancient religious math presided over by a Brahmin who was also the spiritual head of the Chettys and that it was not merely a trust founded by the Chettys (the gurukkal being only their servant with no interest in math properties) is correct.....The head of the math has therefore prima facie the right to possession unless it can be shown that he has either parted with his rights or that adverse rights have been acquired by third parties.....It cannot be disputed that the Chettys, who were in management, though calling themselves hakdars or trustees, professed to manage the properties for the benefit of the math which is in this case represented by the plaintiff as the gurukkal. This is not a case where the property belongs to an idol with a trustee or dharmakartha, but a case where the property vests in the guru himself who is the sole beneficiary. This is not a case where the property belongs to an idol with a trustee or dharmakartha, but a case where the property vests in the guru himself who is the sole beneficiary. The fact that he is bound to apply the income for certain purposes would not affect the question. It has no doubt been held that, where property is dedicated to an idol, the office of dharmakartha may be acquired by adverse possession, but where property is given to the head of a math and vests in him absolutely, subject to the application of the income to certain purposes, the person, who manages the property on behalf of the math, prima facie manages it also on behalf of the gurukkal who is the sole person entitled to the properties. Even assuming that the Chetty community as a whole were managing the properties for the math, their management was only a management on behalf of the plaintiff and prima facie the plaintiff has a right to put an end to their management if he chooses to do so. Mere length of time of management on behalf of another would not deprive the owner of the property of his power to put an end to the management and assuming the same himself. In the present case we have to see whether the evidence is such as to support the view that the entire body of the Chetty community acquired as against the plaintiff a right to hold the property in spite of his desire to be in possession." In his opinion the defendants had not succeeded in showing that that was the case. A decree was drawn up whereby it was inter alia ordered and declared " that the plaintiff, as head of the Patharakudi math, is entitled solely to the possession and enjoyment of the plaint village of Patharakudi, being item No. 1 in the schedule annexed to the decree of the lower Court, and that the said plaintiff, as head of the said math, is entitled to draw the surplus income realized by the receiver and deposited by him to the credit of the suit, and also to receive from the Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 65 receiver any further surplus income which may have been realized by him subsequently, and that the defendants have no right to the said village of Patharakudi." 1919. May 1, 2, 5, 6, 8. Romer K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The High Court was in error in treating the institution as though it were a regular monastic math. The decisions as to the right and powers of the head of a math of that character do not apply. Although the institution was loosely referred to as the Patharakudi matam or math, the priest was not a gosain nor under vows of asceticism (save that while holding office he had to be unmarried), there was no monastic brotherhood, or college for instruction in Hindu theology. It is an institution of the Chetty community, the plaintiff being gurukkal or priest. There being no written constitution, or direct evidence of the intention of the founder, the rights depend upon the custom and usage of the institution Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das ((1016) L. R. 43 I. A. 73.) and decisions there referred to. The evidence of long user showed that the Chettys according to the constitution of the institution had the right to be trustees and to manage its affairs. Under Madras Regulation VII. of 1817 the general superintendence of all endowments was vested in the Board of Revenue ; ss. 10 and 13 providing for the appointment of managers. In petitions filed under that Regulation it was stated that the villages belonged to the Nagara Chettys, and that they were trustees. Similar proceedings in 1832 confirmed that view. The findings and report of the Inam Commission in 1864 conclusively established that the Chettys were hakdars and trustees for the institution. The High Court failed to give due effect to the long discharge of the functions of hakdars, trustees and managers by the appellants and their predecessors, with the acquiescence of all concerned, and to the advantage of the trust. The respondent claimed to be sole beneficiary, but in any case the property vested in him only in trust for the institution Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das. (L. R. 43 I. A. 73, 76.) The suit should have been dismissed upon that ground. The respondent claimed to be sole beneficiary, but in any case the property vested in him only in trust for the institution Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das. (L. R. 43 I. A. 73, 76.) The suit should have been dismissed upon that ground. In any case, the appellants admitting that their possession was as trustees, the suit was barred by limitation Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Chor v. Purun Mar Chaube. (( 1883) L. R. 10 1. A. 90.) [In the course of the argument reference was also made to Vidyapurna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi (( 1904) I. L. R. 27 M. 435.) ; Thurstons Castes and Tribes of Southern India ( 1909), vol. v.5 pp. 260, 264 ; and to Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue, Order 116, p. 211.] De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the respondent. The Courts below have concurrently found that this institution is an ancient religious math, presided over by a Brahmin who was also spiritual head of the Chettys, and that it was not merely a trust of the Chettys, The math was of the usual type of such institutions in Southern India. The possession and management of all the endowed properties., including the village in suit, vested in the respondent as head Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari Debi (( 1904) L. R. 31 I. A. 203.) ; Sethuraswamiar v. Meruswamiar. (( 1917) L. R. 45 I. A. I.) The findings of the Inam Commission were not against the respondents contention. At that time there was no head to the math, the proceedings were properly taken by those interested in it. The Chettys are not shown to have asserted any right adversely to the head of the math. In the years preceding the appointment of the respondent, the title was recognized as being vested in the head or matatipathi. The grant by the Inam Commission was to the dharmakartha of Patharakudi math. The respondent was not claiming the income in the hands of the receiver for his personal enjoyment, but as head of the math, and on its behalf. The appellants allegation that the institution was not properly a math, and that the respondent was their servant and liable to dismissal, was negatived by both Courts. The evidence did not establish that the appellants were appointed trustees, or that they claimed adversely to the respondent. Romer K.C. replied. June 26. The appellants allegation that the institution was not properly a math, and that the respondent was their servant and liable to dismissal, was negatived by both Courts. The evidence did not establish that the appellants were appointed trustees, or that they claimed adversely to the respondent. Romer K.C. replied. June 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 66 LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from (a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated August 10, 1914, which varied a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura, dated October 19, 1908. The exact terms of these judgments will be afterwards referred to. It is necessary, however, in order to understand them to keep clearly in view the form and nature of the suit as brought. The suit was brought by the present respondent " to declare that the defendants have no right to the village of Patharakudi, and that the plaintiff, as head of the math,is entitled to the possession of the village .... and to receive the income of the same from the hands of the Receiver.” The village is part of the property of a math. It has been long administered by the appellants, who are Nagara Chettys. Broadly speaking, the contest in the case—and for the purpose of stating this contest colourless terms are employed—is between the head of the math on the one hand, who claims in virtue of his office to be entitled to the management and possession of the entire property of the math ; while, on the other hand, the appellants claim that they are entitled as trustees or managers of the part of the property of the institu tion which is in suit to be continued in the possession and management thereof. The form of the action brought in these circumstances is a suit for possession instituted by the head of the math, who does not have that possession, against the trustees or managers, who and whose predecessors for very many years have had it. In such circumstances there naturally arises a subsidiary question of limitation, but their Lordships are unwilling to have the suit disposed of merely on the latter ground, and the case was argued before the Board with much fullness on its merits. In such circumstances there naturally arises a subsidiary question of limitation, but their Lordships are unwilling to have the suit disposed of merely on the latter ground, and the case was argued before the Board with much fullness on its merits. In the Courts below this appears also to have been done, and in these Courts judgments of much elaboration were pronounced. Again, however, it must be stated that the suit is one the substantial aim of which is the eviction of the present possessors at the instance of the respondent, with the substitution in lieu thereof of possession and enjoyment by the respondent of the property in question, and of its entire income. In the village of Patharakudi there are (1.) A temple of the god specially revered by the Nagara community, of which the appellants are members and have acted as representatives. This community forms a sub-caste of the Chettys ; (2.) a residence for the Nagara priest or gurukkal; (3.) a shelter house or matam, for the use of Nagarathars when they resort to the place for religious exercises ; (4.) a choultry (Chawati or chauti, corruptly choultry a public lodging house, a shelter for travellers. Wilsons Glossary.), where food is distributed to Brahmans ; and (5.) a street of houses forming part of a great enlargement made in recent times by the Chettys—that is, by the appellants and their predecessors. This street of houses is an agraharam. (Agraharam a village or part of one occupied by Brahmans, and held either rent free under grants, or at a reduced assessment. Wilsons Glossary.) It is said to be the usual adjunct of a Hindu temple, and to be for the accommodation of Brahmans or Brahmanical worshippers ; while (6.) there is the village itself and the lands belonging to it, the income of which falls into the general revenue of the math as an institution. Wilsons Glossary.) It is said to be the usual adjunct of a Hindu temple, and to be for the accommodation of Brahmans or Brahmanical worshippers ; while (6.) there is the village itself and the lands belonging to it, the income of which falls into the general revenue of the math as an institution. In consequence of a certain assumption throughout the evidence of the knowledge of distinctions between these various parts of the property, there is a lack of clearness on that subject notwithstanding the voluminous evidence ; but, speaking generally, their Lordships may assume that the temple or place of worship, together with the residence of the respondent as spiritual head of the institution, the shelter house, and the choultry, or place for the feeding of Brahmans, stand on one side, while on the other stands the remainder of the property. The latter is now in the hands of the Receiver, and has been so for some years. Their Lordships are Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 67 relieved of difficulty in regard to the distinctions referred to by this fact of a receivership. The suit has reference, and reference alone, to the property which is in the Receivers hands. His management has not interfered with the purely spiritual functions of the gurukkal and with those parts of the property, like the place of worship and his own residence, which naturally attach to the performance of such functions by him. In the plaint the respondent treats the other parts of the property under the general term " village," and this is quite a convenient term. His position on the pleading is that he, the mahant, was all along in the possession and enjoyment of the village. In the course of the case, however, no substantial denial could be offered to the fact, which was notorious, that the actual possessors were the Chettys. The averment is that ; the Chettys were managing the affairs of the math only as agents under the plaintiff and under his supervision, and were at no time in possession of the village of Patharakudi, the same having all along remained in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff." Tins is the case attempted to be set up by the respondent and by certain witnesses whom he produced, but they wore disbelieved. The respondent was appointed head of the math in the year 1867. There seems little reason to doubt that a decree in the terms sought by him would, to say the least, involve a very considerable subversion of the mode of occupation, possession and management which have obtained during his entire term of office. Under a decree in terms of his plaint he could dismiss the Chettys from office, and assume possession and management himself or by his nominees. Of course, if he had hitherto been, as is alleged in his suit, in possession and management himself, the demand made in the plaint would have been the natural relief sought. It is, therefore, important to see how the facts on this point stand. Their Lordships have very carefully considered the evidence ; and they see no reason to doubt the soundness of the con clusion thereon arrived at by the learned Subordinate Judge in that part of his pronouncement which is now cited. It is as follows Except the vague and meagre oral evidence, there is not much evidence, on the plaintiffs side in this period (I.e., after 1863.), while considerable documentary evidence, consisting of accounts, receipts, official correspondence and other papers, has been adduced on the defendants side to prove their management as trustees and hakdars. (Hak dar the holder of a right, a person vested with any property, perquisite, or privilege.....Wilsons Glossary.) I may at once state here that the general effect of the entire evidence of this period is to show, beyond all doubt, the full and complete management, control and supervision of the endowments and their income by some Chettys or others to the knowledge of the plaintiff, who appears to have all through acquiesced in the same and not to have interfered with the Chettys in such management. The plaintiff has virtually conceded this state of things, not only in the present case, but has also done so in his previous depositions, in all of which he has unequivocally admitted the management of the Chettys, and the fact of the accounts, etc., being kept, checked and controlled by them. The plaintiff has virtually conceded this state of things, not only in the present case, but has also done so in his previous depositions, in all of which he has unequivocally admitted the management of the Chettys, and the fact of the accounts, etc., being kept, checked and controlled by them. His explanation for this state of things, which his witnesses also try to make out, and which, he contends, is corroborated by a few documents on his side, is that the Chettys did all that business only under his orders, and that their management was never independent and exclusive of his rights as the proprietor and head of the math and its sole beneficiary entitled to appropriate the income as he wished.....The Chettys constructed the houses and the new matam, etc., repaired tanks, etc., paid road-cess, etc., and in fact did everything which an owner or manager or trustee must do for the management and administration of the property. It is also shown by the same evidence that money and paddy payable to the plaintiffs house and to the plaintiff for poojah were treated as amounts standing to their credits and were paid accordingly ; that moneys for the plaintiffs expenses for his trips to Chidambaram immediately after the installation, for his visit to Sringeri Swamigal at Kunnakudy, and for his Benares trip on pilgrimage, were all paid after correspondence between the servants and the Kariakkar Chettys.....The revenue and zemin officers also seem to have recognised the Chettys as hakdars and issued the road-cess pattas and notices, etc., sometimes Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 68 generally, to hakdars or managers without names, and sometimes to Nachiappa Chetty, one of the eight persons already referred to as hakdar." Other portions of the learned Judges judgment deal with the case attempted to be made by the plaintiff that all this possession and management by the hakdars was as his agents. He brings that matter to a point by saying, " In this case the Chettys were in management in their own right as hakdars before the plaintiffs appointment, and continued as such afterwards also. He brings that matter to a point by saying, " In this case the Chettys were in management in their own right as hakdars before the plaintiffs appointment, and continued as such afterwards also. The plaintiff does not prove his case of their management as his agents, or the commencement of their management with his or his predecessors permission." It might, in the view of the Board, have been open upon the evidence to make upon the allegation of agency a much more emphatic pronouncement in the negative, but it is not necessary for their Lordships to go into that they are in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge that the case of agency is not made out, and that accordingly the attempt of the plaintiff either to ground or to fortify his right on possession either by himself or by others has entirely failed. They see no reason to differ from the view of the judge, who holds that the evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses upon this topic cannot be believed. The period of time over which the possession referred to extends covers more than half a century. But the documents in this case are of an important public character, and carry the record of this math much further back. As already stated, the plaintiffs appointment to the headship took place in the year 1867. But the Inam Register for the year 1864 has been produced, and to it their Lordships attach importance. It is true that the making of this Register was for the ultimate purpose of determining whether or not the lands were tax free. But it must not be forgotten that the preparation of this Register was a great act of state, and its preparation and contents were the subject of much consideration under elaborately detailed reports and minutes. It is to be remembered that the Inam Commissioners through their officials made inquiry on the spot, heard evidence and examined documents, and with regard to each individual property the Government was put in possession not only of the conclusion come to as to whether the land was tax free, but of a statement of the history and tenure of the property itself. While their Lordships do not doubt that such a report would not displace actual and authentic evidence in individual cases ; yet the Board, when such is not available, cannot fail to attach the utmost importance, as part of the history of the property, to the information set forth in the Inam Register. From that it appears as follows " Villages of Variyanendal, Surakudi. Kanjiram Kurchi Yendaland, Hamlet Padattanendal. I. These are the four villages in the zamindary of Sivaganga. These were granted by Savundara Pandiyan king in column 11 for the support of a matam in Patharakudi Village. This has no patta. This is an ancient grant. It appears by the tradition that the object of the grant is to keep the matam which is presided by the priest of Yalayattangudy Nattukottai Chettys efficiently by feeding Brahmins in a chattram situated close to the matam, by worshipping the Swamy in Palambady Nader Koil situated close to the matam, and by maintaining the dignity of the priest or guru. Now the object of the grant s efficiently kept up by doing all the above things. The Chettys, who are very rich, spend considerable sums annually for feeding Brahmans, etc. The priest of the matam died about fifteen months ago. The Chettys are in contemplation in electing a priest for the matam. It appears that when the priest was alive, some of the principal Chettys, whose names are given in column 16, were managing the affairs of the matam and of the villages attached to it. The managers or trustees are elected by the Chetty community itself. Thus, the grant falls under Rule III., Clause 1. Tax free. This is a hereditary grant. This is in uninterrupted possession of its holders since the date of the grant. The village is entered as Pathara kudi matam village in all the accounts in column 12. The persons in column 16 are now trustees of the matam. They are managing the affairs thereof." In further observations made by the Deputy Collector who signs the Register it Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. The village is entered as Pathara kudi matam village in all the accounts in column 12. The persons in column 16 are now trustees of the matam. They are managing the affairs thereof." In further observations made by the Deputy Collector who signs the Register it Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 69 is stated that " the trustees in column 16 added 126 ½ acres of wet and 280 acres of dry to the area entered in the account " ; and in another note it is added, " The matam is under the management of the trustees with their villages." Further, a matter of not inconsiderable importance is contained in these words " The zamindar has no objection to registering the names of the trustees here." The names of the trustees are duly set forth in the column headed “Particulars regarding present owner" ; and these particulars are headed " Patharakudi Matam Trustees.” Eight trustees who are Chettys, beginning with Natchiappa Chetty, are then mentioned, the name and age of each Chetty being given. As to the title to the property, that is set forth in a further column as " To be confirmed under Rule III., Clause 1. Tax free." This makes it of importance to consider the rule thus referred to. It is one of the " Rules for the adjudication and settlement of the inam lands of the Madras Presidency," being part of Order 116 printed at page 211 of the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue. It is in these terms "If the inam was given for religious or charitable objects, such as for the support of temples, mosques, colleges, choultries, and other public buildings or institutions, or for services therein, whether held in the names of the institutions or of the persons rendering the services ; it will be continued to the present holders and their successors, and will not be subject to further interference, so long as the buildings or institutions. are maintained in an efficient state, and the services continue to be performed according to the conditions of the grant." It thus appears to their Lordships to be quite clear that the eight Chettys named, who are stated to be trustees, were in 1864 confirmed, after inquiry and in terms of the Rule, as holders of the village. are maintained in an efficient state, and the services continue to be performed according to the conditions of the grant." It thus appears to their Lordships to be quite clear that the eight Chettys named, who are stated to be trustees, were in 1864 confirmed, after inquiry and in terms of the Rule, as holders of the village. And unless the Rule was to be departed from, the inam " will be continued to the present holders and their successors and will not be subject to further interference " so long as two things happen, namely, the buildings are efficiently maintained and the services are continued. Both of these things have happened, and accordingly the adjudication stands the Chettys were the holders, they were continued as such, and they were not to be interfered with. Two points may be mentioned in connection with this adjudication. In the first place, the most important person, apart from the institution itself, was the zamindar, from whose predecessors undoubtedly the original title to the lands had flowed ; and it will be noted that the zamindar had no objection to the registration of the trustees as proposed. In the next place, it is a mistake to treat the transactions of 1864 as merely bearing upon that year. They form, in their Lordships judgment, a record of an anterior state of matters, from which record of possession, etc., a conclusion is formed by the Commissioner as to what was the real state of the title. Following the Report, a title deed was granted by the Inam Commissioner, on June 3, 1864, to " the Dharmakartha of Patharakudi Math,” that is to say, to the trustee or manager of the charity, and in this title deed it is stated, first " On behalf of the Governor-in-Council of Madras I acknowledge your title to a religious endowment matam or inam, situated in .... held for the support of the pagoda called .... in that village.....(2.) This inam is confirmed to you and your successors, subject to the existing quit rent of Rs. 132-11-1 per annum, to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant are duly fulfilled." But at least one further section of the earlier history of this math can be found. Their Lordships attach weight to the transactions of the year 1832. 132-11-1 per annum, to be held without interference so long as the conditions of the grant are duly fulfilled." But at least one further section of the earlier history of this math can be found. Their Lordships attach weight to the transactions of the year 1832. On April 30 of that year a petition was presented by the zamindar, narrating that the Nagara Chettys originally came from the Tanjore Division and settled long ago in his zamindari and that their family deities are in that jurisdiction. He stated that" on account of the performance of those charities, the said Chettys have been paying the porupu (Porupu a low or quit-rent, levied from lands originally granted in inam, or rent free. Wilsons Glossary.) due to Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 70 the sircar in respect of the villages in our zamindari jurisdiction, managing the said temples, matam, etc., and by spending certain moneys out of their own pocket in addition to the income .... are conducting in the said temples, matams, etc.," the worship, and that " they have constructed tanks and have been performing the feeding charity and other charities." He then sets forth that the Chettys had reported to him that the Amildar had contrary to practice appointed monigars (Maniyak aram, Tam., corruptly Monigar, Moniagar a superintendent in general, .... a superintendent of a temple. Wilsons Glossary.) and sampratis (Samprati a person employed to .... examine and mak e out check accounts. Wilsons Glossary.) and called for accounts. Then follows the petition in these terms " We therefore beg to submit that orders may be issued to the head tahsildar to the effect that porupu amount in respect of the said devastanams, matams, etc., may be collected as was being done up to last year, that the monigars and sampratis now newly appointed therefor may be recalled, and that no trouble be caused by calling for any account whatsoever, so that the Chettys may, day by day, do on a grand scale the established poojah, annadanam (feeding charity), etc., in the said temples and matams. The Board again notes the significant fact that the zamindar is himself the petitioner. The Board again notes the significant fact that the zamindar is himself the petitioner. On June 25 of the same year a petition was presented on behalf of the Nagarathars by Venkatachallam Chetty to the Principal Collector of the Madura District, which narrated that " We ourselves have been managing the said temples, matams, etc., from the days of our ancestors up to date, spending large sum of money from our private funds," and it prayed that orders might be passed " to the effect that, in accordance with the provisions of Act VII. of 1817, we alone should without violating the mamul (practice) have claim over the said charities and conduct them, and that the monigars and sampratis now newly appointed by the said Amildar be recalled." It is important to observe what was the Regulation founded upon. It was that of September 30, 1817, passed by the Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George " for the due appropriation of the rents and produce of lands granted for the support of mosques, Hindu temples and colleges, or other public purposes ; for the maintenance and repair of bridges, chaultries or chattrams, and other public buildings." Under the tenth head of the Regulation it was provided that the local agents should ascertain and report " the names of the present trustees, managers or superintendents of the several institutions, foundations or establishments above described, together with other particulars respecting them, and by whom and under what authority they have been appointed or elected." Then follows the thirteenth branch of the Regulation, which is in the following terms " On the receipt of the report and information required by the preceding clause, the Board of Revenue shall either appoint the person or persons nominated for their approval, or shall make such other provision for the trust, management or superintendence, as may to them seem right and fit, with reference to the nature and conditions of the endowment, having previously called for any further information from the local agents that may appear to them to be requisite.” The Regulation of 1817 seems to have been complied with in terms. The language of the petitions by the zamindar and the Chettys was adopted in the decree issued, namely, that the Chettys should be left in their possession and that they would perform the charities according to mamul. The language of the petitions by the zamindar and the Chettys was adopted in the decree issued, namely, that the Chettys should be left in their possession and that they would perform the charities according to mamul. The operative words were these " Let orders be issued to the effect that, in accordance with mamul, the temples, matams, etc., and their villages mentioned above, belonging to the said Nagara Chettys, be delivered over to them alone, without monegars and others being appointed thereto." This is the most remote period to which the authentic history of this math can be said to reach. From the fact that it was a math it follows that it must have had a head as such, with all that that implies, as hereinafter to be referred to. But with regard to the village which is now under receivership, and which is a part of the endowment of the math, the management and possession thereof were in the Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 71 hands of the Nagara Chettys at least for a period of about eighty years prior to the institution of this suit, and their dispossession and the substitution for such management and possession of that of the plaintiff would, as already said, be a subversion of the history of the property. Such subversion may be a necessity of the case on account of the nature of the institution ; and this, which is an important point, will be dealt with. Apart from that point, the right of the plaintiff either to the eviction of the Chettys or to possession for himself is not supported by the hisory of the lands. c No question arises in this case of misappropriation by the defendants ; such a thing is not suggested against them. On the other hand, they admit that their administration must be, not for their personal ends, but entirely for and on behalf of and in the interests of the math itself. This is the settled rule of administration with regard to such institutions under the law of India. In the circumstances above set forth the demand made in the plaint does not appear to their Lordships to be warranted by law. This is the settled rule of administration with regard to such institutions under the law of India. In the circumstances above set forth the demand made in the plaint does not appear to their Lordships to be warranted by law. It may be difficult to trace the origin of the property under receivership in the sense of ascribing its acquisition either to gifts from the Chettys out of their own private resources, or to offerings of worshippers, or to accumulations of income ; but however that may be, the case of possession by the Chettys in their own right, and not as agents for the gurukkal, appears to be made out and is not indeed challenged in the Courts below. The difficulty on this head which the learned judges in the Courts below have experienced arises from two causes, which will now be dealt with first, in regard to the rights of the gurukkal or mahant, which are construed as necessarily equivalent by law to the ownership of the village ; and second, in regard to the possession itself, which, although protracted and undoubted, is treated, particularly in the judgment of the High Court, as being ineffective because it was not, according to the view that Court takes, adverse possession. With reference to the first point, the Board has recently had occasion to deal with the position and rights of a mahant of an asthal, or, as in this case, of the gurukkal of a math, in the two cases of Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das (L. R. 43 I. A. 73.) and Sethuramaswamiar v. Meruswamiar. (L. R. 45 I. A. 1.) In the former of these cases the body of authority upon this subject was dealt with. Two propositions may be cited as now expressing the general state of the law with regard to these institutions. In the first place, the nature of the ownership is an ownership in trust for the institution itself. Secondly, while it may no doubt be true that the ownership in the general case is with the spiritual head of the institution, still, to use the language of Sir Charles Turner in Sammanatha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti (I. L. R. 2 M. 179.) " We do not, of course, mean to lay it down that .... Secondly, while it may no doubt be true that the ownership in the general case is with the spiritual head of the institution, still, to use the language of Sir Charles Turner in Sammanatha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti (I. L. R. 2 M. 179.) " We do not, of course, mean to lay it down that .... the property may not in some cases be held on different conditions and subject to different incidents." As pointed out in Ram Parkash Das v. Anand Das, there are varieties of circumstances and tenure, and in respect to these the usage and custom of the math fall to be determined. Once that usage and custom are clear they form the law of the math. In the opinion of their Lordships, it would be a contravention of the usage and custom of this math, as disclosed by the evidence during the long course of its history, to affirm that the ownership of the village in suit was in the gurukkal. It is in the Chettys, whose title has been officially and apparently quite properly recognized as the "holders." But even this latter proposition is not in truth necessary for the determination of the case, for if the plaintiffs own title as owner fails, and the Board is clearly of opinion that it does, the suit as laid by him cannot be maintained. With regard to the second point mentioned, namely, that the possession by the Chettys has not been adverse to the gurukkal, their Lordships fail to understand on what the difficulty of the Court below rests. Here was possession, not as in right of the gurukkal, but as in the Chettys own right, with all the incidents of possession, namely, the purchase of lands, the borrowing on lands, the erection of buildings, the letting of holdings, the making payments to the priest for his support and spiritual Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 72 services, the keeping of the village accounts. The mahant was presumably aware of these transactions, extending now in his own time for over half a century, yet the first real challenge thereof appears to be the institution of this suit itself. This is a very ordinary case of possession nee vi nee clam nee precario. The mahant was presumably aware of these transactions, extending now in his own time for over half a century, yet the first real challenge thereof appears to be the institution of this suit itself. This is a very ordinary case of possession nee vi nee clam nee precario. The person now claiming to be owner has stood by while others continued to possess not by any derivative title but in practical contravention of his alleged rights. The law does not require that the claimant to ownership must in such circumstances be shown to have protested that his rights were being violated, and that the possession went on adversely to his protests. In short, their Lordships cannot agree with the legal view upon this subject of possession adopted by the Court below. In these circumstances there seems to the Board no reason why the law of limitation should not apply. In Balwant Rao Bishwant Chandra Chor v. Purun Mal Chaube (L. R. 10 1. A. 90.) it was held that limitation applied to cases where the defendant admitted he was a trustee, and the plaintiff, without proving misapplication, brought a suit more than twelve years after the cause of action arose, the object of the suit being to obtain control of the management. As Lord (then Sir Arthur) Hobhouse observed, in words which are applicable to the present case — " Here there is no question of recovering the property for the trusts of the endowment, because the defendant admits that he is a trustee and says that he is applying the property to the trusts of the endowment. There is no evidence that he is not applying the property to the trusts of the endowment, and there is no reason to conclude that the property would be more applied to those trusts if the plaintiff were to succeed in his suit than it is at this moment. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage, or in some way to control the management of, the endowment." The present case is still stronger for the application of the rule of limitation, as the assertion is made not only of the right to management, but of the right of beneficial ownership. The plaintiff is suing only for his own personal right to manage, or in some way to control the management of, the endowment." The present case is still stronger for the application of the rule of limitation, as the assertion is made not only of the right to management, but of the right of beneficial ownership. But while, in their Lordships opinion, the suit would be excluded by the twelve years limitation, they have, on the ground already stated, thought it right to deal with the whole breadth of the argument presented. Their Lordships desire in conclusion to say that no objection was made out to the personnel of the defendants as true successors of the Chettys to whom the rights of ownership for the benefit of the math were confirmed as already narrated ; and no challenge is made of the substantial accuracy of the narrative on that subject contained in the evidence of Annamalai Chetty, the son of Natchiappa Chetty. By the judgment of the Subordinate Judge it was declared that the plaintiff, as the gurukkal and head of the institution, and " consequently as a trustee and manager of the same conjointly with " the Chettys, was entitled to the possession and management along with them, " without prejudice to the rights of the latter to continue in actual possession and direct management of the same as they have been holding and managing them till now from 1863." Underlying this part of the judgment it is plain that the learned judge desired to make clear the propriety of continuing the Chettys possession, but the decree given does not appear to be in workable form. A further objection thereto arises from the latter portion thereof, under which it is declared that the gurukkal " is further entitled to the entire beneficial enjoyment of the income of the said villages during his life and continuance as the spiritual head of the institution, subject only to the maintenance of the said institution," etc. A ready test of the application of this is with regard to the accumulated income, amounting to Rs.20,000 or thereby, now in the hands of the Receiver. Under the decree quoted the gurukkal would be entitled to instant possession and entire beneficial enjoyment of that sum. A ready test of the application of this is with regard to the accumulated income, amounting to Rs.20,000 or thereby, now in the hands of the Receiver. Under the decree quoted the gurukkal would be entitled to instant possession and entire beneficial enjoyment of that sum. If the present purposes of the math did not consume it, he could employ it for his personal use quite apart from the dignity of his office. It is plain to their Lordships that this would be not only a subversion of the usage and custom of Law Rep. 46 Ind. App. 204 ( 1918- 1919) Arunachellam C hetty V. Venkatachalapathi Guruswamigal 73 the math, but would be a violation of the law applicable to such institutions. A fair test to be applied in such cases is to demand what is the true principle or nature of the administration of surplus income. It is, of course, the duty of a trustee to refrain from the personal enjoyment of such surplus and to add the same to the capital of the estate to be administered ; and this law also applies to the property of a math or asthal, and that whether the title to the same is in the gurukkal as spiritual head of the institu tion—which is an ordinary case—or is in trustees like the Chettys according to the usage and custom of the institution as in the present case. This law appears to have been complied c with by the defendants and their predecessors during the past history of this institution, and should be continued. This would not be done by an affirmance of the decree of either of the Courts below. The view of the High Court on this topic was even stronger than that of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff was declared to be entitled solely to possession and enjoyment of the village, and as head of the math to be entitled to draw the surplus income realised by the Receiver and deposited by him to the credit of the suit, and also to receive from the Receiver any further surplus income which may have been realised by him subsequently. In their Lordships’ opinion this declaration cannot be made. In their Lordships’ opinion this declaration cannot be made. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty to recall both of the decrees of the Courts below and to dismiss the suit, the appellants being entitled to a decree for costs of the suit and of this appeal against the respondent, and failing payment thereof, to be entitled to charge the same against the funds and property now in the hands of the Receiver.